THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BITCOIN

The recent proliferation of bitcoin has been a boon for users but might pose problems for governments. Indeed, some governments have already taken steps to ban or discourage the use of bitcoin. In a model with endogenous matching and random consumption preferences, we find multiple monetary equilibria including one in which bitcoin coexists with official currency. We then identify the conditions under which government transactions policy might deter the use of bitcoin. We show that such a policy becomes more difficult if some users strictly prefer bitcoin because they can avoid other users holding the official currency in the matching process. (JEL C78, E41, E42, E50)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION

Two questions are addressed in this paper. (A) Why do labor unions and certain employer organizations respectively promote and impede minimum wage legislation? (B) Do these groups have significant impacts on minimum wages? Question (A) is examined in the context of models that identify the economic self-interest of unionized skilled workers and capitalists in legal wage floors. Question (B) is approached by a median legislator utility maximization model that leads to Tobit estimation of the relationship between state minimum wage rates and measures of statewide organized labor and capital and average hourly earnings.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERGENERATIONAL INCOME MOBILITY

The intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members. While much research has been devoted to measuring this reduced‐form parameter, less is known about its underlying structural determinants. Using a model with exogenous talent endowments, endogenous parental investment in children, and endogenous redistributive institutions, we identify the structural parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income. The model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility. Two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions. We offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model. We conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly informative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico‐economic institutions. (JEL E24, J62, J68, P16)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEW DEAL FISCAL FEDERALISM

While the introduction of federal matching grants to finance the New Deal relief programs is usually viewed as a mechanism to insure federal control over state relief spending, a careful study of the New Deal reveals that the reverse was the case: matching grants allowed the states to escape close federal control. The standard economic model of inter-governmental grants reveals that the federal government will, if allowed, prefer to use discretionary rather than matching grants. With discretion, however, came power; power that neither the states nor Congress wished to see concentrated in the Executive branch.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. WHEAT LEGISLATION

Both taxpayer subsidies to U.S. wheat producers and domestic deadweight losses increased as a result of the U.S. wheat program adopted in 1985. A calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative wheat policies shows that mandatory production controls with no taxpayer expense could have made wheat producers as well off as the adopted policy. Becker's theory of competition among interest groups and Peltzman's theory of the equilibrium amount of regulation are shown to be consistent with the observed policy choice if the list of fnfected interest groups includes agricultural input suppliers and grain marketing firms.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOCIAL MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS: THE CASE OF THE MELTZER‐RICHARD ECONOMY

In previous studies on the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF), the existing tax system has been assumed to be either arbitrary or optimal. This note explores another possibility: the existing tax system itself represents a political equilibrium. Our exploration proceeds in Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) political economy of redistributive taxation. An interesting feature of our finding is that the degree of income inequality as measured by the ratio of mean to median income can play an important role in estimating the SMCF and judging whether the level of redistribution is excessive or inadequate. (JEL D61, D72, H21)     

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NPDES INSPECTIONS

This paper examines the consequences of the delegation of regulatory authority to local officials. The study evaluates three hypotheses of the role delegation plays in the implementation of regulatory policy: (1) the federal case, which predicts that delegation has no effect, (2) the state/local model predicts that delegation is, in fact, abdication, and (3) the full impact model predicts that both interests determine how environmental policy is implemented. The results provide evidence that while delegation does not completely remove national policy maker's ability to alter regulatory policy, it does allow local interests to alter national standards. (JEL L51, Q28)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TIME IN THE INTERNET ERA: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES

This paper examines the gender matrix of time, arguing for cross-disciplinary consideration of political economy, globalization and technology to achieve a detailed understanding of gendered hierarchies of time and the ways in which public/private identifications of social space and time have variously constructed and maintained them. It is argued that women are alienated from their own time, which is identified as most legitimately allocated to the service of others both in the home and at work. The inter-relationship of technologies and gendered identities is explored in relation to public/private divisions and the political-economic and scientific-technological knowledge processes that contribute to upholding them. ICTs reflect these historically established gendered patterns, but international projects such as 'Women on the Net' also demonstrate the capacities of these technologies for disrupting the gender matrix of time through their use by women for women.     

STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MUTUAL FUND REVOLUTION

We find that higher stock ownership rates are linked to an upward shift in the Republican share of the House popular vote since the late 1980s, consistent with theories that property interests affect voting. To proxy for discontinuous stock ownership rates, we use equity mutual fund costs, which have fallen, are negatively correlated with stock ownership rates and the Republican vote share in the long run, and help explain short‐run changes along with midterm elections, economic conditions, and presidential popularity. Findings suggest that the major parties’ shares of the House popular vote will fluctuate around 50% until other factors trigger a political realignment. (JEL D72, G11)     

EMPIRICAL ADVANCES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY

Editor's Note: I wish to thank Coeditor Mark Zupan, who took responsibility for organizing and implementing both the special symposium on public choice and the processing of papers through the refereeing and editorial process for this special section. On behalf of all the editors, I also would like to express thanks to Carolyn Williams, editorial coordinator, for taking on yet another responsibility in arranging the conference symposium meetings and the management of the files. The symposium on public choice was held at Lake Tahoe during the 1993 WE A meetings. The many efforts of authors, referees, editors and staff have resulted in an exciting complement to this year's Economic Inquiry offerings.     

