The impact of right-to-work laws on employer unfair labor practice charges

The expected impact of right-to-work (RTW) laws on employer unfair labor practices is discussed within a resource allocation framework. How RTW laws affect the relative prices of different organizing tactics is also considered. Empirical analysis based on cross-sectional data for 1970, 1975, and 1980 shows that the impact of RTW laws on employer unfair labor practice charges is insignificant. Other variables that affect charge activity are also discussed in terms of their effect on employer/union organizing resource allocation decisions.     

The determinants and effects of right-to-work laws: A review of the recent literature

I review the recent literature on the determinants and effects of right-to-work (RTW) laws. The focus is primarily on the econometric studies published since the early 1980s. Five major areas of impact are assessed: unionization, free riding, union organizing activities and successes in NLRB elections, wage structure, and state industrial development. While individual findings are quite sensitive to model specification, the accumulated evidence indicates that RTW laws have at least a significant short-run impact on all of these areas except perhaps wages.     

ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING,THE EDUCATIONAL INCOME GAP,AND OVERALL INCOME INEQUALITY

An important consequence of the economic structure transformations of recent decades is increased income inequality. While an extensive literature has explored the relationship between economic restructuring and inequality, the unique contribution of this article is that it develops and tests a model that explores the mechanisms by which this process occurs. Specifically, the intervening role of the income gap between the well-educated and those with lower levels of education (the educational income gap) and other moderating factors are explored. The 5 percent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data from the 2000 Census of Population and Housing was used in the analysis. The data provided strong support for the model. It was found that economic structure and the moderating variables were strongly related to the educational income gap, which in turn was strongly related to overall income inequality. Generally, both the educational income gap and overall income inequality were greater in geographic areas with higher proportions of the labor force employed in services, and both were lower where greater proportions of the labor force were employed in goods-producing industries.     

Unit costs,legal shocks,and unionization in construction

I develop an econometric model to examine three potential causes of the decline of unionization in the construction industry in the 1970s and 1980s: increased cost relative to the open shop, reduced coverage by prevailing wage laws, and expanded double-breasting in response to NLRB decisions. The results show that relative cost was the decisive factor in the 1970s, whereas double-breasting was the most plausible explanation in the 1980s. Research support was provided by North Carolina State University. I am deeply indebted to Barry Hirsch for estimating the union-nonunion wage gaps for 1983–1991. An appendix describing the definitions and sources of the variables used in this analysis is available from the author.     

Determinants of female labor force participation: A study of Seoul,South Korea, 1970–1980

This paper investigates the determinants of labor force participation of women living in male-headed households in Seoul, South Korea, at two points in time, 1970 and 1980. Analysis of data from the 1970 and 1980 Korean Population Censuses suggests that both women's educational level and the family economic status determine women's labor force participation in Seoul. Women with middle school education or above are more economically active than those with no education. Women from lower economic backgrounds are almost two to three times more likely to be employed than those in high-status families, controlling for age, number of children under 6, and marital status. However, this pattern is not found among women from the blue-collar wage-working families.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1988 meetings of the Population Association of America.     

REAL WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT UNCERTAINTY AND THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION DECISIONS OF MARRIED WOMEN

This paper argues that an important factor in a married woman's decision to enter the labor force is the degree of uncertainty associated with expectations offuture wages and (husband's) income, and that high levels of uncertainty during the 1970s may have contributed substantially to the growth in participation in that decade. We apply a model of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity to aggregate time series data to measure the level of uncertainty in each period. Our estimates support our hypothesis that the level of uncertainty is an important determinant of labor force participation for married women.     

A Research Note on Family and Income Distribution: The Equalizing Impact of Married Women's Earnings in Metropolitan Brazil*

Using the 1985 Brazilian Annual Household Survey (PNAD), this study analyzes the extent to which the labor force participation of married women influenced familyincome inequality. The marginal impact on family earnings is decomposed into two components, one generated uniquely by differences in earnings inequality between spouses and another produced by imperfect assortive mating on spouses' earnings. Results show that the correlation among spouses' earnings is significantly less than one (0.4), and that the level of earnings inequality is more than 50 percent higher among wives than husbands. Because these forces are offsetting, wives' labor income has a negligible impact on family-income inequality in Brazil. The results demonstrate the importance of isolating the influence of imperfect assortive mating from that due to inequality in earnings between men and women.     

