联盟收益不确定下合作博弈的多目标粒子群扩展算法求解

在传统的合作博弈求解中,通常假设联盟收益确定或者局中人对联盟收益取值意见一致.现实中,联盟收益往往不确定,局中人对联盟收益取值意见不一致,且联盟分配方案的达成通常是局中人基于个体理性与判断进行多轮谈判,互相影响、相互妥协、最终趋同的结果.针对这种情况,本文首先对联盟收益不确定时局中人的收益进行描述,建立合作博弈的扩展模型,再考虑局中人的理性互动与策略博弈,借鉴群智能的建模思想和求解思路,利用多目标粒子群扩展算法对模型进行求解.本文对于联盟收益不确定时合作博弈的求解提供了新的思路与方法.     

基于模糊博弈视角的企业联盟“双循环”合作对策研究

企业合作在“双循环”新发展格局下呈现出更多的模糊特征,能否形成稳定的模糊合作格局及持续合作的收益再分配策略成为合作联盟的关注点。将广义模糊超量博弈和模糊凸博弈及其广义解集应用到“双循环”新发展格局下企业联盟合作与收益再分配中,提出最大广义模糊超量博弈模型及其广义模糊谈判集,并基于最大广义模糊超量博弈均衡性的视角,对模糊凸博弈下广义模糊谈判集与核心的等价性质进行论证。研究结果不仅满足了“双循环”新发展格局下合作企业以部分资源参与合作的意愿,及企业联盟模糊凸合作博弈下再分配方案等价性证明需求,而且实现了保留部分收益用于联盟再发展的策略。     

基于博弈论的供应链知识服务网络知识投入成本策略研究

在供应链知识服务网络中,知识创造、技术更新是企业持续发展、获得竞争优势的最重要方式。对具有企业核心价值的知识来说,知识成本的投入是采用自我研发的方式还是由专业化的知识服务商提供,对企业的未来发展战略以及投资回报都有直接影响。本文在研究一个知识提供方和一个知识需求方的条件下,通过构建Nash博弈、以知识提供方为主导的Stackelberg博弈、以知识需求方为主导的Stackelberg 博弈和合作博弈四种模型,对知识投入成本、价格以及收益进行博弈研究,最终给出最优解。结论指出,供应链若获得最大收益,则知识提供方与知识需求方应该建立战略联盟或合作框架,在供应链最大收益的情况下协商内部分配问题,同时该种情况下的知识成本投入也最大;对于以投入知识获取收益的企业来说,以知识提供方为主导的Stackelberg 均衡博弈模型是较好的选择。     

区间合作博弈Shapley值的矩阵计算方法

在合作博弈中,Shapley单点解按照参与者对联盟的边际贡献率对联盟的收益进行分配.联盟收益具有不确定性,往往不能用精确数值表示,更多学者关注特征函数取值为有限区间的合作博弈(区间合作博弈)的收益分配.文章利用矩阵半张量积,研究区间合作博弈中含有折扣因子的Shapley区间值的矩阵计算.首先利用矩阵的半张量积将合作博弈的特征函数表示为矩阵形式,得到特征函数区间矩阵.然后通过构造区间合作博弈Shapley矩阵,将区间合作博弈的Shapley值(区间)计算转化为矩阵形式.最后利用区间合作博弈Shapley值矩阵公式计算分析航空公司供应链联盟收益的Shapley值.文章给出的区间合作博弈Shapley值的矩阵计算公式形式简洁,为区间合作博弈的研究提供了新的思路.     

供应链网络道德风险演化与仿真研究

针对目前供应链网络存在的越来越严重的道德风险问题,利用演化博弈和系统动力学理论,从供应链网络结构入手,对其演化过程进行了研究。首先基于供应商之间合作过程中的诚信和败德行为,建立供应链网络同级企业间道德风险的演化博弈模型,并分析了其演化路径。其次通过对制造商和供应商之间博弈的动态性分析,建立供应链网络上下游企业间道德风险演化的SD模型,并对其演化过程进行了仿真分析。研究结果表明:供应链网络道德风险的演化结果取决于网络内败德企业获得的超额收益、收益调整程度、惩罚力度和惩罚机制。另外,罚款力度大小与供应链网络道德风险演化的动态性密切相关;动态惩罚机制在其演化的波动性控制方面,具有明显效果。     

基于微分博弈的区域经济合作行为分析

针对区域经济合作行为问题,构建微分博弈模型,将区域合作情况分为弱弱型拮抗博弈、强弱型主从博弈、强强型协同博弈三类,并考察其最优努力策略、最优收益与联盟总体收益变化.研究结果显示:①地区间经济合作努力程度随着合作成本系数、产出漏损系数的上升而下降,随着边际努力产出系数、边际努力收益系数、产出影响系数的上升而上升;②"激励因子"作为一种激励机制,可提高地区间合作努力度、最优收益及联盟整体收益;③三种类型中,强强性协同博弈最优策略及整体最优收益均严格优于其他两种情形.但这种协同合作需要确定联盟整体收益分配系数的取值范围.     

