Tenders: an option for developing countries to support renewable energies under the CDM

Abstract

Renewable energy sources are generally considered as an important tool on the way towards sustainable development. However, if developing countries want to actively promote renewable energies, they may need to face the problem that current legislation conflicts with the clean development mechanism (CDM) rules, and especially with the additionality concept. Thus, CDM projects may become impossible to implement. This article presents an approach to overcoming these potential difficulties. One solution lies in offering a tender specifically for RE-CDM-projects.     

The future of the CDM: same same,but differentiated?

Policy-makers and scientists have raised concerns about the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in particular regarding its low contribution to sustainable development, unbalanced regional and sectoral distribution of projects, and its limited contribution to global emission reductions. Differentiation between countries or project types has been proposed as a possible way forward to address these problems. An overview is provided of the different ways in which CDM differentiation could be implemented. The implications for the actors involved in the CDM are analysed, along with a quantitative assessment of the impacts on the carbon market, using bottom-up marginal abatement cost curves. The discounting of CDM credits, quota systems, or differentiated eligibility of countries could help to address several of the concerns raised. Preferential treatment may also make a limited contribution to achieving the aims of CDM differentiation by increasing opportunities for under-represented host countries. The impact on the carbon market appears to be limited for most options.     

Do bilateral trade relationships influence the distribution of CDM projects?

The use of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is increasingly widespread in developing countries. However, CDM projects are still far from being an effective development activity due to the uneven distribution of these projects in a few relatively well-off economies. One potential cause of this imbalance is analysed in terms of the trade relationships between developed and developing countries. By applying a gravity model to a panel dataset, well-established export flows from developed economies towards developing countries are shown to explain why a large proportion of CDM projects are unevenly geographically distributed. This kind of lock-in effect regarding the CDM between developed and developing countries could be avoided by both enhancing the institutional framework in developing countries that host CDM projects and reinforcing compulsory rules for CDM destinations in the least-developed economies.     

Market penetration metrics: tools for additionality assessment?

Abstract

Project-based emission reduction or ‘offset’ programs are being implemented widely, from the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) to corporate voluntary efforts and municipal and state-level activities. Additionality assessment remains a central and persistent challenge in all programs. Concerns have been raised with methods currently used, such as investment analysis, barrier analysis, and performance thresholds. They have been variously critiqued for high costs, resistance to standardization, weak environmental integrity, and susceptibility to gaming. Technology penetration rates provide another means to infer additionality, and could be a potentially useful complement to other methods. The notion is that emerging technologies with low but increasing penetration rates typically require some type of support, as might be provided through offsets markets, to compete effectively in the marketplace. For penetration rate analysis to provide a useful tool for additionality assessment, several fundamental questions need to be addressed. What do penetration rates represent and how can they be measured? How can additionality evaluation utilize penetration rates? For which sectors and project types are the use of penetration rates most promising? This article shows that penetration tests have a mixture of pluses and minuses, with greater relevance in certain market niches and regions. Reasonable ranges for penetration thresholds are discussed, along with partial crediting approaches to reduce ‘knife-edge’ effects.     

Accounting methods for carbon credits: impacts on the minimum area of forestry projects under the Clean Development Mechanism

Abstract

The Ninth Conference of the Parties (COP-9) decided to adopt an accounting system based on expiring carbon credits to address the problem of non-permanent carbon storage in forests established under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This article reviews and discusses carbon accounting methods that were under consideration before COP-9 and presents a model which calculates the minimum area that forest plantation projects should reach to be able to compensate CDM transaction costs with the revenues from carbon credits. The model compares different accounting methods under various sets of parameters on project management, transaction costs, and carbon prices. Model results show that under current carbon price and average transaction costs, projects with an area of less than 500 ha are excluded from the CDM, whatever accounting method is used. Temporary crediting appears to be the most favorable approach to account for non-permanent carbon removal in forests and also for the feasibility of smaller projects. However, lower prices for credits with finite lifetimes may prevent the establishment of CDM forestry projects. Also, plantation projects with low risk of unexpected carbon loss and sufficient capacity for insuring or buffering the risk of carbon re-emission would benefit from equivalence-adjusted average carbon storage accounting rather than from temporary crediting.     

Can CDM monitoring requirements be reduced while maintaining environmental integrity?

Monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) requirements in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are perceived to be of high quality, but also complex and stringent. Only one-third of the registered projects successfully managed initial verification and already received carbon credits. The time required to achieve first issuance remains high despite considerable improvements in other CDM project cycle steps. This leads to the question of whether MRV provisions in the CDM represent barriers that could be lowered while ensuring the CDM's integrity. The CDM requirements are compared with the MRV provisions of the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS). The comparison shows that CDM–MRV provisions are often stricter and less flexible compared to similar provisions in the EU ETS. Due to structural differences between the EU ETS and the CDM, some different MRV approaches are justified and reflect the CDM's disparate objectives and complexity. It is found that some CDM provisions result in barriers which seem avoidable and do not contribute to the CDM's environmental integrity. Recommendations are made for CDM-specific improvements and general structural changes to improve cost-efficiency and reduce uncertainty with relevance to policy developments around future market mechanisms.     

Post-2012 CDM multi-criteria analysis of industries in six Asian countries: Iranian case study

The prospects of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and for carbon income, up to and beyond 2012, in the industrial sectors of Iran and five other Asian countries are investigated. The attractiveness and suitability of each host country, the status of their industrial sectors (based on four post-2012 scenarios), and the post-2012 potential of the CDM (or similar carbon projects) in these sectors are all examined. A multi-criteria analysis of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, China, and India, based on seven sets of criteria (institutional, regulatory, economic, political, social, CDM experience, and energy production/consumption), is conducted, and the post-2012 potential carbon incomes of each country – based on CO₂e emissions of industrial processes – are calculated. Finally, the Iranian industrial sector and the impact of deregulation of energy prices are examined. The post-2012 potential savings in the Iranian industrial sector are calculated based on energy savings, carbon income, and environmental savings. The results indicate that there is strong demand for investment and new technology in this sector to combat several-fold energy price increases. Moreover, high-priced carbon credits could play a meaningful role in post-2012 energy policies in this sector.

Policy relevance

This research is the first study to quantify the carbon market potentials in the industrial sectors of the selected Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members. The Kyoto Protocol is considered by most OPEC countries to be a mixed bag of threats and opportunities and they have shown ambivalence towards it, mainly due to the threat a reduction of fossil fuel consumption poses to their economies. On the other hand, energy efficiency is a desirable goal for their industrial sectors. Iran, as an OPEC member country with vast energy resources, has mostly ignored the CDM during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and has performed poorly on CDM implementation. However, the current deregulation of energy prices in Iran, with profound cuts in energy subsidies, would definitely alter the perspective of its industrial decision makers on the post-2012 carbon potentials.     

Does the CDM discourage emission reduction targets in advanced developing countries?

Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which industrialized countries, in order to meet their mitigation commitments, can buy emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries. Before its implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that it would sell-off their countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to invest in more expensive measures to meet their future reduction targets. This ‘low-hanging fruit’ argument is analysed empirically by comparing marginal abatement cost curves. Emissions abatement costs and potentials for CDM projects are estimated for different technologies in eight countries, using capital budgeting tools and information from project documentation. It is found that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement potential in most countries. Although the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped are below the average credit price, there are still plenty of available low-cost opportunities. Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM predominantly for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the other countries more expensive projects are accessing the CDM. This evidence at first sight challenges the low-hanging fruit claim, but needs to be understood in the light of the barriers for the adoption of low-cost abatement options.