The minimum wage can harm workers by reducing unemployment

Economists may disagree over how much raising the minimum wage increases unemployment, though few argue that the unemployment effect is zero. According to the standard model, the less the unemployment caused by a minimum wage increase, the less the harm (or greater the good) that results. But by recognizing that minimum wage workers receive fringe benefits, I show that increasing the minimum wage may not cause any unemployment and harms workers because it doesn 't. Furthermore, when there is lumpiness in providing fringe benefits, a minimum wage increase may harm workers by     

Recent minimum wage increases and the minimum wage labor force

Coclusion  Recently Whaples (1996) reported that most labor economists believe that minimum wage laws decrease employment. Despite this, policy makers have continued to periodically raise the minimum, with the most recent increases occurring in October 1996 and September 1997. The various analyses done by Card, Katz, and Krueger, that showed little to no employment effect of past minimum wage increases, have provided additional ammunition for those who would seek further increases. However, using the estimates of Williams and Mills (1998), we demonstrate that the latest minimum wage increases substantially decreased employment for both sexes. We believe that future increases will do likewise.     

The minimum wage and productivity differentials

A firm’s ability to adjust its production process to economize on low-skilled labor when faced with a minimum wage increase will differ greatly depending on industry or occupation. For example, more capital-intensive means of cleaning hotel rooms or serving customers at restaurants may not be readily available without degrading service quality. In such situations, the productivity of labor is essentially capped, and firms have few options when the minimum wage increases. This simple observation has implications for studies that rely on microdata to examine the effects of minimum wage increases. If firms only increase prices in response to a minimum wage increase, employment effects are likely small. If the goal of the minimum wage is to redistribute income from firms and consumers to workers, minimum-wage increases targeted at industries and occupations where such rigidities result in an inelastic demand for labor may achieve the desired goal at a lower cost than across-the-board increases. However, such a scheme causes an inefficient allocation of labor and would be subjected to substantial political pressures that may lead to anomalous results. Additionally, it is unreasonable to conclude that policy makers have the necessary information to skillfully set the minimum wage. I thank Brian E. Chezum and Jeff Waddoups for helpful comments. All mistakes, of course, are my own.     

The minimum wage and tipped employees

Using data from theCensus of Retail Trade, I estimate that allowing restaurants to use servers’ tipped income to satisfy minimum wage requirements would create at least 360,000 new high-paying jobs and increase total income for tipped workers by at least 8 percent. Conversely, if the minimum wage were increased 10 percent, tipped workers would experience a 4 percent decrease in employment and a 6 percent reduction in hours worked, and all servers (tipped and non-tipped) would experience a 3 to 5 percent decrease in total income because the tipped jobs lost paid more than the minimum wage. By not allowing employers to use all of a worker’s tipped income to meet the minimum wage, state and federal minimum wage laws inhibit the creation of hundreds of thousands of new jobs paying well above the minimum wage. Total elimination of this credit would decrease employment at least 10 percent.     

Nepotism and the minimum wage

That an increase in the minimum wage or minimum wage coverage results in an increase in the incidence of nepotism is empirically tested using 1972 data on job-seeking methods used by American workers. The elasticity of the incidence of nepotism with respect to the level of the minimum wage and minimum wage coverage in 1977 is estimated at between .38 and .68. I would like to thank Peter Montiel and Geoffrey Woglom for their helpful comments and suggestions and Bruce Chesebrough for providing the stimulus to write this paper; remaining errors are my own.     

Reducing poverty and inequality through tax-benefit reform and the minimum wage: the UK as a case-study

Atkinson’s book Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Harvard University Press, 2015) sets out a range of concrete proposals aimed at reducing income inequality, which cover a very broad span but include major changes to the income tax and social transfers system and the minimum wage. These are framed with specific reference to the UK but have much broader relevance in demonstrating how substantial the impact on inequality of such measures could be. This paper assesses the first-round effects of these tax, transfer and minimum wage reforms on income inequality and poverty based on a microsimulation approach using EUROMOD. The reforms involve a significantly more progressive income tax structure, a major increase in the minimum wage to the level which is estimated to represent the ‘Living Wage’, and alternative routes to reforming social transfers – either to strengthen the social insurance element or to restructure the entire system as a Participation Income (a variant of Basic/Citizen’s Income). The results show how the first-round effects of either set of tax and transfer proposals would be to substantially reduce the extent of income inequality and relative income poverty and the paper draws out how the two approaches differ in their effects. The additional impact of raising the minimum wage to the Living Wage is modest, reflecting in particular the position of beneficiaries in the household income distribution and the offsetting effects on household income of the withdrawal of means-tested cash transfers.     

Have unions impeded growing wage dispersion among young workers?

Wage inequality is examined for young males over the period 1980–1993. While wage inequality increased substantially for nonunion workers over this period, wage inequality increased only modestly for union workers. In part, this difference results from divergent trends in skill prices—returns to skill rose in the nonunion sector but contracted slightly in the union sector. In particular, returns to education increased sharply in the nonunion sector while remaining stagnant in the union sector. At least for young workers, these findings suggest that unions have been largely successful in resisting market pressures for greater wage inequality. We also uncover evidence suggesting that, as relative returns to education decline in the union sector, highly educated young workers become less likely to choose union employment. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Dek Terrell, Steve Trejo, and Carol Horton Tremblay.     

