Vertical cost information sharing in a supply chain with value-adding retailers

We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two value-adding heterogeneous retailers. Each retailer has full knowledge about his own value-added cost structure that is unknown to the supplier and the other retailer. Assuming there is no horizontal information sharing between two retailers, we model the supply chain with a three-stage game-theoretic framework. In the first stage each retailer decides if he is willing to vertically disclose his private cost information to the supplier. In the second stage, given the information he has about the retailers, the supplier announces the wholesale price to the retailers. In response to the wholesale price, in the third stage, the retailers optimize their own retail prices and the values added to the product, respectively. Under certain conditions, we prove the existence of equilibrium prices and added values. Furthermore, we obtain the condition under which both retailers are unwilling to vertically share their private information with the supplier, as well as the conditions under which both retailers have incentives to reveal their cost information to the supplier, thus leading to a win–win situation for the whole supply chain.     

Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain

We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win-win.     

Coordinating a three level supply chain with flexible return policies

This paper studies the coordination issue of a three level supply chain selling short life cycle products in a single period model. The manufacturer first negotiates the trade contract with the retailer, then with the supplier. We construct the so-called flexible return policy by setting the rules of pricing while postponing the determination of the final contract prices. With return policies between each pair of adjacent firms, unsold products or used modules dissembled from the unsold products are returned level by level from the retailer to the upstream firms and each firm shares in the loss due to the overstock. We show that the three level supply chain can be fully coordinated with appropriate contracts and the total profit of the channel can be allocated with any specified ratios among the firms.     

Information sharing in a supply chain with a make-to-stock manufacturer

We study ex ante information sharing in a supply chain consisting of a downstream retailer and a make-to-stock upstream manufacturer. The retailer has imperfect demand information and may choose to share it with the manufacturer. Based on the information sharing arrangement, the manufacturer makes the wholesale price and the stocking level decisions. Then the retailer decides the order quantity and the manufacturer fulfills the order up to the available stock level. We find that the retailer has an incentive to voluntarily share the information with the make-to-stock manufacturer if the magnitude of demand uncertainty is intermediate. This stands in sharp contrast with the existing studies which show that the retailer never shares information when the manufacturer is make-to-order. Our results highlight the interdependence between the retailer׳s incentive to share information and the manufacturer׳s operational and marketing decisions.     

Supply chain coordination under discrete information asymmetries and quantity discounts

We consider a two node supply chain with a rational manufacturer–retailer pair, in which the retailer has private information that affects the nodes׳ reservation levels. Quantity discounts offered by the manufacturer is the mechanism we propose in order to achieve reduced costs for both supply chain nodes. We derive analytical expressions of the quantity discounts that minimize the manufacturer׳s costs, while enabling the establishment of the business. Furthermore, we show that perfect coordination is possible even under asymmetric information. Sensitivity analysis and numerical examples offer evidence of the robustness of the results and of the potential of the approach for applications to real-life business ventures.     

Fresh-product supply chain management with logistics outsourcing

We consider a supply chain in which a producer supplies a fresh product, through a third-party logistics (3PL) provider, to a distant market where a distributor purchases and sells it to end customers. The product is perishable, both the quantity and quality of which may deteriorate during the process of transportation. The market demand is random, sensitive to the selling price as well as the freshness of the product. We derive the optimal decisions for the three supply chain members, including the 3PL provider's transportation fee, the producer's shipping quantity and wholesale price, and the distributor's purchasing quantity and retail price. We find that the presence of the 3PL provider in the supply chain has a significant impact on its performance. We propose an incentive scheme to coordinate the supply chain. The scheme consists of two contracts, including a wholesale-market clearance (WMC) contract between the producer and the distributor, and a wholesale-price-discount sharing (WDS) contract between the producer and the 3PL provider. We show that the proposed contracts can eliminate the two sources of “double marginalization” that exist in the three-tier supply chain, and induce the three parties to act in a coordinated way.     

