共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 109 毫秒
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通过建立一般情况下的两人进化博弈模型,给出了系统均衡点对应的矩阵行列式和迹表达式的经济含义,分析了16种典型情形下的进化稳定策略,详细讨论了均衡点稳定性分析结果所对应的博弈双方决策过程,从策略权衡的视角揭示了策略选择的内在机制。研究结果表明:不同策略前提下的相对净支付决定了系统的进化稳定策略,对方的策略选择以及自身可选策略的支付比较是影响博弈主体策略选择的两个基本要素,博弈主体会趋向于选择在对方策略既定下能够带来更大支付的策略。最后以环境治理中地方政府与企业以及地方政府之间的博弈关系为例,从对称博弈和非对称博弈两方面阐明了本文所构建模型在政策设计中的应用价值:针对不同案例,只要明确了两人博弈的支付矩阵,就可以通过计算相对净支付确定博弈双方的行为演化规律和稳定策略,从而简化计算过程,更加直接和更为便捷地为政策设计提供理论参考。 相似文献
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基于经典博弈模型的Nash均衡点集的通有稳定性和具有不确定参数的n人非合作博弈均衡点的概念,探讨了具有不确定参数博弈的均衡点集的通有稳定性.参照Nash均衡点集稳定性的统一模式,构造了不确定博弈的问题空间和解空间,并证明了问题空间是一个完备度量空间,解映射是上半连续的,且解集是紧集(即usco(upper semicontinuous and compact-valued)映射),得到不确定参数博弈模型的解集通有稳定性的相关结论. 相似文献
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引入具有不确定参数的n人广义多目标博弈,这里局中人了解不确定性参数的变化区域,而且个人的参数变化与其他局中人的行为密切相关.我们定义广义不确定下广义多目标博弈的弱Pareto-Nash均衡.进一步我们证明广义不确定下广义多目标博弈的弱Pare-Nash均衡点集的存在性与本质连通区的存在性. 相似文献
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保险中遏制投保人逆向选择的博弈策略分析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
以投保人的风险类型难于鉴别的逆向选择问题为研究对象,建立了投保人与保险公司的双人非零和博弈模型,并求解得出了该博弈的混合策略纳什均衡点,从而得出重罚有利于遏制投保人的逆向选择以及使保险公司的期望利润为零的保险定价公式. 相似文献
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通过建立投资人和平台多方均面临借款人违约风险的不完全信息博弈模型,寻找单次博弈的均衡点,再将博弈重复无限次得出了新的均衡. 相似文献
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《数学的实践与认识》2013,(13)
建立了一个综合考虑多种因素的企税博弈模型,解得模型的混合纳什均衡点,以及国家税务机关的查税概率公式和骗税罚款系数公式,讨论了各种相关参数对博弈结果的影响,为国家防止偷骗税行为制定合理的税收检查概率和罚款系数提供了可供操作的理论工具,提出了降低企业骗税概率的建议. 相似文献
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针对突发公共卫生事件下民众对应急防护物资疯狂抢购的问题,以及衍生的供求失衡、价格暴涨、质量良莠不齐等问题,基于演化博弈理论构建政府、企业和民众三方参与的博弈模型。考虑到恐慌情绪对抢购行为的影响,首先刻画了民众在恐慌情绪下的防护物资购买价值;然后结合模型特征,运用非线性系统理论探讨了不同参与主体间的演化机制,得出不同情境下的博弈均衡点和稳定性;最后通过仿真模拟进一步分析不同恐慌强度对参与主体行为演化的影响。研究结果对识别突发公共卫生事件下应急防护物资管理的演化机理具有一定理论价值。 相似文献
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Olivier Menoukeu-Pamen Romuald Hervé Momeya 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2017,85(3):349-388
In this paper, we present an optimal control problem for stochastic differential games under Markov regime-switching forward–backward stochastic differential equations with jumps. First, we prove a sufficient maximum principle for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games problems and obtain equilibrium point for such games. Second, we prove an equivalent maximum principle for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. The zero-sum stochastic differential games equivalent maximum principle is then obtained as a corollary. We apply the obtained results to study a problem of robust utility maximization under a relative entropy penalty and to find optimal investment of an insurance firm under model uncertainty. 相似文献
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In this paper, we propose a distribution-free model instead of considering a particular distribution for multiple objective games with incomplete information. We assume that each player does not know the exact value of the uncertain payoff parameters, but only knows that they belong to an uncertainty set. In our model, the players use a robust optimization approach for each of their objective to contend with payoff uncertainty. To formulate such a game, named “robust multiple objective games” here, we introduce three kinds of robust equilibrium under different preference structures. Then, by using a scalarization method and an existing result on the solutions for the generalized quasi-vector equilibrium problems, we obtain the existence of these robust equilibria. Finally, we give an example to illustrate our model and the existence theorems. Our results are new and fill the gap in the game theory literature. 相似文献
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Population uncertainty and Poisson games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Roger B. Myerson 《International Journal of Game Theory》1998,27(3):375-392
A general class of models is developed for analyzing games with population uncertainty. Within this general class, a special
class of Poisson games is defined. It is shown that Poisson games are uniquely characterized by properties of independent
actions and environmental equivalence. The general definition of equilibrium for games with population uncertainty is formulated,
and it is shown that the equilibria of Poisson games are invariant under payoff-irrelevant type splitting. An example of a
large voting game is discussed, to illustrate the advantages of using a Poisson game model for large games.
