谈判采购与招标采购的交易效率比较

谈判采购与招标采购是企业常用的两种采购方式。本文在非对称信息条件下,研究了这两种采购机制达到均衡状态时的交易效率问题,证明了招标采购机制的交易效率高于谈判采购,并且采购价格更低。此外本文还进一步论证了在招标采购机制下,采购方设置最优保留价能最大化其期望收益,但是却降低了交易效率。     

跨期价格歧视与转售价格维持

跨期价格歧视在现实中普遍存在,很多文献研究了垄断厂商实施跨期价格歧视的动因及条件问题.本文基于Salop模型,并假设消费者在评价价值和等待成本两个维度上存在差异,分析了双寡头竞争的纵向市场结构下跨期价格歧视的问题.通过比较两种博弈的结果,得出在一定条件下“跨期价格歧视”博弈中生产商的利润大于“单一定价”博弈中生产商的利润,揭示出转售价格维持可以帮助生产商区分不同类型的消费者,实施跨期价格歧视,获得高利润,而消费者遭受损失.本文的研究结论不仅补充了跨期价格歧视和转售价格维持的理论,而且对于反垄断执法实践具有重要的参考价值.     

需求具有价格弹性情况下协调供应链的数量折扣策略研究

本文探讨了需求具有价格弹性情况下,批量折扣和总量折扣作为单个供应商和单个零售商组成的供应链的协调机制的效率问题。分别研究了单独提供批量折扣或总量折扣时确定最优折扣策略的方法以及同时提供总量折扣和批量折扣的情形下确定最优联合折扣方案的方法。然后通过数值研究对各种折扣方案的相对效力进行评价。研究结果表明：在协调供应链方面,当需求价格弹性较高时,总量折扣非常有效;需求价格弹性较小时,批量折扣有效;而当联合运用这两种折扣策略时,供应链总能达到完美协调。     

台湾股票指数期货的日内价格发现机制研究

通过使用 Hasbrouck,以及 Gonzalo 和 Granger 的价格发现模型,研究了新加坡衍生产品交易所和台湾期货交易所共同上市的台湾股票指数期货在两家交易所的信息传递效率,分析了上市相似指数期货合约的各个交易所间信息传递的机制.研究结果表明,两种台湾股票指数期货和它们的标的资产之间存在着一个共因子,而且新加坡交易所的摩根台指期货合约在价格发现的过程中起到了主导作用.究其根本,新加坡相对宽松的监管制度决定了它能够更有效地进行市场交易制度改革,从而占据价格发现的主体地位.对于存在竞争的交易所来讲,监管环境是决定其价格功能发挥的一个重要的因素.     

“农业社会企业+农户”模式下政府补贴方式选择：目标价格相对于面积补贴

农业作为国民经济的基础产业一直是各国关注的焦点,但其生产存在着弱质性。政府对其实施补贴政策,而如何选择补贴方式保证政策的有效发挥至关重要。本文针对农产品产出不确定情境,探究政府补贴方式的选择——是锁定农产品目标价格还是按种植规模进行定额补贴更为有效。为了缓解农户的资金困境以及政府部门在社会服务方面所面临“市场失灵”的风险,本文在农业供应链中引入社会企业,并建构农业社会企业与农户的Stackelberg博弈模型,寻求目标价格补贴和面积补贴两种机制下供应链各成员的最优决策。研究发现：与面积补贴政策相比,当政府的补贴率较高时,目标价格以平均价格水平作为动态的目标补贴价格,使得补贴更具有针对性,更能实现社会福利的增长;相较于目标价格而言,面积补贴可以通过调整每亩农田的补贴标准进而从补贴效果上更能促进农户收入以及农户生产投入量的提升,因此政府可根据当期的政策目标灵活选择合适的农业补贴方式。     

建筑工程项目招投标价格的控制策略浅析

<正>在建筑工程的发展过程中,项目招标已经成为非常重要的部分。因此,招标价格越来越受到有关人员的关注。在实施建筑项目投标的价格确定与计算时,很容易就会产生风险,所以要对风险进行避让,这样才能将风险发生率控制在最低的范围内。在这种环境下,本文对项目招投标价格的控制方案进行了深入研究,并且分析了其中存在的影响因素,     

