需求价格敏感下具有损失厌恶零售商的闭环供应链定价与协调

基于零售商回收模式,运用前景理论探讨了价格敏感随机需求下具有损失厌恶零售商参与的两级闭环供应链定价与协调问题。首先针对分散式决策,在两种批发价模式下推导和比较制造商和零售商的最优行为,分析损失厌恶程度对零售商定价和订货联合决策的影响;然后通过与集中式决策的对比验证了分散式供应链存在效率损失,进而设计收益共享契约对分散式供应链进行协调;最后通过算例验证了以上结论,并将回收率对最优决策和成员效用的影响进行了灵敏度分析。     

非对称需求信息下两阶段供应链协调

针对由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链，其成员之间的市场需求信息不对称问题，建立了非对称信息下批发价与订货量的stackelberg博弈模型，给出了零售商和供应商分别拥有需求信息下的博弈均衡．效值实例分析了非对称信息对价格和订货量及利润的影响，同时给出了信息不对称下的供应链协调机制。     

模糊闭环供应链的定价与销售努力决策

从期望利润最大化的角度研究了单周期两级模糊闭环供应链的定价与销售努力最优决策问题。分析了包含一个制造商和一个零售商的闭环供应链中的模糊不确定性及需求依赖于零售价格和零售商销售努力的性质,分别建立了集中式决策模型和零售商主导的Stackelberg 博弈模型并进行了求解。数值算例验证了模型的有效性,结论表明：考虑销售努力时产品的最优零售价格、批发价格分别高于不考虑销售努力情形下的相应价格;考虑销售努力时零售商和系统的最大期望利润分别大于不考虑销售努力情形下的最大期望利润。     

Optimal pricing decisions in a fuzzy dual-channel supply chain

This paper analyzes the pricing decisions of a dual-channel supply chain including one retailer and one manufacturer who produces a product and sells it to the end customer through retailer or directly. Both the manufacturing cost and the customer demand are considered as fuzzy variables. Two pricing models, including centralized decision model and manufacturer-leader Stackelberg game, with consideration of different market power structures are adopted. Optimal decisions on wholesale price and retail prices are determined using game theoretical approach and fuzzy set theory for each model. Finally, a numerical example is solved to illustrate the effectiveness of models and provide some managerial insights from analysis.     

Dynamic ordering and pricing for a perishable goods supply chain

The paper studies the combined problem of pricing and ordering for a perishable product supply chain with one supplier and one retailer in a finite horizon. The lifetime of the product is two periods and demand in each period is random and price-sensitive. In each period, the supplier determines first a wholesale price and then the retailer decides an order quantity and retail prices. We show that the optimal pricing strategy for the non-fresh product depends only on its inventory, and the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal order quantity for the fresh product depend only on the wholesale price and they have a constant relation. Moreover, the game between the retailer and the supplier for finite horizon is equivalent to a one period game with only one order. Thus, the optimal policies are identical at each period. For the additive and multiplicative demands, we further obtain equations to compute the optimal strategies. All of above results are extended into the infinite horizon case and longer lifetime products. Finally, a numerical analysis is given.     

Pricing decisions with retail competition in a fuzzy closed-loop supply chain

The optimal pricing decision problem of a fuzzy closed-loop supply chain with retail competition is considered in this paper. The fuzziness is associated with the customer demands, the remanufacturing cost and the collecting cost. By using game theory and fuzzy theory, the optimal decision on wholesale price, retail prices and remanufacturing rate are explored respectively under the centralized and the decentralized decision scenarios, and the expressions for them are also established. Some insights into the economic behavior of firms are given, which can serve as the basis for further study in the future.     

