Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning,Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks

Global games of regime change—coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it—have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time. We first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria. We then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time, or with changes in fundamentals, leads to interesting equilibrium properties. First, multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark. Second, fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks. Finally, equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility—where no attack is possible—and phases of distress—where a large attack can occur—even without changes in fundamentals.     

DISTANCE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT WHEN CONTRACTS ARE INCOMPLETE

We introduce incomplete contracts in a model where multinational firms from a certain country (“North”) can decide to serve a foreign market (“South”) through exports or through horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI relies on the supply of specialized intermediate inputs that could be supplied either by northern suppliers or by suppliers located in South. Intermediate sourcing contracts are complete in North but not in South. Were southern contracts also complete, FDI would arise only when trade barriers are high enough. Incomplete contracts in South generate, instead, a non‐linear relation between trade barriers and FDI as foreign investment emerges also when trade barriers are low enough. The reason is the positive effect that low trade barriers have on the bargaining power of final producers with respect to their southern suppliers. (JEL: F23, F12)     

An Empirical Equilibrium Model of a Decentralized Asset Market

I estimate a search‐and‐bargaining model of a decentralized market to quantify the effects of trading frictions on asset allocations, asset prices, and welfare, and to quantify the effects of intermediaries that facilitate trade. Using business‐aircraft data, I find that, relative to the Walrasian benchmark, 18.3 percent of the assets are misallocated; prices are 19.2 percent lower; and the aggregate welfare losses equal 23.9 percent. Dealers play an important role in reducing trading frictions: In a market with no dealers, a larger fraction of assets would be misallocated, and prices would be higher. However, dealers reduce aggregate welfare because their operations are costly, and they impose a negative externality by decreasing the number of agents' direct transactions.     

Stigma toward internalizing and externalizing disorders: How do adolescents perceive their peers? A network analysis approach

This study's first aim was to explore whether stigma's facets differ between internalizing and externalizing disorders in adolescence. The second aim was to compare the relationships among stigma's facets toward these disorders. Two vignettes depicting a peer with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) or Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) were used with 616 adolescents in Italy. A Repeated measure MANOVA showed biogenetic causes, social distancing, and discomfort were more attributed to depression, while dangerousness to ADHD. Furthermore, a Psychometric Network Analysis showed no differences between these disorders in the relations among stigma's components. However, dangerousness seemed to be among the nodes with the highest levels of “strength,” confirming previous literature that shows that dangerousness plays a major role in stigma.     

An Integrated Approach to Select Key Quality Indicators in Transit Services

Social Indicators Research - Recent interests in transit services have captured attention of experts on the monitoring of public transport quality. Previous research focused on relevant models and...     

From Keynes to a theoretical-political approach to conventional economics

The aim of this study is twofold. The first is to question the claim that the price system is the only form of coordination of individual actions. The attempt to overcome this assumption highlights the need for other forms of coordination to regulate behaviours that are not price-related, proposing the concept of Keynesian Convention as a special kind of coordination. The second is an effort to define the theoretical-political dimension of the economics of conventions. In fact, focusing on the strategic approach of conventions, depending on whether the concept of a convention is used to resolve problems finding a balance in coordination games, it seems reasonable to seek a political dimension of the economics of conventions. We will show how the assumptions underlying the theory of general economic balance are extremely restrictive, because they assume a complete lack of uncertainty or strategic interaction between the different agents. For the purpose of ensuring objectivity, we will highlight the role of the concept of the convention as a mechanism of coordination that transcends prices. Finally, although the standard theory strives to prove otherwise, the narrow path of validation is proof that an analysis of coordination cannot consider only the price system and is inseparable from the concept of rules.     

Why do they stay? A study of resilient child protection workers in three European countries

Whilst 50% of child protection workers across much of Europe and the affluent ‘West’ leave after two years, many stay and develop substantial professional careers. This paper discusses research in Italy, Sweden and England examining what factors explain ‘remaining’ for more than three years in this stressful job. Underpinned by a hermeneutic epistemology, qualitative interviews were undertaken and subject to an interpretative thematic analysis. The findings proved to be complex and multi-layered and this paper presents an overview of these. The theoretical framework for the project mainly drew on organisations and resilience, and the initial sections of the paper consider how formulations of resilience as contextual and relational can elucidate professional sustainability. Organisational issues are considered, including the impact of work management, of supervision and of allocation in different national contexts. The paper also focuses on the role of friendships and informal support at work. Threaded through these established themes are more, perhaps surprising, concepts: for example, creativity, power, reflexive spaces and interpersonal relations as explanatory of remaining in child protection work.     

Spatial hidden Markov models and species distributions

A spatial hidden Markov model (SHMM) is introduced to analyse the distribution of a species on an atlas, taking into account that false observations and false non-detections of the species can occur during the survey, blurring the true map of presence and absence of the species. The reconstruction of the true map is tackled as the restoration of a degraded pixel image, where the true map is an autologistic model, hidden behind the observed map, whose normalizing constant is efficiently computed by simulating an auxiliary map. The distribution of the species is explained under the Bayesian paradigm and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms are developed. We are interested in the spatial distribution of the bird species Greywing Francolin in the south of Africa. Many climatic and land-use explanatory variables are also available: they are included in the SHMM and a subset of them is selected by the mutation operators within the MCMC algorithm.     

Variable selection in proportional hazards cure model with time-varying covariates,application to US bank failures*

From a survival analysis perspective, bank failure data are often characterized by small default rates and heavy censoring. This empirical evidence can be explained by the existence of a subpopulation of banks likely immune from bankruptcy. In this regard, we use a mixture cure model to separate the factors with an influence on the susceptibility to default from the ones affecting the survival time of susceptible banks. In this paper, we extend a semi-parametric proportional hazards cure model to time-varying covariates and we propose a variable selection technique based on its penalized likelihood. By means of a simulation study, we show how this technique performs reasonably well. Finally, we illustrate an application to commercial bank failures in the United States over the period 2006–2016.