Technology transfer in the CDM: an updated analysis

The prevalence of technology transfer (TT) for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects is analysed, based on information in the project design documents (PDDs) of 3949 projects registered as of 31 March 2012. Responses to a follow-up survey indicate that the PDD statements that concern TT are reasonably accurate and at least 39% of the related projects are expected to involve it. Technology transfer is very heterogeneous across project types and is more common for larger projects. It also usually involves both knowledge and equipment and differs significantly by host country. Technology transfer has declined over time in China, India, and Brazil, the countries that host most of the CDM projects, but it has remained high for other host countries. A host country's existing capacity specific to the technology, the scope for economic deployment of the technology, and complementary policies to build capacity and promote TT, increase the frequency of TT by CDM projects. The technology used by CDM projects originates mostly from Germany, the US, Japan, Denmark, and China, with multiple suppliers of the technology for all project types.     

Factors driving international technology transfer: empirical insights from a CDM project survey

This study empirically explores factors driving international technology transfer via Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects by explicitly considering factors that have been identified in the literature on international technology transfer as being relevant for transfer success. These factors include technological characteristics, such as the novelty and complexity of a technology, as well as the use of different transfer channels. Employing data from an original survey of CDM project participants, the econometric analysis also distinguishes between knowledge and equipment transfer. The findings suggest that more complex technologies and the use of export as a transfer channel are both associated with a higher degree of technology transfer. Projects involving two- to five-year-old technologies seem more likely to involve technology transfer than both younger and older technologies. Energy supply and efficiency projects are correlated with a higher degree of technology transfer than non-energy projects. Unlike previous studies, technology transfer was not related to project size, to the length of time a country has hosted CDM projects, or to the host country's absorptive capacity. The findings for knowledge and equipment transfer are similar, but not identical.

Policy relevance

CDM projects are often seen as a vehicle for the transfer of climate technologies from industrialized to developing countries. Technology transfer is an important element of the new and emerging market mechanisms and frameworks under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, such as the Technology Mechanism, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, or Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. Thus, a clearer understanding of the factors driving technology transfer may help policy makers in their design of such mechanisms. For the CDM, this may be achieved by including more stringent technology transfer requirements in countries’ CDM project approval processes. Based on our findings, such policies should focus particularly on energy supply and efficiency technologies. Likewise, it may be beneficial for host countries to condition project approval on the novelty and complexity of technologies and adjust these provisions over time. Since such technological characteristics are not captured systematically by project design documents, using a survey-based evaluation opens up new opportunities for a more holistic and targeted evaluation of technology transfer in CDM projects.     

Determinants of technology transfer through the CDM: a within-country analysis for China

Technology transfer (TT) is not mandatory for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, yet proponents of CDM argue that TT in CDM can bring new technologies to developing countries and thus not only reduce emissions but also foster development. We review the quantitative literature on determinants of TT in CDM and estimate determinants for CDM projects in China. China is by far the largest host country of CDM projects and it is therefore crucial to understand the factors that drive TT there. To gain better interpretation, we focus on heterogeneity within a single country and results can thus be linked to specific policies of the country. Our probit estimations confirm previous international cross-country studies, indicating that larger projects and more advanced technologies are more likely to involve TT. In addition, we find evidence that agglomeration effects are more pronounced at the province level rather than larger regions. We also find a positive effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on TT, and academic research and development (R&D) is complementary to TT.

Policy relevance

Technology transfer (TT) is a goal of Chinese CDM legislation, but it is not a prerequisite for project approval. Our estimations show the project specific, technological and region-specific features that encourage more TT among CDM projects. Some variables analysed such as R&D spending and FDI (both are found to have positive effects on TT) can be, to some extent, influenced by the policy-makers. Moreover, we find some evidence for the presence of negative agglomeration effects on the provincial level: the likelihood of TT is decreasing in the number of previous projects operating in the same technology and province. This finding needs to be interpreted with great caution. It may suggest the existence of a learning externality, which could serve as a justification for policy intervention. Any policy intervention requires however careful analysis of potential positive or negative externalities resulting from the agglomeration of CDM projects and a comparison of possible benefits with the costs of TT.     

