国际气候谈判达成合作协议的内在动因与稳定性研究

通过建立国际气候谈判的合作博弈理论模型,从协议内部缔约国收益预期出发,研究气候谈判国际合作治理的内在动因与稳定性。结论表明:合作协议有助于异质性国家间增加温室气体减排治理带来的收益,参与气候谈判的国家间形成合作协议的内在动因,正是对合作净收益的预期分配;而这种内在动因并不能使合作协议达到均衡,均衡的实现过程,是对预期净收益的内部分配政策的调整过程:当部分谈判参与国以退出合作联盟作为最有力威胁,没有任何一方能在联盟瓦解时,在不造成损失的情况下获得效用的增加,这就使谈判参与国在相互制衡中形成稳定状态。研究贡献在于突破了固有的非合作博弈框架,在更为一般层面上解释了异质性国家间的气候谈判合作机理,有助于各国采取有效措施建立气候合作联盟,应对气候挑战。     

基于模糊博弈视角的企业联盟“双循环”合作对策研究

企业合作在“双循环”新发展格局下呈现出更多的模糊特征,能否形成稳定的模糊合作格局及持续合作的收益再分配策略成为合作联盟的关注点。将广义模糊超量博弈和模糊凸博弈及其广义解集应用到“双循环”新发展格局下企业联盟合作与收益再分配中,提出最大广义模糊超量博弈模型及其广义模糊谈判集,并基于最大广义模糊超量博弈均衡性的视角,对模糊凸博弈下广义模糊谈判集与核心的等价性质进行论证。研究结果不仅满足了“双循环”新发展格局下合作企业以部分资源参与合作的意愿,及企业联盟模糊凸合作博弈下再分配方案等价性证明需求,而且实现了保留部分收益用于联盟再发展的策略。     

求解一类直觉模糊联盟合作博弈Shapley值的新方法北大核心CSCD

文章对带有Choquet积分的直觉模糊联盟合作博弈Shapley值进行了研究.通过证明一类直觉模糊联盟合作博弈Shapley值满足单调性条件,给出该类直觉模糊联盟合作博弈Shapley值的简单计算方法.该方法是由区间特征函数的上下界直接计算得出直觉模糊联盟合作博弈Shapley值的上下界,避免了区间数减法.此外,文章又进一步对该类直觉模糊联盟合作博弈Shapley值的性质进行了证明.最后通过数值实例说明该方法的适用性和有效性.     

一种资源投入不确定情形下的合作博弈形式及收益分配策略

首先,将经典合作博弈进行扩展,提出了一类模糊联盟合作博弈的通用形式,涵盖常见三种模糊联盟合作博弈,即多线性扩展博弈、比例模糊博弈与Choquet积分模糊博弈.比例模糊博弈、Choquet积分模糊博弈的Shapley值均可以作为一种特定形式下模糊联盟合作博弈的收益分配策略,但是对于多线性扩展博弈的Shapley值一直关注较少,因此利用经典Shapley值构造出多线性扩展博弈的Shapley值,以此作为一种收益分配策略.最后,通过实例分析了常见三类模糊联盟合作博弈的形式及其对应的分配策略,分析收益最大的模糊联盟合作对策形式及最优分配策略,为不确定情形下的合作问题提供了一定的收益分配依据.     

基于Choquet积分的直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的Shapley值

本文针对联盟是直觉模糊集的合作博弈Shapley值进行了研究.通过区间Choquet积分得到直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的特征函数为区间数,并研究了该博弈特征函数性质。根据拓展模糊联盟合作博弈Shapley值的计算方法,得到直觉模糊联盟合作博弈Shapley值的计算公式,该计算公式避免了区间数的减法。进一步证明了其满足经典合作博弈Shapley值的公理性。最后通过数值实例说明本文方法的合理性和有效性。     

直觉模糊联盟合作博弈团结值简化求解方法及性质

在经典合作博弈中,参与者联盟信息是完全确定的(即1表示完全参加而0表示完全不参加)。然而,由于实际情况下联盟信息具有不确定性,联盟信息具有模糊性。本文利用直觉模糊集理论方法,对合作博弈进行直觉模糊拓展,提出基于直觉模糊联盟合作博弈团结值。然后,研究了该类合作博弈解简化算法和满足有效性、可加性、平均贡献等价性等重要性质和唯一性。最后,通过算例说明该团结值求解方法的合理性和适用性。     

区间合作博弈Shapley值的矩阵计算方法

在合作博弈中,Shapley单点解按照参与者对联盟的边际贡献率对联盟的收益进行分配.联盟收益具有不确定性,往往不能用精确数值表示,更多学者关注特征函数取值为有限区间的合作博弈(区间合作博弈)的收益分配.文章利用矩阵半张量积,研究区间合作博弈中含有折扣因子的Shapley区间值的矩阵计算.首先利用矩阵的半张量积将合作博弈的特征函数表示为矩阵形式,得到特征函数区间矩阵.然后通过构造区间合作博弈Shapley矩阵,将区间合作博弈的Shapley值(区间)计算转化为矩阵形式.最后利用区间合作博弈Shapley值矩阵公式计算分析航空公司供应链联盟收益的Shapley值.文章给出的区间合作博弈Shapley值的矩阵计算公式形式简洁,为区间合作博弈的研究提供了新的思路.     

