《巴黎协定》实施细则评估与全球气候治理展望

《巴黎协定》在确立2020年后应对气候变化框架性制度安排的同时也给出了一系列留待解决的后续任务,包括制定《巴黎协定》实施细则,细化相应规则、制度和指南等。经过3年的谈判,2018年年底在卡托维兹举行的第24次缔约方会议对《巴黎协定》涉及的除市场机制外的众多议题做出了一揽子安排,建立了一系列指导和帮助各方在2020年后落实和履行《巴黎协定》的实施细则,为全面有效实施《巴黎协定》提供了更明确的指导。本研究致力对《巴黎协定》实施细则的内容和特点、对中国的潜在影响和要求、后续谈判走向以及中国的对策等进行全面深入的梳理和分析。评估发现,实施细则继续保持了《巴黎协定》的“精妙平衡”,严格恪守并充分体现了“自下而上”的《巴黎协定》模式,在为发展中国家保留一定灵活性的基础上统一了报告和审评的“度量衡”,并进一步明确了以五年为周期提高行动和支持力度的序贯决策机制。细则可能给中国引领全球气候治理和国内履约带来新的机遇和挑战。中国需要从观念认识、责任担当、业务协调上做好新的布局,根据国内外新趋势、新特点构建中国特色的气候治理新体系。     

全球碳排放空间约束条件下美国退出《巴黎协定》对中欧日碳排放空间和减排成本的影响

应用全球多部门、多区域动态可计算一般均衡（CGE）模型,采用情景分析方法,评估美国退出《巴黎协定》后,由于其碳排放路径的变化对国际气候谈判中的3个重要谈判方中国、欧盟和日本实现国家自主贡献（NDC）和2℃目标情景下碳排放空间和减排成本的影响。结果表明：在全球碳排放固定且分配方式固定的条件下,美国不同程度的退约将为自身获得较大的碳排放空间,同时挤压其他地区,包括中国、欧盟和日本实现NDC和2℃目标的碳排放空间,将推高中国、欧盟和日本实现NDC和2℃目标的碳价。2030年,2℃目标下中国碳价的升幅将达4.4~14.6美元/t,欧盟为9.7~35.4美元/t,日本为16.0~53.5美元/t。同时将增加中国、欧盟和日本等其他国家和地区的GDP损失。2030年,2℃目标下中国GDP损失的升幅将达220.0亿~711.0亿美元（相当于16.4~53.1美元/人）,欧盟为93.5亿~321.4亿美元（相当于20.7~71.1美元/人）,日本为41.3亿~134.5亿美元（相当于34.3~111.7美元/人）。     

巴黎协定——全球气候治理的新起点

巴黎气候变化大会完成了历时4年的德班平台谈判进程,达成了以《巴黎协定》（简称《协定》）为核心的一系列决定。《协定》确立了一种全缔约方参与,以“自主贡献+审评”为中心,全面涉及减缓、适应及其支持的全球应对气候变化新模式。这一模式在继承《公约》原则的基础上,明确了发达国家和发展中国家各自的责任,通过国家自主贡献的方式充分动员所有缔约方采取应对气候变化行动,促进可持续发展。《协定》还鼓励除缔约方外的其他主体积极参与应对气候变化进程,鼓励市场和非市场机制的加入,动员资金流向绿色低碳领域。在制度安排上,《协定》体现了激励、透明、非对抗、非惩罚性的特点。《协定》的达成标志着全球气候治理进入了新的发展阶段,传递出全球推动实现绿色低碳、气候适应型和可持续发展的强有力信号。然而由于《协定》全面平衡了各方的利益,在未来的遵约细节和实施落实方面将会有更多的难题,如果处理不当,将可能会损害发展中国家的利益,尤其是发展中大国。     

走向《巴黎协定》温升目标：已经在路上

目前欧盟、中国、日本、韩国、加拿大,以及南非等国家或地区,已经公布了温室气体中和或者碳中和的目标,如果加上很可能很快也会提出碳中和目标的美国,全球有可能近70%的CO₂排放的国家或地区提出碳中和的目标。由于这些国家或地区是全球技术主导和经济主导地,因而全球2050年左右实现碳中和具有可行性。2050年左右实现碳中和,即和《巴黎协定》2℃目标,甚至和其1.5℃温升目标下的减排路径相一致。研究表明实现2050年左右碳中和有其可行性,实现该目标需要更多的技术创新,未来将是各个国家技术竞争和经济竞争阶段。     

基于各国NDC/INDC目标的全球减排不确定性研究

基于各国提交的165份国家自主贡献文件,以其中提出的减排目标为基准,尽可能充分地考虑了减排目标的范围不确定性、不同经济情景带来的碳强度减排目标不确定性、减排气体种类边界差异、碳排放达峰约束等因素,并通过蒙特卡洛模拟的方法对全球、各区域和主要经济体的温室气体排放总量、不确定度及其来源进行了定量分析.结果表明,到2030年...     

