基于DC-net的会议室电子选举方案

提出了一种新的适用于小规模选举活动的电子选举方案,其最大特点是能够提供无条件的完美选票秘密性保障。方案具有自计票功能,能够实现公平性和可验证性。敌手对选举结果的破坏等同于解离散对数问题。该方案建立在DC-net匿名广播协议基础之上,其安全性不依赖于任何信任中心,但需假定任意投票者之间存在秘密信道。     

基于PKI的安全电子投票方案

电子投票是电子政务的一项重 要内容,它以密码学为基础,运用 现代计算机网络技术和通信技术来 实现投票功能。与传统的手工投票 方式相比,它提供了更高的效率和 更大的灵活性,不仅可以减少通常 投票活动在组织、计票和安全保密 等方面所需花费的大量人力和物 力,而且为投票者提供了极大的方 便性。 当前,我国已基本形成电子政 务建设的总体结构和总体技术框 架,其中,总体技术框架以公钥基 础设施(PKI)、授权管理基础设施 (PMI)、可信时间戳服务系统为基 础,其核心是PKI技术。本文利用PKI 及匿名通道协议,提出了一个基于 PKI的安全电子投票方案,该方案可 以方便、有效地在电子政务系统的 架构上来实现。     

基于QA-NIZK证明系统的高效简短可验证洗牌方案

电子投票中为保护投票者的隐私,要由一系列混合服务器对选票进行洗牌操作,为保证洗牌操作的诚实性,需要可验证洗牌方案。现有简短可验证洗牌方案的证明大小要依赖于混合服务器的数量和投票者的数量,效率较低。基于近来的一个高效的QA-NIZK证明系统构建了一个高效的简短可验证洗牌方案,不管有多少混合器和投票者其证明大小都是O(1),即常量大小。具有其独立的意义是在构建中指出原QA-NIZK证明系统是可变的。     

在选举会议中使用计算机处理选票的系统

本文简要介绍了用计算机和光机电器件组成计算机选举计票系统，在选举会议中实时处理选票，不易出错、省时、省力，可大大缩短会议时间。     

在选举会议中使用计算机处理选票的系统

本文简要介绍了用计算机和光机电器件组成计算机选举计票系统，在选举会议中实时处理选票，准确方便，不易出错，省时、省力，可大大缩短会议时间。     

RFID匿名认证协议的设计

在分析RFID协议安全需求的基础上,基于通用可组合安全模型,设计了一个低成本的RFID匿名认证协议,在标准模型下证明了RFID匿名认证协议的安全性.设计的协议提供匿名、双向认证和并发安全,并且协议的实现对于一般的RFID结构都是切实可行的.     

基于身份的异构无线网络匿名漫游协议

分析了一种基于身份的认证模型的安全缺陷,指出该方案存在身份伪装攻击,无法实现用户身份认证.提出了一种改进方案用于实现异构无线网络匿名漫游.与原方案相比,改进之处主要体现在2方面:第一,弥补了原协议的安全缺陷,并且在CK模型下是可证明安全的;第二,简化了协议流程,提高了协议的效率.     

无线传感器网络中匿名的聚合节点选举协议

提出一种分簇无线传感器网络中匿名的簇头选举协议。给出了匿名簇头选举的判定规则及成簇模式,并采用基于双线性对的匿名否决协议对选举结果进行验证以保证存在节点成功当选。设计了相应的匿名数据聚合方案,无需泄露节点身份信息即可完成聚合。分析及仿真结果表明,协议同时实现了簇头选举的匿名性、高效性及安全性,可有效抵抗窃听攻击、节点妥协攻击及合谋攻击等恶意行为。     

改进的移动计算平台直接匿名证明方案

分析了Ge等人提出的直接匿名证明方案的安全缺陷,指出该方案的认证协议在用于远程证明时不能抵抗重放攻击和平台伪装攻击。提出一种改进的直接匿名证明的认证协议,引入会话密钥协商机制,增强互认证功能。分析表明,改进方案在正确进行直接匿名证明的前提下,满足不可伪造性和匿名性,能够抵抗重放攻击和平台伪装攻击,协议性能满足移动计算平台的可信验证需求。     

介质独立信息服务的匿名访问协议

针对异构网络环境下介质独立信息服务(MIIS)的匿名访问需求,提出了一种MIIS匿名访问协议.协议中用户和信息服务器在家乡网络服务器的辅助下,既能实现双向认证,也能保护用户的隐私性.提出的协议与已有协议相比具有较好的性能,并且在CK模型下是可证明安全的.     

