考虑横向公平的双渠道销售闭环供应链定价策略与协调研究

考虑双渠道零售商和制造商组成的闭环供应链,分别构建了制造商直接回收、委托第三方回收模式下的动态博弈模型,以公平中性时的均衡策略为参照,对比分析了线下零售商的横向公平偏好对双渠道闭环供应链中各决策主体定价策略及利润的影响。研究表明,无论零售商是否存在横向公平关切行为,制造商直接回收模式都优于委托第三方回收。在直接回收模式下,线下零售商的横向公平偏好使得在正向供应链中的两零售商为提高市场占有率会竞相降低零售价格,制造商为鼓励竞争会降低批发价,并且价格均与横向公平关切系数负相关。在逆向供应链中,制造商会提高废旧产品的回收率;相比公平中性的情况,此定价策略使制造商和整个供应链系统效用增加,而两零售商收益递减。制造商作为渠道管理者为鼓励零售商之间竞相降价,可通过一个三方收益共享的契约实现协调,达到帕累托最优。     

Agent-based simulation of pricing strategy for agri-products considering customer preference

Agri-products typically have short life cycles and are perishable. The price of perishable goods is influenced by many factors. Customers in a market have different preferences with regard to price, the quality of the product and the brand. Though studies on pricing strategies that consider customer preference are rare, this paper addresses the problem of optimal pricing strategy for retailers considering customer preferences. Traditional mathematical methods cannot adequately describe the complexities of customer preference. Due to these complexities, this paper proposes an agent-based simulation model composed of six retailers and hundreds of customers, each with personal preferences. The different retailers set prices according to freshness, inventory, cost and other factors. Due to the perishable nature of the products considered, this paper proposes a new categorising price strategy that sets prices according to different degrees of treatments. By comparing the final profit of all retailers at the end of a simulation, the categorising price strategy is demonstrated to be the optimal strategy if customers with different preferences are randomly distributed. Furthermore, based on the model, the paper studies how optimal strategies are influenced by the proportion of customers with different preferences.     

Optimal two-level piecewise-constant price discrimination for a storable perishable product

Price differentiation over time is an additional policy that firms might consider when determining prices for perishable products. The common policy of a fixed price regardless of freshness might result in leaving some expired inventory unsold. Price differentiation can impact the demand for perishable products, which declines as the expiration date approaches. We develop an optimisation model with the goal of evaluating the monetary effectiveness of the strategy of simultaneously combining price discrimination across heterogeneous consumers with price differentiation over time for perishable inventory under separable multiplicative demand factors of price and time. Necessary optimality equations are derived, and their solutions are proved to constitute a unique global optimal solution. It is proved that an optimal pricing policy is to implement price discrimination with respect to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness, while dynamically changing the price over time, starting with a lower price at the early stages of the product’s shelf life and increasing it at a later stage. The monetary benefit that the retailer and consumer can derive from the suggested pricing policy is evaluated by comparing the model to other models in which price discrimination or dynamic pricing are not implemented. A numerical example that illustrates the significance is introduced. From the analysis of a numerical illustration of the model, it is concluded that a dynamic price discrimination policy can be approximated by an identical-to-all dynamic pricing policy in order to maximise the retailer’s profit and thus, mitigate the retailer’s risk from failing in the process of implementing price discrimination.     

Peer-regarding fairness in supply chain

People exhibit peer-regarding fairness concern when others who are in similar circumstances are treated unfairly. The fairness concern derives from a sense of sympathy or schadenfreude. We study it in a distribution channel where a supplier deals with two retailers located at independent markets. Sympathy means the decrease of the retailer’s utility because he believes that his peer’s unfair treatment is undeserved, while schadenfreude indicates the utility increase as the unfair treatment is perceived deserved. The two retailers are offered wholesale prices sequentially and set their retail prices if they accept the offers. In our paper, the second retailer has the peer-regarding fairness concern. We show the following in regards to this idea: (i) the retailers’ profits and the distribution channel performance can be improved by the peer-regarding fairness concern for sympathy; (ii) the retailers’ profits and the channel performance can be reduced by the peer-regarding fairness concern for schadenfreude; and (iii) the peer-regarding fairness concern for sympathy is unfavourable to the supplier, and the second retailer may be punished separately if the concern is not strong enough, while the supplier benefits from the peer-regarding fairness concern for schadenfreude and may exploit the second retailer solely if the schadenfreude parameter is large.     

