The special climate change fund: origins and prioritisation assessment

The Special Climate Change (SCC) fund was established by the Marrakesh Accords under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This fund will finance climate change activities in the areas of: adaptation, technology transfer, certain specific sectors, and activities to assist oil-exporting countries diversify their economies. These activities are to be complementary to those funded by the Global Environment Facility and by bilateral and multilateral funding. This paper describes the origins of the SCC fund and proposes a framework for the prioritisation of its activities. The fund has a complicated history that is intrinsically linked to numerous Convention issues, which explains the range of activities included in it. The framework proposed is based on certain principles: sound scientific knowledge, the ultimate objective of the Convention, “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” and the status of the climate negotiations. This appraisal suggests that the fund should prioritise adaptation, followed by mitigation and finally economic diversification.     

An emission intensity protocol for climate change: an application of FUND

Abstract

An emission intensity protocol to govern long-term international greenhouse gas emission reduction is proposed. The protocol may also be interpreted as a technology protocol. The protocol consists of three parameters: a graduation income, below which countries have no emission reduction obligations; a convergence rate, at which emission intensities should approach that of the most carbon-extensive countries; and an acceleration rate, at which the most carbon-extensive countries should improve their technology over and above the business-asusual scenario. Depending on the parameter values, emission reduction ranges from draconian to almost nil. The graduation income and acceleration rate have the expected effects. The effect of the convergence rate is strongly scenario-dependent; some scenarios, perhaps unrealistically, assume strong technological convergence in the nopolicy case; in other scenarios, adopting ‘best commercial technology in the whole world’ would lead to substantial emission reduction. Not surprisingly, different regions prefer different parameters in the emission intensity protocol. Adopting the opinion of the median voter, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide in the year 2200 would be reduced from 1650 to 950 ppm. This reduction is relatively robust to changes in crucial model parameters. The costs of complying with the emission intensity protocol can be reduced substantially through international trade in emission permits and, in particular, by banking and borrowing.     

The use of scenarios as the basis for combined assessment of climate change mitigation and adaptation

Scenarios are used to explore the consequences of different adaptation and mitigation strategies under uncertainty. In this paper, two scenarios are used to explore developments with (1) no mitigation leading to an increase of global mean temperature of 4 °C by 2100 and (2) an ambitious mitigation strategy leading to 2 °C increase by 2100. For the second scenario, uncertainties in the climate system imply that a global mean temperature increase of 3 °C or more cannot be ruled out. Our analysis shows that, in many cases, adaptation and mitigation are not trade-offs but supplements. For example, the number of people exposed to increased water resource stress due to climate change can be substantially reduced in the mitigation scenario, but adaptation will still be required for the remaining large numbers of people exposed to increased stress. Another example is sea level rise, for which, from a global and purely monetary perspective, adaptation (up to 2100) seems more effective than mitigation. From the perspective of poorer and small island countries, however, stringent mitigation is necessary to keep risks at manageable levels. For agriculture, only a scenario based on a combination of adaptation and mitigation is able to avoid serious climate change impacts.     

Interactions between European agricultural policy and climate change: a Slovenian case study

This article analyses the interactions between agricultural policy measures in the EU and the factors affecting GHG emissions from agriculture on the one hand, and the adaptation of agriculture to climate change on the other. To this end, the article uses Slovenia as a case study, assessing the extent to which Slovenian agricultural policy is responding to the challenges of climate change. All agricultural policy measures related to the 2007–2013 programming period were analysed according to a new methodological approach that is based on a qualitative (expert evaluation) and a quantitative (budgetary transfers validation) assessment. A panel of experts reached consensus on the key factors through which individual measures affect climate change, in which direction and how significantly. Data on budgetary funds for each measure were used as weights to assess their relative importance. The results show that there are not many measures in (Slovenian) agricultural policy that are directly aimed at reducing GHG emissions from agriculture or at adaptation to climate change. Nevertheless, most affect climate change, and their impact is far from negligible. Current measures have both positive and negative impacts, but overall the positive impacts prevail. Measures that involve many beneficiaries and more budgetary funds had the strongest impact on aggregate assessments. In light of climate change, agricultural policy should pay more attention to measures that are aimed at raising the efficiency of animal production, as it is the principal source of GHG emissions from agriculture.

Policy relevance

Agricultural policy must respond to climate challenges and climate change impact assessment must be included in the process of forming European agricultural policy. Agricultural policy measures that contribute to the reduction of emissions and adaptation, whilst acting in synergy with other environmental, economic and social goals, should be promoted. The approach used in this study combines qualitative and quantitative data, yielding an objective assessment of the climate impact of agricultural policy measures and providing policy makers with a tool for either ex ante or ex post evaluations of climate-relevant policy measures.     

