协作车辆路径成本分摊问题的 B-T Shapley 方法

多个企业协作配送能显著地降低物流配送成本和减少尾气排放, 研究协作配送模型与成本分摊方法是亟需解决的关键问题.传统经典成本分摊方法需要计算所有子联盟的协作成本, 在本问题中等价于需要求解2N-1个 (N为企业数量) 复杂的车辆路径问题.本文建立了多方协作车辆路径问题模型, 分析了协作配送成本分摊问题的属性.基于经典的Shapley成本分摊方法, 提出了B-T (Binary Tree) Shapley近似方法, 不仅将成本分摊本身计算复杂度由O (N22N) 降为O (N2log2N) , 而且将需要求解的车辆路径问题数量由2N-1个锐减至2N-1个, 从而能够在合理时间内完成协作配送问题的成本分摊.通过求解算例和实际案例, 计算结果表明, B-T Shapley的耗时与Shapley方法相比几乎可以忽略不计, 更重要的是B-T Shapley与Shapley的成本分摊结果之间仅有细微的偏差, 其平均准确度可以达到95%左右.     

模糊合作对策的区间Shapley值

本文主要研究合作对策中支付函数是区间模糊数的情形,利用区间数运算的性质,拓广了shapley值在经典意义下的三条公理,并给出了唯一满足此三条公理的shapley函数形式,最后将此区间shapley分配方法应用到利益分配的实例中.由证明可知,支付函数是区间数的合作对策的分配的结果也是一个区间数,并且由各个联盟所对应的区间支付范围内的不同实数值所组成的对策是经典合作对策,并且其shapley值一定包含在区间shapley值中.由于本文研究的是支付函数模糊化的一种特殊形式一区间数,从而为求解具有其他模糊化形式的支付的合作对策奠定了一定的基础.     

基于EOQ的集成供应成本分摊问题研究

第三方物流的集成供应是降低供应链成本的有效途径,而集成供应成本在各供应商企业之间的分摊是需要解决的核心问题.本文详细阐述了第三方物流的集成供应问题,基于合作博弈理论建立了第三方物流集成供应的成本分摊模型.在采用夏普利值法对该模型进行求解的过程中,针对夏普利值法难以赋值的问题,引入集成供应的经济订货批量模型,有效解决了了第三方物流供应成本分摊问题.最后,用算例对该方法进行了说明.     

非合作-合作两型博弈的Shapley值纯策略纳什均衡解求解方法

在合作中又有竞争的"经济全球化"时代背景下,经济实体之间越来越多地体现出竞争与合作交织的特点,既有策略的选择,同时也有利益的分配或者成本的分摊,即竞争与合作相互联系。为此,Brandenburger和Stuart提出了非合作-合作两型博弈模型为这类博弈提供了有效的工具。目前非合作-合作两型博弈研究较少,且Brandenburger和Stuart提出的非合作-合作两型博弈存在一些不足：合作博弈用核心求解可能为空或者不唯一。Shapley值是一种重要的合作博弈单值解,满足匿名性、有效性、可加性和虚拟性,表达形式简单且唯一,对一些成本分摊问题和利益分配问题,给决策者提供了一个公平满意的分配方案。因此本文研究将Shapley值作为合作博弈的解时非合作-合作两型博弈解存在的条件。为了分析本文提出的基于Shapley值的非合作-合作两型博弈的新理论框架,首先给出了其特征函数满足的联盟无外部性条件。在满足此条件下,我们进一步证明了非合作-合作两型博弈解存在的条件及性质。结合数值实例比较分析合作博弈用核心和Shapley值求解非合作-合作两型博弈解的优缺点。研究表明：当用Shapley值求解合作博弈解,降低了非合作-合作两型博弈解存在条件。因此,本文的研究不仅弥补了Brandenburger和Stuart提出的非合作-合作两型博弈中合作博弈的核心为空或者不唯一的情况,而且为非合作-合作两型博弈的解提供新的理论框架,从而为既有竞争又有合作的博弈问题提供新的求解方法,因此,本文的研究具有一定的理论价值和应用价值。     

企业技能型人才培养的博弈及成本分摊问题探讨

随着"中国制造2025"战略的提出和经济增长动力的转变,人力资本尤其是技能型人才在推动我国经济发展进程中的作用更加凸显,这使得技能型人才的培养问题显得尤为重要。但从企业的微观层面来看,由于企业与技能型人才培训博弈机制和培养成本分摊机制的失效,导致技能型人才的流动性过高、整体素质水平偏低等问题凸显。本文对技能型人才培训博弈机制和成本分摊机制失效的现状和存在的问题进行分析,并针对这些问题从政府部门的角度提出一些对策建议,以期使企业对技能型人才的培养体系得到改进完善。     