Wholesale price discrimination with interdependent retailers

This paper examines the relationship between one manufacturer and two retailers who sell a product on their downstream markets. If a retailer invests in activities that enhance demand and, for example, improve the perceived image of the product, he or she might attract more customers, as well as increase the sales volumes of other retailers. In such a situation, free rider problems arise between the retailers, which finally lead to reduced sales efforts. We show that for linear wholesale prices, the manufacturer’s pricing strategy depends on the retailers’ investment costs and derive conditions for the optimality of wholesale price discrimination. We find that for low and high costs the manufacturer charges the retailers identical wholesale prices and thus does not have to bear any agency costs due to free riding. In all other cases, the manufacturer mitigates this problem by engaging in wholesale price discrimination. Our results indicate why it might make sense for a manufacturer to charge different wholesale prices even when the retailers have equal cost structures, market conditions, and investment options.     

考虑零售商风险态度的绿色供应链契约协调模型

以风险中性制造商和风险规避零售商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,考虑风险规避度和产品绿色度等因素,建立了集中决策博弈模型和制造商领导Stackelberg博弈模型。比较了两博弈模型中,产品绿色度、转移价格、产品价格与风险规避度的相互影响,以及风险规避度对制造商利润和零售商效用的影响。研究表明：(1)在集中决策模型中,零售商的单位产品利润和总利润均为零;(2)在制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型中,随着零售商风险规避度的提高,产品价格会逐渐降低;制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型中的转移价格大于集中决策模型中的转移价格;(3)收益共享契约能够协调绿色供应链。     

Optimal piecewise-constant price under heterogeneous sensitivity to product freshness

When perishable products are priced uniformly, regardless of the amount of time remaining until expiration, consumers may gravitate towards fresher products, leaving some inventory unsold. This research considers dynamic pricing policies as well as replenishment policies in the context of perishable products with a fixed shelf life. Consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous in their sensitivity to freshness, i.e. their willingness to pay more for fresher products. We develop a model for identifying an optimal (profit-maximising) dynamic pricing policy and for evaluating the extent to which both the retailer and the consumer benefit from the implementation of a dynamic pricing policy as opposed to a static policy. The model assumes that the retailer is able to utilise knowledge regarding the heterogeneous characteristics of incoming customers (e.g. the retailer can gather specific information about customers’ historical purchases). Unexpectedly, it is proven that in an optimal pricing policy, the retailer should assign a lower price to fresher products and then raise the price as the products approach expiration. A numerical illustration shows that profits are strongly influenced by the volatility of consumer sensitivity to freshness; specifically, this variable has the potential to reduce optimal profits by up to 8%.     

考虑网络零售商有限IT服务能力的产品定价与广告策略分析

研究了网络零售商有限IT服务能力下产品定价与广告投入问题。首先,建立垄断市场中零售商决策模型,研究发现：零售商广告投入水平、零售价格以及消费者剩余都与零售商IT服务能力正相关。其次,在竞争市场中运用博弈论分别建立了两个零售商Nash静态和Stackelberg动态博弈模型。结果显示,零售商动态博弈中所制定的零售价格高于静态博弈时零售价格,而广告投入水平低于静态博弈时的广告投入水平,并且动态博弈时消费者剩余较小。对于零售商1而言静态博弈时最优服务能力大于动态博弈时的最优服务能力,而零售商2结论相反。最后,分析了消费者时间敏感性和广告敏感性对零售商利润以及最优服务能力的影响。     

Dynamic pricing vs. acquiring information on consumers’ heterogeneous sensitivity to product freshness

We propose a model of an inventory system in which a perishable product is periodically replenished, and the retailer is unaware of consumer heterogeneity in consumers’ sensitivity to freshness of a perishable product with a fixed shelf life (though it exists). Using an analytical approach, we optimally solve the problem and evaluate the extent to which unawareness is likely to detract from a retailer’s profit and the extent to which it is likely to affect the price that consumers pay. In addition, we evaluate the conditions in which a dynamic pricing policy is beneficial either to the retailer or to the consumer, as compared with a static pricing policy. It is proven that the retailer should assign products a lower price at the early stages of their shelf life and then raise the price as the products approach expiration. A numerical illustration combined with sensitivity analysis demonstrates the applicability of the modelling approach. Key parameters such as volatility of consumer sensitivity to freshness and the retailer’s estimation regarding consumers’ sensitivity are investigated. A conclusion is that, in monetary terms, it is preferable from the retailer’s perspective to invest in dynamic pricing technology rather than in technologies for gathering information on consumers’ purchases.     

