| 基于公平偏好理论的激励机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李训,曹国华. 基于公平偏好理论的激励机制研究[J]. 管理工程学报, 2008, 22(2): 107-111,116 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李训 曹国华 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030 |
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| 摘 要： | 传统委托-代理模型都是建立在代理人纯粹自利假设基础上的,本文将公平偏好理论融入传统委托-代理模型进行研究,分析委托人雇佣公平偏好代理人情况下的最优激励机制.研究表明公平偏好因素改变了传统委托-代理模型的许多结论,传统委托.代理模型仅是本文所建立模型的一种特殊形式.
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| 关 键 词： | 公平偏好 委托-代理 产出分享 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-6062(2008)02-0107-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-05-26 |
Research of Incentive Mechanism Based on Fairness Preference Theory |
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| LI Xun,CAO Guo-hua. Research of Incentive Mechanism Based on Fairness Preference Theory[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2008, 22(2): 107-111,116 |
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| Authors: | LI Xun CAO Guo-hua |
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| Affiliation: | LI Xun,CAO Guo-hua(College of Economics & Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China) |
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| Abstract: | All traditional principal-agent models are ground on absolute selfish agent.In this paper,based on the fairness preference theory,the traditional principal-agent model is researched.The paper analyses the optimal incentive mechanism when principals employ the agents of fairness preference.The analysis shows that fairness preference changes a lot of conclusions of the traditional principal-agent model.The traditional principal-agent model is a special form of the model set up in the paper. |
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| Keywords: | fairness preference principal-agent piece rate contract incentive mechanism |
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