Potentially self-defeating: Group buying in a two-tier supply chain

Retailers have an incentive to cooperate in the form of group buying (GB) when a supplier provides quantity discounts, because wholesale price under GB depends on total purchasing quantity rather than individual purchasing (IP) quantity. Most previous studies on GB focus on the benefits that buyers get but ignore the supplier׳s response to GB. In this paper, we take the supplier׳s response into consideration, and present a game model with a single supplier and two symmetric competing retailers in two systems: the retailers purchase individually, and the retailers group buy. Under a general quantity discount schedule, each system has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium. The comparison between IP and GB suggests that GB may sabotage the benefits of all members in the supply chain (i.e., the supplier, the retailers, and the consumer). Retailers may hold contradictory attitudes toward GB before and after the publishing of the discount schedule. These insights are shown to be robust for the case when more than two retailers are involved, as well as the case when the supplier enjoys economies of scale based on the order volume. We suggest that a mixed discount schedule may help prevent the potential damage of GB. In addition, with significant economies of scale, the supplier and retailers may be better off under GB. Then GB can be a favorable purchasing strategy.     

Centralization versus decentralization: Risk pooling,risk diversification,and supply chain disruptions

We investigate optimal system design in a multi-location system in which supply is subject to disruptions. We examine the expected costs and cost variances of the system in both a centralized and a decentralized inventory system. We show that, when demand is deterministic and supply may be disrupted, using a decentralized inventory design reduces cost variance through the risk diversification effect, and therefore a decentralized inventory system is optimal. This is in contrast to the classical result that when supply is deterministic and demand is stochastic, centralization is optimal due to the risk-pooling effect. When both supply may be disrupted and demand is stochastic, we demonstrate that a risk-averse firm should typically choose a decentralized inventory system design.     

Outsourcing vs. in-house production: a comparison of supply chain contracts with effort dependent demand

We analyze the effort and pricing decisions in a two facility supply chain in which one of the parties can exert costly effort to increase demand. We consider an outsourcing model in which the supplier makes the effort decision and an in-house production model in which the manufacturer decides on the effort level and we compare these two models with each other. We analyze and compare several contracts for decentralized supply chain models and we aim to find which contracts are best to use in different cases. We find the optimal contract parameters in each case and perform extensive computational testing to compare the efficiencies of these contracts. We also analyze the effect of the powers of the parties in the system and the effect of system parameters on the performances of the contracts and on the optimal values of the model variables such as price, effort and demand.     

A delay-in-payment contract for Pareto improvement of a supply chain with stochastic demand

We consider a supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer with stochastic customer demand, which is operated over an infinite horizon. We propose a delay-in-payment contract to coordinate the supply chain. With this contract, the supplier allows the retailer to pay partial order cost at the ordering epoch, and to pay the remaining portion after a permissible number of periods. The system is formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming problem. It is shown that there exists a base-stock policy to be optimal. Compared with the traditional wholesale-price contract, the delay-in-payment contract with appropriate parameters can achieve a Pareto improvement (i.e., the performances of both the supplier and the retailer using the delay-in-payment contract are better than those using the wholesale-price contract). Numerical studies are performed to investigate both the effectiveness of the Pareto improvement, and the impact of the major parameters of the delay-in-payment contract on the system performance.     

Impact of secondary market on consumer return policies and supply chain coordination

In this paper, we develop a unified model to study the inventory management problem of a product and the coordination of the associated supply chain consisting of a single supplier and considerably many retailers in the presence of a secondary market. Specifically, consumer returns are allowed in the initial sales. Then, we introduce a secondary market to salvage the returns and the leftovers from the initial sales. In this secondary market, a discount price will be offered to the consumers but no returns are accepted. Moreover, between the primary and the secondary market, there is an internal market where retailers can trade among themselves so that they are able to adjust their inventory levels to prepare for the sales in the secondary market. We study the retailers' and the supply chain's inventory decision in this case and highlight the impact of the secondary market on the sales as well as on the supply chain coordination contracts. We conclude that the secondary market helps us to increase the total wholesale volume. Numerical examples show that the total sales profit is also increased. However, the secondary market aggravates the incentive conflict between the retailers and the supply chain on deciding the optimal inventory levels and hence requires the supplier to offer more generous buyback or sales rebate contracts for coordination of the supply chain. Finally, we extend our analysis to more general cases and also show that our results are robust to some of the modeling assumptions.     

