The Use of Switching Point and Protection Levels to Improve Revenue Performance in Order‐Driven Production Systems

In a multiproduct order‐driven production system, an organization has to decide how to selectively accept orders and allocate capacity to these orders so as to maximize total profit (TP). In this article, we incorporate the novel concept of switching point in developing three capacity‐allocation with switching point heuristics (CASP_a‐c). Our analysis indicates that all three CASP heuristics outperform the first‐come‐first‐served model and Barut and Sridharan's dynamic capacity‐allocation process (DCAP) model. The best model, CASP_b, has an 8% and 6% average TP improvement over DCAP using the split lot and whole lot policies, respectively. In addition, CASP_b performs particularly well under operating conditions of tight capacity and large price differences between product classes. The introduction of a switching point, which has not been found in previous capacity‐allocation heuristics, provides for a better balance between forward and backward allocation of available capacity and plays a significant role in improving TP.     

Competition and Coordination in Two‐Tier Public Service Systems under Government Fiscal Policy

As a result of government budgetary limits and rapid market growth, many public service systems—such as health care—are characterized by extensive customer wait times that have become a serious problem. This problem might be solved by allowing private firms to enter these markets, which would provide customers with a choice between a free (governmental) public service provider (SP) and a fee‐charging (or “toll”) private SP. In such a two‐tier service system, the two SPs are differentiated by service quality and cost efficiency. This study focuses on the competition and coordination issues for two‐tier service systems with customers who are sensitive to both service quality and delay. The free system attempts to maximize its expected total customer utility with limited capacity, whereas the toll system attempts to maximize its profit. Neither goal is aligned with the social welfare goal of the public service. To achieve the social welfare goal, the government plays a crucial role in coordinating the two‐tier service system via the budget, the tradeoff of social members' goals, and tax‐subsidy policies. Using a mixed duopoly game, we establish Nash equilibrium strategies and identify the conditions for the existence of the two‐tier service system. We employ several interesting and counter‐intuitive managerial insights generated by the model to show that the public service can be delivered more efficiently via customer choice and SP competition. In addition, we show that a relatively low tax‐subsidy rate can almost perfectly coordinate the two SPs to achieve most of the maximum possible benefit of the two‐tier service system.     

Sentiments

This paper develops a new theory of fluctuations—one that helps accommodate the notions of “animal spirits” and “market sentiment” in unique‐equilibrium, rational‐expectations, macroeconomic models. To this goal, we limit the communication that is embedded in a neoclassical economy by allowing trading to be random and decentralized. We then show that the business cycle may be driven by a certain type of extrinsic shocks which we call sentiments. These shocks formalize shifts in expectations of economic activity without shifts in the underlying preferences and technologies; they are akin to sunspots, but operate in unique‐equilibrium models. We further show how communication may help propagate these shocks in a way that resembles the spread of fads and rumors and that gives rise to boom‐and‐bust phenomena. We finally illustrate the quantitative potential of our insights within a variant of the RBC model.     

Shipping Fees or Shipping Free? A Tale of Two Price Partitioning Strategies in Online Retailing

In this article, we study the price partitioning decisions of online retailers regarding shipping and handling (S&H) fees. Specifically, we analyze two partitioning formats used by retailers in this context. In the first scenario, retailers present customers with a price that is partitioned into a product price and a separate S&H surcharge (the PS strategy); in the second, customers are offered free shipping through a non‐partitioned format where the product price already includes the shipping cost (the ZS strategy). We first develop a stylized game‐theoretic model that captures the competitive dynamics between (and within) these two formats. Analysis of the model provides insights into how both firm and product level characteristics drive a retailer's strategic choice regarding which partitioning format to adopt and, hence, determines the equilibrium market structure in terms of proportion of ZS and PS retailers. Subsequently, we conduct empirical analyses, based on product and S&H prices data for two different product categories (digital cameras and printers) collected from online retailers, to validate all the results of our theoretical model. We establish that PS retailers charge lower product prices than ZS ones, but the total price (product + S&H) charged is higher for the first group. The S&H charge for PS retailers can be significant—it is, on average, 5.4% (printers) and 3.0% (digital cameras) for our two product categories. Furthermore, retailers which are popular and/or face risky cost environment are more likely to opt for the ZS strategy, while retailers whose portfolio mostly includes large or heavy products with high cost (S&H)‐to‐price ratios usually choose the PS strategy. Lastly, our empirical study also illustrates that the price adjustment behavior of retailers is affected by their shipping‐fee policies—for example, ZS retailers change their product prices almost 1.5 times more frequently than PS ones.     

Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity

We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the n‐person unanimity bargaining game. As is well‐known, in this game every individually rational allocation is sustainable as a Nash equilibrium (also as a subgame perfect equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient and if n & 2). Moreover, delays in agreement are also possible in such equilibria. By limiting ourselves to a plausible notion of complexity that captures length of memory, we find that the introduction of complexity costs (lexicographically with the standard payoffs) does not reduce the range of possible allocations but does limit the amount of delay that can occur in any agreement. In particular, we show that in any n‐player game, for any allocation z, an agreement on z at any period t can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of the game with complexity costs if and only if t≤n. We use the limit on delay result to establish that, in equilibrium, the strategies implement stationary behavior. Finally, we also show that ‘noisy Nash equilibrium’ with complexity costs sustains only the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium allocation.     

Equilibrium Bias of Technology

This paper presents three sets of results about equilibrium bias of technology. First, I show that when the menu of technological possibilities only allows for factor‐augmenting technologies, the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change relatively biased toward that factor—meaning that the induced technological change increases the relative marginal product of the factor becoming more abundant. Moreover, this induced bias can be strong enough to make the relative marginal product of a factor increasing in response to an increase in its supply, thus leading to an upward‐sloping relative demand curve. I also show that these results about relative bias do not generalize when more general menus of technological possibilities are considered. Second, I prove that under mild assumptions, the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change that is absolutely biased toward that factor—meaning that it increases its marginal product at given factor proportions. The third and most important result in the paper establishes the possibility of and conditions for strong absolute equilibrium bias—whereby the price (marginal product) of a factor increases in response to an increase in its supply. I prove that, under some regularity conditions, there will be strong absolute equilibrium bias if and only if the aggregate production function of the economy fails to be jointly concave in factors and technology. This type of failure of joint concavity is possible in economies where equilibrium factor demands and technologies result from the decisions of different agents.     

Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons

We study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information (news) about the value of a privately informed seller's asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers. We construct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure. The no‐trade period ends in one of two ways: either enough good news arrives, restoring confidence and markets reopen, or bad news arrives, making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is, a partial sell‐off of low‐value assets. Conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided. We analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news. Higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes. Our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem—in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news, reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure.     

Coordinating Supply Chains via Advance‐Order Discounts,Minimum Order Quantities,and Delegations

To avoid inventory risks, manufacturers often place rush orders with suppliers only after they receive firm orders from their customers (retailers). Rush orders are costly to both parties because the supplier incurs higher production costs. We consider a situation where the supplier's production cost is reduced if the manufacturer can place some of its order in advance. In addition to the rush order contract with a pre‐established price, we examine whether the supplier should offer advance‐order discounts to encourage the manufacturer to place a portion of its order in advance, even though the manufacturer incurs some inventory risk. While the advance‐order discount contract is Pareto‐improving, our analysis shows that the discount contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. However, if the supplier imposes a pre‐specified minimum order quantity requirement as a qualifier for the manufacturer to receive the advance‐order discount, then such a combined contract can coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, the combined contract enables the supplier to attain the first‐best solution. We also explore a delegation contract that either party could propose. Under this contract, the manufacturer delegates the ordering and salvaging activities to the supplier in return for a discounted price on all units procured. We find the delegation contract coordinates the supply chain and is Pareto‐improving. We extend our analysis to a setting where the suppliers capacity is limited for advance production but unlimited for rush orders. Our structural results obtained for the one‐supplier‐one‐manufacturer case continue to hold when we have two manufacturers.     

Order Progress Information: Improved Dynamic Emergency Ordering Policies

Technologies such as radio‐frequency identification and global positioning systems can provide improved real‐time tracking information for products and replenishment orders along the supply chain. We call this type of visibility order progress information. In this paper, we investigate how order progress information can be used to improve inventory replenishment decisions. To this end, we examine a retailer facing a stochastic lead time for order fulfillment. We characterize a replenishment policy that is based on the classical (Q, R) policy and that allows for releasing emergency orders in response to the order progress information. We show that the optimal structure of this policy is given by a sequence of threshold values dependent on order progress information. In a numerical study we evaluate the cost savings due to this improved replenishment policy.     

Multiperiod Models with Capacities in Competitive Supply Chain

This paper considers a supply chain setting where several capacitated suppliers compete for orders from a single retailer in a multiperiod environment. At each period, the retailer places orders to the suppliers in response to the prices they announce. Each supplier has a fixed capacity. We consider a make‐to‐stock setting where the retailer can carry inventory. The retailer faces exogenous, price‐dependent demand. We study the problem using ideas from fluid models. In particular, we (i) analyze when there are pure equilibrium policies in this setting and characterize the structure of these policies; (ii) consider coordination mechanisms; and (iii) present some preliminary computational results. We also consider a modified model that uses option contracts to coordinate the supply chain.     

