考虑风险规避与质量和服务水平的VMI供应链期权协调策略

针对一个考虑风险规避供应商与质量和服务水平的二级VMI供应链,应用条件风险价值(CVaR)准则刻画供应商的风险规避行为,提出由期权和成本分担构成的组合契约,构建以零售商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨供应链协调策略以及风险规避对供应链协调和利润分配的影响.研究表明,供应商的最优生产量随着其风险规避程度的增加而减小,但最优质量和服务水平与风险规避程度无关;当且仅当供应商风险规避程度较低时供应链才能实现协调,且供应商风险规避程度是影响供应链契约设计和利润分配的关键因素.     

Financing decisions in supply chains with a capital‐constrained manufacturer: competition and risk

Supply chain finance is a crucial topic. In this paper, we consider that a capital‐constrained manufacturer can borrow money from either a bank (bank credit financing) or a retailer (trade credit financing). Our analysis compares supply chain performance under these two financing schemes. Furthermore, we extend our model to evaluate the impacts of retail competition and supply chain member's risk aversion on supply chains, which consist of one capital‐constrained manufacturer and two competing retailers. We consider three financing schemes: only bank credit financing, dual trade credit financing, and bank and trade credit mix financing. We find that without retail competition, the retailer is always willing to use the trade credit financing; whereas with retail competition, if one retailer provides the trade credit but the other does not, the credit provider could receive the superior profit. Thus, providing an appropriate trade credit financing scheme is critically important for retailers. Moreover, we find that without retail competition, when a trade interest rate is relatively low, both the retailer and manufacturer could reach a win‐win situation in the trade credit financing. However, with retail competition, supply chain members (i.e., two retailers and one manufacturer) will not have an all‐win situation no matter which specific financing scheme is adopted and only a win‐win‐lose situation exists when using the credit mix financing scheme or the dual trade credit financing in supply chains. Last but not least, regardless of risk neutrality or aversion of supply chain members, their pricing decisions among three financing schemes are similar. This implies that the impacts of supply chain members’ risk aversion are limited in supply chain financing scheme selection. More managerial insights are discussed.     

Trade credit insurance in a capital‐constrained supply chain

We examine the role of trade credit insurance in a capital‐constrained supply chain with one (or two) loss‐neutral retailer(s) and one loss‐averse manufacturer. We model the interplay between these supply chain participants as a Stackelberg game and analyze their operating and financing decisions. In one capital‐constrained retailer case, we find that either the manufacturer's high loss aversion level or the retailer's low initial capital motivates the manufacturer to adopt insurance. Insurance drives more credit financing with more attractive financing terms (a lower wholesale price), which promotes the manufacturer to collect better product sales and performance. Although the retailer enjoys improved profit from insurance, its default risk increases. In contrast, in one capital‐constrained retailer and one well‐funded retailer scenario, numerically, when the manufacturer's loss aversion level is high or the weak retailer's initial capital is low, insurance is also adopted but is not always preferred by the capital‐constrained retailer due to competition. In addition, as the demand substitution rate increases, the manufacturer is more likely to prefer insurance due to better performance.     

需求不确定性对混合条件风险价值约束供应链系统的影响

运用随机占优研究风险偏好和需求不确定性对混合条件风险价值约束供应链系统的影响.证明在批发价和收益共享契约下零售商的最优订货量和利润随风险偏好系数的增加而减小;只有在零售商为风险追求型时,批发价契约才能实现供应链协调;无论零售商的风险偏好如何,收益共享契约都能实现供应链协调.在收益共享契约下,随机大需求将导致零售商获得较高的最优利润;当零售商为风险中性或风险厌恶时,其最优利润随需求可变性的增加而减少.     

Optimal lead time policy for short life cycle products under Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion

The lead time reduction problem in a supply chain with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer for short life cycle products is studied in this paper. Lead time can be reduced by additional crashing cost to enhance forecast accuracy of uncertain demand. Under Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion, the effects of decision maker’s risk aversion and additional crashing cost for lead time reduction on optimal decisions are analyzed. Moreover, a revenue sharing contract is proposed to achieve supply chain coordination. The results suggest that when the retailer is more risk-averse and when forecast error is larger, the retailer tends to select a shorter lead time despite the higher wholesale price charged by the manufacturer. However, if the retailer is mildly risk-averse and the forecast error is small, he might not select to shorten the lead time because of associated additional crashing cost. Thus, the retailer should carefully balance the benefit against the cost of lead time reduction. In addition, we find lead time reduction is conductive to improving supply chain efficiency compared to the case without lead time reduction. Revenue sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination and Pareto improvement for both supply chain agents. The improved utilities increase as the decision maker is more risk-averse and the forecast error is higher.     

考虑质量控制和损失规避的供应链协调研究

研究质量控制和各成员均损失规避背景下的供应链协调问题,应用损失规避效应函数刻画制造商和零售商的损失规避行为,通过分析比较分散决策和集中决策两种模式下的最优策略,引入批发价格-质量成本分担契约构建供应链协调模型,研究表明,该契约能够使质量控制与损失规避背景下的供应链实现协调.通过算例对损失规避程度、产品合格率和销售价格等参数进行灵敏度分析,揭示了损失规避和质量控制等因素与最优产品质量水平、最优订货量以及供应链效用之间的关系.     

