There is more to aptitude than cognitive capacities: Comment.

Comments on the original article "Sex Differences in Intrinsic Aptitude for Mathematics and Science?: A Critical Review," by E. S. Spelke (see record 2005-15840-001). Spelke's critical review is a research-based rebuttal (though implicitly) of Summers's (2005) speech that posited a hypothesis that one of the reasons why women are underrepresented in math, science, and engineering may be sex differences in intrinsic aptitude for mathematics and science. Putting aside the question of whether the empirical evidence was sufficiently reviewed, the way Spelke conceptualized aptitude as a static rather than a dynamic quality (namely, cognitive capacities) rendered her critique of the "differences in intrinsic aptitude" hypothesis less effective in many respects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Coda--After "The end of the end of ideology."

Replies to comments by M. Glassman and D. Karno (see record 2007-18356-016) and R. K. Unger (see record 2007-18356-017), on the author's original article (see record 2006-12925-001) on ideology. J. T. Jost thanks Glassman and Karno for returning him to his philosophical roots. Glassman and Karno argued in favor of an "instrumental pragmatist" approach to the study of ideology that emphasizes the strategic, purposive, goal-directed nature of political rhetoric and belief. He agrees that such an approach is helpful and empirically sound. He also agrees that ideological movements are often orchestrated by elites (e.g., party leaders) for strategic political purposes in a top-down manner. There are several other points, however, on which Glassman and Karno seem to misunderstand him. Regarding Unger's comments, Unger pointed out, quite correctly, that Jost said relatively little about the role of religious ideology in his discussion of ideological polarization in the United States. The ideological gulf between religious traditionalists and secular humanists has indeed been widening since 1980, and it corresponds strongly to right-left differences in political attitudes. Jost mentioned, somewhat cryptically, at the end of his article that "similarly fruitful analyses could be undertaken with respect to religious and other belief systems," and he is grateful for Unger's invitation to elaborate on this point. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond artificial, sex-linked distinctions to conceptualize female sexuality: Comment on Baumeister (2000).

The authors comment on three aspects of R. F. Baumeister's (2000) (see record 2000-15386-001) theoretical article on female sexuality. Questioning the predominance of nature versus cultural factors in accounting for sexual outcomes for men and women, the authors draw attention to the similarities (as opposed to differences) in the sexual attitudes, behaviors, and responses of men and women, and directly question the suggestion of "controlling" women's sexual attitudes, behaviors, responses, etc. to meet social needs for change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Paper or plastic revisited: Let's keep them both--Reply to Broderick and Stone (2006); Tennen, Affleck, Coyne, Larsen, and DeLongis (2006); and Takarangi, Garry, and Loftus (2006).

The authors review commentaries by J. E. Broderick and A. A. Stone (2006)(see record 2006-03820-007); H. Tennen, G. Affleck, J. C. Coyne, R. J. Larsen, and A. DeLongis (2006)(see record 2006-03820-008); and M. K. T. Takarangi, M. Garry, and E. F. Loftus (2006)(see record 2006-03820-009) on their original article (A. S. Green, E. Rafaeli, N. Bolger, P. Shrout, & H. T. Reis, 2006)(see record 2006-03820-006). The authors were pleased to find more agreement than disagreement regarding the choice of methods for conducting diary studies. It is clear that continued critical evaluation of all diary methods, both paper and plastic, is warranted. However, on the basis of their initial findings, the authors conclude that paper diaries are still likely to have a valuable place in researchers' toolboxes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychological perspectives on political change.

Presents a reply by the authors to comments by Sullivan (see record 2007-14606-016) and Webster (see record 2007-14606-017). Both of these comments help to place our article on the red states versus blue states metaphor (Seyle & Newman, see record 2006-11202-001) into a broader context. In particular, both comments make valuable points about the potential for collaboration between psychology, political science, and political action. Sullivan made two points that address this collaboration directly. First, he pointed out that we failed to acknowledge a book by Morris Fiorina and his colleagues. Second, Sullivan disagreed with our claim that psychologists cannot change the system. Webster argued persuasively that we let the Electoral College off too easy. To support his indictment of the Electoral College, he drew on two compelling sources of evidence. First, because of changes in population distribution, electoral votes appear to play more of a role in the outcome of elections than they have at any time in the past. Second, the weighting system used to determine a state's number of electoral votes has the consequence of underrepresenting minority populations. However, we are less optimistic than Webster that this approach might "eliminate red- blue labeling" (p. 703). Thus, we repeat our original suggestion that the best short-term solution for improving political discourse is to encourage the use of the "purple America" approach. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Considering phasic alerting in Alzheimer's disease: Comment on Tales et al. (2006).