Benchmark Schedules for Subcontracted Operations: Decentralization Inefficiencies that Arise from Competition and First‐Come‐First‐Served Processing*

Subcontracting has become a prominent business practice across many industries. Subcontracting of industrial production is generally based on short‐term need for additional processing capacity, and is frequently employed by manufacturers to process customer orders more quickly than using only in‐house production. In this article, we study a popular business model where multiple manufacturers, each capable of processing his entire workload in‐house, have the option to subcontract some of their operations to a single third party with a flexible resource. Each manufacturer can deliver customer orders only after his entire batch of jobs, processed in‐house and at the third party, is completed. The third party facility is available to several manufacturers who compete for its use. Current business practice of First‐Come‐First‐Served (FCFS) processing of the subcontracted workloads as well as the competitive Nash equilibrium schedules developed in earlier studies result in two types of inefficiencies; the third party capacity is not maximally utilized, and the manufacturers incur decentralization cost. In this article, we develop models to assess the value created by coordinating the manufacturers' subcontracting decisions by comparing two types of centralized control against FCFS and Nash equilibrium schedules. We present optimal and/or approximate algorithms to quantify the third party underutilization and the manufacturers' decentralization cost. We find that both inefficiencies are more severe with competition than they are when the third party allocates capacity in an FCFS manner. However, in a decentralized setting, a larger percentage of the players prefer Nash equilibrium schedules to FCFS schedules. We extend our analysis to incomplete information scenarios where manufacturers reveal limited demand information, and find that more information dramatically benefits the third party and the manufacturers, however, the marginal benefit of additional information is decreasing. Finally, we discuss an extension wherein each manufacturer's objective takes into account asymmetries in subcontracting, in‐house processing, and delay costs.     

Modeling Strategic Behavior in The Competitive Newsvendor Problem: An Experimental Investigation

This study experimentally investigates ordering behavior in the competitive newsvendor problem. We consider a duopoly market setting with two identical newsvendors selling the same perishable goods in a common market. Our experimental results show that average observed orders systematically deviate from the Nash equilibrium, and exhibit a similar pull‐to‐center pattern as in the classic non‐competitive newsvendor experiments: average orders fall below the Nash equilibrium in the high‐margin condition, and above the Nash equilibrium in the low‐margin condition. More importantly, the observed orders in the duopoly market are significantly higher than that in the non‐competitive newsvendor market, even in situations where standard inventory models predict no difference. We explain the ordering behavior using a strategic experience‐weighted attraction (EWA) model, which captures players' propensities for strategic thinking in game settings. Our empirical analysis suggests that the strategic EWA model generates more accurate predictions of future ordering behavior than an existing linear adaptive model without concerning strategic thinking. Further analysis shows that individuals are heterogeneous in their propensities to be a strategic player. Our research indicates the importance of modeling strategic behavior when analyzing behavioral decisions in competitive (game) environments.     

Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia

Much evidence suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational, forward‐looking decisions. This raises the question as to when the rational types are decisive for aggregate outcomes and when the boundedly rational types shape aggregate results. We examine this question in the context of a long‐standing and important economic problem: the adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated monetary shock. Our experiments suggest that two types of bounded rationality—money illusion and anchoring—are important behavioral forces behind nominal inertia. However, depending on the strategic environment, bounded rationality has vastly different effects on aggregate price adjustment. If agents' actions are strategic substitutes, adjustment to the new equilibrium is extremely quick, whereas under strategic complementarity, adjustment is both very slow and associated with relatively large real effects. This adjustment difference is driven by price expectations, which are very flexible and forward‐looking under substitutability but adaptive and sticky under complementarity. Moreover, subjects' expectations are also considerably more rational under substitutability.     

Uncovering Mechanisms of Theory Development in an Academic Field: Lessons from Leadership Research

Abstract

A long‐standing debate in organization studies has centered on the tension between paradigmatic consensus and theoretical pluralism in an academic field, but little attention has been paid to the underlying processes of field development that account for this. Using a mechanisms‐based approach, we examined the field of leadership over the last 50 years (1957–2007) focusing on: scholarly consensus on theory and methods; models and variables; and examinations of the state of the field. In spite of considerable advances in research, we find a general lack of commensuration or standards by which theories can be compared or synthesized; an emphasis on leaders’ effects on performance rather than meaning‐making or value infusion; and sparse instances of taking stock of the overall field. We conclude by proposing three research strategies for the future—theoretical compartmentalization, theoretical integration, and theoretical novelty—and advocating greater methodological variety.     

Strongly Consistent Self‐Confirming Equilibrium

Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) introduced the notion of self‐confirming equilibrium, which is generally less restrictive than Nash equilibrium. Fudenberg and Levine also defined a concept of consistency, and claimed in their Theorem 4 that with consistency and other conditions on beliefs, a self‐confirming equilibrium has a Nash equilibrium outcome. We provide a counterexample that disproves Theorem 4 and prove an alternative by replacing consistency with a more restrictive concept, which we call strong consistency. In games with observed deviators, self‐confirming equilibria are strongly consistent self‐confirming equilibria. Hence, our alternative theorem ensures that despite the counterexample, the corollary of Theorem 4 is still valid.     