Social capital and household income distributions in the United States: 1980, 1990

This paper asked if changes in social capital influence the level and disparity of household income in the United States. Social capital is defined in this paper as one's sympathy (antipathy) for others and one's idealized self. Changes in social capital are expected to produce the following economic consequences. First, increases in social capital are expected to alter the terms of trade and to increase the likelihood of trades between friends and family. Second, increases in social capital are expected to increase an economic agent's concerns for the external consequences of his or her choices, internalizing what otherwise would be considered externalities. Third, increases in social capital between firms are expected to increase the likelihood that they will act in their collective interest. Fourth, increases in social capital are expected to increase the opportunities for specialization and the likelihood of trade. Finally, increases in social capital are expected to raise the average level of income and reduce the disparity of income.This paper empirically tested the relationship between changes in social capital indicator variables and changes in the average and coefficient of variation (CVs) of household income. State CVs and averages of household income were calculated for all 50 states and for different races/ethnic groups using the U.S. Census data for 1980 and 1990. Social capital indicator variables selected to measure changes in social capital included measures of family integrity including the percentages of households headed by a single female with children; educational achievement variables including high school graduation rates; crime rate variables including litigation rates; and labor force participation rates. The social capital indicator variables appeared to be significantly correlated with each other. However, in 1980, the percentages of households headed by a single female with children was not significantly related to the birth rates of single teens. By 1990, however, a strong correlation was found between the percentages of households headed by a single female with children and the birth rate of single teens.Income inequality among U.S. households measured using CVs increased between 1980 and 1990 in all 50 states. The largest increase in CVs was among white households. The smallest increase in CVs was among Asian households. The states with the largest increase in the ratio of 1990 and 1980 CVs were Arizona, Wyoming, Maine, Vermont, and Texas. Half of the states reported decreases in real household income between 1980 and 1990. Those states with the largest percentage decrease in real income were Wyoming, Alaska, Montana, Louisiana, and West Virginia. The largest percentage increase in real income was reported by Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts.State CVs and averages of household income were regressed on four factors or subsets of social capital indicator variables. The four factors used to predict CVs and averages of household income were generally statistically significant. The findings of this report support the conclusion that changes in social capital have a significant effect on the disparity and level of household income.     

Decomposition of Changes in Korean Wage Inequality, 1998–2007

South Korea experienced a steep increase in wage inequality between the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis in 2008. This paper investigates the causes of the sharp change during that time period by looking at the contributions of changes in the distributions of schooling and unionization. The effects are estimated applying two robust distributional function based decomposition methods on Korean Labor and Panel Survey data for the time period 1998–2007. The results suggest changes in the distribution of schooling can explain about 10 % of the changes in the 90/50 percentile wage gap. The declining unionization rate does not have much impact on the upward trend of Korean wage inequality. In addition, aggregate decomposition results suggest that changes in labor force composition can explain a significant proportion of the total wage changes in the upper-tail of the distribution. Based on our findings we provide a list of policy recommendations to address the wage inequality issue in Korea.     

Potential labor force supply and replacement in Mexico and the states of the Mexican Cession and Texas: 1980-2000

"The purpose of this article is to carry forward the examination of potential labor force supply and replacement of men in Mexico into the 1980-1990 and 1990-2000 decades so that the possible future course of international migration between that country and the United States may be better anticipated. In addition, to provide a degree of developmental perspective, trends in potential labor force supply and replacement in Mexico since 1930-40 are presented." As a contrast, "ratios of potential labor force supply and replacement in the southwestern United States--the states of the Mexican Cession and Texas, which were formerly part of Mexico--also are shown for the 1980-1990 and 1990-2000 intervals." The results suggest that "in Mexico, the projected number of males entering the labor force ages will be about 48 percent larger in the 1980s than in the 1970s.... Fertility declined significantly in Mexico in the 1970s, and therefore the number of new entrants to the labor force ages in the 1990s will decline...." The implications for international migration between Mexico and the United States are considered.     