基于BSV模型及其扩展的IPO价格形成机制

本文通过引入行为金融学中投资者心态模型,讨论了在目前我国IPO询价机制下广大中小投资者行为对IPO价格形成的影响.本文借鉴BSV模型,结合我国的实际,建立了中小投资者的基本心态模型与扩展心态模型.在此基础上,分别讨论了两种模型下中小投资者对IPO价格形成机制的影响,得出了基于两种心态模型下的IPO价格表达式,从理论上剖析了基于我国中小投资者心态模型的IPO价格形成机理,以期对发行人和承销商确定较合理的IPO价格起到一定的借鉴作用和积极意义.     

股票市场透明度、信息份额与价格发现效率

股票市场透明度是交易机制设计的一个重要方面,这关系着资本市场能否有效促进价格发现及其效率。2003年12月8日深圳证券交易所买卖盘揭示范围由三档变为五档,股票市场透明度增加。基于信息份额模型,本文研究了市场透明度的增加对价格发现效率的影响。结果表明,新增加的两档报价向市场传递了边际信息含量,有助于投资者做出理性投资决策;同时,交易价格偏离有效价格的定价误差显著减小,收益自相关性程度降低,交易价格更加趋向于有效。因此,市场透明度的增加促进了资本市场价格发现及其效率的提高,为今后市场透明度的改革提供了有意义的参考意见。     

中国证券市场价格冲击传导效应分析

资产定价历来是金融经济学研究的中心问题之一。从文献上看,研究者们更多地是从收益序列的分布特征角度展开分析,较少关注市场中不同证券之间的价格关系。实际上,证券市场中不同证券的价格彼此密切相关,形成特定的价格冲击传导机制。特别是在中国这样的转轨经济新兴市场中,投资者受政策预期主导,决策与行为趋同,客观上强化了股价冲击传导的动态作用机制,整个市场表现为“板块联动”“、股价齐涨同跌”现象显著。实证研究表明,上海证券市场不同行业板块之间股价存在着明显的联动特征,新息(innovation)对股价的影响一般将持续4￣5周左右。尽管不同板块在价格冲击传导机制中的重要性各不相同,但证券市场股价波动的市场性显著地超过了不同板块(或个股)的独立性,不同行业间的组合投资策略效果不佳,市场效率还有待于进一步提高。     

市场竞争与价格离散——影响机理与经验证据

价格离散背离了"一价定律",是市场运行效率低的一种反映,但却是一种普遍存在的现象。那么,通过市场竞争机制能否降低某一行业（产品）的市场中的价格离散?本文先是分别在消费者信息搜寻理论和厂商空间竞争理论的框架下,分析市场竞争对价格离散的影响机理。然后,本文收集了我国地级（及以上）城市的车险市场上所有企业的价格和其他相关变量,研究主要发现：即使去除了产品异质性,车险市场仍然存在明显的价格离散,企业之间价格的变异系数的均值和中位数分别为0.472和0.445;市场竞争能够降低车险市场的价格离散,平均而言,企业数目提高10家（市场集中程度降低一单位样本标准差）,企业之间车险价格的标准差将降低其平均水平的约25%（5%~6%）。辅助性分析和稳健性分析支持了本文结论。本文的政策含义在于：应当增进供给侧的竞争,降低需求侧的信息搜寻成本。     

The Effect of Timing on Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions

We investigate the role of timing in ascending auctions under the premise that time is a valuable resource. Traditional models of the English auction ignore timing issues by assuming that the auction occurs instantaneously. However, when auctions are slow, as Internet auctions used for procurement often are, there are significant opportunity or monitoring costs to bidders, and the choice of the size of the jump bid becomes a strategic decision. We study the choice in the experimental laboratory by systematically varying the opportunity costs associated with fast bidding. When time is more valuable bidders respond by choosing larger jump bids. Surprisingly, the economic performance of the auction is not significantly affected. We develop a simple model of ascending auctions with impatient bidders that provides insights into the effect jump bids have on auction performance.     

