Should the use of standardized baselines in the CDM be mandatory?

There has been considerable debate on the merits of standardized baselines (SBLs) in the clean development mechanism (CDM), and how such baselines could reduce transaction costs for CDM projects. It has not been considered whether the voluntary versus mandatory use of SBLs by CDM project developers can affect the environmental integrity of the CDM. An example is given in which SBLs are applied to a homogeneous output industry in order to illustrate how the voluntary use of SBLs could lead – even with relatively stringent benchmarks – to over-crediting of emission reduction credits.     

Future restrictions for sinks in the CDM: How about a cap on supply?

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects.This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries.     

Does the CDM discourage emission reduction targets in advanced developing countries?

Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which industrialized countries, in order to meet their mitigation commitments, can buy emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries. Before its implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that it would sell-off their countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to invest in more expensive measures to meet their future reduction targets. This ‘low-hanging fruit’ argument is analysed empirically by comparing marginal abatement cost curves. Emissions abatement costs and potentials for CDM projects are estimated for different technologies in eight countries, using capital budgeting tools and information from project documentation. It is found that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement potential in most countries. Although the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped are below the average credit price, there are still plenty of available low-cost opportunities. Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM predominantly for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the other countries more expensive projects are accessing the CDM. This evidence at first sight challenges the low-hanging fruit claim, but needs to be understood in the light of the barriers for the adoption of low-cost abatement options.     

CDM and national policy: Synergy or conflict? Evidence from the wind power sector in China

This study assesses the effectiveness of a mix of policy instruments including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) to induce wind technology diffusion in China. Relying on a panel dataset consisting of information from 1207 CDM wind projects in thirty provinces over the period 2004–2011, the empirical analysis indicates that: first, wind energy deployment responds primarily to those counterfactual emissions which would have occurred in the absence of the wind projects; second, the dynamic efficiency of the FIT subsidy shows a potential incompatibility with the CDM incentive; third, the leverage of the CDM on wind investment is supported by the industry and technology policy package, which explains in large part the decrease in the FIT subsidy. Given these findings, suggestions are made regarding the design of a future carbon offset scheme and its link with mitigation action in developing countries.     

The future of the CDM: same same,but differentiated?

Policy-makers and scientists have raised concerns about the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in particular regarding its low contribution to sustainable development, unbalanced regional and sectoral distribution of projects, and its limited contribution to global emission reductions. Differentiation between countries or project types has been proposed as a possible way forward to address these problems. An overview is provided of the different ways in which CDM differentiation could be implemented. The implications for the actors involved in the CDM are analysed, along with a quantitative assessment of the impacts on the carbon market, using bottom-up marginal abatement cost curves. The discounting of CDM credits, quota systems, or differentiated eligibility of countries could help to address several of the concerns raised. Preferential treatment may also make a limited contribution to achieving the aims of CDM differentiation by increasing opportunities for under-represented host countries. The impact on the carbon market appears to be limited for most options.     

Future restrictions for sinks in the CDM How about a cap on supply?

Abstract

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects.

This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries.     

Can the EU emission trading scheme support CDM forestry?

Abstract

The European Commission is mandated to consider the inclusion of credits from land-use projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI), beginning with the second period of the European Union's emission trading scheme (ETS) in its report due in July 2006. Temporary credits from afforestation and reforestation under the CDM are seen by many as posing a technical problem for their use under the ETS. This article summarizes three feasible, efficient and environmentally sound alternatives for achieving the integration of such temporary credits in the European emissions trading market starting in 2008. The first proposal integrates tCERs and lCERs (temporary credits) into the EU ETS by allowing for their direct use for compliance purposes. The second proposal builds on the idea of swapping temporary credits for EU allowances (EUAs) by Member States. The third proposal would not require a political decision at the EU level. Instead supportive Member States or private carbon fund operators would agree to swap temporary credits for the CERs or ERUs they hold in their accounts. All three solutions would be linked to a risk-mitigation strategy based on levying a fee or fixing an exchange rate, which would allow governments to hedge the risk of losing temporary credits.     

Glaciers and Climate in the Andes between the Equator and 30° S: What is Recorded under Extreme Environmental Conditions?

