Place matters: Contextualizing the roles of religion and race for understanding Americans' attitudes about homosexuality

As laws and policies related to homosexuality have evolved, Americans' attitudes have also changed. Race and religion have been established as important indicators of feelings about homosexuality. However, researchers have given almost no attention to how county characteristics shape Americans' attitudes. Using Hierarchical Linear Modeling techniques, we examine how personal characteristics and the religious and racial context of a county shape feelings about homosexuality drawing on data from the American National Election Survey and information about where respondents reside. We find that African Americans initially appear less tolerant than other racial groups, until we account for the geographical distribution of attitudes across the nation. Additionally, once we consider religious involvement, strength of belief, and religious affiliation African Americans appear to have warmer feelings about homosexuality than whites. Drawing on the moral communities' hypothesis, we also find that the strength of religiosity amongst county residents heightens the influence of personal religious beliefs on disapproving attitudes. There is also a direct effect of the proportion conservative Protestant, whereby people of all faiths have cooler attitudes towards homosexual individuals when they reside in a county with a higher proportion of conservative Protestants. Finally, we do not find any evidence for an African American cultural influence on attitudes.     

The Republicanization of evangelical Protestants in the United States: An examination of the sources of political realignment

Although the association between evangelical Protestant and Republican affiliations is now a fundamental aspect of American politics, this was not the case as recently as the early 1980s. Following work on secular political realignment and the issue evolution model of partisan change, I use four decades of repeated cross-sectional survey data to examine the dynamic correlates of evangelical Protestant and Republican affiliations, and how these factors promote changes in partisanship. Results show that evangelical Protestants have become relatively more likely to attend religious services and to oppose homosexuality, abortion, and welfare spending. Period-specific mediation models show that opposition to abortion, homosexuality, and welfare spending have become more robust predictors of Republican affiliation. By the twenty-first century, differences in Republican affiliation between evangelical Protestants and other religious affiliates are fully mediated by views of homosexuality, abortion, and welfare spending; and differences in Republican affiliation between evangelicals and the religiously unaffiliated are substantially mediated by views of homosexuality, abortion, welfare spending, and military spending. These results further understanding of rapid changes in politico-religious alignments and the increasing importance of moral and cultural issues in American politics, which supports a culture wars depiction of the contemporary political landscape.     

Conservative Protestantism and attitudes toward corporal punishment, 1986–2014

Research indicates that conservative Protestants are highly supportive of corporal punishment. Yet, Americans’ support for this practice has waned during the past several decades. This study aggregates repeated cross-sectional data from the General Social Surveys (GSS) to consider three models that address whether attitudes toward spanking among conservative Protestants shifted relative to those of other Americans from 1986 to 2014. Although initial results reveal a growing gap between conservative Protestants and the broader American public, we find that average levels of support have remained most robust among less educated conservative Protestants, with some erosion among more highly educated conservative Protestants. Moreover, trends in variability suggest that conservative Protestants exhibit more cohesive support for this practice than do others. These results provide a window into the cultural contours of religious change and the social factors that facilitate such change.     

Religion, politics, and support for same-sex marriage in the United States, 1988-2008

We examine how religious and political factors structure support for same-sex marriage in the United States over the last two decades. Using data from the General Social Surveys, we show that respondents who identify more strongly with the Republican Party, sectarian denominations, and those who subscribe to biblical fundamentalism and political conservatism are substantially more opposed to same-sex marriage than are other Americans. Heterogeneous ordinal logistic regression models show that these religious and political factors have become more important over the last two decades. Cohorts born after 1945 became substantially more supportive of marriage rights between 1988 and 2008, but shifts in support for marriage rights were less sizeable for persons affiliated with sectarian denominations, religious fundamentalists, Republicans, and political conservatives. Estimates from structural equation models show that religious factors influence political conservatism and Republican identification, yet both religious and political factors have significant and substantial independent direct effects on support for same-sex marriage.     

Socially organized sentiments: Exploring the link between religious density and protest mobilization, 1960–1995

Extensive research has shown individual religiosity to have an impact upon U.S. protest participation. But very little work has examined the role of religious density in a community on the likelihood of protest mobilization. Our research links the religious density across 62 counties in New York State to various protest mobilization issues during the period of 1960–1995. In this research, we develop a theory of socially organized sentiments to examine religious influences on overall protest event mobilizations in local communities, a specific example of a more general theory that can link community structure to multiple forms of civic engagement. The impact of various religious traditions is assessed by using measures for the density of religious population per congregation of three religious traditions—Mainline Protestantism, Evangelical Protestantism and Catholicism. The analysis also assesses the likelihood of mobilization concerning four specific issues—African-American civil rights, gender, anti-nuclear/peace, and anti-poverty movements.     

