Managing Transboundary Crises: Identifying the Building Blocks of an Effective Response System

In recent years, crises have become increasingly transboundary in nature. This exploratory paper investigates whether and how the transboundary dimensions of crises such as pandemics, cyber attacks and prolonged critical infrastructure failure accentuate the challenges that public and private authorities confront in the face of urgent threats. We explore the transboundary dimensions of crises and disasters, discuss how an increase in ‘transboundedness’ affects traditional crisis management challenges and investigate what administrative mechanisms are needed to deal with these compounded challenges. Building on lessons learned from past crises and disasters, our goal is to stimulate a discussion among crisis management scholars about the political‐administrative capabilities required to deal with ‘transboundary’ crises.     

The Transboundary Crisis: Why we are unprepared and the road ahead

Modern societies rely on complex technological systems that are deeply intertwined with other complex systems that stretch across geographical, judicial and administrative borders. When threats emanate from this transboundary space, national governments are often surprised and discover that existing crisis management arrangements do not suffice. This article describes the political and administrative challenges that accompany transboundary crises. It argues that arrangements and processes that work reasonably well for “bounded” crises are unlikely to work in the case of transboundary crises. It formulates an agenda for political debate and academic research. The bottom line is that we need to rethink traditional crisis management arrangements in order to prepare for these increasingly common type of threats.     

Managing Crises in the EU: Some Reflections of a Non‐EU Scholar

In recent years the EU has been increasingly involved in development and implementation of crisis policy as a component of its development and security policy. This process is seriously complicated by the EU architects, who had never conceived it as a crisis management institute. Therefore they failed to design built‐in organisational capacities into the Union to mitigate and respond to crises. In addition, the EU‐agreed overarching concept of crisis as such and EU crisis in particular is missing. Both issues remain a primary question on research and policy agendas. Provided below are some of the author's considerations and comments on these issues. It is argued that, despite the existing divergence in crisis interpretations in the EU, coherent conceptualisation is possible and approaches to this are introduced. Practical implications of generic crisis conceptualisation for EU crisis management policy are analysed. Within this context three major lessons from international experience, including that from the USA and Russia, are emphasised. These concern the issues of organisational flexibility, learning from earlier major crises and comprehensive training of crisis decision units critical for efficient crisis management policy.     

Organizational synthesis in transboundary crises: Three principles for managing centralization and coordination in the corona virus crisis response

Boin (2019) argues that in transboundary crisis management it is almost impossible to achieve centralization and coordination. This article identifies three principles through which actors in a transboundary crisis can balance centralization with autonomy while shaping coordination along the way. We reanalysed three transboundary cases: the Dutch military mission in Afghanistan, the downing of MH17 and hurricane Irma striking Sint‐Maarten. The principles we found are as follows: (a) reformulating key strategic priorities, (b) flexible adaptation of crisis management protocols and (c) the emergence of multifunctional units. With these three principles, we reflect on challenges in the Dutch crisis response to the corona outbreak and propose improvements for progressing current crisis management efforts.     

Explaining the Emergence of Different European Union Crisis and Emergency Management Structures

Two European Union (EU) tools were adopted to enhance cooperation among Member States in the case of crises and emergencies (natural, industrial or man‐made) occurring both inside and outside the EU borders: first, the EU has developed a new tool in the field of civil protection that has been managed by the Directorate General Environment of the European Commission under the label of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism since 2001. Second, the Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA), under the responsibility of the European Council, have been developed since 2005. Using a sociological neo‐institutionalist approach based on the concept of ‘divergent isomorphism’, the paper explains who and what the sources of EU integration process were leading to the coexistence of these two structures. Two case studies are presented using process tracing to demonstrate that two different pre‐existing organizational models were copied to create the EU structures of crisis and emergency management: that of the Community Marine pollution framework for the Community Civil Protection Mechanism and that of NATO for the CCA.     

A System under Stress: The Icelandic Volcano Ash Crisis

This paper analyzes the response to the Icelandic volcano ash crisis of 2010. We examine how the original response was determined by the formal organization of the European air traffic control system, how the crisis was defined, what characterized the or new regulatory regime, and how one can explain the development and handling of the crisis. The theoretical basis is a combination of instrumental organization theory and crisis management theories. The crisis is handled via established organizational arrangements and principles that impose limits on the scope of action. The response to the crisis involved fine‐tuning in the form of an instrumental and incremental adaptation of policies, regulations and practices challenging core political values, which also exhibit elements of path dependency.     

Growth strategy for Finnish science parks under external economic crises

Finland has experienced several economic crises since the 1990s. Among these, the last two economic crises such as the global financial crisis in 2008 and the EU sovereignty debt crisis are still ongoing process because the nation still fights for its economic recovering. Although the national economy has suffered from a low economic growth due to the external economic environment, Finnish science parks known as Technopolis Plc have achieved a high growth and a rapid expansion even to other European countries. Technopolis Plc is a comprehensive service provider for high tech companies growing rapidly in domestic and global markets. At the same time, it is regarded as an innovative company playing significant roles in innovation and high economic growth in the region. The paper argues how Technopolis Plc could grow rapidly particularly under the economic crises and explores which growth strategies have been implemented. Moreover, it also analyses how its future prospects are and whether its growth strategies can be sustainable or not.     

