考虑零售商销售努力的CSR闭环供应链定价决策

本文构建由制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链模型,运用Stackelberg博弈理论,基于零售商销售努力和不同主体承担企业社会责任(CSR)的情形,研究闭环供应链的定价决策,并分析了销售努力效应和社会责任行为对企业决策和利润的影响.研究表明,零售商销售努力均有利于降低批发价,提高需求量和废旧品回收率;不同主体社会责任行为均有利于刺激供应链的需求、提高销售努力水平和回收率.与无CSR模型相比,制造商或零售商承担社会责任时,自身经济利润有损失,但相关利益者的经济利润会增加,最终供应链整体利润和社会效用都会增加.     

CSR投入对闭环供应链定价与协调决策的影响

研究了供应链成员的社会责任（CSR）投入行为对闭环供应链决策的影响。考虑了闭环供应链中以下四种不同的CSR投入方式：（1）无CSR投入;（2）制造商投入CSR;（3）零售商投入CSR;（4）制造商和零售商同时投入CSR。通过对比不同模型的均衡决策和利润,发现制造商和零售商同时进行CSR投入的方式对闭环供应链决策成员和系统均最有利,而零售商投入CSR的方式优于制造商投入CSR方式。其次,以集中化决策模型的最优结果为基准,探讨了不同CSR投入方式下分散化闭环供应链系统的协调机制设计问题。结果表明：两部定价契约能有效实现CSR约束的闭环供应链的协调;且在制造商与零售商同时投入CSR决策情形,契约中制造商的议价能力最弱,零售商的议价能力最强。最后,通过算例分析了模型中关键参数对闭环供应链均衡决策与利润的影响,并进一步对闭环供应链协调的性能进行了分析。     

回收竞争下考虑CSR行为的闭环供应链定价决策及协调

研究考虑企业社会责任(CSR)行为的闭环供应链定价决策及协调问题,分别构建了单个第三方回收及两个第三方回收竞争下的闭环供应链博弈模型,分别从企业与消费者两个视角分析了CSR投入对供应链成员的定价策略及系统总收益的影响,并建立了基于“收益共享”与“回收成本共担”相结合的契约协调模型。研究表明,两个第三方回收商间的适度竞争不仅可以降低产品价格、提升废旧产品回收效率,同时对提高企业的CSR投入水平以及收益水平也起到积极的促进作用。最后,在契约参数的可行性范围内,“收益共享-成本共担”契约在使供应链总收益达到最大的同时,还成功改善了每个成员企业的收益。     

不同渠道权力结构和信息结构下供应链定价和销售努力决策

本文针对零售商销售努力和销售价格影响需求情况下的制造商-零售商两级供应链,研究不同渠道权力结构和信息结构下供应链的分散决策。基于博弈理论和建模方法,对几种权力结构和信息结构情景建立相应模型,通过理论与数值分析对不同博弈均衡进行比较。研究表明,随着零售商势力逐步增强制造商利润会逐步恶化;但零售商势力增强能否带来更多利润,取决于需求对价格和销售努力的敏感度、销售努力成本以及信息结构。占优一方可以通过获取对方更多信息来改善自己处境。若占优零售商不得不依赖于对制造商成本先验分布进行决策,当估计的均值大于真实成本时,适度的方差对零售商更有利。最后,讨论了销售努力成本分担的合作机制,针对非合作博弈给出了帕累托改进的合约区间和 Nash讨价还价均衡。     

回收责任分担视角下零售商主导闭环供应链的政府奖惩机制研究

研究零售商主导的闭环供应链奖惩机制问题，分别建立了四个博弈模型：政府对制造商实施奖惩机制；政府对回收商实施奖惩机制；政府同时对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制以及同时对制造商和回收商实施奖惩机制。研究表明：政府对制造商实施奖惩机制、政府对回收商实施奖惩机制以及政府同时对制造商和回收商实施奖惩机制三种情形下零售价、回收率和批发价相等，且总利润相等；政府同时对制造商和零售商实施奖惩机制与其它情形相比，废旧产品的回收率较低，批发价较高，且总利润降低，但四种情形下零售价相同；当政府同时对制造商和回收商实施奖惩机制时，若制造商承担的回收责任较大，则闭环供应链成员都能从奖惩机制中获益。     