Understanding Americans' abortion attitudes: The role of the local religious context

Although abortion became legal over 40 years ago, Americans remain staunchly divided over its acceptability. Personal religious beliefs and behaviors have emerged as some of the most important factors shaping disapproval. Despite religion's importance, very little attention has been given to how the local religious context may shape views and abortion access. Using data from the General Social Survey (N = 6922) that has geographical identifiers, we examine the role of the local religious context for shaping attitudes and the presence of a county abortion clinic. We find that as the level of county religious engagement rises, religious and secular residents alike develop more conservative attitudes. Conversely, as the county Catholic rate increases, moderate and liberal Protestants become more prochoice. While the county conservative Protestant rate has no influence on residents' attitudes, it is the only religious contextual measure that shapes the likelihood that a county has an abortion clinic.     

Are white evangelical Protestants lower class? A partial test of church-sect theory

Testing hypotheses derived from church-sect theory and contemporary research about changes in evangelical Protestants’ social status, I use repeated cross-sectional survey data spanning almost four decades to examine changes in the social-class hierarchy of American religious traditions. While there is little change in the social-class position of white evangelical Protestants from the early 1970s to 2010, there is considerable change across birth cohorts. Results from hierarchical age–period–cohort models show: (1) robust, across-cohort declines in social-class differences between white evangelical Protestants and liberal Protestants, affiliates of “other” religions, and the unaffiliated, (2) stability in social-class differences between white evangelical Protestants and moderate, Pentecostal, and nondenominational Protestants, (3) moderate across-cohort growth in social-class differences between white evangelical Protestants and Catholics, and (4) these patterns vary across indicators of social class. The findings in this article provide partial support for church-sect theory as well as other theories of social change that emphasize the pivotal role of generations.     

Religious intermarriage in the United States: trends, patterns, and predictors

The reciprocal connection between religion and family life makes the topic of religious intermarriage of particular importance in the sociology of religion. Spousal influences are key for motivating religious switching and other religious commitments. Religious intermarriage has also been shown to influence a host of other outcomes, including spousal conflict, domestic violence, divorce, and fertility. Using data from the 1973–1994 GSS, I estimate log-multiplicative models examining patterns of association between spouses’ religious affiliations across two broad cohorts. Two-step and FIML Heckman’s selection models are used to determine how education, migration, cohort, and denominational origins influence the probability of intermarriage and the distance of intermarriage if it occurs. Religious intermarriage increases across cohorts, but declines in homogamy are limited to liberal religious groups. Catholics and members of conservative sects are less likely to intermarry compared to others. The relative ordering of distances between religious groups was unchanged across cohorts. Educational attainment increases the likelihood of intermarriage, and marriages in which the woman has more education are more likely to be heterogamous. However, educational factors have no impact on the distance of intermarriage if it occurs. Geographically stable rural Southerners are least likely to intermarry and if they do, choose a more similar spouse.     

The effects of religious contextual norms, structural constraints, and personal religiosity on abortion decisions

Researchers have established that individual religiosity influences abortion attitudes, and that abortion attitudes, in turn, shape abortion restrictions and access. Less clear is whether religion and abortion structural constraints influence abortion decisions. This study examines the several individual, contextual, and structural factors that could shape the abortion decisions of women who conceive before marriage. Special attention is given to the importance of academic aspirations and structural constraints, in contrast to religious beliefs and county religious context, for making an abortion decision. Hierarchical modeling techniques and two waves of data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) are employed. Neither generic religiosity nor conservative Protestant religious context appear to influence women’s abortion decisions. Conversely, young women’s abortion decisions are shaped by academic ambition, identification with a conservative Protestant denomination, proximity to an abortion clinic and the level of public abortion funding in their county of residence.     