Sublimation and melt disturb the environmental information obtained from ice core records in the Andes. In two case studies we demonstrate to what extent these post-depositional processes may remove major parts of the accumulated snow cover. Dark ash layers from the Tungurahua eruption changed the albedo of surface snow on Chimborazo glacier (6268 m, 1°30 S,78°36 W, Ecuador) between two ice core drilling campaigns and forced substantial melt. Re-distribution and washout of the chemical constituents shifted the concentration profiles obtained in December 1999 as compared to an equivalent core drilled in December 2000. The stable isotope records showed that approximately the water equivalent (weq) of an annual layer had melted, and that the percolating melt water penetrated within the firn layer to a depth of at least 16.5 m without refreezing. In the second example, from a site on the dry axis between the tropical and extra-tropical precipitation belts, significant loss of accumulated snow layers occurred by sublimation. A surface experiment at Cerro Tapado glacier (5536 m, 30°08 S,69°55 W, Chile) revealed that losses of 2 mm weq (5 mm snow) per day occurred during the dry period following the 1997/98 El Niño. This loss generally included the entire surface layer enriched in stable isotopes, and thus caused minimal disturbance of the isotopic signature (and hence climatic information) of the net accumulation, yet chemical constituents again experienced considerable changes in concentration. From annual layer counting and direct dating it is obvious that the major part of the accumulated ice on both glaciers is younger than 100 years; however, isotopic and chemical variations at least in the basal ice from Cerro Tapado clearly point to climate conditions different from the recent centuries. This evidence is supported by mass balance considerations derived from a glacier-climate model. The possibility of a third type of disturbance aside from sublimation and melting – in this case a significant hiatus in the environmental chronology – also deserves consideration for other icecore records from this region. Potential disruptions or discontinuities need to be carefully evaluated given the profound changes in climatic and glaciological conditions since the Last Glacial Maximum throughout Holocene times.     

Climate change beliefs in an agricultural context: what is the role of values held by farming and non-farming groups?

Climate change in many agricultural contexts will increase tensions between farming and non-farming populations over adaptations in land use and water conservation strategies. How adequately these future tensions may be mitigated will be partially determined by each groups' beliefs about climate change. A voluminous literature shows that climate change beliefs are crucial for understanding engagement with climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, and that values motivate climate change beliefs, but the role of values remains unclear, and comparisons of farming and non-farming populations are scant. We develop a model of climate change beliefs that integrates four main motivating factors - values, political ideology, knowledge, and worldview - and we explicitly compare members of farming and non-farming populations in an agricultural watershed in the Central Great Plains, USA. Our findings highlight the role of held values in motivating climate change beliefs and point to areas of potential consensus and tension within and among members of these two groups. The results provide an empirical basis for developing future climate change engagement strategies in contexts of growing divides and conflicts among farming and non-farming groups.     

Do bilateral trade relationships influence the distribution of CDM projects?

The use of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is increasingly widespread in developing countries. However, CDM projects are still far from being an effective development activity due to the uneven distribution of these projects in a few relatively well-off economies. One potential cause of this imbalance is analysed in terms of the trade relationships between developed and developing countries. By applying a gravity model to a panel dataset, well-established export flows from developed economies towards developing countries are shown to explain why a large proportion of CDM projects are unevenly geographically distributed. This kind of lock-in effect regarding the CDM between developed and developing countries could be avoided by both enhancing the institutional framework in developing countries that host CDM projects and reinforcing compulsory rules for CDM destinations in the least-developed economies.     

The socialization potential of the CDM in EU–Vietnam climate relations

This article argues that the material incentives associated with climate policies such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) may contribute to the socialization of emerging economies such as Vietnam in economic-oriented climate change norms. In current academic research, the CDM has both been extolled as a cost-effective and vilified as an environmentally inadequate instrument. Few studies so far, however, have looked into the CDM's potential contribution to socialization-related phenomena such as raising climate change awareness. This article aims to fill that gap by studying the CDM in EU–Vietnam relations in four periods, namely initiation (2001–2007), improvement (2008–2010), consolidation (2010–2012), and potential habit formation (2012 and beyond), with both the EU and Vietnam being important players in the market for CDM credits (Certified Emission Reductions or CERs). We argue that there is at least a strong potential for habit formation resulting from the CDM's material incentives, and that the underlying causal mechanism involves the emergence and activities of norm entrepreneurs and habit formation through a process of legal institutionalization.