Some economics of ‘dangerous’ climate change: Reflections on the Stern Review

The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change concluded that there can be “no doubt” the economic risks of business-as-usual (BAU) climate change are “very severe” [Stern, 2006. The Economics of Climate Change. HM Treasury, London, p. 188]. The total cost of climate change was estimated to be equivalent to a one-off, permanent 5–20% loss in global mean per-capita consumption today. And the marginal damage cost of a tonne of carbon emitted today was estimated to be around $312 [p. 344]. Both of these estimates are higher than most reported in the previous literature. Subsequently, a number of critiques have appeared, arguing that discounting is the principal explanation for this discrepancy. Discounting is important, but in this paper we emphasise that how one approaches the economics of risk and uncertainty, and how one attempts to model the very closely related issue of low-probability/high-damage scenarios (which we connect to the recent discussion of ‘dangerous’ climate change), can matter just as much. We demonstrate these arguments empirically, using the same models applied in the Stern Review. Together, the issues of risk and uncertainty on the one hand, and ‘dangerous’ climate change on the other, raise very strongly questions about the limits of a welfare-economic approach, where the loss of natural capital might be irreversible and impossible to compensate. Thus we also critically reflect on the state-of-the-art in integrated assessment modelling. There will always be an imperative to carry out integrated assessment modelling, bringing together scientific ‘fact’ and value judgement systematically. But we agree with those cautioning against a literal interpretation of current estimates. Ironically, the Stern Review is one of those voices. A fixation with cost-benefit analysis misses the point that arguments for stabilisation should, and are, built on broader foundations.     

US public opinion on climate change issues: implications for consensus-building and policymaking

While the Conference of the Parties wrangle at an international scale with climate policy, a quiet set of policies and measures is being implemented at a local scale by municipalities across the globe. This study examines the motivation municipalities have for undertaking policies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, when the theory of free-ridingwould predict that local administrations should find it difficult to unilaterally reduce their emissions for the benefit of the global climate. Through interviews with officials and/or staff in 23 municipalities in the United States enacting climate policy, data are gathered that suggest local government abatement policies are primarily a top—down decision based on what officials or staff members believe to be “good business” or rational policy choices. They are primarily driven by the potential for realised or perceived cost savings and co-benefits rather than by public pressure. Economic data from some dozen municipal projects are analyzed, finding, while municipalities lack sophisticated accounting techniques, some justification for the often-disputed claim that at least initial reductions in emissions can be made at cost savings. In the United States, with the lack of national abatement policies, it is municipalities that are leading the way in beginning to implement mitigation strategies, even if only for initial reductions.     

Economics of climate change: risk and responsibility by world region

The impacts of predicted climate change will not be distributed evenly around the world. As post-Kyoto negotiations unfold, relating the geographical distribution of projected impacts to responsibility for emissions among world regions is essential for achieving an equitable path forward. This article surveys the current knowledge of regional climate consequences, and delves into the regional predictions of economic assessment models to date, examining how the uncertainties, assumptions and ethical dimensions influence the portrayal of risk at this scale. The few studies that quantitatively compared regional risk and responsibility are reviewed, and the analytical framework from one such study is applied to the 2006 Stern Review's projections to give the first regional comparison to take purchasing power and welfare considerations into account. Synthesizing burden and blame in this way is informative for policy makers; the world's most vulnerable communities—in Africa, the Indian subcontinent, Latin America, and small island states—accounted for less than 33% of global greenhouse gas emissions over the period 1961–2000, but may experience more than 75% of the ensuing climate damages this century. This analysis reinforces the call for industrialized nations to lead mitigation efforts, and to do so decisively and swiftly.     

The implications of climate policy for the impacts of climate change on global water resources

This paper assesses the implications of climate policy for exposure to water resources stresses. It compares a Reference scenario which leads to an increase in global mean temperature of 4 °C by the end of the 21st century with a Mitigation scenario which stabilises greenhouse gas concentrations at around 450 ppm CO₂e and leads to a 2 °C increase in 2100. Associated changes in river runoff are simulated using a global hydrological model, for four spatial patterns of change in temperature and rainfall. There is a considerable difference in hydrological change between these four patterns, but the percentages of change avoided at the global scale are relatively robust. By the 2050s, the Mitigation scenario typically avoids between 16 and 30% of the change in runoff under the Reference scenario, and by 2100 it avoids between 43 and 65%. Two different measures of exposure to water resources stress are calculated, based on resources per capita and the ratio of withdrawals to resources. Using the first measure, the Mitigation scenario avoids 8-17% of the impact in 2050 and 20-31% in 2100; with the second measure, the avoided impacts are 5-21% and 15-47% respectively. However, at the same time, the Mitigation scenario also reduces the positive impacts of climate change on water scarcity in other areas. The absolute numbers and locations of people affected by climate change and climate policy vary considerably between the four climate model patterns.     