基于风险的供需网契约协调仿真研究

针对供需网的一个典型节点, 研究随机需求情形下零售商主导的供需网契约协调问题。考虑由一个风险厌恶的零售商和一个风险厌恶的制造商构成的两层供需系统, 零售商制定最优批发价, 制造商决定最优供货量, 构建了基于收益共享费用共担的供需网协调模型。仿真分析结果表明, 当整个供需系统的风险厌恶系数高于制造商和零售商的风险厌恶系数时, 收益共享费用共担契约可以实现系统的显著改善甚至完美协调。     

Contract efficiency for a decentralized supply chain in the presence of quality improvement

In this paper, we study a joint pricing and product quality decision problem in a decentralized supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Although the manufacturer decides the product quality with an associated cost, the retailer decides the retail price. We aim to study and compare different contract formats for this decentralized supply chain. There is a trade‐off in the choice of contracts: simpler format contract (with a few parameters) is less complicated, but the contract efficiency is low. We start with the simplest one‐parameter contract: a wholesale price contract that serves as the benchmark. We then study how contract efficiency can be improved by adding one more parameter. Specifically, we consider three two‐parameter contracts that are commonly used in reality: two‐part tariff contract, revenue‐sharing contract, and effort cost sharing contract. We find that the contract efficiency is improved under all the three contracts, but in different ways: the improvement in contract efficiency under each of them dominates the other two when manufacturer's quality improvement effectiveness is relatively low, moderate, and high, respectively. Furthermore, through numerical examples, we find that under some cases, a choice from these three two‐parameter contracts can achieve a close‐to‐perfect efficiency (>85%). Finally, we investigate whether a combination of the three two‐parameter contracts can achieve coordination. Interestingly, we find that only the combination of effort cost sharing contract and revenue‐sharing contract can achieve coordination, whereas combinations of either of them and two‐part tariff contract cannot.     

联合促销和风险规避下应对突发事件的供应链协调策略

针对联合促销和风险规避下考虑突发事件的供应链协调问题,应用条件风险值度量制造商和零售商的风险价值,引入回购契约协调供应链,分别构建应对常规和非常规突发事件的供应链协调模型.研究表明,常规突发事件下,订货量、促销和契约参数具有一定的稳定性,当需求扰动较大时,供应链协调被打破,而非常规突发事件下,需求扰动打破供应链协调,通过调整契约参数能够使供应链重新达到协调状态.     

Contract analysis: A performance measures and profit evaluation within two-echelon supply chains

Coordination is regarded as key in managing dependencies between distinctive members of a supply chain through the benefits of coordination mechanisms. Such coordination mechanisms are contracts, implemented to increase total supply chain profit, reduce costs and share risk among supply chain members. However, by contract implementation the retailer is constrained in his purchase by bearing the entire risk of holding the inventory (wholesale price contract) or by limited risk allocated to the supplier (buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility contracts). By implementing an advanced purchase system the risk of inventory is fairly divided between the supplier and the retailer. In order to observe inventory implications on the supply chain bottom line, this article is directed towards the evaluation of performance measures and supply chain profit behavior under buyback, revenue sharing, quantity flexibility and advanced purchase discount contracts versus no coordination and wholesale price systems.     

风险规避制造商市场入侵策略

针对由风险中性的在位制造商、风险规避的外来制造商和风险中性零售商组成的二级供应链系统,基于Stackelberg博弈理论建立不同市场入侵策略下的决策模型,研究风险规避的外来制造商市场入侵策略选择问题,分析市场入侵和风险规避行为对供应链成员均衡决策的影响.研究发现:当外来制造商通过零售商销售产品时,损害在位制造商的利润,但对零售商有利;当外来制造商通过网络渠道直接向消费者销售产品时,不一定损害在位制造商的利润,存在帕累托改进区域;当外来制造商的风险规避程度较大时,价格战愈发激烈,对自身、在位制造商和零售商都是不利的;外来制造商的市场入侵策略受质量差异程度、风险规避程度、生产成本和直销成本的综合影响;外来制造商选择最优的市场入侵策略时,损害在位制造商的利润,而且供应链系统不能实现帕累托改进.     

产出和需求不确定下三级供应链契约协调模型

研究基于供应商和制造商随机产出以及零售商随机需求的单一供应商、制造商和零售商组成的三级供应链契约协调问题, 构建并分析集中和分散条件下供应链系统的最优决策模型, 证明随机产出和需求下运用风险共担契约可以使分散期望利润达到集中决策的水平. 在数值算例中, 通过模型和契约参数的分析, 阐述了风险共担契约协调的有效性.     