战略投资者与财务投资者投资行为比较:基于合作博弈Shapley值的分析

战略投资者和财务投资者是企业发展过程中两类非常重要的投资者,对两类投资者的投资行为当前有很多争论.通过将两类投资者的投资行为抽象为合作博弈中的结盟行为,利用合作博弈联盟分配中的Shapley值分析两类投资者应该获得的公平收益,并将其与按股份比例获得的收益进行比较.结论显示,战略投资者在实际中获得的收益要小于其公平收益,财务投资者则获得了公平收益;战略投资者总倾向转变为财务投资者,并在上市后退出.     

协作运营网络收益协调模型与求解方案研究

为提高协作运营网络的稳定性,从收益角度,研究协作运营网络中各协作单元的收益协调问题.首先界定协作单元、协作运营、协作运营网络和协作运营网络收益概念;基于"合作博弈",建立协作运营网络收益协调数学模型,实现协作运营网络收益最大化和协作单元收益均衡化;借助"Shapley值",对协作运营网络收益协调模型进行求解,提出基于"收益补偿"的协调策略.对如何有效协调协作组织收益,提高运营过程中各协作单元的主动性和积极性具有实践价值.     

考虑风险的产业技术联盟知识共享演化博弈研究

知识共享是促进产业技术联盟绩效增长的重要途径。考虑产业技术联盟成员风险偏好的差异性,引入成员风险因子与知识共享收益因素,构建基于风险因子和知识共享收益非线性关系的演化博弈支付矩阵,并求得博弈的均衡解。通过TD产业联盟的案例分析,仿真模拟风险因子、收益分配系数等因素对知识共享意愿的影响。研究结果表明:联盟成员的共享意愿对收益分配系数的变化非常敏感;风险因子和知识共享程度对联盟成员的共享意愿影响较大。     

具有限制结盟结构的供应链合作创新及其收益分配

针对具有限制结盟结构特征的三级供应链合作创新联盟问题,分析了由单个供应商、制造商和销售商组成的不同联盟系统下的收益情况,并运用图合作博弈的average tree solution(简称“A-T解”)法对各成员的收益进行了分配。结果表明,所有成员参与供应链联盟时总收益最大,且A-T解分配法与Shapley值法相比更具合理性和有效性,能充分突出成员在合作联盟中的特殊地位(位置)及其重要性,该结论进一步通过比较不同级别结构下的供应链收益分配问题进行说明。     

Airport games: The core and its center

An approach to define a rule for an airport problem is to associate to each problem a cooperative game, an airport game, and using game theory to come out with a solution. In this paper, we study the rule that is the average of all the core allocations: the core-center (González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2007). The structure of the core is exploited to derive insights on the core-center. First, we provide a decomposition of the core in terms of the cores of the downstream-subtraction reduced games. Then, we analyze the structure of the faces of the core of an airport game that correspond to the no-subsidy constraints to find that the faces of the core can be seen as new airport games, the face games, and that the core can be decomposed through the no-subsidy cones (those whose bases are the cores of the no-subsidy face games). As a consequence, we provide two methods for computing the core-center of an airport problem, both with interesting economic interpretations: one expresses the core-center as a ratio of the volume of the core of an airport game for which a player is cloned over the volume of the original core, the other defines a recursive algorithm to compute the core-center through the no-subsidy cones. Finally, we prove that the core-center is not only an intuitive appealing game-theoretic solution for the airport problem but it has also a good behavior with respect to the basic properties one expects an airport rule to satisfy. We examine some differences between the core-center and, arguably, the two more popular game theoretic solutions for airport problems: the Shapley value and the nucleolus.     

Communicability graph and community structures in complex networks

We use the concept of the network communicability [E. Estrada, N. Hatano, Communicability in complex networks, Phys. Rev. E 77 (2008) 036111] to define communities in a complex network. The communities are defined as the cliques of a “communicability graph”, which has the same set of nodes as the complex network and links determined by the communicability function. Then, the problem of finding the network communities is transformed to an all-clique problem of the communicability graph. We discuss the efficiency of this algorithm of community detection. In addition, we extend here the concept of the communicability to account for the strength of the interactions between the nodes by using the concept of inverse temperature of the network. Finally, we develop an algorithm to manage the different degrees of overlapping between the communities in a complex network. We then analyze the USA airport network, for which we successfully detect two big communities of the eastern airports and of the western/central airports as well as two bridging central communities. In striking contrast, a well-known algorithm groups all but two of the continental airports into one community.     