Technology transfer in the Clean Development Mechanism

Technology transfer is often mentioned as an ancillary benefit of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), but this claim has hardly been researched or substantiated. The question of technology transfer is important, both for developing countries in need for new technology and knowledge and for industrialized countries, as it provides export potential for climate-friendly technologies. To determine what technology transfer means, whether it is occurring through the CDM, and what the value of the associated capital flows is, this article examines technology transfer in the 63 CDM projects that were registered up until 1 January 2006. Technology hardware originates from outside the host country in almost 50% of the evaluated projects, particularly in non-CO₂ greenhouse gas projects, wind energy projects, and a substantial share of the hydropower projects. Bioenergy and projects in the agricultural sector mainly use local technology. The investment value associated with the CDM projects that transferred technology is estimated to be around €470 million, with about €390 million coming from the EU. As the non-CO₂ greenhouse gas projects had very low capital costs, the investment value was highest in the more capital-intensive wind energy and hydropower projects. We also found substantial soft technology transfer, but uncertainties for this finding are greater.     

Technology transfer in the CDM: the role of host-country characteristics

Technology transfer is not an explicit objective of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, it constitutes a potential co-benefit by helping to improve living conditions in developing countries. Understanding the drivers and barriers of technology transfer in CDM projects is therefore essential to direct investment flows in host countries and enhance the current CDM framework. In this respect, the contribution of this article is twofold. First, it identifies stepping stones and stumbling blocks to technology transfer in the CDM. Higher applied tariff rates on environmental goods and services as well as burdensome administrative procedures to start a new business are found to be negatively associated with the likelihood of a technology transfer. The results are robust to the exclusion of large host countries such as China and India from the sample. Second, as an extension, the article analyses the correspondence of these supporting factors and barriers with the likelihood of a transfer of the different types of technology (equipment, knowledge, or both). The article concludes with policy recommendations for non-Annex I governments, and suggestions for improvements to the CDM to better assess technology transfer in offsetting projects.     

Technology transfer in the clean development mechanism: Insights from wind power

International technology transfer is a key element in efforts to ensure low carbon growth in developing countries. A growing body of literature has sought to assess the extent of technology transfer in the clean development mechanism (CDM). In this paper we use the case of wind power CDM to expand the focus to how technology transfer occurs. We seek insights from the technology and CDM literatures to develop a framework with multiple technology transfer mechanisms. We then show empirically that technology transfer in CDM wind projects occurs through a greater variety of mechanism than is commonly assumed. The evidence suggests that the strengthening of host country capabilities changes the nature of technology transfer. The cases of China and India indicate that diversity in transfer mechanisms is an effect of the pre-existing industrial and technological capabilities. We show that CDM projects in China and India tend to utilise transfer mechanisms opened up prior to and independent of CDM projects, not the other way around. Our findings suggest that research and policy should pay more careful attention to the relationship between international low carbon technology transfer mechanisms and local technological capabilities.     

Implementing CDM for the Indian dairy sector: prospects and issues

What is the potential for developing small-scale CDM projects in India to reduce enteric methane emissions from cattle and buffaloes? The issue of baseline setting for prospective CDM projects is a complex one in the Indian context. The baselines constructed on the basis of aggregate emission rates at the national level are unlikely to be precise as methane emission rates are influenced by the livestock and feed characteristics, which vary widely across regions in an agro-climatically diverse country like India. This calls for establishing a project specific baseline underpinned with regional methane emission rates. The various aspects of sustainable development that merit consideration in formulating a CDM project in the Indian dairy sector include; increasing the productivity of animals, increasing the net income of producers, decreasing the cost of milk production and the transfer of safe technologies. The projects in the sector would be able to meet the ‘additionality’ conditions of the CDM. However, there are a number of constraints in implementing the enteric methane mitigation strategies through a CDM project at the field level. The article discusses these technical, financial, socio-cultural and institutional barriers along with possible responses to these constraints.     