Political support for minimum wage legislation

Conclusion Even if minimum wage laws reduce employment opportunities for some workers, other individuals may benefit from their enactment. In particular, union members and residents of states with high wage levels would be expected to encourage their senators to vote in favor of minimum wage legislation. Examination of senators’ votes on the 1966 and 1974 minimum wage bills indicates that senators favoring passage of these bills are likely to come from states with high union membership and, to a lesser extent, high wage levels. The equations explaining senators’ votes on these bills were disaggregated by political party affiliation and length of membership in the Senate. Democrats were more likely than Republicans to support minimum wage bills. Virtually no difference was observed between senators who voted on both the 1966 and 1974 measures and those who voted on only one. Perhaps the most encouraging result reported is the similarity of coefficients generally observed for corresponding 1966 and 1974 equations. This similarity suggests that the equations reported herein could be used to predict votes on future minimum wage bills. The results suggest also that the general mode of analysis can be fruitfully applied to other economic legislation.     

State minimum wage laws: Youth coverage and impact

Federal minimum wage statutes cover only 70 percent of the work force and 30 percent of all employers. State laws are designed to close some of these coverage gaps and in some cases to set higher wage floors. Hence, differences in state wage floors and coverage should affect employment rates and wage distributions, particularly among low-skilled workers. Evidence from the National Longitudinal Ssurveys of Youth is mixed, however: State wage floors appear to have no impact on youth employment or entry wages, but coverage exemptions appear to increase both employment and wages. These observations underscore the need to include state provisions in models of minimum wage impacts, particularly for later periods (e.g., 1988–1991) when state wage floors were relatively higher.     

Political support for minimum wage legislation: 1989

A model explaining senators’ votes on minimum wage increases in 1966 and 1974 was applied to the 1977 and 1989 votes with similar results. The extent of unionization in each state was positively associated with votes in favor of minimum wage increases. State wage levels were not significantly associated with senators’ votes. These results held for Republican senators as well as for all senators. However, neither wage levels nor unionization rates was a significant factor explaning Democrats’ votes on minimum wage increases.     

Economic growth and inequality in Singapore: The case for a minimum wage

In the context of Singapore's ageing population, the employment of large numbers of low‐skilled foreign workers is proving to be a major challenge to inclusive growth because of the stagnation of low‐wage workers' incomes. In order to address this problem, the author makes the case for introducing a minimum wage to complement existing in‐work benefit schemes. After addressing the commonly voiced objections to a minimum wage system, he suggests ways in which a minimum wage could be implemented in Singapore. New measures to enhance the social safety net and foster more sustainable economic growth are also proposed.     

The labor market effects of minimum wage laws: A new perspective

Economists almost uniformly argue that minimum wage laws benefit some workers at the expense of other workers. This argument is implicitly founded on the assumption that money wages are the only form of labor compensation. Based on the more realistic assumption that labor is paid in many different ways, the analysis of this paper demonstrates that all laborers within a perfectly competitive labor market are adversely affected by minimum wages. Although employment opportunities are reduced by such laws, affected labor markets clear. Conventional analysis of the effect of minimum wages on monopsony markets is also upset by the model developed. The author is indebted to Rex Cottle, Benjamin Hawkins, Hugh Macaulay, Michael Maloney, Thomas Schaap, Gordon Tullock, Gene Uselton, and Karen Vaughn for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

The reverse wage gap among educated White and Black women

Using the 2004 National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses and the 2004–2005 American Community Surveys, we estimate the Black–White wage gap among females with at least some college education. We find that Black female nurses earn 9% more at the mean and median than White female nurses, controlling for selection into nursing employment. Among K-12 teachers, Black females earn 7% more than White females at the median. There is no Black–White wage gap among all women with a bachelor’s degree. Differences in opportunities for education and marriage between White and Black women may explain why highly educated Black females earn on par with highly educated White females.     

Nontransferable rents and an unrecognized social cost of minimum wage laws

This paper identifies an additional social cost of minimum wage laws. The nontransferable sunk investments made in competing to obtain minimum wage jobs produce a social cost since individuals will remain in those positions as long as they obtain a positive return on this investment. This will be true even when more efficient providers of the service exist. The higher the minimum wage is, the greater the level of sunk nontransferable investments and, therefore, the greater the potential inefficient allocation of labor.     

The illegal alien work force,demand for unskilled labor,and the minimum wage

Estimates of the illegal alien work force, employment, and the number employed below the legal minimum wage are not available, but are often required for the study of a variety of public policy issues, e.g., immigration and refugee policy, and policy towards the monitoring of minimum wage laws. This paper attempts to fill this void by developing estimates of these quantities. Of equal importance, however, is determining what light this and other related evidence throws upon the oft-expressed view that the demand for unskilled labor at below-legal-minimum wage rates is virtually inelastic. Evidence is presented which contradicts this belief. I am grateful to Janet Hunt and Richard H. Timberlake, Jr. for valuable comments but I absolve them of responsibility for any errors.