Received December 1995/Revised version July 1997 相似文献
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We present a distribution-free model of incomplete-information games, both with and without private information, in which
the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. Our ``robust game' model relaxes the assumptions
of Harsanyi's Bayesian game model, and provides an alternative distribution-free equilibrium concept, which we call ``robust-optimization
equilibrium,' to that of the ex post equilibrium. We prove that the robust-optimization equilibria of an incomplete-information game subsume the ex post equilibria of the game and are, unlike the latter, guaranteed to exist when the game is finite and has bounded payoff uncertainty
set. For arbitrary robust finite games with bounded polyhedral payoff uncertainty sets, we show that we can compute a robust-optimization
equilibrium by methods analogous to those for identifying a Nash equilibrium of a finite game with complete information. In
addition, we present computational results.
The research of the author was partially supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship and by the
Singapore-MIT Alliance.
The research of the author was partially supported by the Singapore-MIT Alliance. 相似文献
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We study optimal stochastic control problems with jumps under model uncertainty. We rewrite such problems as stochastic differential games of forward–backward stochastic differential equations. We prove general stochastic maximum principles for such games, both in the zero-sum case (finding conditions for saddle points) and for the nonzero sum games (finding conditions for Nash equilibria). We then apply these results to study robust optimal portfolio-consumption problems with penalty. We establish a connection between market viability under model uncertainty and equivalent martingale measures. In the case with entropic penalty, we prove a general reduction theorem, stating that a optimal portfolio-consumption problem under model uncertainty can be reduced to a classical portfolio-consumption problem under model certainty, with a change in the utility function, and we relate this to risk sensitive control. In particular, this result shows that model uncertainty increases the Arrow–Pratt risk aversion index. 相似文献
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D. W. K. Yeung 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》2001,111(2):445-460
In this paper, we consider infinite-horizon stochastic differential games with an autonomous structure and steady branching payoffs. While the introduction of additional stochastic elements via branching payoffs offers a fruitful alternative to modeling game situations under uncertainty, the solution to such a problem is not known. A theorem on the characterization of a Nash equilibrium solution for this kind of games is presented. An application in renewable resource extraction is provided to illustrate the solution mechanism. 相似文献
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Roman Kozhan 《International Journal of Game Theory》2011,40(2):215-230
This paper introduces a class of non-additive anonymous games where agents are assumed to be uncertain (in the sense of Knight)
about opponents’ strategies and about the initial distribution over players’ characteristics in the game. We model uncertainty
by non-additive measures or capacities and prove the Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence theorem for this class of games. Equilibrium
distribution can be symmetrized under milder conditions than in the case of additive games. In particular, it is not required
for the space characteristics to be atomless under capacities. The set-valued map of the Cournot–Nash equilibria is upper-semicontinuous
as a function of initial beliefs of the players for non-additive anonymous games. 相似文献
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We consider a class of regular–singular stochastic differential games arising in the optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. The information available to the two players is asymmetric partial information and the control variable of each player consists of two components: regular control and singular control. We establish the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the saddle point of the zero-sum game. Then, as an application, these conditions are applied to an optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. Furthermore, we generalize our results to the nonzero-sum regular–singular game with asymmetric information, and then the Nash equilibrium point is characterized. 相似文献