On the psychological meaning of information about competence: A reply to Ryan and Deci's comment on Butler (1987).

The comment by R. M. Ryan and E. L. Deci (see record 1989-34660-001) addresses a study (R. Butler; see record 1988-21628-001) in which I investigated the motivational effects of different kinds of information. Findings were related to several issues, including the different emphases of J. G. Nicholls's (see record 1984-28719-001) theory of task/ego involvement and their cognitive evaluation theory. Ryan and Deci's comment on my article reflects cognitive evaluation theory's emphasis on perceived autonomy as the major determinant of intrinsic motivation. I discuss certain methodological and conceptual limitations of their approach in understanding the impact of different achievement goals and competence strivings on intrinsically motivated behavior. I suggest that it would be fruitful to work toward a synthesis between cognitive evaluation theory and achievement theory that would clarify the relation between perceptions of autonomy and conceptions of competence. Such a synthesis should be helpful in achieving their common aim of promoting task-involved, intrinsically motivated learning in the classroom. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Formulations théoriques contemporaines en motivation intrinsèque: Revue et critique.

Reviews recent theoretical formulations on explaining and predicting the effects of reinforcement on intrinsic motivation. Included are the overjustification hypothesis of M. R. Lepper et al (see record 1974-10498-001), cognitive evaluation theory of E. L. Deci and R. M. Ryan (1975, 1980), the competing response hypothesis of S. Reiss and L. W. Sushinsky (see record 1975-28914-001), and the delay of gratification hypothesis of W. Mischel et al (see record 1972-20631-001). Cognitive evaluation theory was found to provide the most complete theory in that it generates predictions of both decreases and increases in intrinsic motivation. Little conceptual evidence was found for the major theoretical formulations, and the use of an interactional paradigm in future research is stressed. (73 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond symbolizing: A response to Bornstein’s review.

Responds to the review by R. F. Bornstein (see record 2010-02522-001) on the current author's book, "Psychoanalysis and cognitive science: A multiple code theory" (see record 1997-08863-000). Although there is not much that Bornstein says with which Bucci can disagree, she responds specifically to a few of Bornstein's points and adds a few that he does not include. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of facial response in self-reports of emotion: A critique of Laird.

Discusses a study by J. D. Laird (see record 1985-11387-001) that contrasted 16 successful demonstrations of the facial feedback hypothesis with R. Tourangeau and P. C. Ellsworth's (see record 1981-00499-001) failure to demonstrate any effects of facial expressions on mood. It is argued that Laird's conclusion that facial feedback effects have been demonstrated consistently and that the null results of the Tourangeau-Ellsworth study are atypical is more strongly worded than current evidence warrants. It is shown that most of the 16 successful studies are relevant only to the weak (dimensional) version of the hypothesis and not to the strong (categorical) version that Tourangeau and Ellsworth sought to test. (36 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recent psychological approaches to the free will versus determinism issue.

This article examines the scientific utility of the concept of free will. Distinctions are drawn between the concepts of hard determinism, soft determinism, libertarianism, conscious choice, beliefs about conscious control, volitional behavior, and actual personal control. Relevant theories reviewed include R. Zavolloni's (1962) feedback theory, J. E. Rychlak's (1981) telospouse theory, C. W. Tageson's (1982) 3-dimensional model, R. W. Sperry's (see record 1989-00022-001) theory of supervenient control, A. Bandura's (see record 1990-01275-001) theory of agency, and the chaos concept. Data relevant to these theories are reviewed. It is concluded that theories of free will can be compatible with the scientific tasks of prediction and control. However, the free will vs. determinism issue is unlikely to be resolved conclusively by using scientific data. Nevertheless, the concept of free will can play a useful role in scientific theorizing by serving as a meta-assumption. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive resource theory: Issues for specifying a test of the theory.

F. E. Fiedler et al (see record 1992-34884-001) raise a variety of objections to a study by R. P. Vecchio (see record 1990-17057-001), which addressed the 7 propositions of cognitive resource theory. Their objections, which are essentially based on reservations offered in the article itself, reflect overstatement and are largely unfounded. This article examines each of their objections and reiterates areas that deserve further refinement. Future research related to cognitive resource theory will benefit from a consideration of the original points raised in the author's earlier article. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Microgenetic methods revisited.

Responds to the comments of R. C. Fowler (see record 1993-05092-001) and M. Pressley (see record 1993-05123-001) to the authors' article (see record 1991-27066-001) regarding the microgenetic method (MM) of studying cognitive development. The authors discuss views of development and methodological issues to assert that the MM produces more useful data than available alternatives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Confluence effects: Not here, not nowp.

R. B. Zajonc and G. B. Markus's (see record 1976-09290-001) confluence model is both a statement of a psychological theory and a mathematical operationalization of that theory. As such, it is the first formal behavioral model of the relationship between intelligence and family configuration and applies to within-family processes. However, most tests of the model have been done on aggregate data or have lacked the necessary information to do a direct test of the model. The present study applied the confluence model to longitudinal data on 311 intact families with 906 children. Data were also tested with simple linear models, and the analyses by M. L. Berbaum and R. L. Moreland (see record 1980-32378-001) and R. C. Galbraith (see record 1982-11822-001) were replicated. Results suggest the confluence model should be rejected as a useful model for these data based on principles of parsimony and predictability. Consideration of confluence in historical perspective suggests that the underlying psychological processes are not well enough understood to expect predictability from models as complex and rigid as confluence. Strategies for future model development are proposed. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychological adjustment and cancer outcome: Levy versus Taylor.