Community level adaptation to climate change: The potential role of participatory community risk assessment

This paper explores the value of using community risk assessments (CRAs) for climate change adaptation. CRA refers to participatory methods to assess hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities in support of community-based disaster risk reduction, used by many NGOs, community-based organizations, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent. We review the evolution of climate change adaptation and community-based disaster risk reduction, and highlight the challenges of integrating global climate change into a bottom-up and place-based approach. Our analysis of CRAs carried out by various national Red Cross societies shows that CRAs can help address those challenges by fostering community engagement in climate risk reduction, particularly given that many strategies to deal with current climate risks also help to reduce vulnerability to climate change. Climate change can also be explicitly incorporated in CRAs by making better use of CRA tools to assess trends, and by addressing the notion of changing risks. However, a key challenge is to keep CRAs simple enough for wide application. This demands special attention in the modification of CRA tools; in the background materials and trainings for CRA facilitators; and in the guidance for interpretation of CRA outcomes. A second challenge is the application of a limited set of CRA results to guide risk reduction in other communities and to inform national and international adaptation policy. This requires specific attention for sampling and care in scaling up qualitative findings. Finally, stronger linkages are needed between organizations facilitating CRAs and suppliers of climate information, particularly addressing the translation of climate information to the community level.     

South African crop farming and climate change: An economic assessment of impacts

This paper assesses the economic impact of the expected adverse changes in the climate on crop farming in South Africa using a revised Ricardian model and data from farm household surveys, long-term climate data, major soils and runoffs. Mean annual estimates indicate that a 1% increase in temperature will lead to about US$ 80.00 increase in net crop revenue while a 1 mm/month fall in precipitation leads to US$ 2.00 fall, but with significant seasonal differences in impacts. There are also significant spatial differences and across the different farming systems. Using selected climate scenarios, the study predicts that crop net revenues are expected to fall by as much as 90% by 2100 with small-scale farmers been most affected. Policies therefore need to be fine-tuned and more focused to take advantage of the relative benefits across seasons, farming systems and spatially, and by so doing climate change may be beneficial rather than harmful.     

Linkages between climate change and sustainable development

Abstract

Climate change does not yet feature prominently within the environmental or economic policy agendas of developing countries. Yet evidence shows that some of the most adverse effects of climate change will be in developing countries, where populations are most vulnerable and least likely to easily adapt to climate change, and that climate change will affect the potential for development in these countries. Some synergies already exist between climate change policies and the sustainable development agenda in developing countries, such as energy efficiency, renewable energy, transport and sustainable land-use policies. Despite limited attention from policy-makers to date, climate change policies could have significant ancillary benefits for the local environment. The reverse is also true as local and national policies to address congestion, air quality, access to energy services and energy diversity may also limit GHG emissions. Nevertheless there could be significant trade-offs associated with deeper levels of mitigation in some countries, for example where developing countries are dependent on indigenous coal and may be required to switch to cleaner yet more expensive fuels to limit emissions. The distributional impacts of such policies are an important determinant of their feasibility and need to be considered up-front. It follows that future agreements on mitigation and adaptation under the convention will need to recognise the diverse situations of developing countries with respect to their level of economic development, their vulnerability to climate change and their ability to adapt or mitigate. Recognition of how climate change is likely to influence other development priorities may be a first step toward building cost-effective strategies and integrated, institutional capacity in developing countries to respond to climate change. Opportunities may also exist in developing countries to use regional economic organisations to assist in the design of integrated responses and to exploit synergies between climate change and other policies such as those designed to combat desertification and preserve biodiversity.

© 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.     

Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: Dimensions, determinants and change over time

While scientific consensus and political and media messages appear to be increasingly certain, public attitudes and action towards the issue do not appear to be following suit. Popular and academic debate often assumes this is due to ignorance or misunderstanding on the part of the public, but some studies have suggested political beliefs and values may play a more important role in determining belief versus scepticism about climate change. The current research used two representative postal surveys of the UK public to: measure scepticism and uncertainty about climate change; determine how scepticism varies according to individual characteristics, knowledge and values; and examine how scepticism has changed over time. Findings show denial of climate change is less common than the perception that the issue has been exaggerated. Scepticism was found to be strongly determined by individuals’ environmental and political values (and indirectly by age, gender, location and lifestyle) rather than by education or knowledge. Between 2003 and 2008, public uncertainty about climate change has remained remarkably constant, although belief that claims about the issue are exaggerated has doubled over that period. These results are interpreted with reference to psychological concepts of motivated reasoning, confirmation bias and ‘finite pool of worry’. Implications for communication and policy are discussed.     

