Risk Perceptions,General Environmental Beliefs,and Willingness to Address Climate Change

The research reported here examines the relationship between risk perceptions and willingness to address climate change. The data are a national sample of 1225 mail surveys that include measures of risk perceptions and knowledge tied to climate change, support for voluntary and government actions to address the problem, general environmental beliefs, and demographic variables. Risk perceptions matter in predicting behavioral intentions. Risk perceptions are not a surrogate for general environmental beliefs, but have their own power to account for behavioral intentions. There are four secondary conclusions. First, behavioral intentions regarding climate change are complex and intriguing. People are neither nonbelievers who will take no initiatives themselves and oppose all government efforts, nor are they believers who promise both to make personal efforts and to vote for every government proposal that promises to address climate change. Second, there are separate demographic sources for voluntary actions compared with voting intentions. Third, recognizing the causes of global warming is a powerful predictor of behavioral intentions independent from believing that climate change will happen and have bad consequences. Finally, the success of the risk perception variables to account for behavioral intentions should encourage greater attention to risk perceptions as independent variables. Risk perceptions and knowledge, however, share the stage with general environmental beliefs and demographic characteristics. Although related, risk perceptions, knowledge, and general environmental beliefs are somewhat independent predictors of behavioral intentions.     

Risk and Climate Change: Perceptions of Key Policy Actors in Canada

This article examines factors that predict perceptions of risk associated with global climate change. The research focuses on the perceptions of those associated with climate change policy making in the prairie region of Canada. The data are from an online survey ( n = 851) of those policy actors. The analysis integrates several dominant approaches to the study of risk perception: psychometric approaches that examine the effects of cognitive structure; demographic assessments that examine, for example, differences in perception based on gender or family status; and political approaches that suggest that one's position in the policy process may affect his or her perceived risk. Attitudes toward climate change are to a degree predicted by all of these factors, but only when indirect effects are observed. Sociodemographic characteristics have little direct effect on perceived risk, but do affect general beliefs that affect risk perceptions. Perceived risk is related more strongly to these general beliefs or world views than to more specific beliefs about the effects of climate change on weather patterns. Position within the policy process also contributes to our understanding of perceptions, with industry and governmental actors demonstrating similar attitudes, which contrast with environmental groups and university researchers.     

Indiscriminate,Irrelevant, and Sometimes Wrong: Causal Misconceptions about Climate Change

Prior research demonstrates widespread persistence of beliefs about climate change causes and risks that are arguably misconceptions. They include believing pollution causes climate change, believing ozone depletion causes climate change, the combination of these two “green beliefs,” referred to as environmental problems, and believing natural climate variation significantly contributes to current climate trends. Each of these causal beliefs has the potential to weaken or divert support away from effective climate change risk mitigation policies. To assess this potential, we explore the nature and prevalence of these beliefs in the United States with a national sample of interviews (N = 77) and two national surveys (N = 1,013, N = 1,820), and apply regression and mediation analyses to explore whether they explain any of the variation in individuals’ concern or support for policy to mitigate climate change. Adherence to these beliefs—which reflect a variety of misconceptions illustrated in the interviews—differs by political ideology but is common, with over a third of interviewees mentioning one or more. Controlling for general knowledge, political ideology, and other factors, misconceptions about environmental problems are still associated directly with support for climate change policies. On average adherence to the belief that environmental problems cause climate change is associated with a 25% higher probability of policy support. In contrast, believing natural climate variability is a major recent cause of climate change is associated with a 7% lower probability of supporting climate policy, even after controlling for political ideology and other knowledge about climate change.     

