| 农村节能型建材推广中的博弈初探 |
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| 引用本文： | 李援转,谢丽冰,陈存恩. 农村节能型建材推广中的博弈初探[J]. 山西建筑, 2009, 35(36): 218-219 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李援转 谢丽冰 陈存恩 |
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| 作者单位： | 华南农业大学水利与土木工程学院,广东,广州,510640 |
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| 基金项目： | 广东省科技计划项目"粤东地区农村节能型住宅示范性研究" |
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| 摘 要： | 针对建筑能耗问题,用博弈论分析农村居民、企业和政府三者在决策过程中的实际行为,得到各类博弈后的解均为不利于节能型建筑建造的纳什均衡,即形成非合作博弈,指出必须结合政府政策和市场机制改变各博弈方的收益,使博弈达到新的纳什均衡。
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| 关 键 词： | 农村 节能 博弈 |
The preliminary game exploration of the promotion of rural energy-saving construction material |
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| LI Yuan-zhuan,XIE Li-bing,CHEN Cun-en. The preliminary game exploration of the promotion of rural energy-saving construction material[J]. Shanxi Architecture, 2009, 35(36): 218-219 |
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| Authors: | LI Yuan-zhuan XIE Li-bing CHEN Cun-en |
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| Affiliation: | LI Yuan-zhuan XIE Li-bing CHEN Cun-en |
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| Abstract: | Considering on building energy consumption problems,this paper analyzes by game theory the actual activities of rural residents,enterprise,and government during the determining process,the solution of various types of game all go against the nash equilibrium established for energy-saving building,so forms non-cooperative game.Finally it points out that the benefit of all players in game should be altered by the combination of governmental policy and market mechanism so as to make new nash equilibrium. |
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| Keywords: | rural energy-saving game the competitive phenomenon |
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