World and regional labour force trends and prospects

Changes in fertility during 1970-1985 will not have any effect on the composition of the world work force until 1985 because the people who will be of working age at that time have already been born. However, fertility for this period will directly influence the size of the age group 15-30 in the year 2000. Moreover, fertility trends for this period will have an indirect effect on participation of women in the labor force. The number of people in the labor force has proportionately followed total population. Just as total population is projected to increase in the single decade 1970-1980 by an amount equal to its size in 1750, so the labor force will increase by 360 million during the 1980's (its original size in 1750). By the end of the present century the world labor force may well number some 2,6000 million, reaching 3,000 million by the year 2010; 4,000 million by 2030; 5,000 million by 2070; and stabilizing at about 5,200 million by the end of the 21st century. There will be great regional variations. Increases will range from 20-35% in Europe and the U.S.S.R. to 100-120% in South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For East Asia and North America the increases may amount to 60% by the year 2000 and 100% by 2050. In 1970 less developed regions had 2/3 the world's labor force; by 2000 they will have 3/4. In 1970 about 20% of the labor force in more developed regions were working in agriculture while in less developed regions 2/3 were so engaged. In other terms, in more developed regions 10 farmers supported 108 persons while in less developed regions 10 farmers supported only 38. According to Food and Agriculture Organization projections, by 2000 only 3.5% of the labor force in developed regions and 43.5% in less developed regions will be in agriculture. Differences in gross national product between regions is striking. In 1970 the less developed regions contained 70% of world population, 67% of the world labor force, 87% of the world agricultural labor, and produced 15% of its wealth. There are also sharp contrasts in participation in the labor force. In less developed countries more youths and older persons are in the labor force while in developed countries more women work. By the year 2000 female activity rates in more developed regions will increase for ages 20-64 and decrease for those under 20 and over 64. This will raise female participation in the labor force to 35%. In less developed regions female participation is expected to decline. The proportion of young workers is expected to increase in less developed and decline in more developed regions; the same will be true for older workers. The dependency burden will be concentrated among the young in less developed nations; in more devel oped regions there will be larger numbers of older dependents.     

Performance pay,the marriage market and rising income inequality in Taiwan

Taiwan expanded its college access significantly over the past two decades by converting 2-year junior colleges to 4-year colleges and relaxing entrance standards. The share of college graduates in the 22–24 years old population rose from 12 to 71% between 1990 and 2014. This should have suppressed returns to schooling and lowered household income inequality. Instead, Taiwan’s Gini coefficient rose. We show that rising use of performance pay and positive assortative mating in the marriage market jointly increase the household income inequality by 46.5% between 1980 and 2014. Our results suggest that uneven quality of the most recent cohorts of college graduates led to two sources of rising household income inequality: the increased use of bonus pay which increases residual inequality among college graduates; and matching on unobserved skills in the marriage market which increases inequality among married couples.

     

The globalization of production,national labour regulations and income inequality in the global North and South, 1980–2013

A central concern over global value chains (GVCs) is whether the integration of national firms into GVCs exacerbates income inequality within countries. However, despite decades of research, the distributional consequences of GVCs remain unclear in the empirical literature. Drawing on panel data from 96 countries between 1980 and 2013, we examine the effects of GVC integration on market income inequality and whether national labour regulations moderate these effects. We find integration increases inequality in the global North and South. More importantly, we find labour regulations amplify the inequality effects of integration in Southern countries by expanding the size of the informal sector while suppressing these effects in Northern countries by promoting unionization. This suggests institutional power from national labour regulations may enhance the bargaining power of labour in the North through increasing collective resources while disempowering labour in the South through reinforcing labour market segmentation between formal and informal sectors.     

An estimate of teenage abortion demand

This study estimates the demand for abortion by U.S. teenagers (15–19 years of age) for the year 1992. The empirical results found teenage abortion demand was inelastic with respect to price and a normal good with respect to income. Teenage abortion demand was also found to be positively related to state Medicaid funding and labor force participation. Parental involvement laws, welfare benefits, educational attainment, and state abortion attitudes are found to have no statistically significant impact on teenage abortion demand. Teenage abortion demand was found to be coincident with the business cycle. Using data pooled over the years 1992 and 1980, the pooled time-series estimates of the teenage abortion demand model were both quantitatively and qualitatively consistent with the cross-section estimates.     

