What Do We Know About Making Risk Comparisons?

The risks of unfamiliar technologies are often evaluated by comparing them with the risks of more familiar ones. Such risk comparisons have been criticized for neglecting critical dimensions of risky decisions. In a guide written for the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Covello et al. (¹) have summarized these critiques and developed a taxonomy that characterizes possible risk comparisons in terms of their acceptability (or objectionableness). We asked four diverse groups of subjects to judge the acceptability of 14 statements produced by Covello et al. as examples of their categories. We found no correlation between the judgments of acceptability produced by our subjects and those predicted by Covello et al. .     

Do Reports on Drinking Water Quality Affect Customers' Concerns? Experiments in Report Content

The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 required U.S. utilities to report on drinking water quality to their customers annually, beginning in fall 1999, on the assumption that such reports would alert them to quality problems and perhaps mobilize pressure for improvement. A random sample of New Jersey customers read alternative versions of a water quality report, in an experiment on reactions to water quality information under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) rules. Experiment design was 2 x 3 + 1: two versions each--one with, one without, a violation of a health standard--of a report that was (1) Qualitative (without water quality numbers, thus not meeting USEPA rules); (2) Basic, with minimal information meeting the rules; or (3) Extended, adding reading aids and utility performance information; plus a control instrument without any hypothetical report. Results of ANOVA suggest the reports will have less effect than hoped or feared. These manipulations were successful: people reading the Qualitative versions were less likely to say that the report gave the amounts of substances found in the water, and those reading Violation versions were more likely to report a violation of a health standard. The main differences in responses to the report involved the judged adequacy of the information, and to a lesser extent responses on a Concern scale (constructed from measures of concern, judged risk, clean-up intentions, distrust of utility information, and doubt that the utility was doing all it could to improve water quality). Overall judgments of water quality and utility performance did not change, either relative to the controls or in before versus after responses. Qualitative reports performed worse than others, confirming the decision to have utilities report actual contaminant levels. Extended reports did only slightly better than the Basic versions on these measures. Many respondents had trouble identifying the presence or absence of substance amounts or violations, despite their seeming obviousness (e.g., in a \"bottom line\" summary on the front page of each report), suggesting many were not processing this information carefully. However, the pattern of responses for those who accurately identified the presence or absence of substance amounts or violations did not differ substantially from that for the group as a whole. Generic risk beliefs (serious local environmental problems; lack of control over risks to one's health) dominated demographic variables, attitudes toward utility water quality or trustworthiness, and the content and format of water quality reports in influencing concern about drinking water quality. Previous empirical and theoretical evidence for lack of change in public risk attitudes due to one-time or infrequent communications--e.g., role of personal experience, perseverance of prior trust or distrust--seems to be confirmed for annual water quality reports.     

Evaluating Risk Communications: Completing and Correcting Mental Models of Hazardous Processes, Part II

We propose a decision-analytic framework, called the mental models approach , for evaluating the impact of risk communications. It employs multiple evaluation methods, including think-aloud protocol analysis, problem solving, and a true-false test that allows respondents to express uncertainty about their answers. The approach is illustrated in empirical comparisons of three brochures about indoor radon.     

Climate Change Risk Perception and Communication: Addressing a Critical Moment?

Climate change is an increasingly salient issue for societies and policy‐makers worldwide. It now raises fundamental interdisciplinary issues of risk and uncertainty analysis and communication. The growing scientific consensus over the anthropogenic causes of climate change appears to sit at odds with the increasing use of risk discourses in policy: for example, to aid in climate adaptation decision making. All of this points to a need for a fundamental revision of our conceptualization of what it is to do climate risk communication. This Special Collection comprises seven papers stimulated by a workshop on “Climate Risk Perceptions and Communication” held at Cumberland Lodge Windsor in 2010. Topics addressed include climate uncertainties, images and the media, communication and public engagement, uncertainty transfer in climate communication, the role of emotions, localization of hazard impacts, and longitudinal analyses of climate perceptions. Climate change risk perceptions and communication work is critical for future climate policy and decisions.     

Conventional Wisdom on Risk Communication and Evidence from a Field Experiment

A recent comprehensive review of the literature identified a number of facts and principles governing risk communication. This paper evaluates several of these propositions using recent evidence from a field experiment in communicating the risks from radon in homes. At this point in the research, data relates primarily to the response of risk perceptions to different information treatments and different personal characteristics. The effect of various causal factors is sensitive to the particular test of risk perception applied. No information treatment was clearly superior for all tasks. An important implication of these findings is that risk communicators must determine what specific task or tasks the information program should enable people to do.     