从巴黎到卡托维兹：全球气候治理中的统一和分裂

《巴黎协定》达成之后的实施细则谈判从一开始就面临各种挑战。尽管如此,卡托维兹气候大会基本完成了实施细则的磋商,通过统一规则的制定夯实了基于规则的气候治理框架,为“自下而上”的松散协定注入了更多规则绑定强制性色彩,提升了协定的法律地位。会议也见证了气候世界的分裂,包括主要缔约方立场的退化、谈判集团的分化重组、利益集团的博弈、对科学报告的分歧等,从而使关于力度的磋商没有实质进展。从巴黎到卡托维兹的谈判路程表明治理全球化、治理效率以及国家主权之间暂时存在“不可能三角”。未来的谈判应促进从规则到行动的转变。     

公平实现《巴黎协定》目标的碳减排贡献分担研究综述

各国目前的国家自主贡献与实现《巴黎协定》温控目标的要求仍有较大的差距,各国进一步强化其自主贡献力度亟需公平的碳减排贡献分担作为目标参考。本文系统梳理了碳减排分配涉及的公平原则及其4个主要维度,即排放责任、经济能力、人均主义和国家主义,评述了依据不同维度或维度组合制定的分配方案的研究进展和存在的问题,并将该领域错综复杂的分歧矛盾分为3个层次,即公平原则维度的选择、分配机制的设计以及具体参数设置。研究发现,目前旨在指导各国提高自主贡献力度的公平分配研究在全面性、一致性和客观性方面仍有缺陷,特别是基于多元文献分析以及综合分配模型的综合分配研究不能全面客观地反映发展中国家对公平的关切。为此,本文针对性地提出了未来碳减排贡献分担综合研究的需求和方向,即需要系统阐述发展中国家视角的公平分配方案并构建一个全面、平衡、客观的综合碳减排贡献分担模型,以提升中国在这一问题上的话语权,在公平实现《巴黎协定》目标的进程中更好地发挥贡献者和引领者的作用。     

《巴黎协定》下市场机制建设中的风险与对策

《巴黎协定》（《协定》）第6条设立了合作方法和可持续发展机制两种市场机制。受国家自主贡献（NDC）减排目标多样性和未来减排努力不确定性等因素的影响,《协定》下市场机制在设计和实施中面临着巨大的风险和挑战,主要包括缺乏稳健的核算规则、不恰当的额外性评估带来的环境完整性风险以及经济激励下缔约方不积极扩大减排目标覆盖范围、提高减排行动力度的风险。为了降低风险给全球减排行动可能带来的负面影响,必须建立稳健的核算规则,在额外性评估中合理考虑东道国NDC下的减排承诺,并通过设立参与资质要求等方式确保市场机制促进缔约方扩大减排目标覆盖范围。建议中国结合国内碳市场的发展现状,从识别《协定》下市场机制对我国的要求和影响、进行相关能力建设、设立严格的监管措施和建立所需机构等方面入手,为我国有效参与做好充分准备。     

《巴黎协定》实施细则适应议题焦点解析及后续中国应对措施

适应是《联合国气候变化框架公约》及其《巴黎协定》下的重要谈判内容。2018年12月举行的第24次缔约方大会（COP24）就适应议题后续实施方案达成了共识,为全球气候治理带来新的机遇和挑战。中国在未来全球气候治理中,如何借助新成果推动国内适应工作稳步发展,积极发挥中国作用,是新形势下亟需考虑的重要问题。基于此,本文梳理了适应议题的焦点问题、各集团和缔约方的立场观点,展望了2019—2025年适应相关议题主要工作安排,并对此提出了中国未来适应领域完成相关工作需要考虑的应对措施建议,包括：(1)深入分析国际信息报告体系与国内信息的联系,梳理国内适应工作亮点,为构建高质量报告奠定基础;(2)构建跨部门跨地区协作机制,加强信息搜集与完善,有效提高数据和信息统计功能;(3)强化气候变化适应技术、规范、标准等科学研究的作用,为制定政策规定时纳入相应技术要求、提高政策规定等需求提供科学性和可操作性的服务。     

