Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts

This paper deals with on-line computation—or step-wise learning—of Pareto optimal insurance contracts. Our approach tolerates that the loss distribution might be unknown, intractable, or not well specified. Thus we accommodate fairly inexperienced parties. Losses are here simulated or observed, one at a time, and they cause iterated revisions of the premium. The mechanical and global nature of probability calculus thereby yields to more tentative, myopic procedures, possibly closer to how humans operate or reason in face of risk. Sequential revisions may also reduce the expense of insurers' time and money in seeking sufficient statistics. Emphasized below is the remarkable simplicity and stability of the resulting adaptive procedures. Special attention goes to catastrophic risks, and to subsidized or competitive insurance.     

我国城市规模分布Pareto指数测算及影响因素分析

本文用OLS方法测算我国各省、三大区域以及全国的城市人口规模分布和经济规模分布Pareto指数(1997年、2000年和2003年),对Pareto指数进行跨区域和跨时间的对比分析,并实证分析我国城市规模分布的影响因素。分析表明,我国的城市规模分布显著地服从Pareto分布,并具有明显的结构性特征。工业化、产业结构以及运输能力对城市人口规模分布具有显著影响,而工业化和运输能力则是影响城市经济规模分布的重要因素。     

从公共产品的私人供给看税收的自愿缴纳

据公共产品的私人供给与税收的自愿缴纳问题 ,提出完全信息下的税收方案 ,具有税收管理成本最低 ,逃税的超额负担得以消除的特点。如采用该税收方案作为常规税收制度的补充 ,可以达到帕累托改进的效果。     

休闲位置消费的经济分析及对策研究

争名与逐利一样都是人的经济本性,因而位置消费现象在休闲消费领域也同样存在。运用经济学的相关理论对休闲消费中的位置消费行为进行分析发现:该行为既无法使休闲消费资源达到帕累托最优状态,也不能使人们从休闲消费中获得最大效用,且个人休闲位置消费的理性选择还会导致集体消费的非理性结果。因此,政府应加强引导,采取有效措施降低位置消费的负面影响,促进休闲经济健康发展。     

Policy Discrimination with and without Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility

Can the Pareto criterion guide policymakers who do not know the true model of the economy? If policymakers specify ex ante preferences for agents, then Pareto improvements from a distorted status quo are usually possible, and with more commodities than states, one can implement almost every Pareto optimum. Unlike the standard second welfare theorem, planners cannot dictate allocations: agents must trade. Unfortunately ex ante preferences impose interpersonal comparisons. If policymakers merely aim to maximize some social welfare function then optimal policies form an open set; hence small changes in the environment do not necessitate any policy response. Planners with symmetric information about agents can sometimes intervene without making interpersonal comparisons.     

村级财务治理新机制:村务(财务)监督委员会及其制度的学理解析——基于浙江武义县后陈村的调查

本文从浙江武义县后陈村财务监督个案出发,以财务学、制度经济学与法学为主要分析工具,对后陈村村务（财务）监督委员会组织及其制度进行学理解析,最终提出一般性结论与建议.     

组织间关系:价值界面与关系租金的获取

价值界面与关系租金概念的提出大大地拓展了获取企业内生性成长中各种资源的空间。本文通过价值界面、关系租金的模块化生产范式和关系型交易范式的分析,指出了价值界面与关系租金对于帕累托边界外推、埃奇沃思方盒改进的经济学意义,并进一步得出了价值界面构成与关系租金获取的四维模型,为网络创新提供了积极的研究视角。     

对于我国公平与效率关系的经济学思考

本文主要通过对我国公平与效率关系的描述及当前面临的现状的分析,运用帕累托效率的分析方法,得出公平与效率本质上具有一致性的结论,在此基础上提出公平与效率可以实现最优结合。我国目前正值“十一五”规划纲要的实施初期,大力发展和谐社会,应该在微观领域体现效率优先的原则,宏观领域公平优先的原则,来实现二者的最优结合。     

可持续发展背景下地方政府竞争过程中的合作困境剖析——博弈论的分析视角

尽管现阶段促进和实现区域可持续发展的战略目标已成了国家和地区社会经济发展的共识,然而目前在区域可持续发展战略实施过程中的制度保障、基础设施建设等方面的博弈,不仅难以实现区域可持续发展战略中的"帕累托改善",而且也还极易引发区域可持续发展战略实施中的"搭便车"问题,进而最终形成可持续发展背景下的地方政府竞争过程中的合作困境.     

Pareto-improving social optimal pricing schemes based on bottleneck permits for managing congestion at a merging section

Akamatsu, Sato, and Nguyen (2006 Akamatsu, T., Sato, S., &; Nguyen, X. L. (2006). Tradable time-of-day bottleneck permits for morning commuters (in Japanese). JSCE Journal of Infrastructure Planning 62(4), 605–620.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) proposed a first-best pricing scheme based on the concept of bottleneck permits. The scheme allows permit holders to pass a bottleneck at specified times and is shown to be able to minimize social cost. However, the scheme is not always Pareto-improving in that it may harm some drivers. The objective of this study is to design Pareto-improving pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for a V-shaped two-to-one merge bottleneck. First, the paper formulates the morning commute model in the network and describes the arrival time choice equilibrium in the network with merging bottleneck. Secondly, we show that the first-best pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for this V-shaped network does not always achieve a Pareto improvement, with the cost of one group of drivers is increased by the permit pricing, a phenomena akin to the bottleneck paradox of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1993 Arnott, R., de Palma, A., &; Lindsey, R. (1993). Properties of dynamic traffic equilibrium involving bottlenecks, including a paradox and metering. Transportation Science 27(2), 148–160.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We propose three implementations of bottleneck permits for Pareto-improving: (1) merging priority rule is included in the bottleneck permits scheme by creating different market for each origin; (2) the permit revenues are refunded as monetary compensation to drivers whose cost is increased; and (3) the permit revenues are used to expand bottleneck capacity. For each implementation, we derive their equilibrium solutions and demonstrate that the Pareto improvement is achieved and social cost is decreased by using the permit revenues for expanding the bottleneck capacity.