直销渠道选择对供应链成员决策的影响研究

在考虑直销渠道单位产品运作成本和消费者区域性差异特点的情况下,研究了处于主导地位的制造商开通直销渠道的条件,探讨了直销渠道对渠道需求、制造商和零售商的最优定价和利润的影响。结果表明,开通直销渠道不影响制造商的批发价定价,但可以迫使零售商降低零售价格;开通直销渠道使制造商在分散式供应链中和协调式供应链中都能获得更多利润,使零售商利润减少;只有当运作成本和消费者区域性差异都很大时,开通直销渠道对双方都是有利的,实现“双赢”局面。     

基于制造商促销的供应链战略库存协调模型

考虑由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两周期供应链系统,在第一周期结束后零售商储存战略库存控制第二周期制造商批发价格的活动条件下,分别建立了集中式决策、分散式决策以及制造商促销的契约决策的供应链模型,并对三种情况下的决策变量进行了比较分析。研究结果表明：在零售商主导的情境下,零售商没有必要储存战略库存;在制造商主导的情境下,制造商通过简单的批发价格契约无法促进渠道的协调,而在制造商进行促销决策条件下,零售商的战略库存量减少,且制造商和零售商的最优利润均大于分散式决策时的最优利润。最后通过算例验证该模型的有效性。     

零售电商和回收政策对闭环供应链的影响研究

构建第三方回收下的双渠道闭环供应链模型,考虑了三种不同的决策情形来探讨零售电商参与和处理基金政策对供应链中决策、利润、需求和消费者剩余的影响。结果表明：零售电商参与使得传统零售商的产品价格和利润水平降低,制造商可以通过调整对零售电商的批发价格来提高其利润;第三方回收商的回收决策和最优利润不受到零售电商参与的影响,处理基金政策可以有效地提高产品回收数量,但也会使得正向供应链中企业的定价提高;零售电商会蚕食制造商原有的市场份额,但产品总需求量不发生变化。当进一步考虑处理基金政策时,市场总需求量出现下降的趋势;此外,零售电商参与和处理基金政策都会造成供应链中消费者总剩余的减少。     

三级低碳供应链联合减排及宣传促销微分博弈研究

低碳环境下,研究供应商、制造商与零售商组成的三级供应链联合减排及宣传促销微分博弈问题.首先,通过两次成本加成,考虑产品需求受产品减排量、零售商宣传促销努力及产品零售价格的综合影响,得到供应链分散决策与集中决策情形下的动态均衡策略及减排量的最优轨迹.然后,通过数值算例及灵敏度分析比较两种情形下的结果,研究发现:无论分散决策还是集中决策,减排量,产品批发价,供应商、制造商、零售商的努力水平都随时间逐渐增加至某一稳定值,但集中决策的稳定值大于分散决策相应的稳定值;随着供应商、制造商各自的减排努力对产品减排率的影响系数及零售商的宣传促销努力对产品需求的影响系数的增大,减排量、产品批发价、供应链成员努力水平、供应链成员利润、供应链总利润都会增加;集中决策的供应链总利润总是大于分散决策的供应链总利润.最后,对集中决策总利润用多人联盟博弈的多目标决策合作博弈方法进行分配,实现了供应链系统整体绩效的提升.     

考虑Showrooms效应的供应链定价与渠道模式策略

构建双渠道和线上到线下(O2O)两种模式下的供应链博弈模型,研究Showrooms效应影响下的供应链定价和渠道模式策略选择问题.研究结果表明:无论何种渠道模式,Showrooms效应和线下展厅服务使得制造商和零售商提高线上和线下渠道的零售价格;双渠道模式下制造商将降低批发价格,而O2O模式下制造商不一定降低批发价格.线下展厅服务和Showrooms效应可以增加线上、线下渠道和总需求量,实现零售商利润增加,零售商会提供线下展厅服务并愿意接受O2O模式.只有当Showrooms效应较小时,制造商选择O2O模式,此模式在大部分条件下可以提高供应链运作效率.因此,当Showrooms效应和线上渠道需求比例满足一定条件时,O2O模式是制造商和零售商的一致选择,从而实现由双渠道模式到O2O模式的成功转型.     