多属性采购拍卖理论与应用评述

仅以价格作为确定获胜者的唯一准则已经不能满足许多行业采购拍卖的实际要求.实用中,为确定获胜者,除价格外还需要考虑采购品的其它重要的非价格属性(包括其它的成本型属性和效益型属性),如采购品的质量、交割日期和交割条款等.因此,多属性拍卖理论的发展变得极其重要.由单属性拍卖拓展到多属性拍卖已经引起一系列挑战性的问题.文中介绍了多属性采购拍卖的应用领域和需要研究的理论问题;把多属性采购拍卖分为两类(博弈论模型和决策论模型),并对相关文献的建模假设、主要思想和结论进行回顾和评述.     

Do Auction Parameters Affect Buyer Surplus in E‐Auctions for Procurement?

Although the initial euphoria about Internet‐enabled reverse auctions has given way to a cautious but widespread use of reverse auctions in business‐to‐business (B2B) procurement, there is a limited understanding of the effect of auction design parameters on buyer surplus. In this paper, we study the effect of bidding competition, information asymmetry, reserve price, bid decrement, auction duration, and bidder type on buyer surplus. We collected field data on more than 700 online procurement auctions conducted by a leading auctioneer and involving procurement items worth millions of dollars. Consistent with the predictions of auction theory, the results indicate that bidding competition, reserve price, and information sharing affect buyer surplus. Unlike previous findings in the consumer‐to‐consumer context, we find that bid decrement and auction duration have no effect in B2B procurement auctions. Our results suggest that use of the rank‐bidding format increases buyer surplus when incumbent suppliers participate in the auction. We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings for future research and for optimal design of online procurement auctions.     

Reverse Auctions to Innovate Procurement Processes: Effects of Bid Information Presentation Design on a Supplier's Bidding Outcome

Information technologies (ITs) are being used to innovate various procurement processes. This research study focuses on the supplier‐side effects of IT design choices to conduct reverse auctions, which are increasingly used to procure a wide range of products and services. IT–enabled reverse auctions enhance supplier participation across geographical boundaries, leading to more efficient pricing. However, there are growing concerns about the adverse effects of IT–enabled reverse auctions on a supplier's performance. Supplier‐side issues are gaining prominence in the reverse auction literature and are critical for the long‐term success of reverse auctions. Therefore, we focus on suppliers’ bidding outcomes and assess how the design of an IT–enabled reverse auction facilitates the auction bidding outcomes of participating suppliers. Specifically, we examine the effects of two types of bid information presentation design—full price visibility and partial price visibility—on supplier's auction bidding outcomes, across auctions with different cost certainty and suppliers bargaining power vis‐à‐vis the buyer. The results of this study contribute new knowledge about the ways to use IT for creating effective auction designs and innovating procurement through auctions to enhance both the buyer's and suppliers’ performance. We present the detailed theoretical contributions of our study and discuss the managerial implications for designers of reverse auctions.      

带佣金率和保留价的一级和二级价格拍卖

本文通过引入佣金率和保留价,分别讨论了一级和二级价格密封式拍卖,得到以下结论:(1)两种密封式拍卖的均衡报价随佣金率的提高而减少;(2)一级价格密封式拍卖的均衡报价随保留价的增加而增加,而二级价格密封式拍卖的均衡报价随保留价的增加而减少;(3)一级价格密封式拍卖的投标者预期收益与佣金率和保留价均呈反向变动,而二级价格密封式拍卖的投标者预期收益独立于佣金率和保留价;(4)收益等价定理仍然成立;(5)在两种密封式拍卖中,当佣金率增加时,卖方的预期收益减少,拍卖行的预期收益以及卖方和拍卖行的总预期收益可能增加也可能减少;(6)在两种密封式拍卖中,当保留价增加时,卖方的预期收益、拍卖行的预期收益以及卖方和拍卖行的总预期收益可能增加也可能减少;(7)给出了卖方的最优保留价的表达式;(8)把本文的结论与以前相应的研究工作做了比较。     

Split‐Award Procurement Auctions—Can Bayesian Equilibrium Strategies Predict Human Bidding Behavior in Multi‐Object Auctions?