Spain: words that succeed and climate policies that fail

Abstract

The two project-based Kyoto mechanisms, joint implementation (JI) and the clean development mechanism (CDM), require a determination of the “baseline”, the development of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the absence of the project. This paper examines, whether absolute (given in tCO₂ equivalent) or relative baselines (“benchmarks”, given, e.g. in tCO₂ equivalent/MWh) should be applied for JI/CDM projects in the energy sector. Accuracy of the GHG emission reduction and manageability of GHG emission balances are used as evaluation criteria. The results show that relative baselines are a more accurate instrument for the estimation of emission reductions in JI/CDM projects in the energy sector without posing significant additional risks to the management of GHG emission balances for large entities. In comparison to absolute baselines, relative baselines indicate in a more realistic and conservative manner the amount of emission reductions obtained in the energy system and give more appropriate incentives to project sponsors. The additional risks of relative baselines are likely to be small compared to the normal deviation of the domestic/internal GHG emissions. The findings are in line with the Marrakesh Accords, which set restrictions to application of absolute baselines.     

The potential of the CDM to deliver pro-poor benefits

The potential of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to deliver pro-poor benefits at the community level is examined. Both regular CDM and premium add-on standard projects are evaluated, including the Gold Standard and Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standard, through the use of seven poverty indicators. Some key characteristics associated with providing pro-poor benefits are also identified. Finally, the market potential of a revised or new premium add-on standard explicitly designed to deliver pro-poor benefits is assessed through the use of a survey. The results indicate that regular CDM projects are only moderately successful at delivering pro-poor benefits. Although the few projects registered that utilize the CCB Standard all performed well in delivering pro-poor benefits, those that used the Gold Standard performed only slightly better than regular CDM projects. Characteristics associated with providing pro-poor benefits include the use of add-on standards, a high level of stakeholder participation, and the development of projects by not-for-profit and government/intergovernmental organizations. The survey of carbon market participants indicated both an interest and desire for Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits with pro-poor benefits attached and shows that the market potential for such a standard to be quite good.

Policy relevance

This analysis of the CDM goes beyond sustainable development to consider the potential of a project to deliver pro-poor benefits at the local community level. Specific characteristics associated with projects are identified that appear to deliver pro-poor benefits that may benefit future project design. Through this analysis and identifying these characteristics, actions may be taken to incorporate those into CDM project requirements or guidelines to advance the mechanism as a means to contribute to poverty alleviation.     

Who uses the Clean Development Mechanism? An empirical analysis of projects in Chinese provinces

China is by far the largest host of projects implemented under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, earlier studies shed little light on the determinants of the distribution of CDM projects across Chinese provinces. Given China's large size and political-economic diversity, this dearth of research is troubling. We provide an empirical analysis of 2097 CDM projects in 30 Chinese provinces, 2004–2009. We find that high electricity consumption, low per capita income, and a lack of foreign direct investment are all associated with CDM project implementation. The findings are particularly strong for electricity and foreign direct investment. These findings are consistent with the economic theory of CDM project implementation. Project developers focus on minimizing the cost of carbon abatement. Moreover, they suggest that the CDM can, despite its limitations, contribute to reducing economic inequality and uneven development in China.     

Linking the CDM with domestic carbon markets

Certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have traditionally served as an indirect link between cap and trade systems around the world. However, since 2010, import restrictions have increased. Reasons for import limitations include the supplementarity principle, genuine concerns about the environmental integrity of CERs and social benefits of CDM projects, pressure from domestic emissions mitigation industries, concerns about competition in the industries in which reductions take place, as well as the attempt to pressure advanced developing countries to accept national emissions commitments under a future international climate policy regime. It is shown that import limitations lead to a decrease in CER prices and a race to generate CERs as quickly as possible. Such effects are visible in the CDM market after the EU announced its import limitations. The exclusion of CERs from specific project types will distort the CDM supply curve and increase the CER price unless the marginal abatement costs of the excluded project type are above the CER world market price. Similarly, exclusion of CERs from specific host countries will increase the price. Substantial differences are found in CER access to national carbon markets around the world.Policy relevanceCDM regulators could try to improve access of CERs to cap and trade schemes through improvements to additionality testing, standardizing baseline and monitoring methodologies and stakeholder consultation. However, regulators should be aware that standardization is no panacea, and controversies may resurface if standardized additionality determination (e.g. through benchmarks or positive lists) are applied for a certain period and found to be problematic. However, domestic policy concerns such as an unwillingness to send money abroad to buy credits, an inability to control market prices, and competitiveness impacts cannot be resolved by CDM reforms. If, despite such reforms of the CDM, blatant protectionism continues, a challenge before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could be launched to stop discrimination of service exports from specific countries.     