An experiment on the security of the Norwegian electronic voting protocol

Even when using a provably secure voting protocol, an election authority cannot argue convincingly that no attack that changed the election outcome has occurred, unless the voters are able to use the voting protocol correctly. We describe one statistical method that, if the assumptions underlying the protocol’s security proof hold, could provide convincing evidence that no attack occurred for the Norwegian Internet voting protocol (or other similar voting protocols). To determine the statistical power of this method, we need to estimate the rate at which voters detect possible attacks against the voting protocol. We designed and carried out an experiment to estimate this rate. We describe the experiment and results in full. Based on the results, we estimate upper and lower bounds for the detection rate. We also discuss some limitations of the practical experiment.     

基于部分盲签名和散列链的安全电子投票方案

基于部分盲签名和散列链设计了一种新的电子投票方案。投票人被划分为不同类别．可以分别统计每一类投票人对问题的看法。大量信息采用公告栏的形式有较好的效率。同时利用单向哈希函数构造选票使投票人的计算量减小，大大简化了投票人的操作。实现该协议的计算量小，无论将投票人划分为多少个类别。协议所需的轮数不变，而且可以适应多种类型的选举。     

Full privacy preserving electronic voting scheme

Privacy is an important issue in electronic voting.The concept of ’full privacy’ in electronic voting was firstly proposed,not only the privacy of voters is concerned,but also the candidates’.Privacy preserving electronic election architecture without any trusted third party is presented and a general technique for k-out-of-m election based on distributed ElGamal encryption and mix-match is also provided.The voters can compute the result by themselves without disclosing their will and the vote of the losing candidates.Moreover,whether the vote of winner candidate is more than a half can be verified directly.This scheme satisfies ’vote and go’ pattern and achieves full privacy.The correctness and security are also analyzed.     

E-voting advocates hold out hope

The Pentagon's recent decision not to allow online voting in the upcoming US presidential election came as a blow to many e-voting proponents. Pentagon officials halted plans to roll out the Defense Department's Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment during the upcoming general election after four prominent security researchers issued a report detailing the system's security vulnerabilities. Mock pilot elections can establish the efficacy, not to mention security, of online ballot casting. Sample votes can be garnered from online voters from one or two test states, several states, or abroad. And, as with most other Internet applications with optimum security concerns, further trials might also incorporate "white hat" hacker tests, in which "friendly" hackers attack the system and provide feedback to its developers. Pilot tests can also include using secure-access kiosks     

A taxonomy for software voting algorithms used in safety-critical systems

Voting algorithms are used to provide an error masking capability in a wide range of highly dependable commercial & research applications. These applications include N-Modular Redundant hardware systems and diversely designed software systems based on N-Version Programming. The most sophisticated & complex algorithms can even tolerate malicious (or Byzantine) subsystem errors. The algorithms can be implemented in hardware or software depending on the characteristics of the application, and the type of voter selected. Many voting algorithms have been defined in the literature, each with particular strengths and weaknesses. Having surveyed more than 70 references from the literature, a functional classification is used in this paper to provide taxonomy of those voting algorithms used in safety-critical applications. We classify voters into three categories: generic, hybrid, and purpose-built voters. Selected algorithms of each category are described, for illustrative purposes, and application areas proposed. Approaches to the comparison of algorithm behavior are also surveyed. These approaches compare the acceptability of voter behavior based on either statistical considerations (e.g., number of successes, number of benign or catastrophic results), or probabilistic computations (e.g., probability of choosing correct value in each voting cycle or average mean square error) during q voting cycles.     