Social media crisis management: Aligning corporate response strategies with stakeholders’ emotions online

The article focuses on how the analysis of stakeholders’ emotions online can help companies facing a social media crisis determine the response strategy that will best minimize the reputational threat. The article indeed questions the relevance of classical crisis management theory to an online environment. Results show that social media have increased the unpredictability of corporate crises. Consequently, on social media, crises cannot be addressed with the methods that have prevailed so far. Rather, incorporating emotion‐based analysis in six case studies showed how crisis analysis, and the subsequent response strategy, could be fine‐tuned. The article builds on recent literature to develop a new analytical framework for response strategies and a model for crisis resolution—the social media crisis management matrix.     

What Factors Drive Organizational Learning From Crisis? Insights From the Dutch Food Safety Services’ Response to Four Veterinary Crises

Although organizational learning has been studied extensively, empirical studies in relation to crises and theory building have remained scarce. This study explored what factors affect the learning process from crises of a public sector organization. We studied the responses of the Dutch food safety services (NVWA) to the veterinary crises classical swine fever (1997–1998), foot‐and‐mouth disease (2001), avian influenza (2003) and Q fever (2007–2010). Data from in‐depth interviews with key experts in the organization and from crisis management documents pointed to political–economic context, social–emotional understanding, organizational structure, organizational culture, crisis management stage and organizational forgetting as key factors. Remarkably, postcrisis evaluation reports, leadership and a shared sense‐making of what lessons to learn were not found to play a central role.     

Lessons from the MH17 transboundary disaster investigation

Transboundary crises, incidents and disasters, such as chemical spills, airplane crashes and critical infrastructure breakdowns, involving multiple levels and domains of governance pose a particular set of challenges. These challenges also pertain to the investigation and learning phase of a crisis. We study a typical transboundary case: the crash of a Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), with 298 people on board from a variety of nationalities but the majority from the Netherlands, that crashed in Ukraine in a conflict zone near the Russian border. The MH17 case contains valuable lessons on transboundary disaster investigations. The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) took the lead of the international independent investigation into the causes of the crash. With an international group of stakeholders, the DSB investigated a crash that resulted from a bilateral conflict, requiring the support from Ukraine's powerful neighbour Russia that meanwhile stood accused of withholding evidence and supporting Ukrainian separatists. Retrieving evidence and researching the causality of the crash was no easy task. If countries wish to follow their ambition to learn from accidents in order to “prevent the past repeated,” they may more often need to investigate such transboundary cases. This case study probes into how challenges that are typical to transboundary crises affected the accident investigation into the MH17 disaster. We search for lessons on transboundary accident investigation that transcend the boundaries of this single case. Such lessons may prove invaluable for learning from future accidents.     

Crisis Management Planning among Tier 2 Automobile Suppliers: Why Suppliers Fail to Plan

One of the greatest threats facing automobile suppliers is a disruption to the supply chain resulting from a crisis. This paper explores why nearly two‐thirds of Tier 2 automobile suppliers fail to plan for these substantial risks by comparing the identification of potential crises, and assessments of the risk of occurrence and impacts on the firm between suppliers that do and do not plan for potential crises. The results show that suppliers that do not plan identified fewer potential crises, and rated their risks and impacts lower. These assessments weigh heavily against the decision to develop crisis management plans, and are rated more important by suppliers than the cost of planning or the availability of resources to plan.     

Can crisis management teams mitigate COVID-19's effects? A comparative case study between China and the United States

The COVID-19 pandemic has been the world's greatest challenge since World War II. As an unprecedented global public health crisis, crisis management teams (CMTs) in the infected countries need to rethink to cope with the similar uncertainty and urgency of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The shared context of COVID-19 allows us to explore a cross-nation study of different constructs and CMT to communicate information about crises with the public effectively. Since the pandemic affected all countries, the comparison is warranted. Can CMTs mitigate the effects of COVID-19? Based on the analysis of China and the US cases, our study explores how shared and common knowledge cognition among crisis responders plays a pivotal role in effective CMTs' communication while technological failures and inadequate information disrupt the system, worsening pandemics like COVID-19. Furthermore, organizational dysfunction, such as institutional fragmentation, regulatory hurdles and bureaucratic arrogance, impede effective communication between CMTs. However, effective coordination and decisive leadership could improve coordination effectiveness and reduce crisis costs.     

Understanding EU Crisis Decision‐making: The Case of Chechnya and the Finnish Presidency

Why did the European Union accept a limited policy risk by adopting sanctions against a difficult target, Russia, in the Chechnya conflict and what does this case tell about the EU's crisis management practice? The explanation of the decision is based on problem framing, the exertion of power and the justifications of decision‐making. The analysis shows that occasionally the Union may adopt a bold policy, if a situation is framed as a grave crisis, a strong leadership of large members emerges advocating a firm response and pressures of public opinion preclude passivity; in addition, the policy is considered justified by groupthink based on anticipation, by institutional arguments as well as lessons learnt, which are likely to lead to stronger commitments. Yet the policy is likely to be a bounded one because of constraining values and goals, previous institutional commitments and practices, countervailing policy lessons and rational recognition of the Union's limited influence. Moreover, a bold policy may prove to be inconsistent over time. As a rule the pivotal role of large EU members, established practices as well as the decentralisation and consensus‐seeking tendencies combine to limit the Union's crisis response to a restricted and supporting diplomatic and economic role. The ongoing efforts to enhance the EU's crisis management capacity are yet to change significantly these habitual patterns.     

