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Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents. 相似文献
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Summary. Combining a strategy model, an inference procedure and a new experimental design, we map sequences of observed actions in repeated games to unobserved strategies that reflect decision-makers’ plans. We demonstrate the method by studying two institutional settings with distinct theoretical predictions. We find that almost all strategies inferred are best responses to one of the inferred strategies of other players, and in one of the settings almost all of the inferred strategies, which include triggers to punish non-cooperators, are consistent with equilibrium strategies. By developing a method to infer unobserved repeated-game strategies from actions, we take a step toward making game theory a more applied tool, bridging a gap between theory and observed behavior.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 19 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, C80, C90.The authors are indebted for discussions with Ray Battalio, David Cooper, Robin Dubin, John Duffy, Ellen Garbarino, Susan Helper, Margaret Meyer, John Miller, Jim Rebitzer, Mari Rege, Al Roth, and John Van Huyck. The authors also benefited from discussants at economic department seminars at Case Western Reserve, McMaster and McGill University, University of Pittsburgh, SUNY-Stony Brook, and Texas A&M, and participants at the 2002 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh and Case Western Reserve University. 相似文献
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Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Abstract. It is not only the great number of papers written on environment economics that make it worth dealing with this special branch of experimental research, but the environmental problem in all its facets seems to serve as a catalyst for identifying some methodological problems of the experimental method. For this reason, we will not only try to give an overview of recent experiments in environmental economics but also add some thoughts on the methodological implications of this work. We identify three direct connecting factors for the experimental method and environmental economics. First, social dilemmas are, in many cases, at the core of environmental problems. Experiments are able to test theoretical hypotheses for individual behavior in such social dilemma situations. The second connecting factor comes from the field of applied experimental work and can be characterized as the testbedding of institutional arrangements for the solution of environmental problems. The last direct application of experimental methods to environmental economics concerns the individual evaluation of environmental resources. 相似文献
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In some of their papers published in the 1950s, Herbert Simonand Sidney Siegel responded to the so-called mixed strategyanomaly in ways which deserve more attention. They producednot only (i) immediate defences of the economic theory of theirown time, but also (ii) ideas and solutions that have laterturned out to be significant contributions to the developmentof the economic theory of choice and decision-making and theseparation of experimental economics from experimental psychology.These observations suggest that economics can be more responsiveto empirical anomalies than has been assumed. Furthermore, knowledgeof the desirable responsiveness to anomalies can provide meansof avoiding the non-desirable immunity to anomalies. 相似文献
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信息不对称资本市场的实验研究 总被引:17,自引:0,他引:17
我们采用经济学实验研究方法构建了信息不对称的实验室资本市场,研究信息是否可以通过市场迅速传递。实验结果表明,在信息不对称的情况下,资本市场是非有效的;市场对信息的传递和价格反应是有条件的而且也是需要时间的;资本市场中的投资者并非完全理性,而是具有认知和行为偏差的普通人,存在过度自信和过度交易的情况;信息不对称还可能引起市场操纵行为,从而导致价格泡沫的形成。 相似文献
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In premium auctions, the highest losing bidder receives a reward from the seller. This paper studies the private value English premium auction (EPA) for different risk attitudes of bidders. We explicitly derive the symmetric equilibrium for bidders with CARA utilities and conduct an experimental study to test the theoretical predictions. In our experiment, subjects are sorted into risk-averse and risk-loving groups. We find that revenues in the EPA are significantly higher when bidders are risk loving rather than risk averse. These results are partly consistent with theory and confirm the general view that bidders' risk preferences constitute an important factor that affects bidding behavior and consequently also the seller's expected revenue. However, individual subjects rarely follow the equilibrium strategy and revenue in our experiment is lower than in the symmetric equilibrium. 相似文献
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董志勇 《技术经济与管理研究》2010,(3):88-93
随着金融市场理论研究和实践检验的不断发展,资本市场的许多基础理论受到了极大的挑战,与现有理论相悖的异象不断涌现。新近兴起的实验经济学为人们研究资本市场提供了一条更为有效的途径。本文分析了实验方法在资本市场研究中的利与弊,介绍了部分资本市场实验的设计过程,并应用该方法分析了风险与收益、资本市场的效率、市场泡沫的产生和破灭、CAPM理论,以及交易制度等。文章指出,在资本市场中运用实验方法进行研究,具有可控性、可比性以及可重复性等优点,为我们对于资本市场诸多理论进行检验提供了可能。在资本市场实验的设计中,我们不但需要考虑实验的各种交易制度,还需要考虑到被试人员的选择、交易资产的确定以及市场信息的设计等很多问题,只有对这些问题进行全面地考虑,才能保证实验结果的可信度,进而为我们对于各种金融理论的检验提供可能。 相似文献
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Trust is frequently a requirement for economic exchanges and the management of natural resources. Providing public information on past actions can promote trust through the formation of reputations. We developed an economic experiment to test whether a formal reputation mechanism could facilitate trusting relationships in the tradable grazing rights markets. Providing information to create formal public reputations for market participants did not increase the overall efficiency of the market. However, it did result in greater equality of income between partners, suggesting that participants showed more concern for their partners when they knew they would be rated. Even with public reputation information, bilateral relationships remained central to the market. Market failures in existing grazing rights markets may be better addressed by measures to increase communication between partners rather than simply relying on a formal reputation mechanism. 相似文献