基于限制博弈的具有容量限制的易腐品联合运输费用分摊问题

在易腐品的运输过程中,易腐品的新鲜度不仅会随时间的流逝而下降,而且还会受运输设施所采用的保鲜技术的影响。所以易腐品零售商使用某种运输设施时,零售商除了需要支付运输成本和保鲜成本之外,他们还需要承担因易腐品新鲜度下降而导致的价值损耗。本文首先把运输成本、保鲜成本和易腐品新鲜度下降导致的价值损耗作为总费用,通过应用限制博弈的可行联盟思想,把具有容量限制的易腐品联合运输的费用分摊问题转化为一类限制博弈模型。然后,通过讨论该限制博弈的相关性质,给出了该博弈限制核非空的充分条件。最后,通过实例将限制核与Shapley值、τ-值和核仁进行了比较分析。     

嵌入Supply-hub的供应链联合生产与订货批量模型研究

考虑JIT环境下基于Supply-hub的供货模式,建立了制造商、Supply-hub和供应商的平均成本函数,提出了供应链分散决策和集中决策情形下的制造商和供应商的生产与订货批量模型。结果表明,制造商的生产批量在供应链分散决策时变化无规律,而在供应链集中决策时随着供应商与Supply-hub之间距离的增加而增加;相比分散决策,供应链集中决策时制造商的成本增加而供应商的成本减少,而整个供应链的总成本减少,供应商可以通过转移支付让制造商和供应商均受益,从而实现整个供应链的帕累托优化,随着供应商与Supply-hub之间的距离增加,协调能够让供应链得到更多的收益。     

提前期、构建成本和短缺量拖后率均可控的EOQ模型

传统库存模型通常将提前期和构建成本视为不可控制。事实上可以通过追加投资缩短提前期和降低构建成本。缺货期间,为减少订单丢失量和补偿顾客的损失,供应商会给予一定的价格折扣。现实库存系统中,容易得到需求的期望值和标准差,但较难得到其分布规律。基于此,考虑短缺量拖后率与价格折扣和缺货期间库存水平相关,提出了一种需求为任意分布且提前期和构建成本均可控的EOQ模型,证明了模型存在唯一最优解,给出了一种寻优算法。数值仿真分析表明,一般情况下,压缩提前期和降低构建成本能降低订购批量和安全库存,降低库存总成本;短缺量拖后系数和缺货概率对库存总成本影响较大,企业应尽量降低缺货概率,尤其在短缺量拖后系数较小时。     

基于最小平方距离的区间值合作对策求解模型与方法

Most of the existing studies on interval-valued cooperative games in which the values of coalitions S are expressed with intervals υ(S)=[υ_L(S),υ_R(S)]are based on the interval arithmetic (e.g., interval subtraction) and ranking functions of intervals and hereby are some extensions of the classic Shapley value. The main purpose of this paper is to develop an effective method for solving n-person interval-valued cooperative games based on the least square method. Firstly, according to the concept of the distance between intervals and the least square method, an optimization mathematical model is constructed through considering that players in coalitions try to guarantee their payoffs' sums being as close to the coalitions' values as possible. Through solving the constructed optimization mathematical model, all players' interval-valued payoffs x_i=[x_Li, x_Ri] (i=1,2,…,n) can be obtained, which can be determined by the analytical formula[X_L,X_R]=[A^-1 B_L,A^-1 B_R], where B_L=(υ_L(S),υ_L(S),…,υ_L(S))^T,B_R=(υ_L(S),υ_L(S),…,υ_L(S))^T,A^-1=(1/2^n-2)(a'_ij)_n×n, and a'_ij=-/(n+1)(i≠j or n/(n+1) if i=j. Then, the auxiliary optimization mathematical model is extended so that it satisfies some conditions x(N)=υ(N) and hereby all players' interval-valued payoffs x'_i=[x'_Li, x'_Ri] (i=1,2,…,n) are solved, which can be determined by the analytical formula[X'_L,X'_R]=[X'_L+(υ_L(N)-x_Li)e/n,X_R+(υ_R(N)-x_Ri)e/n]. Finally, a numerical example of the dispatch coalition problem is used to conduct the validation and comparison analysis, which has shown that the proposed models and method are of the validity, the applicability, and the superiority. The models and method proposed in this paper can effectively avoid the magnification of uncertainty resulted from the subtraction of intervals and provide a new theoretical angle and suitable tool for solving interval-valued cooperative games.     

Coalition Formation and Cost Allocation for Joint Replenishment Systems

This paper focuses on the issues of coalition formation and cost allocation in a joint replenishment system involving a set of independent and freely interacting retailers purchasing an item from one supplier to meet a deterministic demand. The papers dealing with this problem are mainly focused on supperadditive games, where the cost savings associated with a coalition increase with the number of players in the coalition. The most relevant question addressed then is how to allocate the savings to the players. In this paper, we propose to go further by dealing with a non‐supperadditive game, where a set of independent retailers have the common understanding to share the cost savings according to the cost‐based proportional rule. In this setting, the global cost optimization is no longer a relevant approach to identify appealing coalitions for any retailer. Here, we provide an iterative procedure to form the so‐called efficient coalition structure and we show that this coalition structure has the nice properties of being (i) weakly stable in the sense of the coalition structure core and (ii) strongly stable under a given assumption. An exact fractional programming based solution is also given to generate such efficient coalitions.     

