Void Closure in Complex Plasmas under Microgravity Conditions

We describe the first observation of a void closure in complex plasma experiments under microgravity conditions performed with the Plasma-Kristall (PKE-Nefedov) facility on board the International Space Station. The void--a grain-free region in the central part of the discharge where the complex plasma is generated--has been formed under most of the plasma conditions and thought to be an inevitable effect. However, we demonstrate in this Letter that an appropriate tune of the discharge parameters allows the void to close. This experimental achievement along with its theoretical interpretation opens new perspectives in engineering new experiments with large quasi-isotropic void-free complex plasma clouds in microgravity conditions.     

On the quantum-mechanical bound on the loss of information through side channels in quantum cryptography

The security of cryptographic keys in quantum cryptography systems is guaranteed by fundamental quantum mechanical exclusion principles. A quantum channel through which quantum states are transferred is not controlled and an eavesdropper can perform any modifications with it. The security of quantum key distribution protocols has already been proved [M. Tomamichel et al., Nature Commun. 3, 634 (2011); S. N. Molotkov, J. Exp. Theor. Phys. 115, 969 (2012)], including the realistic case of a finite length of transmitted sequences. It is always assumed that the eavesdropper has neither direct nor indirect access to the transmitting and receiving equipment. The real situation is somewhat different. The preparation and detection of quantum states occur according to random sequences that are generated on the transmitter and receiver sides. Detecting electromagnetic radiation generated in these processes, the eavesdropper can obtain additional information on a key. The upper quantum-mechanical bound on the amount of information of the eavesdropper on the key that can be obtained through a side channel has been determined.     

On the vulnerability of basic quantum key distribution protocols and three protocols stable to attack with “blinding” of avalanche photodetectors

The fundamental quantum mechanics prohibitions on the measurability of quantum states allow secure key distribution between spatially remote users to be performed. Experimental and commercial implementations of quantum cryptography systems, however, use components that exist at the current technology level, in particular, one-photon avalanche photodetectors. These detectors are subject to the blinding effect. It was shown that all the known basic quantum key distribution protocols and systems based on them are vulnerable to attacks with blinding of photodetectors. In such attacks, an eavesdropper knows all the key transferred, does not produce errors at the reception side, and remains undetected. Three protocols of quantum key distribution stable toward such attacks are suggested. The security of keys and detection of eavesdropping attempts are guaranteed by the internal structure of protocols themselves rather than additional technical improvements.     

Entropy uncertainty relations and stability of phase-temporal quantum cryptography with finite-length transmitted strings

Any key-generation session contains a finite number of quantum-state messages, and it is there-fore important to understand the fundamental restrictions imposed on the minimal length of a string required to obtain a secret key with a specified length. The entropy uncertainty relations for smooth min and max entropies considerably simplify and shorten the proof of security. A proof of security of quantum key distribution with phase-temporal encryption is presented. This protocol provides the maximum critical error compared to other protocols up to which secure key distribution is guaranteed. In addition, unlike other basic protocols (of the BB84 type), which are vulnerable with respect to an attack by “blinding” of avalanche photodetectors, this protocol is stable with respect to such an attack and guarantees key security.     

Distinguishability of quantum states and shannon complexity in quantum cryptography

The proof of the security of quantum key distribution is a rather complex problem. Security is defined in terms different from the requirements imposed on keys in classical cryptography. In quantum cryptography, the security of keys is expressed in terms of the closeness of the quantum state of an eavesdropper after key distribution to an ideal quantum state that is uncorrelated to the key of legitimate users. A metric of closeness between two quantum states is given by the trace metric. In classical cryptography, the security of keys is understood in terms of, say, the complexity of key search in the presence of side information. In quantum cryptography, side information for the eavesdropper is given by the whole volume of information on keys obtained from both quantum and classical channels. The fact that the mathematical apparatuses used in the proof of key security in classical and quantum cryptography are essentially different leads to misunderstanding and emotional discussions [1]. Therefore, one should be able to answer the question of how different cryptographic robustness criteria are related to each other. In the present study, it is shown that there is a direct relationship between the security criterion in quantum cryptography, which is based on the trace distance determining the distinguishability of quantum states, and the criterion in classical cryptography, which uses guesswork on the determination of a key in the presence of side information.     

Fine structure of the soliton signal in the magnetic chain in an external magnetic field near a critical value

As is known, there is a critical magnetic field which separates two principally different zones for the soliton signal propagation in magnetic chains, the sine-Gordon zone and the Heisenberg zone. We investigate the fine structure of these signals in a neighborhood of the critical field with nonzero soliton velocity. Explicit formulas both for the azimuthal kink and meridional soliton are obtained. These formulas take into account the nonlinear interaction of soliton structures. Dedicated to the memory of Vladimir Borovikov     

Energy Conservation in Distributed Interference as a Guarantee for Detecting a Detector Blinding Attack in Quantum Cryptography

Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics - An avalanche single-photon detector blinding attack is one of the methods for quantum hacking of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. The attack...     

Practical quantum cryptography

A quantum cryptography system based on a 4-basis protocol with geometrically uniform states is tested in a series of experiments. Quantum states of light transmitted through real fiber optic communication channels to a distance of 32 km in the presence of uncontrolled external actions are prepared, transformed, and measured. It is shown that the chosen algorithms of processing quantum information are adequate and can be used as foundations of practical devices in protected communication lines.₁     

Hysteresis in an acoustic medium with relaxing nonlinearity and viscosity

The loading and unloading waves propagating in a nonlinear relaxing and dissipative medium of the consolidated soil type are investigated. Solutions describing the waves in such a medium are constructed with the use of the Stokes method and the small-distance asymptotic approach. Explicit approximate solutions are obtained for different values of the relaxation and viscosity parameters. The influence of the type of the medium on the shape of the hysteretic curves is described.     

Cryptographic robustness of practical quantum cryptography: BB84 key distribution protocol

In real fiber-optic quantum cryptography systems, the avalanche photodiodes are not perfect, the source of quantum states is not a single-photon one, and the communication channel is lossy. For these reasons, key distribution is impossible under certain conditions for the system parameters. A simple analysis is performed to find relations between the parameters of real cryptography systems and the length of the quantum channel that guarantee secure quantum key distribution when the eavesdropper’s capabilities are limited only by fundamental laws of quantum mechanics while the devices employed by the legitimate users are based on current technologies. Critical values are determined for the rate of secure real-time key generation that can be reached under the current technology level. Calculations show that the upper bound on channel length can be as high as 300 km for imperfect photodetectors (avalanche photodiodes) with present-day quantum efficiency (η ≈ 20%) and dark count probability (p _dark ～ 10^?7).