Development and validation of a lean supply chain management measurement instrument

It is widely argued that to be competitive, a company not only needs to focus on internal aspects but on the entire supply chain. Lean supply chain management has become a means of enhancing competitiveness by improving efficiency and increasing flexibility at all stages of the supply chain. This research develops and validates a lean supply chain management measurement instrument. A two-phase approach is used for scale development and refinement. In the first phase, a literature review is conducted to identify definitions of lean supply chain management and agile supply chain management and their corresponding measurement items. In the second phase, the lean supply chain management measurement instrument is validated using survey data based on scales developed in the first phase by 59 scholars with experience in lean management and/or supply chain management. The results provide a structured and comprehensive measure of lean supply chain management indicating that there are two differentiated dimensions in the measurement instrument: one related to the operational aspects of lean supply chain strategy implementation and the second related to lean supply chain planning.     

A systematic approach for supply chain conflict detection with a hierarchical Petri Net extension

Coordinating and managing distributed entities in a supply chain is a challenging task due, in part, to conflicts present in such systems. If not handled effectively, the conflict can degrade the performance of the system as a whole due to the fact that each individual entity may be working towards goals that sub-optimize the integrated system. Therefore, the ability to discover conflicts would be a valuable asset, particularly if the discovery occurred proactively. This paper presents a methodology, extending the concept of basic Petri Nets, to discover supply chain conflict before they occur and cause detrimental effects to system performance. The approach involves linking hierarchical levels of the supply chain system and detecting conflicts occurring when the single entities, each optimized for it own operations, are combined together in a supply chain. These conflicts are not obvious or intuitive in examining the single entities of the supply chain, but when integrated the conflicts are discovered by the methodology. We applied the proposed methodology on a real-world supply chain to illustrate the validity of the tool. Although, further research is needed to fully explore this method of conflict detection, we believe that this research does indeed provide some much needed insight into the daunting task of conflict discovery and therefore proactive handling of these potentially negative occurrences in the supply chain.     

Stages of Supply Chain Disruption Response: Direct,Constraining, and Mediating Factors for Impact Mitigation

It is well established that supply chain disruptions can have a severe negative impact on firms and general wisdom suggests that this impact can be mitigated by quick responses. Aside from a few anecdotes, however, little is known about the decision‐making process that leads to speedy responses and about its impeding and supporting antecedents. Using the organizational information‐processing perspective, this empirical study unravels the disruption management process along a sequence of four stages—disruption recognition, disruption diagnosis, response development, and response implementation—and hypothesizes constraining and mediating effects of these stages. The findings contribute to an improved understanding of the role that the decision stages play in mitigating supply chain disruptions, and confirm the prediction that the speed with which information is processed and the stages are worked through positively affects supply chain performance. In addition, the findings suggest that one of the stages, diagnosis, acts as a constraining factor to the other stages. The stages also play a mediating role between the impact that the disruption has and a firm's readiness (prior to a disruption), dependence on a key supplier, and supply chain complexity. This provides guidance to decision makers in the application of resources both prior to a negative event and during a disruption recovery.     

Universal supplier selection via multi-dimensional auction mechanisms for two-way competition in oligopoly market of supply chain

Allocation of the tasks in competitive market conditions at each echelon of the supply chain is an important activity in the supply chain. The task allocation problem, referred to as supply chain formation process, normally faces information asymmetry in the supply chain. The information asymmetry is caused by rational and intelligent players trying to maximize their own profit rather than opt for the supply chain profit as a whole. Thus, the process of allocating tasks in such situations becomes difficult and will result in externalities in the supply chain trades. These externalities can be internalized with present methodologies in the literature. In this paper, the major internalization methods in different contexts are considered. Lagrange relaxation and Vickery Clarke Groves (VCG) auction mechanism are explored in order to form a supply chain. This paper proposes the multi-stage auction mechanism analyzing two-way competitions, a Bertrand and Cournot competition where price per unit and quantity are the underlying two parameters in a utility analysis. To analyze the problem in real life, the industry example of Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd. (IRCTC) procurement process has been taken which demonstrates the usability of the proposed framework.     

