Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge Reconnaissance

Hurricane Katrina (August 23–30, 2005) was one of the costliest and deadliest hurricanes to ever strike the United States, impacting low-lying coastal plains particularly vulnerable to storm surge flooding. Maximum storm surges, overland flow depths, and inundation distances were measured along the Gulf Coast of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. The vehicle-based survey was complemented by inspections with the reconnaissance boat along the Gulf Coast and the Mississippi Barrier Islands. The survey covered both the impact on the built and the natural environments. The storm surge peaked to the east of Katrina’s path exceeding 10?m in several locations along the Mississippi coastline. The storm surge measurements show that the lower floors of specially designed buildings were damaged by the surge of seawater and associated wave action, while the upper floors sustained minimal wind damage. The storm surge measurements along New Orleans Lakeshore allowed the investigators to exclude overtopping as failure mechanism for the 17th Street outfall canal levee. Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge distribution (Category 3 at landfall) is compared against Hurricane Camille’s storm surge distribution (Category 5 at landfall). The land loss on the barrier islands and the increased vulnerability of the US Gulf Coast to future hurricane storm surges is discussed.     

New Orleans Levee System Performance during Hurricane Katrina: London Avenue and Orleans Canal South

Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history. The effects of the hurricane were particularly devastating in the city of New Orleans. Most of the damage was due to the failure of the levee system that surrounds the city to protect it from flooding. This paper presents the results of centrifuge models conducted at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers simulating the behavior of the levees at London Avenue North and South that failed during Hurricane Katrina. Those levees failed without being overtopped by the storm surge. Also included are the results of a centrifuge model of one levee section at Orleans Canal South, which did not fail during the hurricane. The key factor of the failure mechanism of the London Avenue levees was the formation of a gap between the flooded side of the levee and the sheetpile. This gap triggered a reduction of the strength at the foundation of the protected side of the levee. The results are fully consistent with field observations.     

Energy Supply System Performance for Hurricane Katrina

In 2005, wind-induced structural damage from Hurricane Katrina resulted in extensive energy supply disruptions across the Gulf of Mexico. In this paper, we examine the resilience of these systems with a particular emphasis on the electric power delivery systems. We investigate the correlations of the power outage data with weather parameters such as wind speed, rainfall, and storm surge. We examine the resilience and recovery of the electric delivery system spatially and temporally and compare the results with other natural disasters. We conclude that the behavior of the delivery systems under hurricane loadings is affected by rainfall and storm surge as well as wind speed. Widespread failures may occur at wind speeds less than predicted peak values.     

Bridge Damage and Repair Costs from Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina caused significant damage to the transportation system in the Gulf Coast region. The overall cost to repair or replace the bridges damaged during the hurricane is estimated at over $1 billion. This paper describes the observed damage patterns to bridges, including damage attributed to storm surge, wind, impact from debris, scour, and water inundation, as well as examples of repair measures used to quickly restore functionality to the bridges and transportation system. Using the data from the 44 bridges that were damaged, relationships between storm surge elevation, damage level, and repair costs are developed. The analysis reveals that, in general, regions with higher storm surge had more damage, although there were several instances where this was not the case, primarily due to damage resulting from debris impact. It is also shown that a highly nonlinear relationship exists between the normalized repair cost and the damage state. The paper concludes with a brief discussion on the efficacy of using typical seismic design details for mitigating the effects of hurricane loads, and potential design considerations for bridge structures in vulnerable coastal regions.     

Observations of Structural Damage Caused by Hurricane Katrina on the Mississippi Gulf Coast

The loads associated with Hurricane Katrina led to the destruction or severe damage of approximately 130,000 homes and over 200 deaths in the state of Mississippi. This paper discusses the results of a field inspection of structural damage along the state’s Gulf Coast area caused by this hurricane. It was found that reinforced concrete, steel frame, and heavy timber structures generally performed well, with minimal structural damage. Precast concrete, light frame wood, and bridge structures generally performed poorly. Nonstructural components of all building types, in particular facades and interior partitions subjected to storm surge, were typically destroyed. For various structures, the primary cause of failure was found to be insufficient connection strength. A comparison of Katrina’s storm surge and wind loads is made to those specified in current design standards. It was found that Katrina’s forces exceeded those specified in design standards in many parts of the state.     