An investigation into the usability of electronic voting systems for complex elections

Many studies on electronic voting evaluate their usability in the context of simple elections. Complex elections, which take place in many European countries, also merit attention. The complexity of the voting process, as well as that of the tallying and verification of the ballots, makes usability even more crucial in this context. Complex elections, both paper-based and electronic, challenge voters and electoral officials to an unusual extent. In this work, we present two studies of an electronic voting system that is tailored to the needs of complex elections. In the first study, we evaluate the effectiveness of the ballot design with respect to motivating voters to verify their ballot. Furthermore, we identify factors that motivate voters to verify, or not to verify, their ballot. The second study also addresses the effectiveness of the ballot design in terms of verification, but this time from the electoral officials’ perspective. Last, but not least, we evaluate the usability of the implemented EasyVote prototype from both the voter and electoral official perspectives. In both studies, we were able to improve effectiveness, without impacting efficiency and satisfaction. Despite these usability improvements, it became clear that voters who trusted the electronic system were unlikely to verify their ballots. Moreover, these voters failed to detect the “fraudulent” manipulations. It is clear that well-formulated interventions are required in order to encourage verification and to improve the detection of errors or fraudulent attempts.     

Voting networks

Designs of hardware voters are presented that can be easily pipelined to accommodate extremely high data rates. Design strategies for bit-voters and word-voters are described. Examples of resultant designs are given and each design is evaluated with respect to cost and performance. Both ordinary and generalized m-out-of-n voting, with arbitrary vote assigned to the inputs, are considered. Median voters can be synthesized by simple variants of the design methods. Using currently available technology, these designs can operate at speeds of many millions of votes per second. For majority bit-voters with small values of n, a multiplexer-based design method generally yields the best realizations while for larger values of n , designs based on selection networks tend to be most efficient. For word voters, cost-effective designs based on modified or augmented sorting networks are feasible. In either case, the rich theory developed for the analysis and synthesis of parallel/pipelined sorting networks directly benefits the design process     

TMR voting in the presence of crosstalk faults at the voter inputs

In high reliability systems, the effectiveness of fault tolerant techniques, such as Triple-Modular-Redundancy (TMR), must be validated with respect to the faults that are likely in the current technology. In todays' Integrated Circuits (IC), this is the case of crosstalks, whose importance is growing because of device & interconnect scaling. This paper analyzes the problem of crosstalk faults at the inputs of voters in TMR systems. In particular, possible problems are illustrated, and it is shown that such crosstalk may invalidate the reliability of both voting, and diagnosing operations. The problem is analyzed from a probabilistic point of view. Its occurrence is estimated by using a set of TMR systems obtained with combinational benchmarks as functional modules. The possible problems of such operations are discussed in the presence of crosstalk faults. It is shown that crosstalk may invalidate the reliability of both voting, and diagnosis operations. A probabilistic model of the voting & diagnosis operations in the presence of crosstalk has been developed. Finally, such a model has been used to estimate the probability of voting & diagnosis failures in a set of TMR systems obtained by using combinational benchmarks as functional modules. We have shown that the presence of crosstalk faults at voter inputs may impair both the voting, and the diagnosis mechanisms. This problem has been quantified by applying a probabilistic model of crosstalk fault effects on voting and diagnosis to a set of benchmark circuits. Results show that crosstalk may create a reliability problem for TMR systems. Such a problem can be solved by using on-line testing or design for testability providing additional controllability & observability to the replicated functional units.     

Crowdsourced integrity verification of election results

In this work, we describe an experiment for evaluating the integrity of election results, and improving transparency and voter participation in electronic elections. The idea was based on two aspects: distributed collection of poll tape pictures, taken by voters using mobile devices; and crowdsourced comparison of these pictures with the partial electronic results published by the electoral authority. The solution allowed voters to verify if results were correctly transmitted to the central tabulator without manipulation, with granularity of individual polling places. We present results, discuss limitations of the approach and future perspectives, considering the context of the previous Brazilian presidential elections of 2014, where the proposed solution was employed for the first time. In particular, with the aid of our project, voters were able to verify 1.6 % of the total poll tapes, amounting to 4.1 % of the total votes, which prompted the electoral authority to announce improved support for automated verification in the next elections. While the case study relies on the typical workflow of a paperless DRE-based election, the approach can be improved and adapted to other types of voting technology.