Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

The Moral Truth about Discourse Theory

Abstract. The fundamental impulse of Discourse Theory is to eschew the moral substantivism of ethical rationalism in favour of a pragmatic, procedural approach to ethical and legal analysis. However, this paper argues that even if the analysis of Communicative Action as reconstructed by Habermas’s “Universal Pragmatics,” and the implied procedural rules of practical discourse advanced by Robert Alexy are accepted, the validation or “redemption” of all authoritative and distributive claims must, in terms of logical priority, encounter the substantively general necessity of Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency. This result operates as a reductio ad absurdum of the project of Universal Pragmatics and prompts us to reconsider the epistemological status and the political and ethico‐legal function of Discourse Ethics in Civil Society.     

Exploring the Sources of Authority Over the Word Meaning in Transgender Jurisprudence

This paper looks at transgender identities and the law in the context of marriage in common law jurisdictions. It particularly focuses on the nature and sources of authority over word meaning as well as the role of language and definition in classifying transgender individuals into a legal category. When it comes to the legal question of who may marry whom, and what the terms “man” and “woman” actually refer to, there is no statutory definition of the terms “man”, “woman”, “male” and “female”. This has put the onus on judges, especially those who needed to decide whether a transgender person can marry in his/her affirmed sex, to interpret these terms. Two lines of cases in transgender jurisprudence are examined so as to have a close study of how the courts construed these terms and classified transgender people into a category. The first concerns United Kingdom cases, namely Corbett v Corbett (1971), Bellinger v Bellinger (2003) and the Hong Kong case W v Registrar of Marriages (2010), (2011) & (2013). The second consists of Australian cases such as Secretary, Department of Social Security v State Rail Authority (1993) and Re Kevin (2002). This paper discusses these issues by analyzing and comparing different cases in transgender jurisprudence as well as examining how these issues play out in contemporary Hong Kong.     

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

“Jurisdictional Realization of Law” as Judicium: A Methodological Alternative,Beyond Deductive Application and Finalistic Decision

The proposed reflection intends to present the problem of judicial adjudication as a substantially-axiologically founded autonomous moment on the practical realization of law, and to explore this understanding in confrontation with external exigencies, mostly teleologically determined—hence, beyond strict deductive application, as a (normativistic-positivistic) syllogistic reference of facts to norms, and finalistically determined decision, as an option among possible alternatives to achieve specific aims. The main objective is to enter into a discussion on the methodological meaning of “integrity”, “hard cases” and “right answer”, as presented by Ronald Dworkin, and a critical reflection on the criticism(s) of that approach levelled by Neil MacCormick, so as to confront the relevance of principle and policy arguments, in order to bring about a different methodological approach, an alternative jurisprudentialist conception of adjudication, incorporating a practical-normative constitutive dialectics between legal controversy and legal system, such as that presented by Castanheira Neves. The focus will, then, be the legitimacy of the connection of arguments of principle and consequentialist arguments in adjudication, its selection and its justification, stating, therefore, a specifically assumed judicium, a judicative decision, having the legal system as its horizon of normative reference and of substantial and institutional autonomy.

     

Basketball in the Key of Law: The Significance of Disputing in Pick‐Up Basketball

While the conception of law as a constructive and constitutive force is often stated, we have relatively few concrete and grounded case studies showing precisely where and how social actors construct the meaning of their engagements through the invocation of legality. Drawing on Erving Goffman's Frame Analysis (1974), I use the concept of “keying” to articulate how basketball players in informal “pick‐up” games transform the meaning of their activity through disputing. By playing in a legalistic way, players constitute the game as “real” and “serious” rather than “mere play.” The analysis tracks basketball players in the heat of action as they perceive the game, call rule violations, contest those violations, and ultimately give up. Players organize each phase of the dispute's natural history in the “key of law” by constructing and comparing cases, invoking and interpreting rules, setting precedent, arguing over procedure, and proposing solutions. Through these practices, players infuse the game with rich meaning and generate the motivational context demanding that the game be treated as significant. This analysis contributes to an understanding of legal ontology that envisions law's essence as potentiating rather than repairing normative social life.     