市场机制和政府调控下产学研联盟稳定性研究

为了促进产学研联盟的稳定发展,针对我国产学研联盟短期化行为严重问题,基于演化博弈理论从市场机制和政府调控两方面构建企业和学研机构联盟行为选择的决策模型,以及通过复制动态方程对策略选择进行稳定性分析,同时运用Matlab 7.0软件模拟仿真在不同程度的市场机制和政府调控下企业和学研机构在联盟创新中的演化行为。通过市场机制和政府调控两方面的深入剖析,对我国产学研联盟的稳定发展具有重要的理论指导意义。     

Topology of the Italian airport network: A scale-free small-world network with a fractal structure?

In this paper, for the first time we analyze the structure of the Italian Airport Network (IAN) looking at it as a mathematical graph and investigate its topological properties. We find that it has very remarkable features, being like a scale-free network, since both the degree and the “betweenness centrality” distributions follow a typical power-law known in literature as a Double Pareto Law. From a careful analysis of the data, the Italian Airport Network turns out to have a self-similar structure. In short, it is characterized by a fractal nature, whose typical dimensions can be easily determined from the values of the power-law scaling exponents.Moreover, we show that, according to the period examined, these distributions exhibit a number of interesting features, such as the existence of some “hubs”, i.e. in the graph theory’s jargon, nodes with a very large number of links, and others most probably associated with geographical constraints.Also, we find that the IAN can be classified as a small-world network because the average distance between reachable pairs of airports grows at most as the logarithm of the number of airports. The IAN does not show evidence of “communities” and this result could be the underlying reason behind the smallness of the value of the clustering coefficient, which is related to the probability that two nearest neighbors of a randomly chosen airport are connected.     

Game analysis of technology innovation alliance stability based on knowledge transfer

Under incomplete information, a game model is used to investigate the influence of ownership level and learning ability on the stability of technology innovation alliance from the perspective of knowledge transfer. The decision-making processes of involved parties are divided into two stages in the model. In the first stage, the firm possessing advanced technology decides on the level of knowledge it transfers to its alliance partner. In the second stage, the decision of the parties on whether to maintain or terminate the alliance is based on two factors: the level of knowledge learned and profits gained. The outcomes of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium in the model can reveal when the parties decide to maintain or terminate the alliance. The model explores the status of alliance stability under different ownership levels and learning abilities to provide theoretical support for the selection of optimal dynamic competitive-cooperative relationship and managerial flexibility.     

利益驱动对创新网络合作行为演化的影响机理及仿真——基于复杂网络拓扑结构视角

随着合作创新的网络化发展,创新网络中各主体的利益诉求对网络演化的影响不断加深。基于不同网络拓扑结构视角下不同利益对创新网络主体合作行为的影响,建立了创新网络演化博弈模型。在无标度与小世界网络拓扑结构下,结合声誉机制、学习行为、网络环境等因素,对创新网络中合作行为的演化进行了仿真研究。结果表明:创新网络的合作行为演化受到网络结构及规模的双重影响,在无标度网络下,合作率更加稳定;合作利益的公平分配促进创新网络合作行为的演化;机会利益的诱惑导致创新网络合作行为的显著波动。     

机场安全运行监管机制的动态博弈分析

监管机制是否行之有效是决定机场能否长期安全运行的关键所在.针对机场安全运行监管现状,进一步挖掘机场与政府之间内在博弈机理,在引入机场按章运行与违章运行下发生不安全事件概率因子的基础上,构建了机场与政府之间的安全运行动态监管博弈模型,研究了二者在机场安全运行监管过程中博弈双方的策略选择问题.通过对模型混合策略纳什均衡进行...     

航空公司部分多属的枢纽机场定价研究

平台经济理论的运用是机场管理研究的新视角.以机场为平台商,航空公司和乘客为平台用户,在平台经济的分析框架下,以Armstrong价格模型为基础,并吸收Hotelling模型关于平台竞争及客户异质性的构建思想,针对竞争性的枢纽机场的定价策略进行研究.结果表明:机场的定价策略与航空公司和乘客的网络外部性参数和需求的价格弹性、乘客的预期交易次数、机场服务成本有关;倾斜的定价策略和航空收入与非航空收入的交叉补贴并不适用于模型假设下的机场.     

TPL介入的产运销供应链联盟决策及运作效率评价

在生产商批发价格为内生变量且TPL物流服务水平影响零售商市场需求的情形下,研究了整体联盟、分散决策、产运联盟和运销联盟四种模式下产运销供应链系统内各决策主体的决策行为以及系统的运作效率。分别构建了各决策模式下的数学模型,并证明了系统最优解或博弈均衡解的存在性和唯一性。通过对上述四种模式下的运算结果进行两两比较,发现:较之整体联盟,其他三种决策模式下系统利润均出现损失;其他三种模式下的最优订购量、物流服务水平和二者的比值大小均取决于某些特定的条件,这导致TPL介入的供应链内部联盟并非一定能使系统整体运作效率获得提高。进一步通过数值算例对零售价格和可变物流服务成本进行了灵敏度分析,发现在大多数情形下,运销联盟模式下的系统运作效率是上述三种决策模式中最高的。