Creating usable science: Opportunities and constraints for climate knowledge use and their implications for science policy

In the past several decades, decision makers in the United States have increasingly called upon publicly funded science to provide “usable” information for policy making, whether in the case of acid rain, famine prevention or climate change policy. As demands for usability become more prevalent for publicly accountable scientific programs, there is a need to better understand opportunities and constraints to science use in order to inform policy design and implementation. Motivated by recent critique of the decision support function of the US Global Change Research Program, this paper seeks to address this issue by specifically examining the production and use of climate science. It reviews empirical evidence from the rich scholarship focused on climate science use, particularly seasonal climate forecasts, to identify factors that constrain or foster usability. It finds, first, that climate science usability is a function both of the context of potential use and of the process of scientific knowledge production itself. Second, nearly every case of successful use of climate knowledge involved some kind of iteration between knowledge producers and users. The paper argues that, rather than an automatic outcome of the call for the production of usable science, iterativity is the result of the action of specific actors and organizations who ‘own’ the task of building the conditions and mechanisms fostering its creation. Several different types of institutional arrangements can accomplish this task, depending on the needs and resources available. While not all of the factors that enhance usability of science for decision making are within the realm of the scientific enterprise itself, many do offer opportunities for improvement. Science policy mechanisms such as the level of flexibility afforded to research projects and the metrics used to evaluate the outcomes of research investment can be critical to providing the necessary foundation for iterativity and production of usable science to occur.     

山西省省级气候影响评价现状与发展

本文介绍了山西省省级气候影响评价工作的基本状况，气候影响评价系统和气候影响评价中所采用的指标、方法、模式，对山西省气候影响评价现状与发展进行了分析，并提出了今后工作的初步设想。     

Upholding labour productivity under climate change: an assessment of adaptation options

Changes in labour productivity feed through directly to national income. An external shock, like climate change, which may substantially reduce the productivity of workers is therefore a macroeconomic concern. The biophysical impact of higher temperatures on human performance is well documented. Less well understood are the wider effects of higher temperatures on the aggregate productivity of modern, diversified economies, where economic output is produced in contexts ranging from outdoor agriculture to work in air-conditioned buildings. Working conditions are at least to some extent the result of societal choices, which means that the labour productivity effects of heat can be alleviated through careful adaptation. A range of technical, regulatory/infrastructural and behavioural options are available to individuals, businesses and governments. The importance of local contexts prevents a general ranking of the available measures, but many appear cost-effective. Promising options include the optimization of working hours and passive cooling mechanisms. Climate-smart urban planning and adjustments to building design are most suitable to respond to high base temperature, while air conditioning can respond flexibly to short temperature peaks if there is sufficient cheap, reliable and clean electricity.

Key policy insights

• The effect of heat stress on labour productivity is a key economic impact of climate change, which could affect national output and workers’ income.

• Effective adaptation options exist, such as shifting working hours and cool roofs, but they require policy intervention and forward planning.

• Strategic interventions, such as climate-smart municipal design, are as important as reactive or project-level adaptations.

• Adaptation solutions to heat stress are highly context specific and need to be assessed accordingly. For example, shifting working hours could be an effective way of reducing the effect of peak temperatures, but only if there is sufficient flexibility in working patterns.

     

How inequitable is the global distribution of responsibility, capability, and vulnerability to climate change: A comprehensive indicator-based assessment