Age, period, and cohort effects on religious activities and beliefs

Despite the theoretical emphasis on religious decline in modern societies, sociologists remain divided over trends in religious activity and belief that support or refute claims of religious decline. Much of this disagreement stems from the inability to distinguish between period and cohort effects when analyzing repeated cross-sectional survey data. I use the intrinsic estimator, a recently developed method of simultaneously estimating age, period, and cohort effects, to examine changes in Americans’ religious service attendance, prayer, belief in the afterlife, and biblical literalism. Results show that regular service attendance declines, predominantly across cohorts. There are also period- and cohort-based declines in biblical literalism and a cohort-based decline in prayer. Belief in the afterlife is relatively stable across periods and cohorts. These results provide mixed support for theories of religious decline, and they demonstrate the importance of differentiating between period and cohort effects on social change.     

新疆乌恰县黑孜苇乡柯尔克孜族宗教信仰调查

历史上,柯尔克孜族先民信仰过萨满教等原始宗教,后信仰伊斯兰教。尽管柯尔克孜族皈依伊斯兰教已有数百年,但在他们今天的信仰中,我们依然可以看到远古信仰的遗留。现在在柯尔克孜族人的信仰中,原始宗教与人为宗教并存依然是其宗教信仰方面的重要特征。这样的特征,反映在他们的生活和行为中,显示出宗教信仰的复杂性。随着时间的推移和社会的发展,呈现出宗教仪式简化、宗教对生活的影响弱化和宗教观念渐趋淡泊的趋势。     

Parental same-sex relationships, family instability, and subsequent life outcomes for adult children: Answering critics of the new family structures study with additional analyses

The July 2012 publication of my study on the outcomes of young adults who report parental same-sex relationship behavior raised a variety of questions about the New Family Structures Study and my analyses and interpretations of it. This follow-up article seeks to address a variety of the more common criticisms that have been raised, to offer new commentary and analyses, and to pose questions for future analysts of the NFSS and other datasets that are poised to consider how household dynamics are associated with youth and young-adult outcomes. The new analyses I present here still reveal numerous differences between adult children who report maternal same-sex behavior (and residence with her partner) and those with still-married (heterosexual) biological parents. Far fewer differences appear between the former and several other groups, most notably never-married single mothers.     

Cohorts,education, and the evolution of tolerance

Normative and social structural explanations for changes in tolerance are tested using racial attitude items from 11 surveys between 1958 and 1978. Over the 20 years, while there were changes in the overall levels of racial tolerance, there were also changes in the upper and lower ends of a tolerance spectrum which differentially depended on cohort and educational effects. Regardless of the position in the tolerance spectrum, most of the change in racial attitudes resulted from across-the-board changes in all cohort and educational groups. The most racially conservative end of the spectrum was slightly eroded by increased educational attainment in the population, while the most racially liberal position was somewhat advanced by cohort replacement. In the final analysis, the normative perspective demonstrated the greater potential for applications to other, more complex, configurations of tolerance.     

The effect of immigration on religious belief and practice: A theologizing or alienating experience?

Using data from the New Immigrant Survey, we examine the religious beliefs and practices of new legal immigrants to the United States. We find that Christian immigrants are more Catholic, more Orthodox, and less Protestant than American Christians, and that those immigrants who are Protestant are more likely to be evangelical. In addition to being more Catholic and more Orthodox than American Christians, the new immigrants are also paradoxically less Christian, with a fifth reporting some other faith. Detailed analysis of reported church attendance at places of origin and in the United States suggest that immigration is a disruptive event that alienates immigrants from religious practice rather than “theologizing” them. In addition, our models clearly show that people who join congregations in the United States are highly selected and unrepresentative of the broader population of immigrants in any faith. In general, congregational members were more observant both before and after emigration, were more educated, had more cumulative experience in the United States, and were more likely to have children present in the household and be homeowners and therefore yield biased representations of all adherents to any faith. The degree of selectivity and hence bias also varies markedly both by religion and nationality.     

Spaces of encounter and attitudes towards difference: A comparative study of two European cities

Scholars have been increasingly interested in how everyday interactions in various places with people from different ethnic/religious background impact inter-group relations. Drawing on representative surveys in Leeds and Warsaw (2012), we examine whether encounters with ethnic and religious minorities in different type of space are associated with more tolerance towards them. We find that in Leeds, more favourable affective attitudes are associated with contact in institutional spaces (workplace and study places) and socialisation spaces (social clubs, voluntary groups, religious meeting places); however, in case of behavioural intentions – operationalised as willingness to be friendly to minority neighbours – only encounters in socialisation spaces play a significant role in prejudice reduction. In Warsaw, people who have contacts with ethnic and religious minorities in public (streets, park, public services and transport) and consumption spaces (cafés, pubs, restaurants) express more positive affective attitudes towards them, but only encounters in consumption space translate into willingness to be friendly to minority neighbours.     