直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的非线性规划模型

本文研究联盟是直觉模糊集的合作博弈。首先,给出直觉模糊联盟的定义,并根据Choquet积分的直觉模糊形式,得到直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的区间值特征函数,进一步证明直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的区间值特征函数具有超可加性、凸性、弱超可加性. 其次根据区间数的闵可夫斯基距离、区间数的排序及损失函数的定义,建立直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的非线性规划模型,并对其求解得到最优分配. 最后给出一个具体的事例说明本文所建立的模型的合理性和有效性。     

云资源提供商的合作博弈模型与收益分配研究

云计算是目前国际上诸如信息科学与管理科学中的热点研究课题,其中云资源提供商是构建云平台的基本单元。目前,对云资源提供商进行合理的收益分配机制设计是提升云平台运营能力的一个关键因素。本文建立了一个由多个云资源提供商组成的合作博弈模型,分析了该合作博弈的超可加性和核心非空性,并给出了云资源提供商及其联盟的收益分配方案:核心和Shapley值。通过一些数值算例说明了云资源提供商合作博弈的非凸性,并表明了如何计算这个合作博弈的核心和Shapley值,为云资源提供商设计了一种合理的收益分配机制。本文的结果为研究IaaS(基础设施即服务)云资源提供商的合作行为提供了新的理论依据。     

一类模糊合作博弈资源与收益分配研究

本文的目的是提出一类具有特殊结构的模糊合作博弈的资源分配方法。具体地说,此类模糊合作博弈的特征函数具有Choquet积分的表示形式。我们提出的资源分配方法可以保证所有局中人支付之和最大,从而解决了模糊合作博弈中会形成什么样的模糊联盟结构的问题。针对改进了的模糊联盟结构,本文提出了一种分配规则。该规则可以实现局中人的个体理性与集体理性,从而保证了模糊联盟结构的稳定性。     

Avoiding unfairness of Owen allocations in linear production processes

This paper deals with cooperation situations in linear production problems in which a set of goods are to be produced from a set of resources so that a certain benefit function is maximized, assuming that resources not used in the production plan have no value by themselves. The Owen set is a well-known solution rule for the class of linear production processes. Despite their stability properties, Owen allocations might give null payoff to players that are necessary for optimal production plans. This paper shows that, in general, the aforementioned drawback cannot be avoided allowing only allocations within the core of the cooperative game associated to the original linear production process, and therefore a new solution set named EOwen is introduced. For any player whose resources are needed in at least one optimal production plan, the EOwen set contains at least one allocation that assigns a strictly positive payoff to such player.     

跨界创新联盟关联信用风险传染模型研究

跨界创新联盟是企业创新过程中资源整合与共享的一种有效形式,但在带来企业创新资源共享效益的同时,联盟中复杂的关联关系也构成了联盟关联信用风险传染的新渠道。本文结合复杂网络理论与传染病模型,根据跨界创新联盟特点,在原有资产关联研究的基础上,综合考虑行业关联、资产关联和创新合作关联三种关联关系,改进了风险传播的传染病模型,并进行了数值仿真实验。结果表明:行业关联、资产关联和创新合作关联对跨界创新联盟关联信用风险传染阈值具有综合性影响,增加行业关联和创新合作关联因素,有利于提高关联信用风险传染阈值的精度。此外,资产关联度越高则感染成员密度越大;行业关联度越低,创新合作关联度越高则感染成员密度越小。     

Interconnected games and international environmental problems,II

Some features of international environmental problems are considered. A basic problem is to induce countries to adopt a cooperative approach. One of the instruments to induce countries to cooperate is an exchange of concessions in fields of relative strengths, such as swapping trade concessions for cooperation on international environmental problems. This instrument will be modelled in this paper with tensor games. Both tradeoff and non-tradeoff tensor games will be addressed, with emphasis on tradeoff tensor games with linear strict weights. The relationship between the Pareto equilibria of a non-tradeoff tensor game and the Nash equilibria of the associated tradeoff tensor games will be studied. Due to structural similarities between tensor games and repeated multiple objective games, some attention will also be paid to the latter. Relationships between objects related to Folk theorems for the tradeoff tensor game with completely additive weights and the corresponding objects for its constituting isolated games will be studied. Since many international environmental problems have prisoners' dilemma characteristics, it is analyzed how interconnection may enhance cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games.     