Development of the New Orleans Flood Protection System prior to Hurricane Katrina

The system of flood protection surrounding New Orleans and its adjoining parishes prior to Hurricane Katrina evolved over a period of 280?years. The earliest drainage works sought to elevate the river’s natural levees and excavate drainage canals leading towards Bayou St. John, the only natural break across the Metairie-Gentilly distributary ridge. An extensive zone of Cypress Swamps occupied the levee flank depression between the ridge and Lake Pontchartrain. 58?km of drainage canals were excavated across the natural levee backslope and through the swamp depressions bordering the lake between 1833 and 1878. These canals sought to drain the lower portions of the city, which suffered periodic outbreaks of yellow fever, which killed more than 100,000 people during the 19th century. The city has not suffered flooding from the Mississippi River since 1895, most damaging floods having emanated from hurricane surge off of Lake Pontchartrain. Since 1559, 177 hurricanes have struck the Louisiana coastline. A system of pump stations was constructed between 1895 and 1927, which pump water into the river, the lake, and adjacent bayous. The cypress swamps were replaced by the Lakeview and Gentilly residential districts, built after 1945. This old swamp zone has settled as much as 3+?m since 1895. After 1927 the Army Corps of Engineers assumed a leadership role in providing flood control infrastructure, supervising the Mississippi River & Tributaries Project in 1931–1972. In 1955 the Corps role was expanded to include the City of New Orleans, which included maintaining capacity and freeboard of the old drainage canals. After a series of lawsuits between 1961 and 1977, the Corps was forced to employ concrete flood walls along the subsiding drainage canals. These walls were constructed in the 1990s, though some transition elements remained incomplete when Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005.     

Roof Damage in New Homes Caused by Hurricane Charley

Hurricane Charley was the first Category 4 hurricane to strike Florida after 1992. This paper presents results of a study to investigate the performance of 425 of 747 roofs of new homes in Punta Gorda Isles, a subdivision of Punta Gorda that was directly in the path of Hurricane Charley shortly after it made landfall. The homes examined were larger, concrete/clay tiled roof homes having irregular floor plans and complex roof configurations not explicitly addressed by prevailing wind load codes. Roof damage was evaluated using images from aerial photographs taken at an elevation of approximately 762?m?(2,500?ft.) Specialized software was used to quantify damage. Damage was classified based on tile loss area. The study showed that the vast majority of the roofs were either undamaged or sustained minor damage. Fewer than 14% were classified as damaged. The most common observed tile loss was along ridges, corners, or in the hip zone where negative uplift pressures are recognized to be the highest. Given the modest observed damage, prevailing methods for estimating wind loads for irregular buildings specified in codes may be adequate. Problems encountered may be best resolved through new details for attaching tiles on ridges, corners, and hip zone.     

New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. IV: Orleans East Bank (Metro) Protected Basin

This paper addresses damage caused by Hurricane Katrina to the main Orleans East Bank protected basin. This basin represented the heart of New Orleans, and contained the main downtown area, the historic French Quarter, the Garden District, and the sprawling Lakefront and Canal Districts. Nearly half of the loss of life during this hurricane, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a number of important geotechnical lessons, as well as geo-forensic lessons, associated with the flooding of this basin. These include the difficulties associated with the creation and operation of regional-scale flood protection systems requiring federal and local cooperation and funding over prolonged periods of time. There are also a number of engineering and policy lessons regarding (1) the accuracy and reliability of current analytical methods; (2) the shortcomings and potential dangers involved in decisions that reduced short-term capital outlays in exchange for increased risk of potential system failures; (3) the difficulties associated with integrating local issues with a flood risk reduction project; and (4) the need to design and maintain levees as systems; with each of the many individual project elements being required to mesh seamlessly. These lessons are of interest and importance for similar flood protection systems throughout numerous other regions of the United States and the world.     

Mental health symptoms in youth affected by Hurricane Katrina.

Natural disasters, such as hurricanes, may cause severe psychological impairment in children and adolescents, which may persist in youth who have survived hurricanes, their effects, or both. To better understand the needs of youth in the community after Hurricane Katrina, officials in St. Bernard Parish, LA, commissioned a youth needs assessment survey. The survey assessed how youth were coping approximately 2 years after Hurricane Katrina. The goal was to explore the prevalence and severity of depressive, anxious, and posttraumatic symptoms reported by youth. Based on retrospective reports from 43 youth, the prevalence of children’s mental health symptoms was 44–104% higher in the 2 years after Hurricane Katrina compared to pre-Katrina. The majority of mental health symptoms reported by youth had an onset after the hurricane, for example, 79% reported new onset of mental heath symptoms in the year after Katrina. The vast majority of these children (56%) continued to experience mental health difficulties 2 years after the disaster. Implications regarding post-Katrina mental health needs, service delivery, public response, and collaboration efforts are summarized and directions for future research are proposed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: The 17th Street Drainage Canal

The failure of the levee and floodwall section on the east bank of the 17th Street drainage canal was one of the most catastrophic breaches that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. It produced a breach that rapidly scoured a flow pathway below sea level, so that after the storm surge had largely subsided, floodwaters still continued to stream in through this breach for the next two and a half days. This particular failure contributed massively to the overall flooding of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin. Slightly more than half of the loss of life, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a number of important geotechnical and geoforensic lessons associated with this failure. Accordingly, this paper is dedicated solely to investigating this single failure. Geological and geotechnical details, such as a thin layer of sensitive clay that was laid down by a previous hurricane, proper strength characterization of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee, and recognition of a water-filled gap on the inboard side of the sheet pile cutoff wall are judged to be among the most critical factors in understanding this failure. The lessons learned from this study are of importance for similar flood protection systems throughout other regions of the United States and the world.     