Policy relevance

Normative transformation or change is increasingly attracting the attention of both climate policy makers and scholars alike, certainly in view of the failures of ‘standard’ economic or technological solutions to tackle climate change. There is a need, however, to apply insights from social theory to specific policies and cases. The policy relevance of this article lies here: does the CDM (a specific policy) affect climate concerns (norms) in Vietnam (a specific case)? And, if so, to what extent and why? Based on previous research regarding the Chinese case, it is expected that the CDM's material incentives result in a mild effect in Vietnam, probably less pronounced than in China in view of the latter's relative level of economic development, and the strength of its political and legal-institutional system and (human) capacity to develop CDM projects. This article's research findings point out that whether and how ‘deep’ these new shared ideas will succeed in becoming standards of appropriate behaviour in Vietnam might to some extent depend on whether the international community is able to offer a material incentive structure that fosters such a normative transformation.     

LULUCF in the post-2012 regime: fixing the problems of the past?

One of the reasons why the Kyoto Protocol has been environmentally ineffective is the flaws in the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) accounting rules, including voluntary accounting for Article 3.4 activities, the adoption of a definition of forest management that allowed parties to preferentially include and exclude forest lands, and allowing parties with net emissions from LULUCF in 1990 to include deforestation emissions in their 1990 emissions base year. Three proposed amendments to the LULUCF rules for the post-2012 regime are discussed and analysed: (1) a force majeure rule, (2) a baseline-and-credit system for forest management and (3) an ‘emissions-to-atmosphere’ approach for harvested wood products. Although these proposals have the potential to significantly improve the accounting framework, there are still significant problems such as the failure to account for the biophysical effects of forest activities, uncertainties associated with the application of the forest management baseline-and-credit system and continuing optional coverage of Article 3.4 activities.     

The case for Japanese—Russian joint implementation in implementing the Kyoto Protocol

The Doha Amendment allows surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) to be carried over from the first commitment period, but limits their use for offsetting emission growth beyond commitment levels. Amendment 7ter simultaneously ‘shaves’ AAU allocation to a level equivalent to the average 2008–2010 emissions for countries that pledged a growth target under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This means that economies in transition (EITs) are not allocated headroom for growth, and makes their commitments starkly different from their original pledges. The ‘bubble’ arrangement within the EU adds uncertainty to whether new Member States will avoid the ‘shaving’ of 7ter due to their pooled target. This would put Annex I EITs into an unequal position as a result of the Doha Amendment.     

Can CDM finance energy access in Least Developed Countries? Evidence from Tanzania

Policy documents and academic literature suggest that Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) finance could complement traditional ‘energy access’ (EA) funding in developing countries, including the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Yet these propositions have not been empirically tested. This study helps fill this gap by examining constraints to CDM project passage through five stages of an idealized project development cycle (PDC) in Tanzania, and their implications for the ability of the CDM to contribute to financing energy access in LDCs. Twenty-five semi-structured interviews and documentary material were analysed using an analytical framework developed for systematic investigation of constraints. Institutional constraints such as the under-performance of Tanzania's Designated National Authority were the most often mentioned obstacles for project development. Yet non-institutional constraints such as limited energy sector mitigation potential, indigenous skill shortages, and low carbon market prices also hinder project development. Institutional constraints buttress, rather than supersede, pre-existing non-institutional constraints, and together they prevent energy projects from completing the PDC and accessing CDM finance. The number and severity of constraints suggest that the situation is unlikely to change rapidly, and that the CDM sustains and exacerbates existing global inequalities. Since traditional energy access funding is insufficient to address these inequalities, new funding and policy mechanisms are required.