A. Tales, R. J. Snowden, M. Brown, and G. Wilcock (2006; see record 2006-20657-014) have questioned the authors' view (see record 2004-12990-007) of a possible interdependence between attentional systems mediating exogenous spatial orienting and phasic alerting as well as the authors' suggestion that phasic alerting deficits in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) may be influencing their performance on tests of spatial orienting. Consistent with this possibility, both laboratories have previously demonstrated increased spatial orienting and decreased phasic alerting in patients with AD. In Tales et al.'s current study, however, they have instead suggested that their results provide evidence for functional independence between these attentional systems in AD. In this commentary, the authors address the misinterpretations of their study and evaluate the degree to which Tales et al.'s study addresses the issues that they raise. Given Tales et al.'s difficulty performing analyses on response time data because of variance issues, the presence of a reduced (although not significant) alerting effect in Tales et al.'s AD group (consistent with the authors' previous findings), and a potential floor effect in their measure of alerting, the authors question the validity of Tales et al.'s conclusions and reaffirm their position that not considering interactions among attentional systems can lead to inaccurate characterizations of the mechanisms by which they operate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Basic emotions: Can conflicting criteria converge?

Discusses some of the key points raised by P. Ekman (see record 1992-41830-001), C. E. Izard (see record 1992-41836-001), and J. Panksepp (see record 1992-41839-001) in their critiques of A. Ortony and T. J. Turner's (see record 1990-27526-001) suggestion that there are and probably can be no objective and generally acceptable criteria for what is to count as a basic emotion. A number of studies are discussed that are relevant to the authors' contention that a more promising approach to understanding the huge diversity among emotions is to think in terms of emotions being assemblages of basic components rather than combinations of other basic emotions. The authors stress that their position does not deny that emotions are based on "hardwired" biological systems. On the other hand, the existence of such systems does not mean that some emotions (such as those that appear on lists of basic emotions) have a special status. Finally, the authors note that Ekman, Izard, and Panksepp, in adopting different starting points for their research, arrive at rather different conclusions as to what basic emotions are and which emotions are basic. It is concluded that converging resolutions of these questions are improbable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Religious ideology, a neglected variable.

Comments on an article by J. T. Jost (see record 2006-12925-001), which presented interesting data relating some personality dimensions to voting patterns in the last three U.S. presidential elections. R. K. Unger is surprised that in his extensive review of the role of ideology, Jost ignored the role of religious ideology in political attitudes and voting behavior. There is ample evidence that level of religious observance (sometimes labeled religiosity, hierarchical religious beliefs, or religious fundamentalism) played a role in 2004 and earlier presidential elections. The relationship between religious ideology and political attitudes is correlational, and one needs to look further for an explanation of their impact. A number of studies indicate relationships between religious fundamentalism and what Jost has termed "system-justifying ideologies." Unger suggests that religiosity has been largely ignored by psychologists interested in social and political behaviors. It is quite possible that religiosity is related to the various personality dimensions discussed by Jost. But we cannot learn more about these potential connections if we continue to ignore the importance of religious ideology as a psychological variable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Science, public policy, and legal recognition of same-sex relationships.

