不同CSR分担模式下的闭环供应链销售努力与定价决策

本文研究考虑企业社会责任(CSR)闭环供应链的定价及销售努力问题,在制造商、零售商以及二者联合承担CSR三种模式下,分析了CSR行为对闭环供应链销售努力及定价策略的影响。研究表明,无论在何种CSR分担模式下,成员企业的CSR行为不仅有利于降低产品价格,提高零售商的销售努力水平、产品销量及废旧产品回收效果,还有效的增加了制造商的社会福利、第三方及系统的总利润。当制造商或零售商单独承担CSR时,第三方及闭环供应链整体的利润均相等且大于二者联合承担CSR时。当制造商和零售商联合承担CSR时,二者的社会福利均大于其单独承担CSR时,且主导零售商的社会福利较之制造商更大。

Sales effort and pricing decision for closed-loop supply chain under different CSR sharing modes

With the large consumption of resources and the enhancement of people’s environmental protection awareness,in addition to carrying out new product production and sales activities through forward supply chain,enterprises also use reverse supply chain to recycle and remanufacture the waste products,which means to implement closed-loop supply chain(Abbreviated to CLSC)management.In order to expand the market demand and improve the recycling rate of waste products,enterprises can stimulate consumers through certain market efforts.Meanwhile,consumers pay more attention to whether the enterprises have undertaken certain social responsibility in the production and operation activities.According to the research from KPMG in 2015,nearly 75%of the top 100 enterprises in the world issued social responsibility reports,and 78%of the top 100 enterprises in China also released corporate social responsibility reports.Corporate social responsibility(Abbreviated to CSR)requires enterprises not to pursue economic interests as the sole goal,but also emphasizes the contribution to their stakeholders,consumers,environment and society in the production process.Therefore,it has great theoretical and practical significance to study the sales effort and pricing decisions for CLSC considering CSR.The CLSC systems researched in this paper consists of a manufacturer,a third-party recycler(Referred to as the third-party)and a retailer.Assuming that the three parties engage in Stackelberg Game under complete information,the retailer is the channel leader and responsible for the sales effort.In the forward supply chain,the manufacturer is responsible for the production of new products and the remanufacturing of waste products.It is assumed that there is no difference between the new product and the remanufactured product.The retailer is responsible for the sales of new product,and assume that both the manufacturer and retailer have CSR awareness(In reality,the third-party may also has CSR awareness,we focuses on the analysis of the manufacturer and the retailer undertake CSR).In the reverse supply chain,the manufacturer entrusts the third-party with the recycling of waste products.On this basis,firstly,this paper regards the concern degree of CLSC members to their stakeholders as CSR of enterprises,and considers that the behavior of enterprises considering consumer surplus is also one aspect of CSR.Secondly,the decision-making models for CLSC considering CSR behavior are constructed by using two-stage Game theory under the three modes when the manufacturer,retailer and their joint undertake CSR,and the corresponding equilibrium results are solved by using reverse recursion method.Then,the influence of CSR behavior of different enterprises on the pricing of new products and recycling rate of waste products,and the performance of members and whole CLSC systems are analyzed.Finally,the main research results are tested and illustrated by a numerical example.The results of this study show that with the enhancement of CSR degree,the manufacturer will reduce the wholesale price,the dominant retailer will increase the sales effort level and reduce the retail price,the third-party will also increase the recycling rate,and it is beneficial to increase the social welfare of manufacturer,the profits of third-party and CLSC.The net profit of manufacturer is the largest when the retailer undertakes CSR,the second when the retailer and manufacturer undertake CSR jointly,the smallest when the manufacturer undertakes CSR,while,the net profit of retailer is the largest when the manufacturer undertakes CSR,second when the retailer and manufacturer undertake CSR jointly,and the smallest when the retailer undertakes CSR.When the manufacturer or retailer undertakes CSR alone,the retailer’s sales effort level and retail price,the market demand,the recycling rate of the waste products,and the profits of the third-party and CLSC are equal,and all are greater than that when retailer and manufacturer undertake CSR jointly.When the manufacturer undertakes CSR,if it undertakes a relatively low degree of CSR,the manufacturer’s net profit will exceed the retailer,however,if the manufacturer undertakes a relatively high degree of CSR,the retailer’s profit will not be lower than that of manufacturer,and the third-party’s profit will always be the smallest.When the retailer undertakes CSR,if it undertakes a relatively low degree of CSR,the retailer’s net profit will exceed the third-party,if the retailer undertakes a relatively high degree of CSR,the third-party’s profit will not be lower than that of retailer,and the manufacturer’s net profit will always be the largest.When the manufacturer and retailer jointly undertake CSR,their social welfares are greater than that of retailer or manufacturer undertakes CSR alone.Although the manufacturer’s net profit will exceed the retailer,the retailer’s social welfare is greater than that of manufacturer.It provides a theoretical basis for the sales effort and pricing decision for CLSC when considering CSR behavior.Since this paper assumes that the CLSC systems dominated by a retailer and the third-party is responsible for the recycling of waste products,in future research,we can first consider the pricing decisions and coordination mechanism of CLSC with CSR behavior under different channel leadership and recycling modes.Secondly,this paper only analyses the influence of CSR behavior on the operation of single CLSC,it is important to research the influence of CSR behavior on the competitive strategy of CLSC under multiple closed-loop supply chains competition.