New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. I: Introduction, Overview, and the East Flank

The failure of the New Orleans regional flood protection systems, and the resultant catastrophic flooding of much of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, represents the most costly failure of an engineered system in U.S. history. This paper presents an overview of the principal events that unfolded during this catastrophic hurricane, and then a more detailed look at the early stages of the event as the storm first drove onshore and then began to pass to the east of the main populated areas. The emphasis in this paper is on geotechnical lessons and it also includes broader lessons with regard to the design, implementation, operation, and maintenance of major flood protection systems. This paper focuses principally on the early stages of this disaster, including the initial inundation of Plaquemines Parish along the lower reaches of the Mississippi River as Katrina made landfall, and the subsequent additional early levee breaches and erosion along the eastern flanks of the regional flood protection systems fronting Lake Borgne that resulted in the flooding of the two large protected basins of New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish. Significant lessons learned include (1) the need for realistic assessment of risk exposure as an element of flood protection policy; (2) the importance of considering erodibility of embankment and foundation soils in levee design and construction; (3) the importance of considering all potential failure modes; and (4) the problems inherent in the construction of major regional systems over extended periods of multiple decades. These are important lessons, as they are applicable to other regional flood protection systems in other areas of the United States, and throughout much of the world.     

Hydrodynamic Investigation of Coastal Bridge Collapse during Hurricane Katrina

A number of U.S. coastal bridges have been destroyed by hurricanes, including three highway bridges in Mississippi and Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina (2005). This paper addresses three fundamental questions on the coastal bridge failures: (1) what were the hydrodynamic conditions near the failed bridge during the hurricane; (2) what was the cause of the bridge collapse; and (3) what was the magnitude of the hydrodynamic loading on the bridge under the extreme hurricane conditions. Guided by field observations of winds, waves, and water levels, two numerical models for storm surges and water waves are coupled to hindcast the hydrodynamic conditions. Fairly good agreement between the modeled and measured high watermarks and offshore wave heights is found, allowing an estimate of the surge and wave conditions near the bridges in nested domains with higher resolutions. The output of the coupled wave-surge models is utilized to determine the static buoyant force and wave forces on the bridge superstructure based on empirical equations derived from small-scale hydraulic tests for elevated decks used in the coastal and offshore industry. It is inferred that the bridge failure was caused by the wind waves accompanied by the storm surge, which raised the water level to an elevation where surface waves generated by strong winds over a relatively short fetch were able to strike the bridge superstructure. The storm waves produced both an uplift force and a horizontal force on the bridge decks. The magnitude of wave uplift force from individual waves exceeded the weight of the simple span bridge decks and the horizontal force overcame the resistance provided by the connections of the bridge decks to the pilings. The methodology for determining the hydrodynamic forcing on bridge decks can be used to produce a preliminary assessment of the vulnerability of existing coastal bridges in hurricane-prone areas.     

Survey of Short- and Medium-Span Bridge Damage Induced by Hurricane Katrina

This paper reports on a survey effort of damaged bridges conducted by the writers in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina of August 2005. As with Hurricane Ivan in 2004, low-lying coastal bridges suffered severe damage due to hydrodynamic forces caused by storm surge. Consequently, transportation networks in the affected areas were disrupted. Since coastal bridges are considered lifelines for the communities they serve, their loss resulted in hindering rescue and recovery efforts. The purpose of this paper is to present related data as observed by the writers. Data collection and documentation of perishable data after natural disasters and before recovery and reconstruction efforts is of great importance. In the case of coastal bridges, they can help in improving future designs and rehabilitating existing ones. The majority of the surveyed bridges collapsed due to unseating. Hydrodynamic forces due to wave impact and water current on the superstructure proved to exceed the capacity of common connections between the superstructure and the substructure for short- and medium-span bridges.     

New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. II: The Central Region and the Lower Ninth Ward

The failure of the New Orleans regional flood protection systems, and the resultant catastrophic flooding of much of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, represents the most costly failure of an engineered system in U.S. history. This paper presents an overview of the principal events that unfolded in the central portion of the New Orleans metropolitan region during this hurricane, and addresses the levee failures and breaches that occurred along the east–west trending section of the shared Gulf Intracoastal Waterway/Mississippi River Gulf Outlet channel, and along the Inner Harbor Navigation Channel, that affected the New Orleans East, the St. Bernard Parish, and the Lower Ninth Ward protected basins. The emphasis in this paper is on geotechnical lessons, and also broader lessons with regard to the design, implementation, operation, and maintenance of major flood protection systems. Significant lessons learned here in the central region include: (1) the need for regional-scale flood protection systems to perform as systems, with the various components meshing well together in a mutually complementary manner; (2) the importance of considering all potential failure modes in the engineering design and evaluation of these complex systems; and (3) the problems inherent in the construction of major regional systems over extended periods of multiple decades. These are important lessons, as they are applicable to other regional flood protection systems in other areas of the United States, and throughout much of the world.     