不同补贴对象下的闭环供应链定价模型北大核心CSCDCSSCI

基于混合回收渠道的充分竞争闭环供应链中的研究假设,针对政府采取不同补贴对象策略(消费者、零售商、制造商或第三方回收商)分别建立闭环供应链定价模型;通过不同补贴对象下闭环供应链的销售渠道定价指标、回收渠道定价指标以及渠道成员利润分配的对比研究对不同补贴对象的影响系数对渠道成员定价决策和利润的影响进行分析。研究结果表明:当政府直接补贴给消费者和零售商时,销售渠道上的定价指标(产品批发价和市场销售价)较高,而回收渠道上的定价指标(废旧产品第三方回收价和制造商回收价)以及渠道成员的利润分配较低;而当政府补贴给制造商和第三方回收商时,销售渠道上的定价指标较低,而回收渠道的上的定价指标以及渠道成员利润分配较高。     

政府补贴下家电行业闭环供应链定价模型

研究单一制造商、单一零售商和单一第三方物流提供商组成的三阶段闭环供应链下的产品定价模型。首先,依据政府为家电行业制定的不同的补贴策略,分别构建了定价补贴模型(LP模型)和定额补贴模型(SQ模型),给出了供应链中各个企业的最优定价策略,并分别分析了单位产品补贴率和单位产品补贴限额对最优定价的影响关系。最终得到结论,从销售渠道价格角度考虑,定额补贴优于定价补贴,从回收渠道价格考虑,定价补贴优于定额补贴;从供应链成员利润和整体利润角度考虑,定价补贴模型是更优的。     

闭环供应链定价模型与回收渠道选择决策

利用Stackelberg博弈理论考察了具有直接销售渠道和间接销售渠道的闭环供应链的定价以及制造商回收渠道的选择等问题,构建了3种不同回收渠道下的闭环供应链模型。研究发现:①当间接销售渠道销售产品的市场份额在不同范围内取值时,批发价格和直接销售渠道的销售价格呈现出不同的关系;②当3种回收渠道的回收成本相同时,制造商回收渠道的效率更高;③影响回收渠道选择的主要因素与制造商所获利润的大小有关,当3种回收渠道的回收成本相同与不同时,制造商会根据自己所获利润的大小,选取不同的回收渠道对废旧品进行回收。     

The closed-loop supply chain network with competition,distribution channel investment,and uncertainties

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain network is investigated with decentralized decision-makers consisting of raw material suppliers, retail outlets, and the manufacturers that collect the recycled product directly from the demand market. We derive the optimality conditions of the various decision-makers, and establish that the governing equilibrium conditions can be formulated as a finite-dimensional variational inequality problem. We establish convergence of the proposed algorithm that can allow for the discussion of the effects of competition, distribution channel investment, yield and conversion rates, combined with uncertainties in demand, on equilibrium quantity transactions and prices. Numerical examples are provided for illustration.     

Models for closed-loop supply chain with trade-ins

Three kinds of decision models for closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with trade-ins are developed in this paper, including the centralized collection (Model C), the retailer collection (Model R), and the manufacturer collection (Model M). By analyzing these models, we argue that there are three types of optimal collection strategies, namely, no collection, partial collection, and full collection. We provide conditions under which one of these three collection strategies is optimal for different supply chain models. By comparing the impact of trade-ins on these different supply chain models, we find that only when the direct net value of a used product derived from the trade-ins for the whole CLSC system including the consumers is high enough can trade-in strategy be adopted to stimulate consumer demand and improve the manufacturer׳s and retailer׳s profit. Based on the life-cycle assessment method, we find that when the marginal effect of the product on environment in the continue-to-use phase is more significant than in other phases, trade-ins can promote the environmental performance of the CLSC system. Further, by comparing the optimal solutions for the different models, we find that one collection model may dominate the others in terms of the economic performance of the involved parties. Specifically, Model M dominates Model R in terms of the profits of the manufacturer and the profits of the whole supply chain; Model R dominates Model M in terms of retailer׳s profit; and Model R dominates all other models in terms of environmental performance.     

