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网约车新政下平台和乘客的Stackelberg博弈模型及策略研究
引用本文:雷丽彩,高尚. 网约车新政下平台和乘客的Stackelberg博弈模型及策略研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(9): 14-20. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0279
作者姓名:雷丽彩  高尚
作者单位:1.湘潭大学 商学院,湖南 湘潭 411105; 2.南京大学 工程管理学院,江苏 南京 210093
基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上项目(72171207);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(19YJA630030)
摘    要:近年来,滴滴和优步等网约车平台的出现给城市居民出行带来了新的选择,然而随着新政的实施以及垄断巨头的酝酿诞生,网约车平台是否会降补贴提车价成为消费者最为关心的问题。文章构建网约车平台和乘客之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了网约车平台的补贴和抽成策略对乘客是否选择网约车出行的决策行为以及网约车市场均衡的影响。理论研究和仿真结果表明:网约车平台合理的补贴力度和抽成力度可以有效规避行政监管成本增加和乘客资源流失的风险,提高双方的收益,实现社会的帕累托最优。

关 键 词:网约车服务  平台策略  Stackelberg博弈  出行决策
收稿时间:2019-08-26

Stackelberg Game Model and Strategy Research between the Platform and Passengers under the New Rules of Ride-hailing Services
LEI Li-cai,GAO Shang. Stackelberg Game Model and Strategy Research between the Platform and Passengers under the New Rules of Ride-hailing Services[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2022, 31(9): 14-20. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0279
Authors:LEI Li-cai  GAO Shang
Affiliation:1. Business School, Xiangtan University, Xiangtan 411105, China; 2. School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
Abstract:For the past years, ride-hailing services, consisting of Didi and Uber, have brought a new choice to the travel of urban residents. However, with the promulgation of new policies and the emergence of industrial monopoly giants in China, whether ride-hailing platform will drop subsides and improve prices becomes the most concern for consumers and the hot problem discussed at present. The Stackelberg model between platform and passengers is established to analyze the impact of platform's strategy(subsidy and commission)on market equilibrium and the optimal trip decision behaviors of passengers. The theoretical research and simulation results indicate that the reasonable subsidy and commission mechanism can effectively avoid the risk of administrative cost increasing and the loss of passenger resources, and can increase revenue of the whole system and further achieve the Pareto optimal of society.
Keywords:ride-hailing services  platform's strategy  Stackelberg game  travel decision  
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