Neo Arithmetic and Ranking Techniques for Trapezoidal Generalized Interval Valued Fuzzy Numbers: Their Applications in Decision Making for Medical Investigation

Neural Processing Letters - The uncertainty caused mainly by the deficiency of precision and data, artificial/human-made errors, information accessed from expert opinions or very miniature size of...     

Certainty aggregation and the certainty fuzzy measures

Aggregation functions are mostly used in decision‐making situations that require information fusion in a meaningful manner. The main purpose of aggregation is to turn a group of input data into a single and comprehensive one. However, in real decision‐making and system evaluation problems, the decision maker may exhibit only some amount of certainty in her decision inputs. In this study, we show how to aggregate these certainty degrees assigned to a group of inputs in an intuitive and reasonable manner. One of the interesting aspects of the problem is that the value aggregation is independent of their certainty degrees while the certainty aggregation essentially depends on both the input values and the value aggregation function. The construction of the aggregation function gives rise to a fuzzy measure that satisfies some very interesting properties. The technique presented here has wide range of applications.     

The Shapley value of cooperative games under fuzzy settings: a survey

We survey the recent developments in the studies of cooperative games under fuzzy environment. The basic problems of a cooperative game in both crisp and fuzzy contexts are to find how the coalitions form vis-á-vis how the coalitions distribute the worth. One of the fuzzification processes assumes that the coalitions thus formed are fuzzy in nature having only partial participations of the players. A second group of researchers fuzzify the worths of the coalitions while a few others assume that both the coalitions and the worths are fuzzy quantities. Among the various solution concepts of a cooperative game, the Shapley value is the most popular one-point solution concept which is characterized by a set of rational axioms. We confine our study to the developments of the Shapley value in fuzzy setting and try to highlight the respective characterizations.     

Cooperative games with multiple attributes

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we introduce the notion of a cooperative game with multiple attributes where players can provide partial participations in multiple attributes and form coalitions. The power or influence of the players due to their multiple attributes is evaluated based on their memberships in the coalitions. Our game therefore, extends the notion of cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions. The Shapley function for this class of games is proposed as a rational and fair solution concept. Every fuzzy game stems out of a specific crisp game under the assumption that the players provide partial memberships in forming multiple coalitions simultaneously. We adopt similar techniques to obtain the cooperative games with multiple attributes from their crisp counterparts and subsequently determine their Shapley functions.