Agency Communication, Community Outrage, and Perception of Risk: Three Simulation Experiments

Three experimental studies were conducted employing hypothetical news stories to compare the effects on reader risk perceptions of two situations: when agency communication behavior was reported to be responsive to citizens' risk concerns, vs. when the agency was reported to be unresponsive. In the first two experiments, news stories of public meetings filled with distrust and controversy led to ratings indicating greater perceived risk than news stories reporting no distrust or controversy, even though the risk information was held constant. This effect appeared clearly when the differences in meeting tone were extreme and subjects made their ratings from their recall of the stories, but it was much weaker when the differences were moderate and subjects were allowed to go back over the news stories to help separate risk information from conflict information. In the third experiment, news stories about a spill cleanup systematically varied the seriousness of the spill, the amount of technical information provided in the story, and the agency behavior and resulting community outrage. The outrage manipulation significantly affected affective and cognitive components of perceived risk, but not hypothetical behavioral intentions. Seriousness and technical detail had very little effect on perceived risk.     

Public Perceptions of the Potential Hazards Associated with Food Production and Food Consumption: An Empirical Study

Although public perceptions of food-related hazards receive much media comment and debate, the research literature on such perceptions is sparse and piecemeal. In the reported study, 216 people completed a questionnaire relating to their perceptions of the "risk characteristics" of potential hazards associated with various aspects of food production and food consumption. Responses were examined via principal-components analysis to obtain a structural representation of risk perception of the kind provided by Fischhoff, Slovic, and their colleagues in their seminal psychometric work.^(1,2) A three-component solution accounting for 87% of the variance was obtained, with the dimensions labeled as "severity,""unknown," and "number of people exposed." The findings also yielded information pointing to evidence of the phenomenon of unrealistic optimism. We conclude that our findings offer a useful base upon which further in-depth research integrating different perspectives on risk perception with respect to food-related hazards may be developed.     

Trust,Emotion, Sex,Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield

Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. Polarized views, controversy, and conflict have become pervasive. Research has begun to provide a new perspective on this problem by demonstrating the complexity of the concept risk and the inadequacies of the traditional view of risk assessment as a purely scientific enterprise. This paper argues that danger is real, but risk is socially constructed. Risk assessment is inherently subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment with important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors. In addition, our social and democratic institutions, remarkable as they are in many respects, breed distrust in the risk arena. Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics and other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power. Scientific literacy and public education are important, but they are not central to risk controversies. The public is not irrational. Their judgments about risk are influenced by emotion and affect in a way that is both simple and sophisticated. The same holds true for scientists. Public views are also influenced by worldviews, ideologies, and values; so are scientists' views, particularly when they are working at the limits of their expertise. The limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of maintaining trust, and the complex, sociopolitical nature of risk point to the need for a new approach—one that focuses upon introducing more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision making in order to make the decision process more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of technical analysis, and increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of the resulting decisions.     

Informing and Educating the Public About Risk

The objective of informing and educating the public about risk issues seems easy to attain in principle, but, in practice, may be difficult to accomplish. This paper attempts to illustrate why this is so. To be effective, risk communicators must recognize and overcome a number of obstacles that have their roots in the limitations of scientific risk assessment and the idiosyncrasies of the human mind. Doing an adequate job of communicating means finding comprehensible ways of presenting complex technical material that is clouded by uncertainty and inherently difficult to understand. The problems may not be insurmountable, however, if designers of risk information programs are sensitive to the difficulties.     

Presenting Uncertainty in Health Risk Assessment: Initial Studies of Its Effects on Risk Perception and Trust

Some analysts suggest that discussing uncertainties in health risk assessments might reduce citizens'perceptions of risk and increase their respect for the risk-assessing agency. We tested this assumption with simulated news stories varying simple displays of uncertainty (e.g., a range of risk estimates, with and without graphics). Subjects from Eugene, Oregon, read one story each, and then answered a questionnaire. Three studies tested between 180 and 272 subjects each. Two focus groups obtained more detailed responses to these stories. The results suggested that (1) people are unfamiliar with uncertainty in risk assessments and in science; (2) people may recognize uncertainty when it is presented simply; (3) graphics may help people recognize uncertainty; (4) reactions to the environmental problems in the stories seemed affected less by presentation of uncertainty than by general risk attitudes and perceptions; (5) agency discussion of uncertainty in risk estimates may signal agency honesty and agency incompetence for some people; and (6) people seem to see lower risk estimates (10^-6, as opposed to 10^-3) as less credible. These findings, if confirmed, would have important implications for risk communication.     

Risk Perception and Communication Unplugged: Twenty Years of Process1

Over the past twenty years, risk communication researchers and practitioners have learned some lessons, often at considerable personal price. For the most part, the mistakes that they have made have been natural, even intelligent ones. As a result, the same pitfalls may tempt newcomers to the field. This essay offers a personal (even confessional) history of the field over this period. It identifies a series of developmental stages. Progress through the stages involves consolidating the skills needed to execute it and learning its limitations. Knowing about their existence might speed the learning process and alert one to how much there still is to learn.