| Abstract: | Twelve groups of 5 players each participated in a multiple-trial social dilemma game in which each player, i, receives a possibly different monetary endowment, ei, and then chooses independently and anonymously whether to contribute it to a monetary public good. The collective good, r, is supplied to all of the group members if the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified and known threshold; it is not supplied otherwise. It was found (a) that the proportion of contributions decreased with experience, (b) that players contributed more often, the higher their endowment, but (c) that players with lower endowments were perceived to be more likely to contribute than were players with higher endowments. Group data provided strong support to a model in which the decision to contribute or not depends on ei and r, altruism, group size, and the probability of being critical to the group outcome. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
