预测信息分享对制造商开通直销渠道的影响

研究了零售商预测信息分享对制造商渠道结构选择的影响.运用不完全信息动态博弈分别建立了单渠道和双渠道供应链决策模型,得到了贝叶斯均衡的渠道价格和各方最优期望利润.研究发现当零售商的需求预测精度比较低时,制造商应当开通直销渠道.零售商没有动机将预测信息与制造商分享.设计了一个信息分享补偿机制使得零售商能自愿分享其私有信息.在信息分享补偿机制下,虽然制造商为获取零售商预测信息付出了成本,但是依然有动机开通直销渠道.     

Differential Pricing for Information Sharing Under Competition

We consider a two‐echelon supply chain with a manufacturer supplying to multiple downstream retailers engaged in differentiated Cournot competition. Each retailer has private information about uncertain demand. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader who sets the contract terms with the retailers, and benefits from retailers sharing their private information. When all retailers are given the same wholesale price, truthful information sharing is not an equilibrium outcome. We propose two variants of differential pricing mechanisms that induce truthful information sharing by all retailers. The first variant rewards a retailer for providing optimistic information and achieves truthful information sharing as a unique equilibrium. The differential pricing mechanism is optimal in the class of linear‐price, incentive‐compatible, direct mechanisms. The second variant, which incorporates provision for a fixed payment in addition to wholesale prices, preserves all the equilibrium properties of the first variant and additionally “nearly coordinates” the supply chain. Our analysis of differential pricing with a fixed payment provides interesting observations regarding the relationship between product substitutability, number of retailers, information precision, and market power. As products become closer substitutes and/or number of retailers increase, the manufacturer's market power increases, enabling her to extract a larger fraction of the supply chain surplus.     

需求信息不对称下基于战略库存的信息披露与契约选择

在考虑市场需求信息为零售商私有信息的基础上,研究了制造商和零售商之间的两阶段动态博弈问题,其中零售商进行信息披露和战略库存决策,而制造商则决定合适的批发价格承诺契约或动态契约。通过对比分析信息披露与不披露两种情形下不同定价契约的博弈均衡决策及供应链各方利润,发现：零售商在实际市场规模小于其均值时披露需求信息、大于其均值时不披露需求信息;无论零售商是否披露信息,制造商通过使期望利润最大化,始终会选择动态定价契约;信息不披露条件下,若单位库存持有成本大于某一阈值或实际市场规模小于某一阈值,零售商则不会持有战略库存。最终通过数值分析,发现零售商的披露决策总能使供应链的总体利润增加;且信息不披露条件下零售商第一阶段的订货量以及战略库存持有量都要高于信息披露情形,而制造商两阶段的定价始终小于信息披露情形。     

基于竞争型制造商创新投入的零售商需求预测信息共享研究

本文考虑两个制造商的竞争,从创新投入的视角构建零售商需求预测信息共享模型,运用贝叶斯统计理论和斯坦伯格博弈方法,探讨了制造商之间的竞争和其开展的成本降低创新对零售商需求预测信息共享的影响。研究发现:(1)制造商的创新投入决策受竞争对手和零售商信息共享的双重影响。(2)由于两个竞争型制造商进行成本降低创新,存在一定的条件使得零售商可以通过免费共享需求信息而获利。(3)当制造商们的创新能力较强时,供应链能够自发达到完全信息共享状态。当制造商们的创新能力较弱时,零售商的信息共享价值为负,竞争型制造商可以通过支付信息共享费用来激励零售商共享需求预测信息。制造商支付的信息共享费用与创新能力、上游竞争强度、预测准确性和随机需求波动性正相关。本文的研究克服了Shang等(2016)关于上游竞争型供应链中零售商信息共享研究中未考虑制造商创新的不足,并进一步探讨了上游竞争型供应链中的信息共享激励机制。     

基于信任的供应预测信息共享策略

现实中供应不确定是比较普遍的现象,供应预测信息共享对改善供应链绩效起着重要作用。针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的单周期供应链,利用斯坦克尔伯格博弈方法研究信任对供应预测信息共享的影响以及回购契约对该供应链的协调作用。研究表明:零售商对制造商的信任影响供应预测信息共享效果,进而影响供应链绩效;制造商说谎的心理负效用系数越大,越倾向于说真话;回购契约可以促进制造商共享真实供应预测信息;当制造商说谎的心理负效用系数较大时,存在一个最佳的回购价格,使供应链实现完美协调。     

供应链中信息共享的管理激励研究

信息共享是供应链成功运营的关键,那么如何激励供应链上的成员进行信息共享,提出有效的激励机制成为这一问题的焦点.本文以一个两阶段供应链为研究对象,建立了多目标、多因素管理激励机制模型.研究结果表明通过建立良好的供应链信息共享条件及有效的信息共享管理激励机制,可以提高供应链的性能,实现供应链成员"双赢".     