补货能力影响部分短缺量拖后率的边补货边需求EOQ模型

Based on the hypothesis of time-dependent partial backlogging,the effect of the waiting time between the next replenishment and the satisfaction of the backlogging demand on the rate of partial backlog-grog was investigated in this paper. Then the backlogging rate influenced by the replenishment capacity and the total of backlogging demand was proposed. Based on this new standpoint,an EOQ model of replenishment with the replenishment capacity affecting the partial backlogging was built up.At last,an emulator was performed and the results showed:improving the replenishment capacity could reduce the replenishment times to a lower constant level;this effect may increase the waiting time before the next replenishment,but it could decrease the waiting time after the start of reple山shment;so the trend of the lostsales varying with the replenishment capacity was not very distinct at the medium level of the replenishment capacity;However,the more adequate replenishment capacity could reduce the number of lostsales and improve the rate of partial backlogging during shortage period than the less one.     

Capacity Sharing and Cost Allocation among Independent Firms with Congestion

We analyze the benefit of production/service capacity sharing for a set of independent firms. Firms have the choice of either operating their own production/service facilities or investing in a facility that is shared. Facilities are modeled as queueing systems with finite service rates. Firms decide on capacity levels (the service rate) to minimize delay costs and capacity investment costs possibly subject to service‐level constraints on delay. If firms decide to operate a shared facility they must also decide on a scheme for sharing the capacity cost. We formulate the problem as a cooperative game and identify settings under which capacity sharing is beneficial and there is a cost allocation that is in the core under either the first‐come, first‐served policy or an optimal priority policy. We show that capacity sharing may not be beneficial in settings where firms have heterogeneous work contents and service variabilities. In such cases, we specify conditions under which capacity sharing may still be beneficial for a subset of the firms.     

基于差分进化算法的运输容量约束下有数量折扣的模糊联合补货模型研究

针对采购管理中广泛存在的不确定性,将单位库存成本和可变订货成本视为模糊变量,构建了运输容量约束下有数量折扣的模糊联合补货模型,此模型属于NP-hard问题,目前缺乏可靠的全局优化求解算法。在选取梯级平均综合表示法对总成本去模糊的基础上,设计了基于自适应混合差分进化算法的求解方法,并通过算例验证了此模糊联合补货模型的有效性和求解算法的全局优化能力。     

基于Shapley值法的商务模式创新价值分享

商务模式的价值创造活动正逐步由个体企业的行为演变为主体企业、伙伴和客户的共同努力。只有以合理的价值分享为前提的价值获取才能保证商务模式创新的价值得以持续创造,保证商务模式创新的成功。基于Shapley值法对商务模式创新后的价值增值在主体企业和其他利益相关者之间进行分享,比较各个参与主体价值增值的大小,得到合理价值分享的条件。研究结果表明,对商务模式创新没有直接贡献的利益相关者也可能分享到创新的价值,但不同创新结果价值分享的对象和数量是不一样的,创新结果参数的变化会不同程度影响分享的价值,为了更好地提高各个利益相关者参与创新的积极性,有必要针对不同创新的结果调整分享的价值。     

基于合作博弈的易腐性产品运输设施选择的费用分配

易腐性产品的价值会随着时间而损失,运输易腐性产品时,客户除了支付运输费用外还需要承担产品的价值损失。本文把易腐性产品的价值损失和运输费用之和作为总费用,应用合作博弈理论,把易腐性产品的运输设施选择的费用分配问题构造成费用分配博弈,证明了在易腐性产品线性价值损失的情况下,运输设施选择博弈的核心非空,且为子模博弈,并讨论核仁、夏普利值、τ-值等解。论文最后讨论了有约束运输的设施选择的费用分配博弈的解的情况,说明其核心也许为空,并提出了进一步研究的方向。     

基于限制合作博弈的产业集群企业利益分配研究

产业集群内部企业组成协同创新联盟是促进联盟合作的有效途径,然而影响联盟企业合作最为关键的因素是如何合理公平的对联盟的利益进行分配。考虑联盟中企业合作能力为灰色信息且企业之间的依赖关系具有不完整性,本文首先,基于灰色系统理论定义了灰色授权算子;其次,运用Choquet积分对企业之间的依赖关系进行集成;再将这种依赖关系信息和Shapley模型结合起来建立了具有灰色授权机制的限制合作博弈模型,并证明了该模型满足有效性、对称性、可加性和哑元性公理。最后通过算例说明了该模型的可行性和实用性。