In response to S. Levy's (see record 1985-25856-001) criticism of R. Taylor's (see record 1984-17824-001) proposed cognitive theory of adaptation to cancer, the present author argues that Levy's contention that psychological maladjustment is associated with positive biological outcome is unjustified and bears little relevance to Taylor's model and its testability. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Neural nets for generalization and classification: Comment on Staddon and Reid (1990).

The neural net model of J. E. R. Staddon and A. K. Reid (see record 1991-03032-001) explains exponential and Gaussian generalization gradients in the same way as the diffusion model of R. N. Shepard (1958). The "cognitive" generalization theory of Shepard (see record 1988-28272-001), which also has been implemented as a connectionist network, goes beyond both of these models in accounting for classification learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stages of brain and cognitive maturation.

H. T. Epstein (see PA, Vol 52:9783 and 1986), R. B. McCall (see record 1988-32308-001), and R. B. McCall et al (see record 1984-17419-001) presented discrepant findings regarding the presence of stages in brain and cognitive maturation, as described in Piagetian theory. This article questions whether their variables (e.g., skull circumference and global mental test scores) are appropriate indices from which to make such conclusions. Evidence from direct brain measurements (e.g., the quantitative electroencephalogram [QEEG]) and other neurobiological indices provides stronger support for the conclusion that regional brain maturation exhibits growth spurts and plateaus. The specific neuropsychological functions represented by regional QEEG maturation data give a composite picture of brain growth that is consistent with Piagetian theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development in moral judgment research.

Two recent articles challenge cognitive developmental interpretations given to moral judgment research using preference data. One article, by J. J. Moran et al (see record 1979-28407-001), suggests that preference data may reflect preference for language sophistication rather than for levels of moral reasoning. The other article, by R. M. Martin (see record 1978-11439-001), suggests that preference for statements of moral reasoning may reflect a prior commitment to an action choice rather than an evaluation of moral reasoning. The evidence in both articles is critiqued, subsequent research dealing with the problems raised is cited, and a reconceptualization of the issues is recommended. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Existentialism and development.

Responds to comments made by G. Kose (see record 1993-25090-001), K. Sun (see record 1993-25097-001), and R. K. Meister (see record 1993-25094-001) on B. Vandenberg's (see record 1992-12211-001) article on epistemology and an existentialist consideration of development. Taking exception with Kose's definition of existentialism and Key's remarks on morality and cognitive developments, Vandenberg voices his agreement with Meister on having a developmental perspective on the concept of death. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

More remarks on social desirability.

Comments on R. Hogan and R. A. Nicholson's (see record 1989-00097-001) article on the meaning of personality test scores, noting that the article elicited a recounting and evaluation of the history of a 25-yr-old controversy over social desirability by 2 of its central participants, A. L. Edwards (see record 1990-13700-001) and J. A. Walsh (see record 1990-13747-001). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Some comments about cognitions as causal variables.

Notes problems with the position forwarded by I. S. Schonfeld (see record 1990-31203-001) that cognitive behaviors may play a role in antisocial behaviors. A longitudinal study by L. R. Huesmann et al (see record 1987-15097-001) is cited that is not consistent with Schonfeld's hypothesis but is consistent with the hypothesis presented by G. R. Patterson et al (see record 1989-26278-001) that achievement failures are the result of antisocial behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Is the cognitive revolution all it is made up to be?

Comments on R. W. Sperry's (see record 1994-00012-001) article on the impact and promise of the cognitive revolution. It is argued that apart from lacking justification as a revolutionary perspective, the cognitive revolution is also found wanting in terms of recent developments in cultural theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the pitfalls of "Ptolemaic" psychology: A reply to Sawusch and Mullennix.

In their reply to the present authors (see record 1986-05428-001), J. R. Sawusch and J. W. Mullennix (see record 1986-05440-001) proposed a counterinterpretation of the authors' results regarding conceptualizations of selective adaptation with speech and described some previously unpublished data that they took to be inconsistent with the present authors' unified adaptation-level account of selective adaptation and contrast effects. It is argued that this counterinterpretation requires a series of purely ad hoc assumptions that render the 2-stage theory of Sawusch and P. Jusczyk (see record 1982-00351-001) almost completely vacuous. It is also shown that the new data of Sawusch and Mullennix are definitely not incompatible with an adaptation-level account. (15 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ending arousal's reign of error: A reply to Anderson.

The unsuitability of global arousal as an explanatory construct has been documented for more than a third of a century (R. Neiss; see record 1989-14248-001). K. J. Anderson's (see record 1990-11404-001) critique attempted to justify continued use of the arousal construct, principally by citing her group's theorizing and research. This reply counters Anderson's argument that cognitive performance and the effects of drugs are best conceptualized in terms of arousal by analyzing this research program. It is proposed that the theorizing presented by Anderson ignores affect by separating mind and body. The empirical studies cited in support of this theory generally fail to assess arousal, and interpret widely varying patterns of results as supportive of the theory, nearly precluding falsifiability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Separate features versus one principle: Comment on Shimaya (1997).

In his article "Perception of Complex Line Drawings," A. Shimaya (see record 1997-02284-003) proposed a quantitative theory that was designed to predict perceived segmentations and amodal completions of line drawings. Shimaya further evaluated the integrative approach of structural information theory (SIT; R. Van Lier, P. Van der Helm, & E. Leeuwenberg, [see record 1995-23971-001]) to pattern interpretation. It is argued in this comment that Shimaya's evaluation of the SIT approach is based on a misconception of SITs basic assumptions and an inappropriate data analysis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)