供应链中的信息共享激励:动态模型

信息共享对促进整个供应链的绩效极为关键,但是供应链中的成员缺乏进行信息共享的激励。本文以一个两阶段的多任务委托-代理模型来研究供应链中的核心企业对其供应商进行供应活动和信息共享活动的最优激励问题,并用它来解释供应链中合作伙伴关系的持续改善过程。结果表明:供应商努力成本的边际替代率在信息共享以及正常供应活动的激励中起着关键性的作用。     

供应链协同与信息共享的关联研究

将协同分成管理协同、技术协同与人机协同3类。据此定义了供应链协同,分析了信息共享在不同条件下存在的价值差异,探讨了供应链协同与信息共享的内在关联。研究结果表明,信息共享是供应链协同实现的必要但不充分条件。在某些条件下,信息共享并不能解决供应链中的协同问题,相反还可能增大协同工作量。要避免这种情况发生,提前进行合理的信息共享设计是必须的。     

供应链中基于Stackelberg博弈的信息共享协调问题研究

基于需求信息的不确定情况,本文对由一个供应商和一个销售商组成的两层供应链系统进行了研究,分析了搜集不确定需求信息的条件,回答了什么条件下销售商与供应商共享这种不确定的需求信息等,为管理者进行供应链实践提供了一些有益的帮助。     

评估供货量信息的共享在供应链管理中的价值

本文衡量了一种共享供货量信息的信息策略-即供应商向其客户(下游厂商)发布每次供货的具体数量,并通过数学建模以及模拟对此问题进行分析。结果显示,在大多数情况下,这种由信息技术支持的策略有助于供应链中的厂商适应并解决供货量不稳定的问题,供货量越是不稳定,企业越是能够从中获益。但是,当供应商及时稳定地补足缺货时,这种受益并不明显。本文的另一个发现是,供货量信息的共享可以使信息获得者受益,但是可能并不有利于发布者。也就是说,这样的信息共享能够为供应商的客户带来好处,但是供应商本身并不能因此获得显著的额外利益,反而要承担实施成本。这种不对称可能会阻碍企业间信息系统的实施,从而促使供应链成员协调信息沟通的费用,以激励供应商发布信息。我们的研究提供了对供货量信息价值进行量化的途径,同时也能够帮助供应链中的厂商评估他们在信息系统建设中的成本-收益率。     

Trust and Information Sharing in Supply Chains

Drawing on behavioral research, we construct a multi‐period model with which to examine the role of trust and other social characteristics in a supply chain. Specifically, we focus on trust building in the context of a salesperson who acts as a representative of a manufacturer and shares demand forecast information with a retailer. The actions of the salesperson affect both her immediate economic gain and her future credibility as determined by retailer's trust. Our analysis reveals that, in such environments, although salespersons of widely varying types (e.g., honest, self‐serving, benevolent, loyal) lie some extent about their forecast information, they tend to be trusted in long relationships, provided their forecasting accuracy is higher than that of the retailer. Furthermore, while the presence of a salesperson can improve the profits of both the retailer and manufacturer, there are cost structures under which the manufacturer is better off without a salesperson. Finally, we make the general observation that the appropriate salesperson compensation scheme depends on her social characteristics, and the specific observation that when the salesperson cares for the retailer, the linear compensation scheme commonly suggested in the literature as the optimal compensation scheme for the salesperson is no longer optimal.     

网络外部性对双渠道供应链信息分享的影响

研究了网络外部性对双渠道供应链信息分享的影响。分别建立了存在网络外部性和不存在网络外部性下的双渠道供应链模型,通过比较零售商信息分享和不分享下其与制造商的期望利润。研究发现：当未考虑产品的网络外部性时,零售商不与制造商分享其市场需求信息,与已有研究一致。当考虑了产品网络外部性且网络外部性较小时,零售商仍不与制造商分享市场需求信息;然而,当网络外部性较大时,零售商与制造商分享其市场需求信息。此外,零售商与制造商共享其市场需求信息有助于增加制造商和供应链利润。     

Supply Contract Design for Competing Heterogeneous Suppliers under Asymmetric Information

This study considers a supply chain with two heterogeneous suppliers and a common retailer whose type is either low‐volume or high‐volume. The retailer's type is unknown to the suppliers. The flexible supplier has a high variable cost and a low fixed cost, while the efficient supplier has a low variable cost and a high fixed cost. Each supplier offers the retailer a menu of contracts. The retailer chooses the contract that maximizes its expected profit. For this setting, we characterize the equilibrium contract menus offered by the suppliers to the retailer. We find that the equilibrium contract menus depend on which supplier–retailer match can generate the highest supply chain profit and on how much information rent the supplier may need to pay. An important feature of the equilibrium contract menus is that the contract assigned to the more profitable retailer will coordinate the supply chain, while the contract assigned to the less profitable retailer may not. In addition, in some circumstances, the flexible supplier may choose not to serve the high‐volume retailer, in order to avoid excessive information rent.     