Climate Change Beliefs and Perceptions of Weather‐Related Changes in the United Kingdom

Public perception research in different countries has suggested that real and perceived periods of high temperature strengthen people's climate change beliefs. Such findings raise questions about the climate change beliefs of people in regions with moderate climates. Relatively little is known about whether public concerns about climate change may also be associated with perceived changes in other weather‐related events, such as precipitation or flooding. We examine the relationship between perceived changes in weather‐related events and climate change beliefs among U.K. residents at a time of below‐average winter temperatures and recent flooding. National survey data (n = 1,848) revealed that heat waves and hot summers were perceived to have become less common during respondents’ lifetimes, while flooding, periods of heavy rainfall, coastal erosions, and mild winters were perceived to have increased in frequency and cold winters were perceived to be unchanged. Although perceived changes in hot‐weather‐related events were positively associated with climate change beliefs, perceived changes in wet‐weather‐related events were found to be an even stronger predictor. Self‐reported experience of “flooding in own area” and “heat‐wave discomfort” also significantly contributed to climate change beliefs. These findings highlight the importance of salient weather‐related events and experiences in the formation of beliefs about climate change. We link our findings to research in judgment and decision making, and propose that those wishing to engage with the public on the issue of climate change should not limit their focus to heat.     

An Evaluation of the Treatment of Risk and Uncertainties in the IPCC Reports on Climate Change

Few global threats rival global climate change in scale and potential consequence. The principal international authority assessing climate risk is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Through repeated assessments the IPCC has devoted considerable effort and interdisciplinary competence to articulating a common characterization of climate risk and uncertainties. We have reviewed the assessment and its foundation for the Fifth Assessment Reports published in 2013 and 2014, in particular the guidance note for lead authors of the fifth IPCC assessment report on consistent treatment of uncertainties. Our analysis shows that the work carried out by the ICPP is short of providing a theoretically and conceptually convincing foundation on the treatment of risk and uncertainties. The main reasons for our assessment are: (i) the concept of risk is given a too narrow definition (a function of consequences and probability/likelihood); and (ii) the reports lack precision in delineating their concepts and methods. The goal of this article is to contribute to improving the handling of uncertainty and risk in future IPCC studies, thereby obtaining a more theoretically substantiated characterization as well as enhanced scientific quality for risk analysis in this area. Several suggestions for how to improve the risk and uncertainty treatment are provided.     

The Politicization of Risk: Party Cues,Polarization, and Public Perceptions of Climate Change Risk

Previous research shows that public perceptions of climate change risk are strongly related to the individual willingness to support climate mitigation and adaptation policy. In this article, I investigate how public perceptions of climate change risk are affected by communications from political parties and the degree of polarization among them. Specifically, using survey data from Sweden, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand, I study the relationship between party source cues, perceived polarization, and public perceptions of climate change risk. The results reveal a positive relationship between party cues and perceptions of climate change risk, indicating that individuals adjust their risk perceptions to align with their party preference. Furthermore, a negative relationship between perceived polarization and individual risk perceptions is also discovered, showing that individuals tend to be less concerned with climate change the more polarization they perceive. However, the effect of perceived polarization is found to be limited to more abstract perceptions of risk, while being unrelated to perceptions of concrete risks. Even with some contextual variance, the results generally hold up well across the four countries.     

Efficacy Foundations for Risk Communication: How People Think About Reducing the Risks of Climate Change

Believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts, according to current risk communication theory. Although the public recognizes the dangers of climate change, and is deluged with lists of possible mitigative actions, little is known about public efficacy beliefs in the context of climate change. Prior efficacy studies rely on conflicting constructs and measures of efficacy, and links between efficacy and risk management actions are muddled. As a result, much remains to learn about how laypersons think about the ease and effectiveness of potential mitigative actions. To bring clarity and inform risk communication and management efforts, we investigate how people think about efficacy in the context of climate change risk management by analyzing unprompted and prompted beliefs from two national surveys (N = 405, N = 1,820). In general, respondents distinguish little between effective and ineffective climate strategies. While many respondents appreciate that reducing fossil fuel use is an effective risk mitigation strategy, overall assessments reflect persistent misconceptions about climate change causes, and uncertainties about the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies. Our findings suggest targeting climate change risk communication and management strategies to (1) address gaps in people's existing mental models of climate action, (2) leverage existing public understanding of both potentially effective mitigation strategies and the collective action dilemma at the heart of climate change action, and (3) take into account ideologically driven reactions to behavior change and government action framed as climate action.     