In their comments on my article discussing the social science data relevant to societal recognition of same-sex committed relationships (see record 2006-11202-004), Rosik and Byrd (see record 2007-14606-024) and Schiller (see record 2007-14606-025) criticized aspects of my analysis and raised questions about the role of psychology in policy debates concerning sexual orientation. In the limited space available here, I first respond to their specific criticisms and then briefly consider the broader policy question. Both comments raised questions about whether and how psychologists should address policy issues related to sexual orientation. Rosik and Byrd advocated what they called a "measured approach" that "would distinguish the social scientist from the social activist" (p. 712). In practice, however, their measured approach apparently allows for vague constructs (e.g., men's "uncivilized" sexual nature), accepts conservative social activists' assumptions (e.g., about the necessity of marital "gender complementarity"), and ignores data that contradict their predictions (e.g., Badgett, 2004). Thus, it clearly is inadequate as a source for guidance. As for Tyler's fourth criterion (see record 200714606-026), it is difficult to know if and how psychologists' efforts in this arena will be effective. Regardless of the ultimate policy outcome, however, to the extent that we successfully communicate accurate information about the current state of scientific knowledge on sexual orientation and same-sex relationships, we will have remained true to our commitment to take a leading role in removing the stigma associated with homosexuality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Family factors and adolescents' alcohol use: A reply to Chassin and Handley (2006) and Fromme (2006).

In this reply, the authors address the comments of L. Chassin and E. D. Handley (see record 2006-07521-006) and of K. Fromme (see record 2006-07521-007) on the authors' article, "Parental Attachment, Parental Control, and Early Development of Alcohol Use: A Longitudinal Study" (see record 2006-07521-002). Further, the authors elaborate on some topics in the area of parenting and substance use-for example, testing bidirectional associations between parenting and adolescents' substance use, the importance of measuring substance-specific socialization, and the relevance of using within-family designs and multi-informant data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive styles partly explain gender disparity in engineering: Comment.

Comments on the original article "Sex Differences in Intrinsic Aptitude for Mathematics and Science?: A Critical Review," by E. S. Spelke (see record 2005-15840-001). Spelke reviewed an assortment of studies showing how rare the differences are between genders in mathematics ability. Yet she also mentioned that academic faculties of U.S. universities in the mathematics-related fields of science and engineering are predominantly male. Aside from differences in gender roles, some of the disparity may also be due to gender differences in cognitive styles, particularly the styles best matched to science and engineering. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Gender similarities still rule.

Replies to comments made by Archer (see record 2006-11202-012), Lippa (see record 2006-11202-013), and Davies and Shackelford (see record 2006-11202-014) on the current author's original article (see record 2005-11115-001). The current author addresses the criticisms put forth by each of these commenting authors, and concludes that the best available scientific evidence continues to support the gender similarities hypothesis, that males and females are similar on most, but not all, psychological variables. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assumptions and Consequences of Treating Providers in Therapy Studies as Fixed Versus Random Effects: Reply to Crits-Christoph, Tu, and Gallop (2003) and Serlin, Wampold, and Levin (2003).

In their comments on the authors' article (see record 2003-10163-009), R. C. Serlin, B. E. Wampold, and J. R. Levin (see record 2003-10163-011) and P. Crits-Christoph, X. Tu, and R. Gallop (see record 2003-10163-010) took issue with the authors' suggestion to evaluate therapy studies with nested providers with a fixed model approach. In this rejoinder, the authors' comment on Serlin et al's critique by showing that their arguments do not apply, are based on misconceptions about the purpose and nature of statistical inference, or are based on flawed reasoning. The authors also comment on Crits-Christoph et al's critique by showing that the proposed approach is very similar to, but less inclusive than, their own suggestion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Building more solid bridges between Buddhism and Western psychology.

Introducing the ways of cultivating mental balance, B. A. Wallace and S. L. Shapiro (see record 2006-12925-003) attempted to build bridges between Buddhism and psychology. Their systematic categorization of Buddhist teachings and extensive review of empirical support from Western psychology are valuable for future study. However, it remains a matter of concern that some more profound parts of Buddhist philosophy can be disregarded by focusing only on practical aspects of Buddhism within the context of mental health. In this comment, the authors briefly address four substantial themes to be considered: reality, identity, causality, and logicality. They suggest that the way to interpret Buddhism as techniques for well-being would certainly be viable in encouraging the study of Buddhist teachings in psychology. Yet, such attempts should not result in superficial imports and applications of Buddhist practices but give due weight to the deeper philosophical issues to build more solid bridges between Buddhism and psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sacred space, not sacred cows, or it's never fun being prophetic.