Does the CDM discourage emission reduction targets in advanced developing countries?

Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which industrialized countries, in order to meet their mitigation commitments, can buy emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries. Before its implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that it would sell-off their countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to invest in more expensive measures to meet their future reduction targets. This ‘low-hanging fruit’ argument is analysed empirically by comparing marginal abatement cost curves. Emissions abatement costs and potentials for CDM projects are estimated for different technologies in eight countries, using capital budgeting tools and information from project documentation. It is found that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement potential in most countries. Although the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped are below the average credit price, there are still plenty of available low-cost opportunities. Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM predominantly for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the other countries more expensive projects are accessing the CDM. This evidence at first sight challenges the low-hanging fruit claim, but needs to be understood in the light of the barriers for the adoption of low-cost abatement options.     

Does the current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) deliver its sustainable development claim? An analysis of officially registered CDM projects

This article presents an analytical framework for analyzing Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in terms of their contribution to employment generation, equal distribution of CDM returns, and improvement of local air quality. It assesses 16 officially registered CDM projects with regard to whether they fulfill the two objectives required by the Kyoto Protocol: greenhouse gas emission reductions and contribution to sustainable development in the host country. While a large part (72%) of the total portfolio’s expected Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are likely to represent real and measurable emission reductions, less than 1% are likely to contribute significantly to sustainable development in the host country. According to our analysis, there are currently no UNFCCC registered CDM projects that are likely to fulfill the Kyoto Protocol’s twofold objective of simultaneously delivering greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction and contributing to sustainable development.     

A CER discounting scheme could save climate change regime after 2012

We can generate a net global GHG emission reduction from developing countries (in an UNFCCC term, non-Annex 1 Parties) without imposing targets on them, if we discount CERs generated from CDM projects. The CER discounting scheme means that a part or all of CDM credits, i.e., CERs, made by developing countries through unilateral CDM projects will be retired rather than sold to developed countries to increase their emissions. It is not feasible to impose certain forms of target (whether sectoral or intensity targets) on non-Annex 1 whose emission trend is hard to predict and whose industrial structure is undergoing a rapid change.

Instead of imposing targets (a command and control approach), we should apply market instruments in generating a net global emission reduction from non-Annex 1. Since April 2005 when the first unilateral CDM was approved by the CDM Executive Board, CDM has been functioning as a market mechanism to provide incentives for developing countries to initiate their own emission reduction projects. As CDM is the only market mechanism engaging developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol, we should try to re-design CDM so that it can generate net global emission reductions by introducing the idea of discounting CERs. But in order to produce meaningful GHG emission reductions by discounting CERs, the project scope of CDM has to be expanded by relaxing project additionality criteria while maintaining strict technical additionality criteria. Agreeing on the CERs Discounting Scheme will have a better political chance than agreeing on imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries.     

Time to market in the CDM: variation over project characteristics and time

Not only is the carbon market inundated with Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) issued by successful projects, it is also littered with failed projects, that is, projects that either fail to be registered under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or projects that have been successfully registered but fail to issue CERs. By relying on a novel application of survival analysis in the context of the CDM, this article shows that half of all projects that start the Global Stakeholder Process fail to issue CERs, while the other half have a median time to market of four years. Furthermore, it is shown that some of the best projects, in terms of being additional, are those that are least likely to make it to market, whereas some of the worst projects, in terms of not being additional, are the ones that are most likely to make it to market. This presents a fundamental challenge for the CDM and future offset schemes that rely on the same design as the CDM. In contrast with previous studies, it is shown that, when project characteristics are controlled for, not all durations measured along the CDM project cycle have increased over time.