Multi-choice clan games and their core

In this paper, we consider market situations with two corners. One corner consists of a group of powerful agents with yes-or-no choices and clan behavior. The other corner consists of non-powerful agents with multi-choices regarding the extent at which cooperation with the clan can be achieved. Multi-choice clan games arise from such market situations. The focus is on the analysis of the core of multi-choice clan games. Several characterizations of multi-choice clan games by the shape of the core are given, and the connection between the convexity of a multi-choice clan game and the stability of its core is studied.      

基于Solidarity值的河流水资源分配

河流水资源分配问题可以抽象为图限制下合作对策解的模型.基于图限制下合作对策的Solidarity值对参与者的收益分配进行分析,构造了Solidarity值的结构,给出了该值的分支有效性等四个性质,并利用这四个性质刻画了Solidarity值的唯一性.最后通过一个简单的实例,证明了河流水资源分配问题中,基于Solidarity值的收益分配比Myerson值更优.     

考虑横纵向一体化的港航联盟的收益模型

随着港航业竞争的加剧,港口间的联盟与合作、港口与航运企业纵向一体化不断发展。尤其是,航运企业以收购或投资模式参与港口间的资源整合,形成了更为复杂的港航混合联盟。针对港口间的资源整合与竞争、航运企业与港口一体化等因素,构建港航混合联盟模式的收益模型,对比分析在区域港口竞争模式和港航混合联盟模式下港口和航运企业的收益变化,揭示地理位置、内陆运输成本、航运企业投资效果等因素的作用。结果表明,港航混合联盟模式能够实现整合港口和航运企业的双赢。同时,当港口与内陆的集疏运基础设施薄弱、航运企业的影响力较大时,非合作港口也会受益,此时港航横纵向混合联盟模式有利于推动整个区域港口经济的发展。     

Some results on cooperative interval games

Uncertainty is a daily presence in the real world. It affects our decision-making and may have influence on cooperation. On many occasions, uncertainty is so severe that we can only predict some upper and lower bounds for the outcome of our actions, i.e. payoffs lie in some intervals. A suitable game theoretic model to support decision-making in collaborative situations with interval data is that of cooperative interval games. Solution concepts that associate with each cooperative interval game sets of interval allocations with appealing properties provide a natural way to capture the uncertainty of coalition values into the players’ payoffs. In this paper, the relations between some set-valued solution concepts using interval payoffs, namely the interval core, the interval dominance core, the square interval dominance core and the interval stable sets for cooperative interval games, are studied. It is shown that the interval core is the unique stable set on the class of convex interval games.     

Preferred coalitions in cooperative differential games

There are many interesting situations which can be described by anN-person general-sum differential game. Such games are characterized by the fact that the strategy of each player depends upon reasonable assumptions about the strategies of the remaining players; and, thus, these games cannot be considered asN uncoupled optimal control problems. In such cases, we say that the game is not strictly competitive, but involves a mutual interest which makes it possible for all of the players to reduce their costs by cooperating with one another, provided the resulting agreement can be enforced. When cooperation is allowed and there are more than two players, there is always the question of whether all possible subcoalitions will be formed with equal ease. This work considers the situation in which a particular subcoalition is preferred. A theory of general-sum games with preferred coalitions is presented, together with constructive examples of alternative approaches which are unsatisfactory.     

民生工程下老城区改造费用分摊对策——以旧房加装电梯为例

本文针对民生工程中旧房加装电梯费用分摊的问题,利用合作对策理论建立了一个模型.为了合理分配全体合作的收益,合作对策理论中必须对对任何一个部分参与者的合作都定义收益.但是在旧房加装电梯工程中,部分参与者的合作是不可能进行的,故无收益可言.为此,本文所建立的模型实际上包含一个虚拟的合作收益函数,使之符合合作分配公理体系,进而可以确定收益的分配,再由此确定费用的分摊比例,所得到的结论近似于按楼梯比例来计算.     

资源整合中企业行为博弈分析

资源整合是企业参与市场竞争的一个重要战略。本文运用博弈论的基本原理,构建资源整合中企业行为的博弈模型。通过对博弈模型的分析,提出资源整合中企业进行合作的三个条件,并在此基础上探讨了资源整合中促进企业合作的措施。