SOME MISLEADING CONCEPTIONS IN SENTENCING RESEARCH

Most studies of sentencing practices in both adult and juvenile courts have compared the relative power to predict dispositions of “legal” variables, such as the seriousness of offense and previous arrest record, and “extralegal” variables, such as race and social class. It is suggested that this is a misleading model for research on the decision-making process in juvenile courts. Instead, results presented here indicate that the juvenile court uses a model of substantive decision-making oriented toward the character and social environment of offenders. Social background variables are found to be more important determinants of disposition than either “legal” or “extralegal” variables.     

Lawyers’ wellbeing and professional legal education

Abstract

THIS PAPER examines the wellbeing and satisfaction levels of lawyers in the workplace. It argues that research suggesting a crisis in the legal profession in the United States is comparable with research on wellbeing and levels of satisfaction for lawyers in Australasia. Some reports in both jurisdictions are critical of conventional legal education and practical legal training programs, which do not encourage students to develop personal and interpersonal skills that can improve self‐awareness, communication skills and the capacity to manage stress and anxiety. Consequently, law students are allowed to assume that these “soft skills” are less important for lawyers compared with cognitive skills such as “knowing the law” and “thinking like a lawyer”.

The paper describes the preliminary results of research conducted with graduates of the School of Law at the University of Newcastle Australia. The results confirm existing research to show that clinical legal education programs that expose law students under supervision to clients with real cases may promote the development of interpersonal skills, which in turn may help them cope with stressors in legal practice, especially in the first few years post‐admission.     

Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification

In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par with Kant's concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In this first part, I raise the issue of the reflexivity of justification and question whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice.     

《民法典》夫妻债务条款的不足与应对

《民法典》第1064条关于夫妻债务的条款源于《最高人民法院关于审理涉及夫妻债务纠纷案件适用法律有关问题的解释》,该条款原来只针对夫妻对外关系,上升为法律条文后同时适用于夫妻对内和对外关系,即“内外同一”模式。由于债权人不易了解夫妻内部情况,这种做法较易损害债权人利益,对此可以通过适当放宽债权人举证责任和强化法院职权探知予以应对。该条文从司法解释上升为法律条文时与第1089条的衔接不够顺畅,遗漏了夫妻中举债一方的举证责任,应予补充。在内容上,该条第1款和第2款都出现“共同意思表示”,鉴于该条款的法理基础是《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国婚姻法〉若干问题的解释(一)》第17条,建议将第1款的“共同意思表示”解释为签订合同的民事法律行为,将第2款的“共同意思表示”解释为表见代理。此外,条文中的夫妻“共同生产经营”的含义具有不确定性,建议对其进行目的性扩张解释。     

A Welcome Conversation: Toward a New Historiography of Intellectual Property

This essay considers what tools should be used to study the legal history of intellectual property. I identify three historiographical strategies: narration, contest, and formation. Narration identifies the diverse “narrative structures” that shape the field of intellectual property history. Contest highlights how the inherent instability of intellectual property as a legal concept prompts recurrent debates over its meaning. Formation recognizes how intellectual property historians can offer insight into broader legal history debates over how to consider the relationship between informal social practices and formalized legal mechanisms. I consider Kara W. Swanson's Banking on the Body: The Market in Blood, Milk and Sperm in Modern America (2014) in light of these historiographical strategies and conclude that Swanson's book guides us to a new conversation in the legal history of intellectual property law.     

Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Exchanges between Hart and Ross*

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law and Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken. The Concept of Law does not go beyond On Law and Justice in so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward in The Concept of Law and On Law and Justice are very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality.     