Optimal pricing strategy for the perishable food supply chain

This research investigates the optimal pricing strategy for the perishable food supply chain. Using the setting of a two-echelon supply chain including a supplier and a retailer, we apply the game theory approach to derive the equilibriums for both a single pricing strategy and a two-stage pricing strategy. Through a comparison of the equilibriums, we explore how the two pricing strategies affect the supply chain’s decisions and supplier’s and retailer’s performance individually and collectively. The results of the analysis show that the optimal choice of pricing strategy depends on the price markdown cost and its relationship with the two critical thresholds that are determined by a combination of factors including the potential market size, the price and quality sensitivity factors, the initial quality, the unit product cost, and the quality deterioration rate.     

竞争环境下考虑需求学习的动态定价策略

为了分析在顾客到达率不确定且面临市场竞争的情况下,零售商如何通过需求学习来动态地调整价格,以达到收益最大化的目的,运用博弈理论和动态规划方法建立了多周期随机动态定价优化模型,分析了需求学习下的价格竞争均衡。研究表明,在竞争和需求学习的市场环境下,零售商的价格博弈存在均衡,且多个均衡价格存在时,各零售商的收益与均衡价格成正比。应用算例分析了需求学习的效果,求出了需求学习下零售商竞争的价格均衡,并得出一些管理启示。     

实体零售商入驻返利网络渠道的条件及策略

新零售时代实体零售商开始尝试通过入驻第三方返利网络平台的方式布局双渠道战略。基于返利网络渠道定价和返利策略这一视角,建立零售商双渠道销售模型,研究实体零售商入驻第三方返利平台的条件、商品最优售价及第三方返利平台向消费者提供的最佳返利策略。研究表明,消费者的低返利兑现率对实体零售商有利,随着返利兑现率的提高,实体零售商采取仅通过返利网络渠道销售商品,到两种销售渠道混合的策略,最终到单一的实体渠道策略的转变。消费者对返利网络渠道的接受程度越高,越能提高实体零售商与第三方返利平台合作的积极性。最后通过数值模拟进一步分析验证所得结论。     

基于风险规避的绿色供应链定价研究

为了解决风险规避型厂商在不同市场结构下的绿色供应链定价问题,首先以由一个风险规避的制造商和一个风险规避的零售商组成的二级绿色供应链为背景,考虑了消费者偏好、产品绿色度、厂商风险规避度等因素,构建厂商的期望效用函数,然后运用博弈论的方法建立了集中决策模型和三种分散决策模型。比较分析了这四种模型下的批发价格、产品绿色度和零售价格,并进一步分析了四种模型在制造商与零售商风险态度不同时的情况。最后通过MATLAB软件数值仿真研究了集中决策模型下的风险规避度对批发价格、产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响以及产品绿色度对供应链效用的影响。仿真结果表明：在一定市场条件下,制造商风险规避对批发价格的影响程度要大于零售商,而对于产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响程度是相同的且负向相关;同时,在固定制造商和零售商的风险规避度为0.5时,最优产品绿色度在3.3~3.4之间,最大产品绿色度为7.8。     

考虑收取搭便车消费者产品体验费的双渠道供应链定价

为研究实体零售商收取搭便车消费者产品体验费时消费者搭便车行为对厂商的影响,并探讨实体零售商收取产品体验费的条件,文章考虑一个制造商和一个实体零售商组成的双渠道供应链,基于消费者效用理论,利用K-T条件,分别在收取产品体验费和不收取产品体验费两种情形下,分析对比了消费者搭便车行为对厂商决策的影响。研究表明,收取的搭便车消费者产品体验费与实体零售商的产品销售价格正相关,当消费者旅行成本较低时,网络渠道产品销售价格与收取的产品体验费负相关。当消费者旅行成本较低且销售的产品估值较高时,实体零售商收取产品体验费才能使自身受益。研究进一步显示,实体零售商收取搭便车消费者产品体验费会损害制造商的利润,加剧了制造商和零售商之间的竞争。     