Improving supply chain social responsibility through supplier development

Abstract

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) emphasises that the entire supply chain of a company should protect natural environment and contribute to social well-being in a tangible way. This study aims to clarify the effects of supplier development practices on supply chain social responsibility. The investigation uses a qualitative case study approach and empirically explores how to develop supplier’s CSR capabilities in a pharmaceutical supply chain. The results indicate that manufacturers can apply supplier development practices, including standard operating procedures (SOPs), audits, collaboration and training, to develop supply chain social responsibility. SOPs and audits are indirect supplier development practices that are designed in response to institutional pressures, and collaboration and training are direct supplier development practices that provide resources for bridging supplier’s CSR capability gaps. In addition, the indirect and direct supplier development practices positively influence each other and they are complementary in enhancing supply chain social responsibility.     

Two-period pricing and ordering policy for the dominant retailer in a two-echelon supply chain with demand uncertainty

Retailing channels are increasingly being dominated by ‘power’ retailers who are in a position to dictate prices and ordering schedules to manufacturers and suppliers. A dominant retailer, such as Wal-Mart, has the ‘power’ to decide retail prices of products because there are so many manufacturers who are keen to sell their products through or to such a large and powerful retailer. Several products, such as electronic products, can be sold in the market for some periods during their lifecycles before they retreat, except when they are not popular with consumers after been introduced. Therefore, in case of such products, the retailer should not just consider a single-period pricing and ordering policy. It should make dynamic pricing and ordering decisions based on market demand forecast, in order to obtain maximum cumulative profit from the product during its lifecycle. In this study, we consider this scenario and construct a two-period model to discuss pricing and ordering problems for a dominant retailer with demand uncertainty in a declining price environment. We show that the maximum expected profit function is continuous concave, so the optimal solution to pricing and ordering policy exists and it is the one and only. We also analyze sensitivity of retailer's expected profit to the effects of parameters of price-discount sharing scheme and market demand.     

新能源汽车闭环供应链的多级契约决策优化

随着环境问题的日益严峻,传统汽车工业面临巨大压力。虽然新能源汽车的绿色低碳为解决大气、水土污染提供了途径,但动力电池若回收不利也将对生态环境造成负面影响。文章着眼于构建新能源汽车销售及动力电池回收的多级供应链网络,在不同回收模式下对电池生产企业主导的闭环供应链进行契约协调。然后,针对动力电池回收体系不完善的社会问题,为政府找到促使销售和回收平衡的最优条件。研究发现:(1)当回收再制造利润空间满足一定条件,电池生产商倾向选择多回收渠道的模式,并且渠道竞争的加剧,对消费者和上游企业都有利;(2)当电池生产商同时参与正向销售、逆向回收上的收益共享时,"联合"共享契约可以实现供应链的协调、有效提高各企业利润;(3)电池的制造、再制造成本对回收价格和企业利润有很大影响,当技术革新、成本下降时,无论是企业还是消费者都可以获得更多的利润,进一步对单、双渠道回收模式进行选择,找出不同成本范围内的最优回收模式;(4)为了提高废旧电池回收率,政府通过征收环境保护税可以有效促进废旧电池的回收,并且最优税额随电池制造成本的增长而降低,随再制造成本的增长而增加。     

Coordinating a supply chain for deteriorating items with a revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract

In this study, a one-manufacturer–one-retailer supply chain model for deteriorating items with controllable deterioration rate and price-dependent demand is developed, in which both players cooperatively invest in preservation technology to reduce deterioration. Algorithms are designed to obtain the pricing and preservation technology investment strategies in both integrated and decentralized scenarios. It is shown that cooperative investment strategy benefits the manufacturer but damages the profits of the retailer and the whole supply chain. A revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract, which combines revenue sharing and cost sharing mechanisms, is thus designed to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium strategies and coordinating results on key system parameters are given to verify the effectiveness of the contract, and meanwhile get some managerial insights. The results show that only when the revenue sharing rate lies roughly between 1/2 and 3/4 can the contract perfectly coordinate the supply chain in most cases, which has an important guiding significance for the supply chain coordination of deteriorating items when considering preservation technology investment.