分散式供应链中信息共享的定价激励模型

从供应商的角度出发,针对一个供应商和多个零售商组成的分散式二级供应链,提出使用价格歧视策略来激励零售商参与信息共享.根据Stackelberg主从对策模型,在企业利润最大化约束下,建立了供应链中的定价激励模型.解出了供应商的最优定价策略,并比较了零售商之间的销售量和利润.最后从博弈论的角度,将本定价激励模型与统一定价模型进行了对比.     

信息共享程度对物流外包激励契约的影响

本文分析了由供应商、制造商和第三方物流企业(3PLs)组成的物流外包系统,考虑了供应商和制造商信息共享程度的影响,建立了协同工作环境下的激励契约模型.结果表明,委托人偏好低努力水平时,信息共享对激励契约没有影响;委托人偏好高努力水平时,信息共享能更好的激励代理人选择委托人希望的行动.信息不共享时,3PLs只有提高对供应商努力水平的积极性;信息共享时,3PLs收入波动性增大,提高对供应商和对制造商的努力水平都能使其获得帕累托改进.本研究为物流成本在供应链成员中的分摊提供了理论依据,并提出了模型改进和研究建议.     

供应链伙伴信息共享的博弈与激励

针对产销双方对供求信息掌握的不对称性,分析了实现供应链合作伙伴信息共享的条件,从保证供应链合作伙伴信息共享的实现出发,建立了信息共享的博弈模型,分析了共享需求信息和成本信息前后期望利润变化,提出了在制造商与分销商信息共享的激励机制。通过激励机制,改变Nash均衡解的利润分配,在价格优惠和一次性补贴下,使供应链伙伴均获得信息共享带来的收益增加。     

Value of Sharing Production Yield Information in a Serial Supply Chain

New developments in corporate information technology such as enterprise resource planning systems have significantly increased the flow of information among members of supply chains. However, the benefits of sharing information can vary depending on the supply chain structure and its operational characteristics. Most of the existing research has studied the impact of sharing downstream information (e.g., a manufacturer sharing information with its suppliers). We evaluate the benefits of sharing upstream yield information (e.g., a supplier sharing information with the manufacturer) in a two‐stage serial supply chain in which the supplier has multiple internal processes and is faced with uncertain output due to yield losses. We are interested in determining when the sharing of the supplier's information is most beneficial to the manufacturer. After proposing an order‐up‐to type heuristic policy, we perform a detailed computational study and observe that this information is most beneficial when the supplier's yield variance is high and when end‐customer demand variance is low. We also find that the manufacturer's backorder‐to‐holding cost ratio has little, if any, impact on the usefulness of information.     

供应链成员信息共享技术策略博弈分析

运用博弈论分析不确定条件下供应链成员的信息共享技术策略。首先建立基于需求不确定和供应不确定两种参数的"供应商+零售商"的期望收益模型,证实在不确定条件下的存在双方期望收益的最优解;建立三阶段博弈模型,探讨双方信息共享技术策略的博弈关系;分析四种的均衡状态:探讨初始需求不确定性、供应商的信息推测能力与零售商收益的不同关系对双方信息共享技术策略的影响,结论显示:当初始需求不确定性较大时,零售商以拒绝策略为先,进一步的策略取决于供应商的信息推测能力及其对零售商收益的影响,如果该能力较强,零售商将采取接受策略,反之则反。     

信息共享与协同合作对两级供应链的收益影响

研究了由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的按订单生产的2级供应链系统。用数学的方法分析了信息共享与协同合作在供应商与制造商的不同策略组合下对该供应链收益的影响。通过具体算例对各种策略进行实验分析,并根据实验结果对信息共享与协调合作在各种策略中,对供应链各成员及整个供应链的收益影响进行评估。结果表明,供应链从传统模式转向完全信息共享与协同合作模式,制造商的订货次数、供应商的调整准备次数以及运输次数都大大减少,系统总成本降低了22.76%。信息共享能够降低成本,但主要收益来自系统的协调决策,而且这些收益并不是均匀地在各成员间进行分配的,而是随策略的不同而不同。     

The Effects of Sharing Upstream Information on Product Rollover

The process of introducing new and phasing out old products is called product rollover. This paper considers a periodic‐review inventory system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer introduces new and improved products over an infinite planning horizon using the solo‐roll strategy. We consider two scenarios: (1) the manufacturer does not share the upstream information about new‐product introduction with the retailer and (2) the manufacturer shares the information. For each scenario, we first derive the decentralized ordering policy and the system‐optimal ordering policy with given cost parameters. We then devise an optimal supply chain contract that coordinates the inventory system. We demonstrate that when the inventory system is coordinated, information sharing improves the performance of both supply chain entities. However, this may not be true if the inventory system is not coordinated. We also show that under the optimal contract, the manufacturer has no incentive to mislead the retailer about new‐product information in the information‐sharing model. When demand variability increases, information sharing adds more benefits to the coordinated supply chain. Our research provides insights about coordinating product, financial, and information flows in supply chains with product rollover.