The value of VMI beyond information sharing in a single supplier multiple retailers supply chain under a non-stationary (Rn,Sn) policy

This study aims to determine the value of vendor-managed inventory (VMI) over independent decision making with information sharing (IS) under non-stationary stochastic demand with service-level constraints. For this purpose, we utilize mixed-integer linear programming formulations to quantify the benefits that can be accrued by a supplier, multiple retailers and the system as a whole by switching from IS to VMI. More specifically, we investigate the incremental value that VMI provides beyond IS in terms of expected cost savings, inventory reductions, and decrease in shipment sizes from the supplier to the retailers by conducting a large number of computational experiments. Results reveal that the decision transfer component of VMI improves these performance measures significantly when the supplier׳s setup cost is low and order issuing efficiency is high. The benefits offered by VMI are negligible under the problem settings where the supplier׳s order issuing efficiency is low and the production setup serves solely a single replenishment under IS.     

Eco-efficient supply chain networks: development of a design framework and application to a real case study

This paper presents a supply chain network design framework that is based on multi-objective mathematical programming and that can identify ‘eco-efficient’ configuration alternatives that are both efficient and ecologically sound. This work is original in that it encompasses the environmental impact of both transportation and warehousing activities. We apply the proposed framework to a real-life case study (i.e. Lindt & Sprüngli) for the distribution of chocolate products. The results show that cost-driven network optimisation may lead to beneficial effects for the environment and that a minor increase in distribution costs can be offset by a major improvement in environmental performance. This paper contributes to the body of knowledge on eco-efficient supply chain design and closes the missing link between model-based methods and empirical applied research. It also generates insights into the growing debate on the trade-off between the economic and environmental performance of supply chains, supporting organisations in the eco-efficient configuration of their supply chains.     

Systemic approach to supply chain management through the viable system model and the theory of constraints

In today’s environment, Supply Chain Management (SCM) takes a key role in business strategy. A major challenge is achieving high customer service level under a reasonable operating expense and investment. The traditional approach to SCM, based on local optimisation, is a proven cause of meaningful inefficiencies – e.g. the Bullwhip Effect – that obstruct the throughput. The systemic (holistic) approach, based on global optimisation, has been shown to perform significantly better. Nevertheless, it is not widely expanded, since the implementation of an efficient solution requires a suitable scheme. Under these circumstances, this paper proposes an integrative framework for supply chain collaboration aimed at increasing its efficiency. This is based on the combined application of the Beer’s Viable System Model (VSM) and the Goldratt’s Theory of Constraints (TOC). VSM defines the systemic structure of the supply chain and orchestrates the collaboration, while TOC implements the systemic behaviour – i.e. integrate processes – and define performance measures. To support this proposal, we detail its application to the widely used Beer Game scenario. In addition, we discuss its implementation in real supply chains, highlighting the key points that must be considered.     

The impact of timely information on organisational performance in a supply chain

Information produced by ERP systems is termed JIT-information, since it is provided at the right time in the right place with a minimum of waste. The JIT-information construct is defined and described and a measurement scale is developed. A JIT-information performance model is proposed and assessed using a structural equation modelling methodology. The results indicate that the model fits the data well: (1) supply chain management strategy positively impacts JIT-information, (2) JIT-information directly impacts both logistics and organisational performance, and (3) logistics performance directly impacts organisational performance.     

Impacts of demand uncertainty on retailer's dominance and manufacturer-retailer supply chain cooperation

Recent studies in marketing and distribution channels have shown that the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers is shifting. Based on this observation, we investigate a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer in this paper. We first develop retailer-dominant non-cooperative game models by introducing a sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price; then we analyze two cooperative scenarios, in which the Nash bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Under the assumption that the manufacturer and the retailer are risk-neutral, we find that the manufacturer and the retailer can bargain to cooperate at any level of retail-market demand uncertainty with exogenous retail price. However, the cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty with endogenous retail price: it can be implemented if the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small, and the measure of retail-market demand uncertainty does not exceed an upper bound. Theoretical and numerical analyses show that the retailer's dominance over the manufacturer increases with the increase in the sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price under a limitation of retail-market demand uncertainty. Numerical analyses also show that the retailer's dominance decreases with the increase in retail-market demand uncertainty.