Dedicated Transportation Subnetworks: Design,Analysis, and Insights

A dedicated subnetwork (DSN) refers to a subset of lanes, with associated loads, in a shipper's transportation network, for which resources—trucks, drivers, and other equipment—are exclusively assigned to accomplish shipping requirements. The resources assigned to a DSN are not shared with the rest of the shipper's network. Thus, a DSN is an autonomously operated subnetwork and, hence, can be subcontracted. We address a novel problem of extracting a DSN for outsourcing to one or more subcontractors, with the objective of maximizing the shipper's savings. In their pure form, the defining conditions of a DSN are often too restrictive to enable the extraction of a sizable subnetwork. We consider two notions—deadheading and lane‐sharing—that aid in improving the size of the DSN. We show that all the optimization problems involved are both strongly NP‐hard and APX‐hard, and demonstrate several polynomially solvable special cases arising from topological properties of the network and parametric relationships. Next, we develop a network‐flow‐based heuristic that provides near‐optimal solutions to practical instances in reasonable time. Finally, using a test bed based on data obtained from a national 3PL company, we demonstrate the substantial monetary impact of subcontracting a DSN and offer useful managerial insights.     

Education,Mobility and Employers’ Monopsony Power: A Search‐theoretic Analysis

Abstract. We analyse the efficiency of schooling choices in a wage‐posting search equilibrium model with on‐the‐job search. The workers have multidimensional skills and the search market is segmented by technology. Education determines the scope — or adaptability— of individual skills. Individuals obtain schooling to leave unemployment more quickly and to climb the wage ladder rapidly through job‐to‐job mobility — that is, to speed up job shopping. Education reduces firms’ monopsony power in the wage determination by improving workers’ mobility. As a result, the wage distribution shifts rightward with aggregate schooling. However, the ratio of vacant jobs to job seekers also falls in each sector. Either one or the other externality may dominate, implying, respectively, under‐ or over‐education. A combination of minimum wage and schooling fee can decentralize the efficient allocation.     

Noisy Stochastic Games

This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic games with noise—a component of the state that is nonatomically distributed and not directly affected by the previous period's state and actions. Noise may be simply a payoff‐irrelevant public randomization device, delivering known results on the existence of correlated equilibrium as a special case. More generally, noise can take the form of shocks that enter into players' stage payoffs and the transition probability on states. The existence result is applied to a model of industry dynamics and to a model of dynamic electoral competition.     

What Happens in the Field Stays in the Field: Exploring Whether Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments

The minimax argument represents game theory in its most elegant form: simple but with stark predictions. Although some of these predictions have been met with reasonable success in the field, experimental data have generally not provided results close to the theoretical predictions. In a striking study, Palacios‐Huerta and Volij ( 2008 ) presented evidence that potentially resolves this puzzle: both amateur and professional soccer players play nearly exact minimax strategies in laboratory experiments. In this paper, we establish important bounds on these results by examining the behavior of four distinct subject pools: college students, bridge professionals, world‐class poker players, who have vast experience with high‐stakes randomization in card games, and American professional soccer players. In contrast to Palacios‐Huerta and Volij's results, we find little evidence that real‐world experience transfers to the lab in these games—indeed, similar to previous experimental results, all four subject pools provide choices that are generally not close to minimax predictions. We use two additional pieces of evidence to explore why professionals do not perform well in the lab: (i) complementary experimental treatments that pit professionals against preprogrammed computers and (ii) post‐experiment questionnaires. The most likely explanation is that these professionals are unable to transfer their skills at randomization from the familiar context of the field to the unfamiliar context of the lab.     

Inventory and transshipment decisions in the rationing game under capacity uncertainty

In this paper, we consider the inventory decisions of two retailers who are supplied by a single supplier with uncertain capacity. When capacity is allocated in proportion to the retailers׳ orders, the retailers compete for the capacity by inflating their orders (i.e., the rationing game). In addition, we allow the retailers to implement transshipment between them such that they cooperate by transshipping the surplus stock of one to another who is out of stock. Our analysis of Nash equilibrium orders shows that, while order inflation in the equilibrium orders persists in the rationing game with transshipment, it may not occur if the amount of capacity shortage is small and the transshipment prices are low. Thus, carefully chosen transshipment prices may alleviate order inflation behavior. We also characterize centralized orders that maximize the total profit of the retailers and compare them to equilibrium orders. In particular, we investigate coordinating transshipment prices that induce the retailers to choose centralized orders. Our numerical analysis shows that, even for two identical retailers, coordinating transshipment prices exist in a more limited range of parameter values in the rationing game than they do outside the rationing game due to capacity uncertainty and limitation.