Policy relevance

This article develops a novel method for analysing durations measured along the CDM project cycle that avoids the biases of previous studies, and corrects for some misconceptions of what the delays faced by CDM projects are and how these delays have changed over time. Developing an understanding of the delays is important in order not to draw the wrong lessons from the CDM experience. As the leading example of an offset scheme, both in terms of geographical scope and sectoral coverage, and some would say institutional complexity, the CDM serves as a benchmark and reference for all future offset schemes, among others, for the New Market Mechanisms (NMMs) and the Chinese domestic offset programme. While the NMMs are still very much in development, China has announced that it will rely on the methodologies and procedures developed under the CDM for generating offsets for their regional carbon trading schemes.     

The future of the CDM: same same,but differentiated?

Policy-makers and scientists have raised concerns about the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in particular regarding its low contribution to sustainable development, unbalanced regional and sectoral distribution of projects, and its limited contribution to global emission reductions. Differentiation between countries or project types has been proposed as a possible way forward to address these problems. An overview is provided of the different ways in which CDM differentiation could be implemented. The implications for the actors involved in the CDM are analysed, along with a quantitative assessment of the impacts on the carbon market, using bottom-up marginal abatement cost curves. The discounting of CDM credits, quota systems, or differentiated eligibility of countries could help to address several of the concerns raised. Preferential treatment may also make a limited contribution to achieving the aims of CDM differentiation by increasing opportunities for under-represented host countries. The impact on the carbon market appears to be limited for most options.     

Estimating the CDM market under the Marrakech Accords

Abstract

The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely.

The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM's share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market.     

Accounting for flexibility against uncertain baselines: lessons from case studies in the eastern European energy sector

Abstract

The Kyoto Protocol defines two project-based flexibility mechanisms: joint implementation (JI) and the cleandevelopment mechanism (CDM). The main methodological problem associated with both these mechanisms isthe choice of an appropriate baseline: since the baseline is, by definition, counterfactual, it imposes considerable uncertainty on the accounting framework. Little work to date has been carried out on trying to estimate how largethis uncertainty might be for particular project types. This paper aims to fill this gap by proposing an approach to baseline construction which explicitly acknowledges this uncertainty. This approach is illustrated through theexamination of pilot JI projects in the energy sector in eastern Europe, and then discussed in terms of its implicationsfor climate policy. The results presented are estimates of the range of counterfactual uncertainty in greenhouse gas emission reductions based on the construction of a number of possible baselines for each project. This range is found to be about ±35% for demand side projects, ±45% for heat supply projects, ±55% for cogeneration projects, and ±60% for electricity supply projects. Estimates of uncertainty in the costs of the pilot projects are also found to be high. The paper discusses the problems arising from such large uncertainty and starts to indicate how this uncertainty may be managed.     

Application of the Multiple Benchmark System (MBS) to selected case study projects

Abstract

Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have been established under the Kyoto Protocol as project-based instruments to mitigate greenhouse gases of the industrialized countries to the levels imposed by their Kyoto commitments. An unresolved issue associated with the implementation of these two flexibility mechanisms, concerns the choice of the appropriate baseline for calculating the emission reductions in JI or CDM projects. This article describes a computerized tool that constructs and compares different types of standardized baselines and benchmarks. The analysis focuses on the suitability of several different types of benchmarks for assessing the emission reductions of certain types of projects. The analysis is also expanded into a discussion of the extent to which benchmarks reduce the crediting of non-additional projects and limit the risk of missed additional investments. This tool has been applied to actual JI and CDM projects in the Russian Federation and Indonesia.     

Transaction costs of the Kyoto Mechanisms

Transaction costs will reduce the attractiveness of the Kyoto Mechanisms compared to domestic abatement options. Especially the project-based mechanisms Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) are likely to entail considerable costs of baseline development, verification and certification. The Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) pilot phase and the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) programme give indications about the level of these costs. Under current estimates of world market prices for greenhouse gas emission permits, projects with annual emission reductions of less than 50,000 t CO₂ equivalent are unlikely to be viable; for micro projects transaction costs can reach several hundred € per t CO₂ equivalent. Thus, the Marrakech Accord rule to have special rules for small scale CDM projects makes sense, even if the thresholds chosen advantage certain project types; projects below 1000 t CO₂ equivalent per year should get further exemptions. An alternative solution with no risk for the environmental credibility of the projects would be to subsidise baseline setting and charge lower, subsidised fees for small projects for the different steps of the CDM/second track JI project cycle.