考虑成员企业风险态度的制造商资金约束闭环供应链定价与回收决策

针对制造商资金约束的闭环供应链,考虑制造商、零售商和回收商面对市场需求不确定性表现出不同的风险态度,研究闭环供应链如何确定其最优定价与回收决策.首先,依据均值-方差法给出制造商、零售商、回收商和闭环供应链的效用函数;然后,基于博弈论的思想分别确定集中式决策下闭环供应链的最优策略和效用,以及分散式决策下制造商、零售商和回收商的最优策略和效用;最后,分析相关参数对最优策略和效用的影响.研究结果表明,制造商、零售商和回收商的风险态度在很大程度上能够影响其最优批发价格、最优零售价格及最优回收率,进而影响其效用.贷款利率能够影响制造商、零售商、回收商和闭环供应链的效用,且对资金约束的制造商的效用影响最为显著.     

Optimal advertising decisions for promoting retail and online channels in a dynamic framework

Advertising plays an important role in sales promotion in supply chains. In this paper, advertising decisions for retail and online channels respectively, by retailer and manufacturer will be analyzed. The competition between retailer and manufacturer will be modeled by differential game theory, and feedback Nash equilibrium of the game will be obtained. Some insights are provided by using comparative statics. The obtained results show that compatibility factor of a product with online marketing, difference between manufacturer's online price and wholesale price, effectiveness of advertising, marginal profits, and cost of advertising all have significant effects on the advertising decisions in the equilibrium.     

模糊环境下考虑零售商风险偏好的绿色供应链博弈模型

在模糊需求环境下绿色供应链运作系统中,研究由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的两级绿色供应链.首先,引入创新成本,分别建立风险中性制造商为主导者,具有中性、悲观和乐观等风险偏好的零售商为跟随者的两级绿色供应链Stackelberg博弈模型;然后,推导出最优决策的期望值和机会约束规划模型,并进行算例分析,比较产品绿色度、批发价格及零售价格与不同置信水平之间的相互影响,探讨具有不同风险偏好的零售商对模糊绿色供应链中制造商、零售商及供应链整体运作绩效的影响.研究结果表明:悲观决策模型中,伴随置信水平的增加,产品的绿色度水平、批发价格及创新成本逐步下降,零售价格、制造商、零售商及绿色供应链整体利润逐步上升;在乐观决策模型中,结论相反.     

风险规避下不同权力结构闭环供应链决策研究

将制造商风险规避行为特征考虑到不同权力结构闭环供应链博弈模型中,利用均值-方差理论探讨风险规避行为和权力结构对闭环供应链决策的影响。研究表明：随着制造商风险规避程度的提高,各权力结构下的批发价、绿色度、零售价和产品性价比逐渐降低;市场中领导者的先动优势总会使其制定出更加有利于自身的决策。对于制造商而言,在零售商主导和无权力结构的市场中,适度的规避风险有助于其效用的提高,而在自身主导的市场中,风险规避行为反而对其不利;当消费者对产品绿色品质的追求较低时,处于无权力结构的市场最有利,否则处于零售商主导的市场会更有利,然而无论消费者处于何种权力结构的市场,制造商风险规避行为都会对其产生负面影响。     

Pricing strategies for dual‐channel supply chains under a trade credit policy

This paper discusses the impact of a trade credit policy on alleviating conflicts arising on a dual‐channel supply chain that includes one manufacturer and one value‐added retailer. We use the Stackelberg game to model the problem and characterize optimal pricing strategies for each supply chain partner, examining different circumstances in terms of retail price and trade credit contracts. When a consistent price strategy is applied in the dual channels under conditions of an exogenous credit period, trade credit can help both partners to achieve win‐win situations in the following circumstances: (1) when the retail channel's market share is small and the retailer's interest rate is high; or (2) when the retail channel's market share is large and the retailer's interest rate is lower than the manufacturer's. The study also concludes that when an inconsistent price strategy is applied, a trade credit contract can alleviate channel conflicts when the retailer's interest rate is higher than the manufacturer's. Otherwise, the partners may terminate cooperation. However, when the manufacturer has the power to determine and set the credit period, trade credit cannot alleviate channel conflicts under consistent price and inconsistent price scenarios.     

