Memory leakage-resilient searchable symmetric encryption |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Sharif University of Technology – Department of Mathematical Sciences P.O. Box 11155-9415, Tehran, Iran;2. Kharazmi University – Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science P.O. Box 15719-14911, Tehran, Iran;1. The School of Science, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou 310018, China;2. Department of Physics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China;1. Cyber-Physical-Social Systems Lab, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China;2. Services Computing Technology and System Lab, Cluster and Grid Computing Lab, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China;3. Key Lab of Cloud Computing Technology, Shenzhen Graduate School, Peking University, Shenzhen, China;1. College of Information and Communication Engineering, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin, Heilongjiang 150001, PR China;2. Academy of Opto-Electronics Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing 100094, PR China;1. School of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China;2. Software College, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China;1. Department of Space Equipment, The Academy of Equipment, Beijing 101416, China;2. Department of Scientific Research, The Academy of Equipment, Beijing 101416, China;3. Department of Automation Measurement and Control, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China |
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| Abstract: | Along with the popularization and rapid development of cloud-computing, more and more individuals and enterprises choose to store their data in cloud servers. However, in order to protect data privacy and deter illegal accesses, the data owner has to encrypt his data before outsourcing it to the cloud server. In this situation, searchable encryption, especially searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) has become one of the most important techniques in cloud-computing area. In the last few years, researchers have presented many secure and efficient SSE schemes. Like traditional encryption, the security of all existing SSE schemes are based on the assumption that the data owner holds a secret key that is unknown to the adversary. Unfortunately, in practice, attackers are often able to obtain some or even all of the data owner’s secret keys by a great variety of inexpensive and fast side channel attacks. Facing such attacks, all existing SSE schemes are no longer secure. In this paper, we investigate how to construct secure SSE schemes with the presence of memory attack. We firstly propose the formal definition of memory leakage-resilient searchable symmetric encryption (MLR-SSE, for short). Based on that, we present one adaptive MLR-SSE scheme and one efficient non-adaptive dynamic MLR-SSE scheme based on physical unclonable functions (PUFs), and formally prove their security in terms of our security definitions. |
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| Keywords: | Searchable symmetric encryption Side-channel attacks Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) Memory leakage-resilient Cloud-computing |
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