2℃全球变暖背景下中国未来气候变化预估

相对于工业化革命前期, 全球年平均地表气温上升2℃的时间和相应的气候变化受到了广泛关注, 特别是包括欧盟成员国在内的许多国家和国际组织已经将避免2℃全球变暖作为温室气体减排的首要目标。为此, 本文作者基于16个气候模式在20世纪气候模拟试验和SRES B1、A1B和A2温室气体和气溶胶排放情景下的数值模拟试验结果, 采用多模式集合方法预估研究了2℃全球变暖发生的时间、对应的大气中主要温室气体浓度以及中国气候变化情况。根据模式集合平均结果, 三种排放情景下2℃全球变暖分别发生在2064年、2046年和2049年, 大气二氧化碳当量浓度分别为625 ppm、645 ppm和669 ppm (1 ppm=10-6)。对应着2℃全球变暖, 中国气候变暖幅度明显更大。从空间分布形势上看, 变暖从南向北加强, 在青藏高原地区存在一个升温大值区; 就整体而言, 中国区域平均的年平均地表气温上升2.7～2.9℃, 冬季升温幅度 (3.1～3.2℃) 要较其他季节更大。年平均降水量在华南大部分地区减少0～5%, 而在其余地区增加0～20%, 中国区域年平均降水增加3.4%～4.4%, 各季节增加量在0.5%～6.6%之间。     

《巴黎协定》强化透明度体系的建立与实施展望

以信息报告和审评为主要内容的透明度体系是《巴黎协定》有效实施的重要保障。《巴黎协定》建立了“强化的透明度框架”,并在2018年底达成了实施细则,形成了强化的透明度体系。这一体系建立在既往透明度履约实践基础上,针对缔约方在《巴黎协定》下所承担“共同但有区别”的义务,在为发展中国家提供履约灵活性和支持的情况下,遵循通用的模式、程序和指南。该规则体系有利于提高缔约方履约报告质量和可比性,督促各方履行条约义务,增进全球气候治理多边机制互信。然而这一体系相比既往实践,给发展中国家提出强化要求的同时尚未落实强化的支持,且体系本身的运行效率还有待观察。为此,各国应当做好充分的国内体制机制建设准备,国际社会应当落实对发展中国家履约的支持,强化相应能力建设。     

《巴黎协定》下的国际碳市场机制：基本形式和前景展望

《巴黎协定》第6条建立的两种国际碳市场机制受到广泛关注,将在2020年后的气候制度中发挥至关重要的作用。文中识别了覆盖范围、交易指标类型和管理模式等3个构成国际碳市场机制的关键要素及其不同设计选项,并以此为基础阐明国际碳市场机制的基本形式。梳理并识别谈判中有关国际碳市场机制的焦点问题及其不同规则设计,并在此基础上分析中国参与国际碳市场机制的机遇和挑战。结合中国气候融资、提升减排力度、推动绿色“一带一路”和气候变化南南合作的内在需求以及国内有关市场机制的现有能力,分析提出两种国际碳市场机制在中国近期、中期和远期的发展前景及其所需的能力建设。     

Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement establishes provisions for using international carbon market mechanisms to achieve climate mitigation contributions. Environmental integrity is a key principle for using such mechanisms under the Agreement. This paper systematically identifies and categorizes issues and options to achieve environmental integrity, including how it could be defined, what influences it, and what approaches could mitigate environmental integrity risks. Here, environmental integrity is assumed to be ensured if the engagement in international transfers of carbon market units leads to the same or lower aggregated global emissions. Four factors are identified that influence environmental integrity: the accounting for international transfers; the quality of units generated, i.e. whether the mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of units leads to emission reductions in the transferring country; the ambition and scope of the mitigation target of the transferring country; and incentives or disincentives for future mitigation action, such as possible disincentives for transferring countries to define future mitigation targets less ambitiously or more narrowly in order to sell more units. It is recommended that policy-makers combine several approaches to address the significant risks to environmental integrity.

Key policy insights

• Robust accounting is a key prerequisite for ensuring environmental integrity. The diversity of nationally determined contributions is an important challenge, in particular for avoiding double counting and for ensuring that the accounting for international transfers is representative for the mitigation efforts by Parties over time.

• Unit quality can, in theory, be ensured through appropriate design of carbon market mechanisms; in practice, existing mechanisms face considerable challenges in ensuring unit quality. Unit quality could be promoted through guidance under Paris Agreement Article 6, and reporting and review under Article 13.

• The ambition and scope of mitigation targets is key for the incentive for transferring countries to ensure unit quality because countries with ambitious and economy-wide targets would have to compensate for any transfer of units that lack quality. Encouraging countries to adopt ambitious and economy-wide NDC targets would therefore facilitate achieving environmental integrity.