考虑参照价格效应的易逝品定价与订购策略

在考虑消费者参照价格效应的基础上,构建一个易逝品的定价与订购联合决策模型,其中产品的需求不仅依赖于销售价格还与该产品在消费者心目中的参照价格相关,变质率为常数,系统不允许缺货.分别讨论了对称参照价格效应和非对称参照价格效应两种情况下零售商的最优定价与订购决策问题,证明并得到关于模型结构的一些性质,进而设计了问题的求解算法.通过数值方法分析了参照价格效应参数和变质率对系统最优解的影响,以及两种情况下最优解之间的关系.结果显示:当面对具有参照价格依赖的消费者时,采用适当的营销策略来提高消费者的参照价格对零售商总是有利的;对高变质率产品而言,零售商可保持一个较稳定的订购策略,更多地关注产品的定价策略;面对损失厌恶型消费者,随着消费者参照价格的逐渐提高,零售商的定价与订购策略均应缓慢地改变,而不宜急剧变化.     

Supply chain financing with advance selling under disruption

We study a financing problem in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one supplier and one buyer under supply disruption. The supplier could face a disruption at its end which could effectively reduce its yield in case of disruption, thereby resulting in supply yield uncertainty. The retailer can finance the supplier using advance selling that can help mitigate the impact of disruption. We model this problem as a Stackelberg game, where the supplier as the leader announces the wholesale price and the retailer responds by deciding its optimal order quantity given stochastic demand and an exogenous fixed retail price. The supplier then commences production and a disruption can happen with a known probability. We assume that under disruption the quantity delivered is a fraction of the initial quantity ordered by the retailer. The retailer loses any unmet demand. We analyze three different scenarios of the Stackelberg game, namely no advance selling with disruption, advance selling without disruption, and advance selling with disruption. Our results indicate that advance selling can be used to mitigate the impact of supply disruption and at the same time could lead to an increase in the overall SC profit.     

需求信息不对称下的双渠道供应链合作广告投资决策分析

研究制造商主导的Stackelberg 博弈下双渠道供应链的合作广告策略, 分析信息不对称及双渠道对供应链合作广告投资决策的影响. 研究表明, 零售商在具有需求信息优势时会谎报需求信息, 并且在一定条件下其谎报决策会降低制造商的利润, 但能提高供应链的利润, 这种情况下制造商无法通过激励合同促使零售商共享信息. 另外, 在最优合作广告策略下, 当直销渠道与分销渠道所占市场份额的分配比例小于一定值时, 制造商采取双渠道会使供应链参与者均受益.

     

The price of anarchy in closed-loop supply chains

This paper measures the worst-case efficiency of price-only contracts in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) with the price of anarchy (PoA). We model a single-period Stackelberg game in which a manufacturer sells new products to a retailer and collects used products with exogenous retail price and collection price via three alternative reverse channels: (a) the manufacturer collects directly from customers, (b) the retailer collects for the manufacturer, and (c) a third party is awarded a collection subcontract from the manufacturer. We carry out a comprehensive investigation under push–pull configurations to observe how reverse channel structures with different gaming sequences of CLSC members influence the worst-case performance when the demand distribution is over the set of increasing generalized failure rate distributions. From our PoA analysis, we find that the pull system does not always outperform the push system, especially when the retailer is the leader, in contrast to the results for forward supply chains. While the PoA of the push system is dramatically sensitive to the quality condition of used products, the pull system has a constant efficiency loss that is independent of the quality condition. Instead, the PoA of the pull system solely changes with the gaming sequence of the manufacturer. We also find that manufacturer's direct collection is a better reverse channel choice compared to retailer's collection. Additional managerial insights are summarized for discussion.