GAS-LIQUID EQUILIBRIUM OF Pb-Cd-Zn SYSTEM UNDER VACUUM

ＧＡＳ－ＬＩＱＵＩＤＥＱＵＩＬＩＢＲＩＵＭＯＦＰｂ－Ｃｄ－ＺｎＳＹＳＴＥＭＵＮＤＥＲＶＡＣＵＵＭＧＡＳ－ＬＩＱＵＩＤＥＱＵＩＬＩＢＲＩＵＭＯＦＰｂ－Ｃｄ－ＺｎＳＹＳＴＥＭＵＮＤＥＲＶＡＣＵＵＭ￥Ｌｉｕ，Ｒｉｘｉｎ（ＩｎｓｔｉｔｕｔｅｏｆＣｈｅｍｉｃａ...     

Ni-Cr-Mo三元系1358 K等温截面的测定

应用三元扩散偶技术测定了Ni-Cr-Mo三元系1358 K的等温截面,借助电子探针微区成分分析方法分析了Ni-Cr-Mo三元扩散偶的相区成分,并对其相关系进行了研究.测得Ni-Cr-Mo三元扩散偶在1358 K下存在一个中间化合物NiMo,Cr和Mo在扩散偶中形成连续固溶体,Ni和（Cr,Mo）有限固溶,扩散偶中未发现三元中间化合物.实验发现Ni-Cr-Mo三元系1358 K的等温截面存在一个三相区：Ni＋NiMo＋（Cr,Mo）.     

温度和气氛对CaO-SiO2-Al2O3-MgO-FetO渣系磷容量的影响

采用气-渣-金平衡法测定CaO-SiO2-Al2O3-MgO-FetO渣系的磷容量,用钼坩埚作为反应容器,Ag-0.2%P合金作为气-渣-金平衡的熔剂,CO-CO2-Ar混合气体提供体系的氧分压,分析了温度和气氛对该渣系磷容量的影响.结果表明,对于一定成分的炉渣,当体系CO、CO2、Ar组成一定时,随着温度由1 723 K增加到1 823 K,CaO-SiO2-Al2O3-MgO-FetO渣系的磷容量降低;在1 773 K,气氛中氧分压由3.6×10-5 Pa增大到7.2×10-4 Pa时,磷容量随着氧分压的增大而增大.     

合成气甲烷化过程热力学分析

以化学热力学为基础,利用FactSage软件对2种典型的煤气化合成气甲烷化反应过程进行了热力学计算和分析。研究了合成气的组分、氢气的配比、反应温度、压力等条件对甲烷化过程的影响,特别是氢气的配比研究,区别于常规对H_2/CO分析而是以氢气的理论配比H_2/(3CO+4CO_2)进行分析。结果表明:反应器操作压力对甲烷化过程的影响不明显,合成气的组分、氢气的配比、反应温度的选择对甲烷化过程的影响较大。得出:合成气甲烷化过程应采用多段反应器,最终控制温度为(300~350)℃;操作压力一般为(3.0~3.5)MPa;H_2的配比采用理论配比时生产出的CH_4浓度高。     

能量平衡法静电驱动柔性振膜微泵特性分析

从能量平衡的角度建立了静电驱动柔性振膜微泵的平衡方程,基于对压缩过程中振膜动能的考虑,改进了最小能量法压缩模型,结合均匀压力载荷下圆薄膜大挠度形变理论对静电驱动柔性振膜微泵进行理论分析.对振膜与腔体壁面贴合的压缩过程中各能量相互转化的关系进行分析,并与最小能量法模型进行了对比.结果表明,能量平衡法考虑了薄膜振动过程中的动能,故薄膜与腔体具有更大的贴合面积,且以薄膜与腔体完全贴合时作为零应力参考状态降低压缩过程中的薄膜形变势能,计算得到的静电微泵的压缩效率更高,在驱动电压为300 V时,改进的双腔模型中振膜贴合半径为4.06 mm,所得最大压升为87.08 kPa.基于改进的模型,对双腔微泵压升的影响因素进行讨论,发现降低柔性薄膜厚度会使输出压力有所上升,并且减小腔体表面介电层厚度、减小腔体深度与半径可以有助于提高微泵的压升.     