Case Study: 17th Street Canal Breach Closure Procedures

On August 29, 2005 Hurricane Katrina resulted in several breaches in the levees and flood walls protecting New Orleans. Of the 20 breaches, the 17th Street Canal breach caused much of the city flooding. In this paper, the results of studies on a 1:50 scale hydraulic model of this breach based on the Froude similitude relationships are presented. It is assumed in the model that the bed is fixed and the levee below the flood wall remains intact during breach closure. This was the case in the 17th Street Canal breach. Because of the many uncertainties in the values of various variables, a range of conditions were run on the model in an attempt to bracket the results for the flooding depths and the initial failed attempts to close the breach. Then, various possible methods for breach closure were investigated utilizing the procedures developed for cofferdam closure for river diversion, e.g., toe dumping, transverse dumping, single- and multibarrier embankments, etc. Closures of the breach and the closure of the canal at the Old Hammond Highway Bridge were investigated. Results from the case study show that some of these methods could have been utilized for closing the Katrina breaches. However, special care should be exercised when extending them for breach closure at other sites.     

The dirty dozen: Twelve failures of the Hurricane Katrina response and how psychology can help.

This comprehensive analysis addresses the United States' alarming lack of preparedness to respond effectively to a massive disaster as evidenced by Hurricane Katrina. First, a timeline of problematic response events during and after Hurricane Katrina orients readers to some of the specific problems encountered at different levels of government. Second, a list of the "Dirty Dozen"--12 major failures that have occurred in prior disasters, which also contributed to inadequate response during and after Hurricane Katrina--is presented. Third, this article encourages expanding psychology's role beyond the treatment of trauma to encompass disaster planning and mitigation efforts from a broader public health perspective. Finally, areas for important interdisciplinary research in human behavior that will influence our nation's overall preparedness for future catastrophes are identified, and ways psychologists can become personally involved beyond treating casualties are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Our Katrina experience: Providing mental health services in Concordia Parish, Louisiana.

Responding to the call for psychologists to serve Louisiana and the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina, 2 school psychologists spent almost 2 weeks in central Louisiana in early September 2005. They were located in a rural area and provided mental health services to evacuees from Hurricane Katrina in a number of small shelters, an RV park, and the schools. This article describes their experiences as mental health volunteers and the impact those experiences had on their professional and personal lives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hurricane Katrina: Experiences of psychologists and implications for future disaster response.

The landfall of Hurricane Katrina marked not only one of the most significant and destructive natural disasters for the United States in recent history, but also a new benchmark in challenges faced by psychologists providing services. The authors explain their roles following the hurricane, describing not only local activities for recovery but efforts conducted in the Gulf Coast as well. Experiences and perceptions of the first author, who was deployed to the Gulf Coast on numerous occasions, are highlighted. In addition, psychological assessments were carried out with a small number of displaced Katrina survivors who were relocated to the authors' local community. The authors document many of the challenges faced by psychologists and other mental health workers during relief efforts in the Gulf Coast, concluding with a set of recommendations for future disaster-relief initiatives regarding such issues as ways in which psychologists can participate in disaster-relief efforts, challenges faced when implementing interventions, cultural competency, community preparedness, and scientific research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pavement Structures Damage Caused by Hurricane Katrina Flooding

In September of 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans and caused sustained flooding. Limited pre- and postflooding tests indicated that the pavement structures tested were adversely impacted by the flood water. Consequently, the Louisiana Dept. of Transportation and Development hired an independent contractor to structurally test approximately 383 km (238?mi) of the region’s federally aided urban highway system both inside and outside of the flooding area. Falling weight deflectometer (FWD) tests were performed every 161 m (0.1?mi) over each selected roadway, along with other field tests. The FWD data were imported into a geographical information system and plotted against a USGS geo-referenced map. Comparative analyses were made possible through the use of extensive flood maps made available through NOAA and FEMA. This arrangement made it possible to classify spatially and graphically all test points on the basis of flooding versus nonflooding, short flooding duration versus longer flooding duration, shallow flooding versus deep flooding, and thin pavements versus thick pavements. Three pavement types, asphaltic concrete, Portland cement concrete, and composite, were considered in this analysis. The statistical inference about the difference in the means of compared data groups was conducted with 95% confidence.