| 装配式建筑企业技术研发与政府激励的 演化博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈勇,李忠富. 装配式建筑企业技术研发与政府激励的 演化博弈研究[J]. 工程管理学报, 2020, 34(1): 13-018. DOI: 10.13991/j.cnki.jem.2020.01.003 |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈勇 李忠富 |
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| 作者单位： | 1,2. 大连理工大学 建设管理系;1. 辽宁大学 商学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于自然人有限理性观点和不对称信息条件，引入企业研发失败概率和研发溢出效应以及政府政策溢出效应构建了 地方政府激励政策与装配式建筑企业创新策略的演化博弈模型，分析双方的演化稳定策略。通过分析可知政府的激励决策受 政府激励成本、企业研发为政府带来的社会收益和环境收益等因素影响较大；企业的研发决策受研发成本、研发收益、研发 风险、技术研发外部性以及政府激励的影响较大；技术研发失败概率应控制在合理区间，有助于实现博弈最优均衡。政府应 为企业打造良好的研发环境和技术交易服务平台保障企业的技术研发活动，不宜仅通过提高研发补贴促进企业参与研发；企 业应立足自身条件，充分考虑研发风险因素和外部性影响，合理制定研发决策。
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| 关 键 词： | 装配式建筑 技术研发 政府激励 演化博弈 |
Evolutionary Game-based Study on the Research and Development of Prefabricated Construction Enterprises and Government Incentive |
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| CHEN Yong,LI Zhong-fu1. Evolutionary Game-based Study on the Research and Development of Prefabricated Construction Enterprises and Government Incentive[J]. Journal of Engineering Management, 2020, 34(1): 13-018. DOI: 10.13991/j.cnki.jem.2020.01.003 |
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| Authors: | CHEN Yong LI Zhong-fu1 |
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| Affiliation: | 1,2. Department of Construction Management，Dalian University of Technology;1. Business School，Liaoning University |
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| Abstract: | Based on bounded rationality and asymmetric information，this paper introduced the probability of failure and overflow effect of enterprises’ R&D and overflow effect of stimulus policies to establish the evolutionary game model between government and prefabricated building enterprises, which is capable of analyzing the stimulus policies of government and R&D strategy of enterprises as well as the evolutionary stable strategy（ESS）. According to the game analysis，the stimulation cost of government， social benefits, and environmental benefits generated by the enterprises’ R&D have an important impact on government decision； cost，benefits，risk and overflow effect of R&D，and stimulation of government deeply impact enterprises’ R&D decision accordingly. It’s important to control the probability of R&D failure within a reasonable range which contributes to achieving optimal equilibrium. The government should establish a good R&D environment and service platform of technology transactions for enterprises rather than increase subsidies for R&D to promote enterprises participating in R&D of prefabricated building. The enterprises should make R&D decisions by comprehensive considering R&D risk and spillover effect base on corporation’s characteristics. |
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| Keywords: | refabricated building technological R& D government stimulation evolutionary game |
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