Collective religiosity and the gender gap in attitudes towards economic redistribution in 86 countries, 1990–2008

What is the relationship between gender and the demand for redistribution? Because, on average, women face more economic deprivation than men, in many countries women favor redistribution more than men. However, this is not the case in a number of other countries, where women do not support redistribution more than men. To explain this cross-national paradox, we stress the role of collective religiosity. In many religions, theological principles both militate against public policies designed to redistribute income, and also promote traditionally gendered patterns of work and family involvement. Hence, we hypothesize that, in those countries where religion remains influential either through closer church-state ties or an intensely religious population, men and women should differ less in their attitudes towards redistribution. Drawing upon the World Values Survey, we estimate three-level regression models that test our religiosity-based approach and two alternative explanations in 86 countries and 175 country-years. The results are consistent with our hypothesis. Moreover, in further support of our theoretical approach, societal religiosity undermines pro-redistribution preferences more among women than men. Our findings suggest that collective religiosity matters more to the gender gap in redistributive attitudes than traditional political and labor force factors.     

宗教对于人类的意义——简论康德与黑格尔的宗教哲学

康德与黑格尔的宗教观出自启蒙运动的思想背景,虽然他们对启蒙的宗教批判持有不同的态度。基于相同的理性主义的立场,他们提出了目标一致的建立道德性宗教的主张,但在对宗教的性质的解释上却有所不同。康德将宗教看作是出自道德的需要,“上帝”是为了实现至善而设定的“公设”;黑格尔则把宗教看作与哲学一样都是纯粹的“思”,其目标是把握真理,“上帝”即是一种真理。他们的宗教哲学的一个共同缺陷,是忽视了宗教最本真的意义在于它作为精神的安身立命之所。     

Religiosity and reactions to terrorism

Although many of the world’s most serious outbreaks of conflict and violence center on religion, social science research has had relatively little to say about religion’s unique role in shaping individuals’ attitudes about these events. In this paper we investigate whether Americans’ religious beliefs play a central role in shaping attitudes toward the continuing threat of terrorism and their willingness to assist officials in countering these perceived threats. Our analysis of an original data collection of almost 1600 Americans shows that more religious respondents are more likely to express concerns about terrorism. However, this relationship is mediated by their level of conservatism. We also find that more religious respondents are more likely to claim that they will assist government officials in countering terrorism. This relationship remained even after accounting for conservatism, and people’s general willingness to help police solve crimes like breaking and entering.     

He said, she said: The gender wage gap according to self and proxy reports in the Current Population Survey

Roughly half the labor force data in the Current Population Survey (CPS) are provided by proxy respondents, and since 1979, men’s reliance on proxies has dropped dramatically while women’s reliance on proxies has increased. Few authors, however, have examined how combining these first-hand and second-hand reports may influence our understanding of long-term economic trends. We exploit the outgoing rotation group structure of the CPS by matching individual records one year apart, and we find that self-reported wages are higher than proxy-reported wages even after controlling for all time invariant characteristics. Furthermore, we find that changes in the use of proxy respondents by men and women since 1979 have made current estimates of the gender wage gap larger than they would have been without changes in reporting status. This suggests that the gender wage gap has closed more than previously estimated. We recommend that researchers combine self and proxy responses with great care, especially when analyzing time trends or making gender comparisons.     

Positive and negative contact and attitudes towards the religious out-group: Testing the contact hypothesis in conflict and non-conflict regions of Indonesia and the Philippines

This study examines the relationship between interreligious contact and negative attitudes towards the religious out-group. It uses unique survey data collected by the authors among Christian and Muslim students in Maluku and Yogyakarta (Indonesia) and Mindanao and Metro Manila (the Philippines). Even after taking self-selection effects into account, interreligious friendships reduce negative attitudes towards the religious out-group. However, casual interreligious contact increases negative out-group attitudes. Also individuals who experienced interreligious violence have more negative out-group attitudes than those without such experience. The experience of interreligious violence has no influence on the effect of interreligious friendships but it further deteriorates the relationship between casual interreligious contact and out-group attitudes. Perceived group threat is an important mechanism explaining the effects of both positive and negative interreligious contact. [125].