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PRESENT相关功耗分析攻击研究
引用本文:刘会英,王韬,赵新杰,周林. PRESENT相关功耗分析攻击研究[J]. 计算机科学, 2011, 38(11): 40-42
作者姓名:刘会英  王韬  赵新杰  周林
作者单位:军械工程学院计算机工程系 石家庄050003
基金项目:本文受国家自然科学基金项目(60772082),河北省自然科学基金数学研究专项(08M010)资助。
摘    要:对PRESENT分组密码抗相关功耗分析能力进行了研究。基于汉明距离功耗模型,提出了一种针对PRESENT S盒的相关功耗分析方法,并通过仿真实验进行了验证。结果表明,未加防护措施的PRESENT硬件实现易遭受相关功耗分析威胁,5个样本的功耗曲线经分析即可恢复64位第一轮扩展密钥,将80位主密钥搜索空间降低到216,因此,PRESENT密码硬件实现需要对此类攻击进行防护。

关 键 词:PRESENT,旁路攻击,汉明距离,功耗模型,相关功耗分析

Research on Correlation Power Analysis Attack against PRESENT
LIU Hui-ying,WANG Tao,ZHAO Xin-jie,ZHOU Lin. Research on Correlation Power Analysis Attack against PRESENT[J]. Computer Science, 2011, 38(11): 40-42
Authors:LIU Hui-ying  WANG Tao  ZHAO Xin-jie  ZHOU Lin
Affiliation:(Department of Computer Engineering,Ordnance Engineering College,Shijiazhuang 050003,China)
Abstract:The correlation power analysis attack against PRESENT was discussed in this paper.An correlation power attack method according to the sbox in PRESENT cipher was presented based on hamming distance power leakage mo-del.The results of experiment indicate that hardware implementation of PRESENT without protection measure is vulnerable to correlation power analysis attacks.The 64-bit first round expanded key can be recovered with 5 power traces,and the 80-bit PRESENT master key searching space can be reduced to...
Keywords:PRESENT   Side channel attacks   Hamming distance   Power consumption model   Correlation power analysis
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