| 治理人监督与战略绩效信息偏误的情境依赖 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 程新生,李海萍. 治理人监督与战略绩效信息偏误的情境依赖[J]. 管理科学学报, 2011, 14(10): 1-10 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 程新生 李海萍 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 南开大学公司治理研究中心,天津300071;南开大学商学院,天津300071
2. 北京石油化工学院经济管理学院,北京,102627 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072095;70771048);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71132001); 国家社科重大资助项目(10ZD&035); 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大资助项目(2009JJD630001) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 将治理人、经理人以及制度环境多个要素纳入一个系统,以代理理论为基础,仿真模拟权力发展和惩罚力度两种环境因素对治理人监督与经理人操纵战略绩效信息行为间的交互过程的影响.研究发现,1)经理人处于权力累积阶段时,无论惩罚制度如何,治理人适合选择监督强度的小幅度变化,由此带来的战略绩效信息偏误程度最小；2)经理人处于权力稳定阶...
|
| 关 键 词： | 治理人监督 战略绩效信息偏误 权力发展 惩罚力度 多智能体仿真模型 |
Dependence on institution condition between governor supervision and distorted information of strategic performance: Power development and punishment strength |
| |
| CHENG Xin-sheng,LI Hai-ping. Dependence on institution condition between governor supervision and distorted information of strategic performance: Power development and punishment strength[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2011, 14(10): 1-10 |
| |
| Authors: | CHENG Xin-sheng LI Hai-ping |
| |
| Affiliation: | CHENG Xin-sheng1,2,LI Hai-ping3 1.Center for Studies of Corporate Governance of Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China,2.Business School of Nankai University,3.Economics and Management School of Beijing Institute of Petrochenical Technology,Beijing 102627 |
| |
| Abstract: | In this paper,governor and manager and institution condition are taken as a system,and based on agent theory,we simulate the influence of environmental factors,including the type of manager's power and punishment strength,on the relation between the rate of governor changing supervision level and distorted information of strategic performance.The results indicate that,(1) when the power is impermanent and contested to the manager,governors should slightly enhance supervision level regardless of the punishme... |
| |
| Keywords: | governor supervision distorted information of strategic performance power development punishment strength multi-agent-based simulation model |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