Personal Efficacy, the Information Environment, and Attitudes Toward Global Warming and Climate Change in the United States

Despite the growing scientific consensus about the risks of global warming and climate change, the mass media frequently portray the subject as one of great scientific controversy and debate. And yet previous studies of the mass public's subjective assessments of the risks of global warming and climate change have not sufficiently examined public informedness, public confidence in climate scientists, and the role of personal efficacy in affecting global warming outcomes. By examining the results of a survey on an original and representative sample of Americans, we find that these three forces—informedness, confidence in scientists, and personal efficacy—are related in interesting and unexpected ways, and exert significant influence on risk assessments of global warming and climate change. In particular, more informed respondents both feel less personally responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. We also find that confidence in scientists has unexpected effects: respondents with high confidence in scientists feel less responsible for global warming, and also show less concern for global warming. These results have substantial implications for the interaction between scientists and the public in general, and for the public discussion of global warming and climate change in particular.     

Parenthood and Worrying About Climate Change: The Limitations of Previous Approaches

The present study considers the correlation between parenthood and worry about the consequences of climate change. Two approaches to gauging people's perceptions of the risks of climate change are compared: the classic approach, which measures risk perception, and the emotion‐based approach, which measures feelings toward a risk object. The empirical material is based on a questionnaire‐based survey of 3,529 people in Sweden, of whom 1,376 answered, giving a response rate of 39%. The results show that the correlation of parenthood and climate risk is significant when the emotional aspect is raised, but not when respondents were asked to do cognitive estimates of risk. Parenthood proves significant in all three questions that measure feelings, demonstrating that it is a determinant that serves to increase worry about climate change.     

Eliciting Information from Experts on the Likelihood of Rapid Climate Change

The threat of so‐called rapid or abrupt climate change has generated considerable public interest because of its potentially significant impacts. The collapse of the North Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation or the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, for example, would have potentially catastrophic effects on temperatures and sea level, respectively. But how likely are such extreme climatic changes? Is it possible actually to estimate likelihoods? This article reviews the societal demand for the likelihoods of rapid or abrupt climate change, and different methods for estimating likelihoods: past experience, model simulation, or through the elicitation of expert judgments. The article describes a survey to estimate the likelihoods of two characterizations of rapid climate change, and explores the issues associated with such surveys and the value of information produced. The surveys were based on key scientists chosen for their expertise in the climate science of abrupt climate change. Most survey respondents ascribed low likelihoods to rapid climate change, due either to the collapse of the Thermohaline Circulation or increased positive feedbacks. In each case one assessment was an order of magnitude higher than the others. We explore a high rate of refusal to participate in this expert survey: many scientists prefer to rely on output from future climate model simulations.     

Uncertainty in Climate Change Modeling: Can Global Sensitivity Analysis Be of Help?

Integrated assessment models offer a crucial support to decisionmakers in climate policy making. For a full understanding and corroboration of model results, analysts ought to identify the exogenous variables that influence the model results the most (key drivers), appraise the relevance of interactions, and the direction of change associated with the simultaneous variation of uncertain variables. We show that such information can be directly extracted from the data set produced by Monte Carlo simulations. Our discussion is guided by the application to the well‐known DICE model of William Nordhaus. The proposed methodology allows analysts to draw robust insights into the dependence of future atmospheric temperature, global emissions, and carbon costs and taxes on the model's exogenous variables.     

Public Perception of Climate Change: The Importance of Knowledge and Cultural Worldviews

The importance of knowledge for lay people's climate change concerns has been questioned in recent years, as it had been suggested that cultural values are stronger predictors of concern about climate change than knowledge. Studies that simultaneously measured knowledge related to climate change and cultural values have, however, been missing. We conducted a mail survey in the German‐speaking part of Switzerland (N = 1,065). Results suggested that cultural worldviews and climate‐related knowledge were significantly related with people's concern about climate change. Also, cultural worldviews and climate‐relevant knowledge appeared important for people's willingness to change behaviors and to accept climate change policies. In addition, different types of knowledge were found to have different impacts on people's concern about climate change, their willingness to change behaviors, and their acceptance of policies about climate change. Specifically, causal knowledge significantly increased concern about climate change and willingness to support climate‐friendly policies. We therefore concluded that risk communication should focus on causal knowledge, provided this knowledge does not threaten cultural values.     