Towards a Theoretical Understanding of the Recurrence of Crises Embracing the Issue of Organizational Learning: An Illustration with the Case of Two Hostile Takeover Bids Faced by Société Générale (1988, 1999)

In this article, we try to better understand the relationship between learning and crisis through the analysis of recurrent crises. Our study focused on two successive and similar crises experienced by the same organization, namely two hostile takeover bids a French bank (Société Générale) had to cope with in 1988 and 1999. From a literature review within the fields of organizational learning and management crisis, we proposed an analytical grid making it possible to get a better understanding of crisis‐induced lesson‐drawing processes. We then used that grid to analyse and compare the learning processes implemented during the two crises under study. This comparison leads us to suggest that lack of organizational learning is one factor that accounts for crisis recurrence. Conversely, proactive crisis management behaviour – resulting from double‐loop learning – seems to be the most fruitful behaviour to adopt in order to prevent a recurrent crisis and produce long‐term effects in the organization.     

The European Union's capacities for managing crises

This article draws on a comprehensive new data set of crisis management capacities at the European Union level to highlight key patterns in their development and use. Organised within the categories of detection, sense‐making, decision‐making, coordination, meaning‐making, communication, and accountability, the data show considerable accumulation of capacities in detection and sense‐making, while decision‐making capacities lag behind. We find that most capacities are sector‐oriented rather than cross‐sectoral, and reside primarily within the European Commission rather than other EU institutions. Comparing the data to previous studies, we note that capacities overall are increasing and some are undergoing evolution; for example, horizon‐scanning tools once limited to collecting information have increasingly been given an analytical, “information enrichment” function akin to sense‐making.     

A Schematic View of Crisis Threat Assessment

Given the short time available for decision‐making during a crisis, a schema is considered useful to organizations both for making sense of crisis situations and for developing an effective crisis plan. As an effort to bridge the existing ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ approaches in crisis classification, a schematic view of assessing crisis threats is elaborated in this study and a new instrument for empirical measurement is further developed. The study is based on a triangulated research design. Based on inductive research and a questionnaire survey, we developed a schematic framework using a measuring instrument for assessing crisis threats that has four dimensions: command incompetence, environmental pressure, information ambiguity, and coordination difficulties. Then, a comparative case study was used to justify the schematic framework.     

Corporate Governance in the Context of Crises: Towards a Stakeholder Theory of Crisis Management

In this paper, we take a step towards developing a stakeholder theory of crisis management. We argue that, in the context of crises, adopting the principles of a stakeholder model of corporate governance will lead companies to engage more frequently in proactive and/or accommodating crisis management behaviour even if these crisis management behaviours are not perceived to maximize shareholder value. We also propose a mechanism that may explain why the stakeholder model may be associated with more successful crisis management outcomes. We conclude by challenging the efficacy of the shareholder view in crisis and crisis‐like situations, and call for further theoretical and empirical research.     

Crisis Politics in Authoritarian Regimes: How Crises Catalyse Changes under the State–Society Interactive Framework

Most studies and research on crisis management and government crises focus on nations that are advanced and democratic. Through the institutionalized mechanism of voting, the public can respond to a government's handling of a crisis without destabilizing the democratic system of government. However, the consequences of crises, particularly governance crises, in authoritarian regimes have not been adequately addressed. Drawing upon different frameworks in the field, this paper proposes a heuristic crisis development ladder and a state–society interactive framework more relevant for studying crisis management in authoritarian nations such as China. By focusing on the catalytic effect of crisis that accelerates reforms and changes, this paper argues that critical crises are politically powerful and decisive in authoritarian systems, especially in the context of an increasingly proactive civil society. This paper illustrates the crisis provoking politics that influences decision‐making under non‐democratic rule.     

Coping with Katrina: Assessing Crisis Management Behaviours in the Big One

Hurricane Katrina continues to capture attention and influence scholarship including official reports that focus more on event chronologies than on conceptual patterns. Our paper explores conceptual patterns crisis management behaviour, drawing upon Lalonde's (2004) archetypes of crisis managers as collectivists, integrators, and reactives. We add a paralytics archetype for our analysis. Key findings include an imbalance between counterproductive and constructive archetypes. Reactive and paralytic crisis manager behaviours were over‐represented, significantly contributing to conflict, communication failures, and the systemic failure of governments. Collectivist and integrator archetypes were badly under‐represented, limiting intergovernmental relations, cooperation, and communication embedded in these behaviour types. Crisis management performance with future crises would benefit from a systematic assessment of crisis management styles and behaviours.