Beyond the Goods/Resources Dichotomy: Animal Labor and Trade Law

Abstract

Since its inception, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has, in a rather self-evident manner, treated animals as objects of trade: Animals must be either goods or natural resources subject to the terms and conditions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, broader public and legal efforts to recategorize animals from goods to “sentient beings,” which are emerging across the world, are casting serious doubt on these assumptions. Using animals’ subjectivity as a starting point, a new and bourgeoning strand of anthropological, ethical, and political studies argues that animals should properly be recognized as working subjects. Be it guide dogs, truffle hogs, logging elephants, or dairy cows—working animals, they argue, are owed wholly new legal and ethical duties. This article builds on these arguments to examine the consequences of “animal labor” for trade law: Are animals wrongly classified as commodities or resources? Is there a need and room to recognize animals as service providers under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)? What are the legal consequences of this proposed change? This article sets out to answer these questions and argues that recognizing animals as workers in trade law is conceptually coherent and can play a crucial role in empowering states to protect animals effectively at the international level.     

Law and Morality: A Critical Relation*

Abstract. The article deals with the difference between some forms of legal positivism. It is argued that, even in continental legal systems which are typically “rule bound,” there is some space left for principles in the legal system. The author tries to explain how this space can be filled and what methods should be used by a judge to do so.     

Thinking like a lawyer/acting like a professional: communities of practice as a means of challenging orthodox legal education

Increasingly, there is pressure upon law schools, in Australia and elsewhere, to impress upon students the significance of the ethical and professional obligations of legal practice. The recent Carnegie Report explicitly looked to law schools “to initiate novice practitioners to think, to perform, and to conduct themselves (that is, to act morally and ethically) like professionals”. Many law students, however, have little appreciation of legal ethics and any concept they may have of professionalism tends to be envisaged as applying only after graduation. In this paper, we explore the idea of a “community of practice”. Lave and Wenger, who coined the phrase, contend that “learning is conceived as a trajectory in which learners move from legitimate peripheral participant to core participant of the community of practice”. We will argue that law students should appreciate that they are entering the legal profession's community of practice and that all aspects of their conduct relevant to professionalism – not only academic integrity, but matters such as time management, teamwork, relationships with peers and staff – relate to this transition into a legal professional community. Such an approach may not only serve to impress upon students the significance of “professionalism” and ethics, but inculcate in them a sense of belonging to a professional community.     

The Use of Unwritten Legal Principles by Courts*

Abstract. I argue that one can distinguish two types of unwritten legal principles as applied by courts (in Europe). On the one hand, what are called “structural principles,” which are induced, or at least pretended to be induced, from the written law. On the other hand, what are called “ideological principles,” which are not induced from the actual legal system, but refer to current dominant beliefs in society as to morals, politics or other non legal ideologies. It is argued that the distinction between structural legal principles and ideological legal principles could be an important element for the elaboration of a legal principle theory, as both these types of principles meet a different need and play a different role in legal practice. Structural legal principles primarily meet the need for a new ius commune, in order to achieve the coherence and the completeness of the legal system, whereas ideological legal principles, just like the human rights, meet a revived demand for an ethical framework for the law.     

The Politics of Jurisprudence Revisited: A Swedish Realist in Historical Context

This article argues that juristic theories must be understood in relation to the historical conditions in which they have emerged. This is not to reduce theories to their context but to gain essential insight into their aims, meaning, and scope with the aid of such “external” reference points. Here I use the ideas of the Swedish legal realist Vilhelm Lundstedt to illustrate these claims, choosing his juristic theory for this purpose specifically because it has been so widely seen (at least by non‐Scandinavian interpreters) as deeply puzzling and “extreme.” The article argues that his central ideas are readily intelligible in historical context. But such a contextual examination of juristic ideas also makes it possible to assess what in them can properly travel beyond immediate context: in other words, what insights about the nature of the jurist's task can legitimately be taken from them for more universal application. Lundstedt's work, despite having been largely ignored or excluded from international juristic debate, has something to offer here if seen through a contextualising lens that sets the possibilities for its broader application in sharp relief.