Applying Moral Foundations Theory to the Explanation of Capital Jurors’ Sentencing Decisions

Abstract

This study applies moral foundations theory to capital juror decision making. We hypothesized that binding moral foundations would predict death qualification and punitive sentencing decisions, whereas individualizing moral foundations would be associated with juror disqualification and a leniency effect. Additionally, we considered whether moral foundations can explain differences in death penalty application between conservatives and liberals. Respondents from two independent samples participated in a mock-juror task in which the circumstances of a hypothetical defendant’s case varied. Results revealed moral foundations were strong predictors of death qualification. The binding and individualizing foundations were related to sentencing decisions in the expected ways. Supporting our contention that moral foundations operate differently across different types of cases, heterogeneity in the effects of moral foundations was observed. Finally, we found support for the hypothesis that the relationship between sentencing decisions and conservatism would be attenuated by moral foundations.     

Sentencing Parricides: Text and Context; Rhetoric and Silence

This article considers the sentencing of two eighteenth centuryparricides, one committed by a daughter, the other by a son. In eachcase the sentencing remarks are first subject to generic analysis,derived from the work of Rukiya Hasan and Susan Urmston Philips. Withinthose thematic structures there is a traditional rhetorical analysis. Bycombining both types of analysis one can demonstrate the salientfeatures of each set of judicial remarks. The focus of the article thenshifts from these texts to their contexts, and reveals features in theiroffence narratives which have been omitted in these otherwise powerfulrhetorical utterances. Explanations for these silences are given.     

Criticizing the image of the student as consumer: examining legal trends and administrative responses in the US and UK1

There is widespread concern that higher education is being compromised by being turned into a ‘commodity’ to be ‘consumed’. This article represents an initial attempt to explore the trends in both the UK and US, and considers how the law has responded to them. It argues, however, that there is an important distinction to be drawn between ‘commodification’ and ‘consumerism’. Education has always been a commodity to be bought and sold; the true danger lies in the move to a ‘rights-based’ culture where students (and politicians) see education merely as something to be ‘consumed’ rather than as an activity in which to participate. Whilst the law seems thus far to have been something of a bulwark against this movement, it remains an open question as to whether this will continue to be the case if HEIs do not themselves act more proactively in challenging this damaging view of higher education.     

The legislative recreation of RICO: Reinforcing the ``myth' of organized crime

This paper uses historical content analysis to examine the implementation ofthe Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). It is argued thatthe historical events leading to the definition of organized crime as an alienconspiracy still affect RICO's use some 30 years after its passage. This paper applies state-centered theory to the theoretical frameworks of sociology of knowledge and innovation diffusion. This approach is used to relate the current implementation and controversy of RICO to the alien conspiracy view. Thought of in this context, legal implementation is the result of a knowledge creation and diffusion process. This paper demonstrates how one knowledge diffusionprocess (the acceptance of organized crime as a national conspiracy in 1970) leads to a new knowledge diffusion process (the use of RICO).     

INTRODUCING PERSPECTIVES IN FAMILY LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

This article provides an editorial introduction to the following three related articles on the growing use and influence of social science research in family law. It first considers why this has become problematic and identifies some common strategies used by advocates, sometimes under the guise of scholarship, to destroy the standing of research findings contrary to their ideological or political position. Then it discusses briefly the remedies proposed to mitigate these kinds of problems within the following three articles.