The Effect of Risk Beliefs on Property Values: A Case Study of a Hazardous Waste Site1

Health risk beliefs of homeowners near a landfill site were assessed in a survey and compared to expert judgments of the health risks of living near the site. A bimodal distribution of health risk beliefs suggested sharp disagreement between the experts and at least some of the residents. Correlates of high risk beliefs included perception of odor from the site, exposure to media coverage of the problem, having children living at home, age (younger respondents more concerned), and gender (females more concerned). An aggregated neighborhood health risk belief predicted reductions in home prices even after controlling for home physical characteristics, such as size and other disamenities such as proximity to a freeway. In the 4100 homes near the site, the estimated depression in property values was estimated to total about $40.2 million before the site was closed and to be about $19.7 million after closure. Implications of these results for community conflict and for benefit-cost analysis of hazard site remediation are discussed.     

Weighing the Risks of Nuclear Energy and Climate Change: Trust in Different Information Sources,Perceived Risks,and Willingness to Pay for Alternatives to Nuclear Power

We examined how individuals perceive nuclear energy in the context of climate change mitigation and how their perceptions are associated with trust in different risk information sources. We analyzed the interrelationships between trust, perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, perception of nuclear energy as an acceptable way to mitigate climate change, and willingness to pay (WTP) for alternatives to nuclear power. A nationwide survey (N = 967) collected in Finland was analyzed with structural equation modeling. The associations between trust and perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, and perception of nuclear power as a way to mitigate climate change varied by the type of information source. Political party support and other background variables were associated with trust in different information sources. The effect of trust in information sources on WTP was mediated by perceived risks and benefits. The results will increase our understanding of how individuals perceive nuclear energy as a way to cut CO₂ emissions and the role of trust in different information sources in shaping nuclear risk perceptions and energy choices.     

Effect of Climate Change on the Concentration and Associated Risks of Vibrio Spp. in Dutch Recreational Waters

Currently, the number of reported cases of recreational‐ water‐related Vibrio illness in the Netherlands is low. However, a notable higher incidence of Vibrio infections has been observed in warm summers. In the future, such warm summers are expected to occur more often, resulting in enhanced water temperatures favoring Vibrio growth. Quantitative information on the increase in concentration of Vibrio spp. in recreational water under climate change scenarios is lacking. In this study, data on occurrence of Vibrio spp. at six different bathing sites in the Netherlands (2009–2012) were used to derive an empirical formula to predict the Vibrio concentration as a function of temperature, salinity, and pH. This formula was used to predict the effects of increased temperatures in climate change scenarios on Vibrio concentrations. For Vibrio parahaemolyticus, changes in illness risks associated with the changed concentrations were calculated as well. For an average temperature increase of 3.7 °C, these illness risks were calculated to be two to three times higher than in the current situation. Current illness risks were, varying per location, on average between 10^?4 and 10^?2 per person for an entire summer. In situations where water temperatures reached maximum values, illness risks are estimated to be up to 10^?2 and 10^?1. If such extreme situations occur more often during future summers, increased numbers of ill bathers or bathing‐water‐related illness outbreaks may be expected.     

Uncertainties in the Link Between Global Climate Change and Predicted Health Risks from Pollution: Hexachlorobenzene (HCB) Case Study Using a Fugacity Model

Industrial societies have altered the earth's environment in ways that could have important, long-term ecological, economic, and health implications. In this paper, we examine the extent to which uncertainty about global climate change could impact the precision of predictions of secondary outcomes such as health impacts of pollution. Using a model that links global climate change with predictions of chemical exposure and human health risk in the Western region of the United States of America (U.S.), we define parameter variabilities and uncertainties and we characterize the resulting outcome variance. As a case study, we consider the public health consequences from releases of hexachlorobenzene (HCB), a ubiquitous multimedia pollutant. By constructing a matrix that links global environmental change both directly and indirectly to potential human-health effects attributable to HCB released into air, soil, and water, we define critical parameter variances in the health risk estimation process. We employ a combined uncertainty/sensitivity analysis to investigate how HCB releases are affected by increasing atmospheric temperature and the accompanying climate alterations that are anticipated. We examine how such uncertainty impacts both the expected magnitude and calculational precision of potential human exposures and health effects. This assessment reveals that uncertain temperature increases of up to 5°C have little impact on either the magnitude or precision of the public-health consequences estimated under existing climate variations for HCB released into air and water in the Western region of the U.S.     