Changing Income Inequality in Nonmetropolitan Counties, 1980 to 1990*

Abstract Income inequality has been increasing across the United States, but little is known about changing income inequality in nonmetropolitan counties. Data from the 1980 and 1990 Summary Tape Files of the U.S. Census of Population and Housing are used to estimate ordinary least squares models of change in income inequality. Household income inequality increased in a smaller share of nonmetro than metro counties from 1980 to 1990, and increases in income inequality were influenced more strongly by economic restructuring in nonmetro than in metro counties. Other factors, such as change in household structure, demographic composition, and labor supply and job quality, were generally similar in affecting income inequality in nonmetro and metro counties. The greater importance of economic restructuring in nonmetro counties indicates the lesser diversity and smaller size of local economies, and their greater vulnerability to forces of economic restructuring.     

Characteristics of cities that pass living wage ordinances: Are certain conditions more conducive than others?

Cities that have passed living wage ordinances often do so because of the strong political appeal of local living wage campaigns as a response to the declining value of the minimum wage, the outsourcing of municipal services, and rising income inequality. These campaigns generally consist of coalitions of community organizations, religious groups, and often times labor organizations. Organized labor is not the primary force behind most living wage campaigns, but they are an important constituency. Unexplored, however, are the labor market and other characteristics of those cities that have passed ordinances. This paper looks at data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and compares cities that passed living wage ordinances to those that did not. Cities in states with high union density, and with higher levels of income inequality and larger immigrant populations appear to be more likely to pass living wage ordinances than those cities that do not have these demographics. But as important as union support may be, without key demographic and economic characteristics, it is nonetheless insufficient to achieve living wage ordinances in most cases.     

Abortion and female labor force participation: Evidence prior to <Emphasis Type="Italic">Roe v. Wade</Emphasis>

From 1969 through 1972, and therefore prior to Roe v. Wade, several states legalized abortion. I examine whether the liberalization of state abortion laws affects female labor force participation using data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) and estimate several probit participation equations. Results indicate that abortion, by reducing unwanted pregnancies and hence fertility rates, has increased the labor force participation rates of females, especially of single black women.     

The participation of women in the labour force of Latin America: fertility and other factors

The level of labor force participation among Latin American women, when compared with participation rates for other countries, is the lowest in the world. Only 20% or less of women 10 years of age and older are economically active. This level did not change much between 1950 and 1970. Few women work in agriculture. The following factors are considered for their effect on labor force participation of urban women: marital status, education, income, and the structure and stage of development of the society. Married women have a low participation rate. More highly educated women are more likely to work, but there must be demand for their work services. As the economy of various countries has progressed, female participation in domestic services has decreased, in industry has remained constant between 1960 and 1970, and in social services has expanded. It is concluded that work participation for married women will only increase with the following changes: 1) improved educational opportunities for women; 2) structural change and modernization in the economy; and 3) reduced family fertility. Changes in the first 2 factors are more important than reduced fertility. Since 1960, only Chile and Costa Rica have had a 25% decline in fertility rates.     

Determinants of employment of recently arrived Mexican immigrant wives

The work force participation of married, Mexican-origin immigrant women who came to the US in the 1980s was investigated. Determinants of employment utilized in this study are the women's human capital stock, household resources, and labor market structural factors. Nine hypotheses were derived from the analytical model and were examined through logistic regression. Findings showed that all human capital resource and structural labor market factors were significantly related to employment. On the other hand, four of the five family household factors namely: the age and presence of children in the household, husband's income, husband's employment, and non-labor income were significantly related to employment. Furthermore, the positive factors indicating the likelihood of being employed in 1989 for Mexican immigrant wives are: 1) being 25-54 years of age; 2) higher educational levels; 3) speaking fluent English; 4) lower levels of husband's income and non-labor income; 5) employment of husband in 1989; 6) absence of children under age 6 at home; 7) lower non-Hispanic female unemployment rates; 8) higher work force proportion employed in immigrant female-dependent occupations; 9) lower proportions of the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) population being of Mexican origin; and 10) smaller MSA populations.