Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities

We study Bayesian mechanism design in the context of the siting of noxious facilities. Under incomplete information, we characterize optimal mechanisms facilitating the siting and cost sharing of the facility. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of the incentive notion to Bayesian–Nash equilibrium and to the balanced budget condition. This phenomenon disappears if the setting is perfectly symmetric.      

城市环境外部性的经济分析与对策研究

本文将就环境外部性的特点进行经济分析,提出运用经济学、伦理学及政治学综合性知识,在追求高效率、确立道德约束、建立政治规则和明确衡量标准的基础上,制定治理环境外部性的积极对策。     

Economics of externalities and public policy

In this paper we study a particular case of “multiple” externalities associated to the production of a good/activity, whose external effects can change from positive to negative depending on the level of output (intersecting externalities). To analyze their impact on the public policy we propose a very simple two-agent partial equilibrium model in the technological context of externalities. In a static framework, the centralized solution always implies an optimal policy, which may consist of taxation or subsidization depending on the individual optimum and on the technology parameters. In a dynamic model with local knowledge of the efficiency function and instantaneous output adjustments, such an optimal policy can be structurally stable or unstable. In the latter case, under small changes of the parameters the policy may switch from low taxation/subsidization to high taxation/subsidization or vice versa, or even jump discontinuously from taxation to subsidization or vice versa. Furthermore, the decentralized solution based upon “tradable rights” can be economically equivalent to the centralized solution in the form of taxation policy but the two solutions may be not politically equivalent.

地区规模、集聚外部性与区域创新能力

采用2005-2013年中国内地30个地区（除西藏外）27个工业行业数据,构建面板门槛模型,实证检验不同地区规模下,区域内多样化集聚（Jacobs外部性）、专业化集聚（MAR外部性）和企业竞争对区域创新能力的影响。结果显示,当地区规模较小时,多样化集聚、专业化集聚与企业竞争都对区域创新能力具有显著促进作用,但随着地区规模的日益增大,多样化集聚对区域创新能力的促进作用明显减小;专业化集聚、企业竞争与区域创新能力之间存在倒U型关系。     

众筹平台双边市场特性与竞争策略研究

当前,众筹平台逐渐分化为综合型与垂直型众筹平台,其用户规模和交易费率都存在显著差异,需要制定有针对性的竞争策略。根据众筹模式特征,构建了Hotelling竞争模型,分组实证考察了综合型和垂直型众筹平台双边用户交叉网络外部性、支持者自网络外部性和平台定价的综合影响。结果表明,在综合型众筹平台中,支持者规模对支持者投资需求产生了显著正自网络外部性;而在垂直型众筹平台中,支持者规模对发起者筹资需求、发起者规模对支持者投资需求均产生了显著的正交叉网络外部性,且平台定价显著负向影响发起者筹资需求。     

Impatience and equilibrium indeterminacy

This paper extends the neoclassical one-sector optimal growth model by postulating that individual agents’ time preference (impatience) depends on the economy-wide average consumption and average income, which are social factors taken as external by individual agents. The paper shows that with the socially determined individual time preference local equilibrium indeterminacy can arise. Moreover, local indeterminacy can also be associated with global indeterminacy in many cases. The results hold in models with bounded and unbounded growth.     

Foreclosure externalities: New evidence

Policy makers have used externalities to justify government intervention in the foreclosure process. Using a new dataset that covers 15 of the largest metropolitan statistical areas in the U.S. and a novel identification strategy, this paper provides new evidence on the size and source of these externalities. Our results show that a property in distress affects the value of neighboring properties from the time when the borrower becomes seriously delinquent on the mortgage until well after the bank sells the property to a new owner. Properties with seriously delinquent loans within 0.1 miles are found to decrease transaction prices of non-distressed properties by approximately one percent on average. The spillovers are found to dissipate rapidly with distance and completely disappear one year after the bank sells the property to a new homeowner. Importantly, we find that the size of the externality is sensitive to the condition of foreclosed properties, as bank-owned properties in poor condition lower nearby transaction prices by 2.6% on average while those in good condition marginally raise prices. We argue that the measured price spillovers are physical externalities caused by a lack of property maintenance and not pecuniary externalities that reflect local supply or demand shocks.     

Externalities of R&D Expenditures

Innovation is generally recognized as a major source of economic growth. R&D investments explicitly aim at generating innovations and creating knowledge. Since knowledge has certain public good properties, positive externalities are likely to exist. In this paper, we extend well-known concepts from the input-output literature (backward multipliers) to indicate at which commodities stimuli should be targeted to enhance R&D and its positive externalities in the economy as a whole. Next, we argue that there may also be negative externalities of R&D, due to increased prices. This issue can be studied by means of forward multipliers. Both concepts are applied to the United States, 1977-90.