We analyze if and when symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium predictions can explain human bidding behavior in multi‐object auctions. We focus on two sealed‐bid split‐award auctions with ex ante split decisions as they can be regularly found in procurement practice. These auction formats are straightforward multi‐object extensions of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction. We derive the risk‐neutral symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium strategies and find that, although the two auction mechanisms yield the same expected costs to the buyer, other aspects of the two models, including the equilibrium bidding strategies, differ significantly. The strategic considerations in these auction formats are more involved than in single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions, and it is questionable whether expected utility maximization can explain human bidding behavior in such multi‐object auctions. Therefore, we analyzed the predictive accuracy of our equilibrium strategies in the laboratory. In human subject experiments we found underbidding, which is in line with earlier experiments on single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions. To control for regret, we organize experiments against computerized bidders, who play the equilibrium strategy. In computerized experiments where bid functions are only used in a single auction, we found significant underbidding on low‐cost draws. In experiments where the bid function is reused in 100 auctions, we could also control effectively for risk aversion, and there is no significant difference of the average bidding behavior and the risk‐neutral Bayes Nash equilibrium bid function. The results suggest that strategic complexity does not serve as an explanation for underbidding in split‐award procurement auctions, but risk aversion does have a significant impact.     

A Framework for Estimating Benefits of Using Auctions in Revenue Management*

We develop a stochastic model to explore the benefits of incorporating auctions in revenue management. To the best of our knowledge the extant literature on modeling in revenue management has not considered auctions. We consider three models, namely, a traditional fixed price (non‐auction) model, a pure auction model, and a hybrid auction model and evaluate their revenue performance under a variety of conditions. The hybrid approach outperforms the other two in all 24 scenarios and yields an average revenue increase of 16.1% over the next best. A surprise finding is that there is no significant difference between the performance of the fixed price and pure auction approaches. A sensitivity analysis reveals that the relative superiority of the hybrid revenue management strategy is reasonably robust.     

Push or Pull? Auctioning Supply Contracts

Consider a buyer, facing uncertain demand, who sources from multiple suppliers via online procurement auctions (open descending price‐only auctions). The suppliers have heterogeneous production costs, which are private information, and the winning supplier has to invest in production capacity before the demand uncertainty is resolved. The buyer chooses to offer a push or pull contract, for which the single price and winning supplier are determined via the auction. We show that, with a pull contract, the buyer does not necessarily benefit from a larger number of suppliers participating in the auction, due to the negative effect of supplier competition on the incentive of supplier capacity investment. We thus propose an enhanced pull mechanism that mitigates this effect with a floor price. We then analyze and compare the outcomes of auctions for push and (enhanced) pull contracts, establishing when one form is preferred over the other based on the buyer's profits. We also compare our simple, price‐only push and pull contract auctions to the optimal mechanisms, benchmarking the performance of the simple mechanisms as well as establishing the relative importance of auction design and contract design in procurement auctions.     

Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale

In standard auctions resale creates a role for a speculator—a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. We study this issue in environments with symmetric independent private‐value bidders. For second‐price and English auctions the efficient value‐bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits. First‐price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders, the value distribution, and the discount factor. Speculators do not make profits in first‐price or Dutch auctions.     

Design of Auction Parameters to Reduce the Effect of Collusion

Government departments are increasingly turning to auctions to procure goods and services. Collusion among bidders, however, reduces competition and raises winning bid prices. Since conventional collusion control measures based on the redesign of auction mechanisms are less effective in government procurement auctions, there is a need to devise control measures that decrease the effect of collusion. This article demonstrates how the principles of design of experiments can be applied in a system dynamics model to find the auction parameter values that substantially reduce the effect of collusion in government procurement auctions. This research makes a number of contributions. First, it develops a feedback‐based dynamic mechanism of collusion in government procurement auctions. The mechanism proposes the winning bid price as being determined not by the total number of bidders but by the number of independent bidders. It defines each cartel as one independent bidder regardless of the number of bidders in the cartel. Second, the mechanism is tested by developing a system dynamics model to government auctions for procuring contracts for roadwork projects in India. Third, the principles of experimental design are applied to find the auction parameter values that ensure high bid participation and low winning price‐to‐reserve price ratios.