考虑信息披露的双渠道供应链两周期定价策略

在一个含有线上直销渠道的双渠道供应链中,考察当消费者注重产品体验时,信息不披露和信息披露两种模式下制造商、零售商两周期的定价策略。研究发现:消费者对产品体验为高的概率和信息披露对提升制造商和零售商的议价能力都存在正向的作用;信息披露使实体店第二期的需求对前期需求更加敏感,而对第二期价格及成本的敏感性下降;不论信息是否披露,第一期实体店定价总高于网店定价,但当消费者体验产品为高的概率足够大时,网店在第二期可以采用高于实体店的定价策略,且信息披露可以使网店在第二期有更多的可能制定高于实体店的定价;信息披露使得制造商在两期内都可以获得更高的收益,而零售商的收益变化与披露成本有关,且零售商在第一期受益的可能性更高。     

Ordering policies under one time only discount and price sensitive demand

Purchase price reductions, even on a one-time-only basis, allow retailers the opportunity to lower their own selling prices, albeit temporarily, in an effort to increase sales. This results in not only additional revenues but also in extra inventory costs. The model presented in this paper examines such a cost/revenue tradeoff, through simultaneous determination of the most profitable: (i) stock level to be purchased by the retailer; (ii) discount level to be passed on to the customers; (iii) stock level qualifying for the retailer's discount; and (iv) time to initiate the discount. Numerical examples are included throughout to illustrate the main features of the model.     

The impact of consumer price forecasting behaviour on the bullwhip effect

As prices fluctuate over time, a strategic consumer may buy more in advance to reduce his or her future needs in anticipation of higher prices in the future, or may choose to postpone a purchase in anticipation of lower prices in the future. We investigate the bullwhip effect from a consumer price forecasting behavioural perspective in the context of a simple two-level supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer. We consider two different forms for the demand function – linear and iso-elastic demand functions, both depending on the prices in multiple periods. Assuming that the retailer employs an order-up-to inventory policy with exponential smoothing forecasting technology, we derive analytical expressions for the bullwhip effect under the two demand functions, and extend the results to the multiple-retailer case. We find that consumer forecasting behaviour can reduce the bullwhip effect, most significantly when the consumer sensitivity to price changes is medium (approximately 0.5) for both the demand forms. In addition, for iso-elastic demand, the mitigation of the bullwhip effect induced by consumer price forecasting behaviour becomes more significant as the product price sensitivity coefficient and standard deviation of the price decrease. These findings are applicable to the development of managerial strategies by supply chain members that are conducive to bullwhip effect reduction through customer behaviour.     

考虑补贴水平影响的易逝品动态定价模型

建立了补贴背景下企业对易逝品动态定价的模型,并对其进行分析和求解,得出最优价格和最优期望收益关于补贴水平的一阶和二阶关系,并对企业的最优定价策略和政府对易逝品的补贴水平给出了指导性意见,得到了政府坚持公平原则的动态补贴策略。     

不同公平关切下的供应链定价决策分析

为了比较研究零售商绝对公平关切和相对公平关切下供应链的定价策略与利润,建立一对一两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,采用逆推法进行求解。数理推导结果表明：两种公平关切模型下,零售商的公平关切均不会影响其定价策略,但会削弱制造商的批发价格,从而导致零售商获取更多的供应链利润;另外,受零售商公平关切程度的影响,两种公平关切下制造商的批发价格及双方利润表现出明显的分段差异性。     

网络零售商产品与运费联合定价的优化决策研究

消费者网络购物对运费的认知和商家的偏好存在差异。通过消费者的购买行为分析和效用函数的刻画,研究网络零售商在进行产品与运费联合定价时捆绑定价和分割定价的优化决策问题。讨论商家之间价格竞争的组合形式,提出最优定价存在的情形选项,论证价格决策的边界和适用条件,揭示商家之间采用捆绑定价的对称竞争均衡具有稳定性,及其不同均衡条件下商家利润的相对大小规律。研究结论表明,价格决策的选项取决于商家的产品成本高低,在产品成本给定的条件下,每种价格决策的边界依赖于市场中消费者的属性特征,即运费存怀疑的消费者比例,以及消费者对商家的偏好程度。