While it is generally asserted that those countries who have contributed least to anthropogenic climate change are most vulnerable to its adverse impacts some recently developed indices of vulnerability to climate change come to a different conclusion. Confirmation or rejection of this assertion is complicated by the lack of an agreed metric for measuring countries’ vulnerability to climate change and by conflicting interpretations of vulnerability. This paper presents a comprehensive semi-quantitative analysis of the disparity between countries’ responsibility for climate change, their capability to act and assist, and their vulnerability to climate change for four climate-sensitive sectors based on a broad range of disaggregated vulnerability indicators. This analysis finds a double inequity between responsibility and capability on the one hand and the vulnerability of food security, human health, and coastal populations on the other. This double inequity is robust across alternative indicator choices and interpretations of vulnerability. The main cause for the higher vulnerability of poor nations who have generally contributed little to climate change is their lower adaptive capacity. In addition, the biophysical sensitivity and socio-economic exposure of poor nations to climate impacts on food security and human health generally exceeds that of wealthier nations. No definite statement can be made on the inequity associated with climate impacts on water supply due to large uncertainties about future changes in regional water availability and to conflicting indicators of current water scarcity. The robust double inequity between responsibility and vulnerability for most climate-sensitive sectors strengthens the moral case for financial and technical assistance from those countries most responsible for climate change to those countries most vulnerable to its adverse impacts. However, the complex and geographically heterogeneous patterns of vulnerability factors for different climate-sensitive sectors suggest that the allocation of international adaptation funds to developing countries should be guided by sector-specific or hazard-specific criteria despite repeated requests from participants in international climate negotiations to develop a generic index of countries’ vulnerability to climate change.     

Mainstreaming climate change adaptation into inland aquaculture policies in Thailand

While there have been many pilot projects on adaptation undertaken in the fisheries and aquaculture sector, state policies are only just beginning to address let alone refer to climate change. This study explores the climate-related content, climate sensitivities, and opportunities to incorporate climate change concerns in a set of aquaculture policies by the government of Thailand. The analysis is based on content analysis of policy documents and in-depth interviews with 14 officials that had roles in the design or implementation of 8 Department of Fisheries policies. The Aquaculture Master Plan 2011–2016 and the now abandoned Tilapia Strategy refer directly to climate variability or change. The Master Plan also suggests measures or strategies, such as investment in research, and the transfer of technologies, which would be helpful to sustainability and adaptation. Other policies suggest, or at the very least include, practices which could contribute to strengthening management of climate-related risks, for example: a registration policy included provisions for compensation; extension programme policy recognizes the importance of extreme events; and a standards policy gives guidance on site selection and water management. Most existing aquaculture policies appear to be sensitive to the impacts of climate change; for instance, the zoning policy is sensitive to spatial shifts in climate. Stakeholders had ideas on how policies could be made more robust; in the case of zoning, by periodically reviewing boundaries and adjusting them as necessary.

POLICY RELEVANCE

This study is one of the first evaluations of the coverage and sensitivity of aquaculture policies to climate change. It shows that while existing policies in Thailand are beginning to refer explicitly to climate change, they do not yet include much in the way of adaptation responses, underlining the need for identifying entry points as has been done in this analysis. Further mainstreaming is one option; another possibility is to adopt a more segregated approach, at least initially, and to collect various policy ideas under a new strategic policy for the aquaculture sector as a whole.     

1960—2009年咸宁市气候变化特征

利用1960—2009年咸宁市3个地面气象站气象资料,统计分析近50 a来该区域气温、降水等主要气候要素的年变化、四季变化及年代际变化的趋势特征。结果表明：近50 a研究区气温有上升趋势,气候倾向率为0.23℃/10 a,年平均气温在20世纪90年代末发生突变。春秋季平均气温分别在2002年和1999年发生突变,夏季平均气温在2006年发生突变,冬季平均气温在1990年发生突变。春季与秋季平均气温的变化较一致,冬季平均气温对全球变暖响应最敏感,春季与秋季对气候变暖的响应较敏感,而夏季对气候变暖的响应最为迟缓。近50 a咸宁市年降水量呈波动但无明显增降的趋势,其中春夏两季变化趋势较为一致并有下降的趋势,且春夏降水量的变化主导着年降水量的变化;而冬季降水量有上升的趋势。通过对气温与降水变化趋势的比较,发现冬季对气候变化的响应最显著,其余季节无明显相关性。     

Trade unions and climate change: The jobs versus environment dilemma

Trade unions are actively engaging with the climate change agenda and formulating climate change policies. Although governments are placing considerable effort on changing consumer behaviour, arguably the most significant impacts on climate change will be through changes in production. Even changes in consumption will have consequences for production. Changes in production will affect workers through the loss of jobs, the changing of jobs, and the creation of new jobs. The jobs versus environment dilemma is a significant issue affecting workers worldwide. In this paper we focus on the ways in which international trade unions are conceptualising the relationship between jobs and the environment, which provide the point of departure from which climate change policies can be formulated. Extended interviews were conducted with senior policy makers in national and international trade unions. On the basis of their responses, four discourses of trade union engagement with climate change are discussed: ‘technological fix’, ‘social transformation’, ‘mutual interests’ and ‘social movement’, which are theorised in the context of the different international histories and models of trade unionism. All discourses imply a re-invention of unions as social movements but do not see nature as a partner in human development.