Evolutionary variational inequality with long-term memory and applications to economic networks

The aim of this paper is to present the relation between an evolutionary variational inequality with long-term memory and Lagrange multipliers. More precisely, we study the oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in which the profit function depends also on previous events of the market by means of a long-term memory which takes into account the previous states of the equilibrium. Moreover, thanks to the variational formulation, we are able to show existence and regularity results for equilibrium solutions. Then, we apply the infinite dimensional duality theory through which we obtain the existence of Lagrange multipliers which are great utility in order to understand the behaviour of the market. Finally, an example is provided, which allows to analyse the influence of the long-term memory on the equilibrium solution.     

Game‐Based Valley‐Fill Charging Coordination for Large‐Population Plug‐in Electric Vehicles

Charging coordination of large‐population autonomous plug‐in electric vehicles (PEVs) in the power grid can be formulated as a class of constrained optimization problems. To overcome the computational complexity, a game‐based method is proposed for the charging problems of the PEV population, which is composed of homogeneous subpopulations, such that individuals update their best charging strategies simultaneously with respect to a common electricity price determined by the total demand. To mitigate the oscillation behavior caused by the greedy behavior for the cheap electricity by individuals, a deviation cost is introduced to penalize against the deviation of the individual strategy from the average value of the homogeneous subpopulation. By adopting a proper deviation cost and following a best strategy update mechanism, the game systems may converge to the socially optimal valley‐fill Nash equilibrium. Simulation examples are studied to illustrate the results.     

Sampling average approximation method for a class of stochastic Nash equilibrium problems

We consider a class of stochastic Nash equilibrium problems (SNEP). Under some mild conditions, we reformulate the SNEP as a stochastic mixed complementarity problem (SMCP). We apply the well-known sample average approximation (SAA) method to solve the SMCP. We further introduce a semismooth Newton method to solve the SAA problems. The comprehensive convergence analysis is given as well. In addition, we demonstrate the proposed approach on a stochastic Nash equilibrium model in the wholesale gas–oil markets.     

单向耦合Lorenz-R(o)ssler系统的多参数分岔

深入研究了单向耦合Lorenz-R(o)ssler系统的动力学行为,首先定性地分析了该系统,找出了该系统所有平衡点及平衡点存在和稳定的条件.再对该系统的分岔行为做了理论分析,得到该系统发生fold和Hopf 分岔的条件.最后利用分岔软件对前面的理论进行验证,而且针对三个单向耦合参数的不同取值情况,从数值的角度研究了该系统的多参数分岔,结果表明不同的耦合强度对于系统的动力学行为有较大的影响.     

A suboptimal joint bandwidth and power allocation for cooperative relay networks＂ a cooperative game theoretic approach

In commercial networks, user nodes operating on batteries are assumed to be selfish to consume their resources (i.e., bandwidth and power) solely maximizing their own benefits (e.g., the received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) and datarates). In this paper, a cooperative game theoretical framework is proposed to jointly perform the bandwidth and power allocation for selfish cooperative relay networks. To ensure a fair and efficient resource sharing between two selfish user nodes, we assume that either node can act as a source as well as a potential relay for each other and either node is willing to seek cooperative relaying only if the datarate achieved through cooperation is not lower than that achieved through noncooperation (i.e., direct transmission) by consuming the same amount of bandwidth and power resource. Define the cooperative strategy of a node as the number of bandwidth and power that it is willing to contribute for relaying purpose. The two node joint bandwidth and power allocation (JBPA) problem can then be formulated as a cooperative game. Since the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to the JBPA game (JBPAG) is computationally difficult to obtain, we divide it into two subgames, i.e., the bandwidth allocation game (BAG) and the power allocation game (PAG). We prove that both the subgames have unique NBS. And then the suboptimal NBS to the JBPAG can be achieved by solving the BAG and PAG sequentially. Simulation results show that the proposed cooperative game scheme is efficient in that the performance loss of the NBS result to that of the maximal overall data-rate scheme is small while the maximal-rate scheme is unfair. The simulation results also show that the NBS result is fair in that both nodes could experience better performance than they work independently and the degree of cooperation of a node only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to improve its own performance.