| 公众参与、政府监管与移动应用安全治理动态演化研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 万晓榆,龙宇,蒋婷.公众参与、政府监管与移动应用安全治理动态演化研究[J].运筹与管理,2018,27(11):50-60. |
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| 作者姓名： | 万晓榆 龙宇 蒋婷 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆邮电大学 经济管理学院, 重庆 400065 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金资助项目(15XGL024);重庆市社会科学规划一般项目(2015YBGL111) |
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| 摘 要： | 针对当前移动应用安全问题突出与政府部门缺乏有效监管的现实情境,本研究以演化博弈模型为主要理论工具,开发了不完全信息下政府部门与应用平台的动态演化博弈系统。通过雅克比矩阵求解和数值仿真模拟揭示了初始条件改变以及决策参数取值不同对演化稳定结果的影响。研究表明:当公众参与度与惩罚力度两个因子的取值位于不同的阈值区间时,系统分别呈现出三种演化稳定结果以及一种周期性的随机状态;利用公众参与同政府部门监管的互补关系,保持公众参与度处于一定阈值之上、同时加大对应用平台违规行为的惩罚力度有助于引导系统向理想状态演化。研究结论为政府部门政策制定及实施提供理论参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府部门 应用平台 公众参与 演化博弈 治理 |
| 收稿时间： | 2017-06-02 |
Public Participation,Government Regulation and the Dynamic Evolution Research into Mobile Application Security Management |
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| WAN Xiao-Yu,LONG Yu,JIANG Ting.Public Participation,Government Regulation and the Dynamic Evolution Research into Mobile Application Security Management[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2018,27(11):50-60. |
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| Authors: | WAN Xiao-Yu LONG Yu JIANG Ting |
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| Affiliation: | School of Economics and Management, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065, China |
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| Abstract: | Focusing on the spotlighted safety problem and the reality of lacking government supervision at the current mobile application market, a dynamic evolutionary game system of government departments and the application platform under incomplete information is constructed based on evolutionary game theory tool. The paper reveals the influence of initial condition changes and different decision parameters on the evolutionary stability results by solving the Jacobi matrix and numerical simulation. The results show that: When the value of the public participation degree and punishment is in different intervals, it respectively presents three evolutionary stable results and a periodic random state; Utilizing the complementary relationship between public participation and government regulation, keeping the public participation above a certain threshold and increasing the punishment for the application platform violations will help guide the system to evolve into an ideal state. The research conclusions provide theoretical reference for policy formulation and implementation of government departments. |
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| Keywords: | government sector app platform public participation evolutionary game governance |
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