ALLOCATING INFECTION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SWINE FLU (H1N1) VACCINE

Previous research has isolated the effect of “congressional dominance” in explaining bureaucracy‐related outcomes. This analysis extends the concept of congressional dominance to the allocation of H1N1, or swine flu, vaccine doses. States with Democratic United States Representatives on the relevant House oversight committee received roughly 60,000 additional doses per legislator during the initial allocation period, though this political advantage dissipated after the first 3 weeks of vaccine distribution. As a result political factors played a role in determining vaccine allocation only when the vaccine was in particularly short supply. At‐risk groups identified by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), such as younger age groups and first responders, do not receive more vaccine doses, and in fact receive slightly fewer units of vaccine. (JEL D72, D73, I18)     

BRIDGING THE NATURAL AND THE SOCIAL: SCIENCE AND CHARACTER IN JEVONS'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

A common characterization of the "marginalist revolution" is that it focused on individuals, depicted economics as the universal application of behavioral laws of choice, and made a clear distinction between the analyses of "pure" economic theory and economic policy. This characterization effaces a number of important differences between the work of W. Stanley Jevons and later supply and demand theories. Using Jevons's discussion of reductions in working hours to illustrate the analysis, the paper shows how he used the Victorian language of "civilization" and "character" to designate class and race behavior in the Theory of Political Economy.     

CARBON GEOGRAPHY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEGISLATION INTENDED TO MITIGATE GREENHOUSE GAS PRODUCTION

Over the last 5 years, the U.S. Congress has voted on several pieces of legislation intended to sharply reduce the nation's greenhouse gas emissions. Given that climate change is a world public bad, standard economic logic would predict that the United States would “free ride” and wait for other nations to reduce their emissions. Within the Congress, there are clear patterns to who votes in favor of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. This paper presents a political economy analysis of the determinants of “pro‐green” votes on such legislation. Conservatives consistently vote against such legislation. Controlling for a representative's ideology, representatives from richer districts and districts with a lower per‐capita carbon dioxide footprint are more likely to vote in favor of climate change mitigation legislation. Representatives from districts where industrial emissions represent a larger share of greenhouse gas emissions are more likely to vote no. (JEL Q54, Q58, R50)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF THE ARAB SPRING

There were large differences in the responses of Arab dictators to the Arab Spring protests. To understand these differences, I present a stylized model of how a dictator responds to mass protests for democratization in a polarized country with two ethnic or religious groups. In this model, the dictator's response crucially depends on oil revenues and his affiliation to either the majority or the minority group. I document that the model's predictions are consistent with the observed differences in the Arab dictators' responses. Hence, ethnic politics and religious divides may play an important role in political transitions and regime changes. (JEL D72, D74)     

THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

The relationship between knowledge, society, and power has been considerably rethought recently. Few defend the idea that knowledges such as the human sciences are merely representational practices. Instead, knowledge is approached as a social power to be analyzed for its social productivity. Assuming a tight link between knowledge and power, this paper aims to sketch a non-Whiggish framework for narrating the development of human sciences. I underscore how the scientization of social knowledge has, on the one hand, produced subaltern interpretative communities and, on the other hand, how these communities–as the repressed unconscious of the human sciences—have continued to shape and trouble the epistemic and social claims to authority by the human sciences.     

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Workers' incentives to seek employment and remain employed are affected by a number of government policies. The policies themselves are in turn influenced by the political beliefs of the electorate about what working conditions and incomes should be. Using a simultaneous equations model of political climate and labor market conditions, this study shows that political liberalism may lead to decreased labor force participation and higher unemployment, particularly for women.     

THE PRESENTATION OF POLITICAL SELF:

This article asks how the cultural environment shapes activist claims making. Using data from a grassroots antitoxics/anti-incinerator movement field study, I show how activists modify their political claims as they shift their discussion from the interpersonal level (back region) to the wider public (front region). Each region has distinct constraints and opportunities that shape the construction and potency of activists' claims.
I begin by describing the interrelations between movement frames and the cultural environment; I then argue that the concept of "cultural resonance" captures these interrelations. Next, I describe the front region and back region collective action frames that activists constructed. Despite their denial, they presented claims that differed between regions. I use the ideas of region and cultural resonance to argue that distinct region specific conventions shaped activist frames into conventional styles, forms, and themes. I conclude by discussing processes of intramovement solidarity, and prospects for intermovement cooperation.