Policy relevance

The CDM fails to fill the EA financing gap in Tanzania. This is also true for other LDCs where comparable project development challenges prevail. The CDM therefore appears to sustain uneven development patterns overlooking those most in need. Claims about its potential to enhance EA are misplaced, and the situation is unlikely to change rapidly. CDM and carbon market projects more widely will have limited ability to help financing EA in LDCs, even if the institutional setting within which they are implemented were reformed in the future. Yet traditional energy funding will be inadequate on its own. The debate over extending the CDM post-2017, when the second Kyoto Protocol commitment period expires, should be informed by honest appraisal of its merits and defects. Policy makers should revisit lessons provided by this article and wider research to help ensure that new EA mechanisms are not hampered by constraints and can benefit those most in need.     

The case for Japanese–Russian joint implementation in implementing the Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol in Japanese policy making must be seen as an instrument in strategic energy planning. A greater focus in Japanese implementation policy on joint implementation within the Russian energy sector (and less emphasis on domestic sinks) is argued to be at least cost neutral, if not outright profitable. More importantly, it would have the capacity to deliver entry into force of the Protocol, and with it a key component in strategic Japanese energy policy: the flexible additional supply required for the successful liberalisation of the Japanese natural gas market.     

Increased Precipitation in the Norwegian Arctic: True or False?

Results from the WMO Solid Precipitation MeasurementIntercomparison and parallel precipitationmeasurements from Svalbard are used to evaluate andadjust models for estimating true precipitation underArctic conditions. The conclusion is that trueprecipitation in the Arctic may be estimatedreasonably well when the wind speed at gauge height isless than 7 m/s. It is possible to give good estimatesof true annual and seasonal precipitation at Svalbard,as only a small part of the precipitation is fallingat wind speeds above 7 m/s. For rough calculations,the correction factors for liquid precipitation isestimated to be 1.15 and for solid precipitation1.85.The developed correction models are used to estimateamounts and trends of true precipitation for two sitesin the Norwegian Arctic. In Ny-Ålesund the trueannual precipitation is more than 50% higher than themeasured amount. As the aerodynamic effects leading toprecipitation undercatch are dependent onprecipitation type and temperature, the observed andprojected increase in the air temperature in theArctic would also affect the measured precipitation,even if the true precipitation was unchanged. Sincethe mid 1960s the temperature at Svalbard Airport hasincreased by 0.5 °C per decade, resulting in areduced fraction of annual precipitation falling assnow. In the same period, the measured precipitationhas increased by 2.9% per decade and the `true' by1.7% per decade. Estimates are made of the fictitiousprecipitation increase that would result from ageneral temperature increase of 2, 4 and 6 °C. The increase in the measured annual precipitationwould be 6, 10 and 13%, respectively. The expectedfictitious precipitation increase is thus of the samemagnitude as the real precipitation increase whichaccording to recent GCM projections may be expected inNorthern Europe as a result of a doubling of theatmospheric CO₂ content.     

Why Was the Strengthening of Rainfall in Summer over the Yangtze River Valley in 2016 Less Pronounced than that in 1998 under Similar Preceding El Ni ?no Events?—Role of Midlatitude Circulation in August

It is widely recognized that rainfall over the Yangtze River valley(YRV) strengthens considerably during the decaying summer of El Ni ?no,as demonstrated by the catastrophic flooding suffered in the summer of 1998.Nevertheless,the rainfall over the YRV in the summer of 2016 was much weaker than that in 1998,despite the intensity of the 2016 El Nio having been as strong as that in 1998.A thorough comparison of the YRV summer rainfall anomaly between 2016 and 1998 suggests that the difference was caused by the sub-seasonal variation in the YRV rainfall anomaly between these two years,principally in August.The precipitation anomaly was negative in August 2016—different to the positive anomaly of 1998.Further analysis suggests that the weaker YRV rainfall in August 2016 could be attributable to the distinct circulation anomalies over the midlatitudes.The intensified "Silk Road Pattern" and upper-tropospheric geopotential height over the Urals region,both at their strongest since 1980,resulted in an anticyclonic circulation anomaly over midlatitude East Asia with anomalous easterly flow over the middle-to-lower reaches of the YRV in the lower troposphere.This easterly flow reduced the climatological wind,weakened the water vapor transport,and induced the weaker YRV rainfall in August 2016,as compared to that in 1998.Given the unique sub-seasonal variation of the YRV rainfall in summer 2016,more attention should be paid to midlatitude circulation—besides the signal in the tropics—to further our understanding of the predictability and variation of YRV summer rainfall.