带有风险规避型销售商的供需链协调

以一个两阶段的供需链系统为背景，针对供需链上决策激励不一致和风险规避效应导致供需链低效的问题，研究了在实践中广泛应用的利益共享合同和批量折扣合同对供需链协调性的影响．证明了两种合同均可克服双重边际效应和风险规避效应，使得供需链协调．并给出了合同参数的设计方案，同时指出在实施上，利益共享合同需强制执行，批量折扣合同自动执行．     

赊销背景下的供应链收入共享契约

在供应商向存在资金约束的销售商提供赊销的背景下,分别探讨了批发价格契约和收入共享契约对二级供应链的协调问题.研究发现,批发价格契约无法协调存在赊销的供应链,当销售商的初始资金满足一定条件时,赊销背景下的收入共享契约能够实现存在资金约束供应链的自愿协调.收入共享契约下,共享比例随销售商初始资金的增大而增大,批发价格则随之增大而减小.最后通过数值算例对结论进行了验证.     

Supply chain coordination for a deteriorating item with stock and price‐dependent demand under revenue sharing contract

This paper deals with an integrated single‐manufacturer single‐retailer supply chain model for a single item. The market demand is assumed to be dependent on both the on‐hand stock and price, and the manufacturer and the retailer are in an agreement of lot‐for‐lot policy. The proposed model is developed under the contract that the retailer offers the manufacturer a percentage of revenue (s)he generates by selling a lot. We determine optimal policies for both the centralized and decentralized coordination systems. A comparison of these policies is made with a numerical example. Sensitivity analysis is performed to examine the stability of the solution.     

考虑损失厌恶和锚定心理的供应链订货与协调

为更合理地实现供应链协调的整体最优绩效,以具有损失厌恶和锚定心理的零售商和风险中性的供应商组成的两级供应链为研究对象,探讨回购契约下的供应链订货及协调情况。建立集中和分散决策下考虑零售商损失厌恶和锚定心理的回购契约协调模型,分析了零售商最优订货量与批发价格、回购价格之间的关系,以及各契约参数对回购价格和各节点利润的影响,并给出了供应链实现协调需要达成的条件。结果表明,当零售商订购的产品为高利润产品时,能够实现供应链整体最优绩效,达到供应链协调,且利润在供应链双方之间的分配随着批发和回购价格的提升而向供应商倾斜,但零售商损失厌恶和锚定心理的加深会使得供应商提升回购价格,使整体供应链的利润下降,成本费用增加。     

Optimal decisions for a two-echelon supply chain with capacity and demand information

Due to the applications of Internet of Things and big data in the Industry 4.0 context, more information in and out of a smart factory can be collected and shared between manufacturers and retailers. In this study, we consider two types of information that can be available in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in Industry 4.0: the capacity information for the later rush production and the demand information shared between the retailer and manufacturer. In the supply chain, the manufacturer provides two orders with maximum limits by using a capacitated normal production and two capacitated rush production modes. To study the effects of the information, we investigate the optimal decisions and profits for the supply chain with and without the capacity information and demand information sharing. In addition, we propose a coordination mechanism for the supply chain with both the capacity information and demand information sharing. The coordination mechanism does not only rely on cost parameters, but also on the capacity and demand information. The numerical examples show that the supply chain profit can be improved by as large as 16.76% in the coordinated system, compared with the original system without the capacity information and demand information sharing.     

供应链间上游核心企业竞争与结构选择

考虑两条供应链间相互竞争的上游核心企业,分别决定是否将产品销售外包给各自的下游零售商,从而形成向下分散式的供应链结构。第三方无成本优势的前提下,制造商和零售商间引入收益共享契约,利用Hotelling模型探讨向下分散式结构对核心企业间博弈均衡结构及供应链利润的影响。结论表明：与集中式相比,分散式供应链本身具有结构优势,在提升自身供应链利润的同时也会促进另一条竞争供应链的利润水平,有悖于通常认为的“双重边际化效应”,从结构优势的视角解释了第三方外包,并且收益共享比例决定了供应链竞争的均衡结构及其演化。     

Designing a supply contract to coordinate supplier’s production,considering customer oriented production

This paper investigates how a manufacturer, who is trying to develop a customer-oriented production system, should design a supply contract with its component supplier. The manufacturer sells its products during a selling season, with stochastic demand and tries to coordinate supplier’s production quantity, with long lead-time, in order to provide sufficient stock. Along this line, a coordinating contract based on an option mechanism is used as the supply contract. The manufacturer’s optimal order, the supplier’s optimal production and the necessary conditions for coordination between them in the mentioned environment are obtained. Also, risk and profit sharing analysis between the contract partners is provided. A numerical example is conducted to illustrate the analysis.     

限额与交易下考虑战略顾客行为的供应链决策与协调

研究由一个受限额与交易政策约束的制造商和一个面临同质战略顾客的零售商组成的两级供应链决策与协调问题. 分别研究得到了限额与交易政策下一体化(包括理性预期均衡和数量承诺两种情形) 和分散化供应链最优决策和最大期望利润, 并与不考虑限额与交易政策的情形进行对比分析, 发现限额与交易政策使得供应链最优产量降低、最优价格升高、碳排放量减少. 最后, 以数量承诺情形为基准, 基于收益分享合同设计了供应链协调策略.