Scenario Discovery with Multiple Criteria: An Evaluation of the Robust Decision‐Making Framework for Climate Change Adaptation

There is increasing concern over deep uncertainty in the risk analysis field as probabilistic models of uncertainty cannot always be confidently determined or agreed upon for many of our most pressing contemporary risk challenges. This is particularly true in the climate change adaptation field, and has prompted the development of a number of frameworks aiming to characterize system vulnerabilities and identify robust alternatives. One such methodology is robust decision making (RDM), which uses simulation models to assess how strategies perform over many plausible conditions and then identifies and characterizes those where the strategy fails in a process termed scenario discovery. While many of the problems to which RDM has been applied are characterized by multiple objectives, research to date has provided little insight into how treatment of multiple criteria impacts the failure scenarios identified. In this research, we compare different methods for incorporating multiple objectives into the scenario discovery process to evaluate how they impact the resulting failure scenarios. We use the Lake Tana basin in Ethiopia as a case study, where climatic and environmental uncertainties could impact multiple planned water infrastructure projects, and find that failure scenarios may vary depending on the method used to aggregate multiple criteria. Common methods used to convert multiple attributes into a single utility score can obscure connections between failure scenarios and system performance, limiting the information provided to support decision making. Applying scenario discovery over each performance metric separately provides more nuanced information regarding the relative sensitivity of the objectives to different uncertain parameters, leading to clearer insights on measures that could be taken to improve system robustness and areas where additional research might prove useful.     

Strategic Appraisal of Environmental Risks: A Contrast Between the United Kingdom's Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change and its Committee on Radioactive Waste Management

In this article, we compare two high‐profile strategic policy reviews undertaken for the U.K. government on environmental risks: radioactive waste management and climate change. These reviews took very different forms, both in terms of analytic approach and deliberation strategy. The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change was largely an exercise in expert modeling, building, within a cost‐benefit framework, an argument for immediate reductions in carbon emissions. The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management, on the other hand, followed a much more explicitly deliberative and participative process, using multicriteria decision analysis to bring together scientific evidence and stakeholder and public values. In this article, we ask why the two reviews were different, and whether the differences are justified. We conclude that the differences were mainly due to political context, rather than the underpinning science, and as a consequence that, while in our view “fit for purpose,” they would both have been stronger had they been less different. Stern's grappling with ethical issues could have been strengthened by a greater degree of public and stakeholder engagement, and the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management's handling of issues of uncertainty could have been strengthened by the explicitly probabilistic framework of Stern.     

Cultural Values,Trust, and Benefit‐Risk Perceptions of Hydraulic Fracturing: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Elites and the General Public

Hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) has recently become a very intensely debated process for extracting oil and gas. Supporters argue that fracking provides positive economic benefits and energy security and offers a decreased reliance on coal‐based electricity generation. Detractors claim that the fracking process may harm the environment as well as place a strain on local communities that experience new fracking operations. This study utilizes a recently conducted survey distributed to a sample of policy elites and the general public in Arkansas and Oregon to examine the role of cultural value predispositions and trust in shaping the perceptions of risks and benefits associated with fracking. Findings indicate that cultural values influence both trust and benefit‐risk perceptions of fracking for both policy elites and the general public. More specifically, we found that trust in information from various sources is derived from the intrinsic values held by an individual, which in turn impacts perceptions of related benefits and risks. We also found that while the overall pattern of relationships is similar, trust plays a larger role in the formulation of attitudes for policy elites than for the general public. We discuss the implications of the mediating role of trust in understanding value‐driven benefit‐risk perceptions, as well as the disparate role of trust between policy elites and the general public in the context of the policy‐making process for both theory and practice.