Replies to comments by E. F. Loftus (see record 1998-00766-029), S. Buchholz (see record 1998-00766-030), L. G. Humphreys (see record 1998-00766-031), D. S. Lindsay (see record 1998-00766-032), and T. Dineen (see record 1998-00766-033) regarding the article (see record 84-26142) concerning managed care and false memory movement issues in social justice-oriented psychology. Firstly, Brown contends that Loftus"s assertions of misrepresentation are inaccurate. Secondly, Brown argues that making memory retrieval per se the guiding strategy and goal of therapy is more likely to be detrimental than helpful to abuse survivors, and is not consistent with a pro-survivor stance. It is also stated that each claim of recovered memories must be evaluated carefully and on an individual basis in light of all available evidence. Lastly, Brown argues that her goal for her colleagues and readers was for them to develop and assert their own strategies for the achievement of tikkunolam, to be the authors of their own actions, as she attempts to create a therapy in which clients are the authors of their own lives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Psychological testing.

Reviews "Psychological testing," by Anne Anastasi (see record 1954-15003-000). Anastasi's book is scholarly, thoughtful, and thorough. Its coverage is broad, yet there has necessarily been selection. The selection has been generally good and the emphases well placed. As an example of textbook organization and writing, this volume may well serve as a model. In spite of good writing, however, the reading will not be found easy except by the better students. The author seems to be right at home when discussing such disparate subjects as factor analysis and projective techniques; measures of artistic aptitude and situational tests; infant tests and measures of deterioration. The author brings into high relief the great amount of floundering that has occurred in connection with attempts to measure deterioration, with projective techniques, and with situational tests. Like most authors who write about tests, she thinks of them entirely as measures of individual differences. It is time that we broaden this conception and recognize that "occasional differences" are also measured by means of tests and that the experimental psychologist is perpetually using tests for this purpose. In only one important place does the author seem uncritical: when she accepts the "projective line" that projective tests take the "global approach." A debatable point, which Anastasi recognizes, is the false dichotomy that has persisted between aptitude tests and personality tests. Surely an individual's abilities are a part of his personality. Overall, it is difficult to find flaws in this book, technical or otherwise. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Leadership and attachment theory.

Comments on the six articles contained in the special issue of the American Psychologist (January 2007) devoted to leadership, written by W. Bennis (see record 2006-23492-002); S. J. Zaccaro (see record 2006-23492-003); V. H. Vroom and A. G. Yago (see record 2006-23492-004); B. J. Avolio (see record 2006-23492-005); R. J. Sternberg (see record 2006-23492-006); and R. J. Hackman and R. Wageman (see record 2006-23492-007). The current authors opine that the inclusion of attachment theory in the study of leadership could strengthen leadership theories as a whole. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Einhorn.

Responds to D. Einhorn's (see record 1986-26897-001) comments on the present authors' (see record 1986-11382-001) critique on moral development vs socialization by defending the importance of societalist and individualist analyses and by addressing Einborn's suggestion that the present authors abandon their eclecticism and take issue with the "criticism" of Kohlberg, which implies that Stages 3 and 4 should be viewed more favorably because those stages only involve "mindlessly obeying the letter of the law." (7 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The argument for constructivism.

Comments on D. C. Geary's (see record 1995-16916-001) assumption that there is a cerebral primacy in the development of knowledge and the suggestion that there is acontinuum between basic skeletal processes developed by humans as a result of evolutionary processes. Criticizes Geary's point that educational models in which children are offered freedom in the way they learn secondary cognitive abilities (e.g., constructivism), may not be the best possible technique, especially in area of mathematics education . The author acknowledges that culturally enforced "drilling" methods suggested by Geary may, in fact, be more detrimental. The Vygotskian notion of the evolution of knowledge, social constructivism, works far better than "drilling." Education in secondary cognitive abilities must incorporate ways for children to understand motivations and discovering the meaning of mathematics in their own lives through solving of problems, hence, what is known as social constructivism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)