• Restricting transfers in instances of high environmental integrity risk – through eligibility criteria or limits – could complement these approaches.

     

How to operationalize accounting under Article 6 market mechanisms of the Paris Agreement

The role of market mechanisms was far from certain in the lead up to the 2015 Paris Climate Conference. The use of ‘constructive ambiguity’ led to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, with Article 6.2 specifying a mechanism with limited international oversight, and Article 6.4 establishing a ‘Sustainable Development Mechanism’ (SDM) subject to detailed rules. Clear operationalization of these mechanisms remains a challenge, especially regarding the critical accounting issue that could not be resolved at the 2018 Katowice Climate Conference (COP24) – how to apply corresponding adjustments, especially regarding sectors not covered by targets under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs). By using fictitious examples, we explain two possible approaches to using Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) under Article 6.2 for achieving NDCs: a ‘target-based’ one where the acquiring Party adds the ITMO amount to the target level of its NDC; and a ‘tally-based’ one where the acquiring Party removes the ITMO amount from the final tally of its NDC. We discuss how these approaches influence the way to make corresponding adjustments and to avoid ‘double counting’. The first one leads to ‘target/budget-based accounting’, the second one to ‘emission-based accounting’. For mitigation outside the scope of the host Party's NDC, we propose using a tally-based interpretation of ITMO use, as opposed to the target-based variety used in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and stress the need for additionality testing. This interpretation allows for mandatory corresponding adjustments for all ITMO usage, while the host Party NDC level remains unchanged. A buffer registry is created for corresponding non-NDC adjustments of the selling party.

Key policy insights

• Under the Paris Agreement, transfers of emissions units between two countries through the Article 6 mechanisms need a corresponding adjustment on both sides to prevent double counting.

• Corresponding adjustments can be applied either to emissions targets under NDCs or measured emissions levels.

• The transfer of emissions reduction credits generated outside an NDC should lead to a corresponding adjustment of a buffer registry of the selling country, but not its emissions level/NDC target. Such credits should only be generated if additionality of the reductions is shown.

     

Global Monsoon Changes under the Paris Agreement Temperature Goals in CESM1(CAM5)

Based on experiments with the Community Earth System Model, version 1(Community Atmosphere Model, version 5)[CESM1(CAM5)], and an observational dataset, we found that CESM1-CAM5 is able to reproduce global monsoon(GM)features, including the patterns of monsoon precipitation and monsoon domains, the magnitude of GM precipitation(GMP,the local summer precipitation), GM area(GMA), and GM percentage(the ratio of the local summer precipitation to annual precipitation). Under the Paris Agreement temperature goals, the GM in CESM1-CAM5 displays the following changes:(1)The GMA is ambiguous under the 1.5℃ temperature goal and increases under the 2.0℃ temperature goal. The increase mainly results from a change in the monsoon percentage.(2) The GM, land monsoon and ocean monsoon precipitation all significantly increase under both the 1.5℃ and 2.0℃ goals. The increases are mainly due to the enhancement of humidity and evaporation.(3) The percentages of GM, land monsoon and ocean monsoon feature little change under the temperature goals.(4) The lengths of the GM, land monsoon and ocean monsoon are significantly prolonged under the temperature goals.The increase in precipitation during the monsoon withdrawal month mainly accounts for the prolonged monsoons. Regarding the differences between the 1.5℃ and 2.0℃ temperature goals, it is certain that the GMP displays significant discrepancies.In addition, a large-scale enhancement of ascending motion occurs over the southeastern Tibetan Plateau and South China under a warming climate, whereas other monsoon areas experience an overall decline in ascending motion. This leads to an extraordinary wetting over Asian monsoon areas.     

Additionality revisited: guarding the integrity of market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

ABSTRACT

The Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of ‘hot air’ generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC’s ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain ‘hot air’, or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time.

Key policy insights

• Without additionality testing, market mechanisms under the Paris Agreements might lead to an international diffusion of ‘hot air’. To avoid this, an independent assessment of NDC ambition is in order. Otherwise, activities under the mechanisms need to undergo specific additionality tests.

• Additionality testing of projects and programmes should build on the experience developed under the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms.

• Bold approaches are needed for assessing additionality of policies. To avoid cumbersome assessment of all activities triggered by such policies, highly aggregated approaches are suggested, ranging from payback period thresholds for technologies mandated by regulation to minimum price levels triggered by carbon pricing policies. Over time, the stringency of threshold values should increase.