| 不同主导力量下考虑公平偏好的旅游供应链定价策略 |
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| 引用本文： | 林强,陈林,甯清万,秦星红. 不同主导力量下考虑公平偏好的旅游供应链定价策略[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(1): 87-95. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.01.012 |
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| 作者姓名： | 林强 陈林 甯清万 秦星红 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆第二师范学院 婴幼产品与服务供应链研究中心, 重庆 400067;2. 重庆工商大学 商务策划学院, 重庆 400067 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71802031)；重庆市教委人文社会科学研究基地资助项目(18SKJD044)；重庆市教委科技学术研究资助项目(KJQN201802403)；重庆第二师范学院大学生科研项目(KY20180246) |
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| 摘 要： | 为了研究不同主导力量下决策者的公平偏好特征对旅游供应链定价策略的影响，建立了由一个景区和一个旅行社组成的旅游供应链Stackelberg主从博弈模型，在景区主导和旅行社主导两种供应链权势结构下，引入从属方的公平偏好特征，研究公平偏好信息对称与不对称情形下的定价策略，并进行对比分析。结果表明，景区主导情形下，旅行社公平偏好信息对称时，景区将采取降低门票批发价格行为，旅行社最优销售价格不变；旅行社公平偏好信息不对称时，景区最优门票价格不变，旅行社最优销售价格逐渐增大。旅行社主导情形下，无论景区公平偏好信息对称与否，景区最优门票批发价格逐渐增大，旅行社最优销售价格不变，但信息不对称下的景区最优门票价格小于信息对称情形。
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| 关 键 词： | 主导力量 公平偏好 旅游供应链 定价策略 Stackelberg博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-04-03 |
A Research on Pricing Strategy of Tourism Supply Chain Based on Different Dominant Forces and Fairness Preference |
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| LIN Qiang,CHEN Lin,NING Qingwan,QIN Xinghong. A Research on Pricing Strategy of Tourism Supply Chain Based on Different Dominant Forces and Fairness Preference[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2020, 23(1): 87-95. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.01.012 |
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| Authors: | LIN Qiang CHEN Lin NING Qingwan QIN Xinghong |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Research Center for Infant Products and Services Supply Chain, Chongqing University of Education, Chongqing 400067, China;2. School of Business Planning, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China |
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| Abstract: | In order to study the influence of the fairness preference of the decision-maker under different leading forces on the pricing strategy of tourism service supply chain, a Stackelberg game model for tourism service supply chain composed of a scenic spot and a travel agency is established, and the fairness preference of dependent party is introduced into the model. Under different power structures of supply chain, the pricing strategies of information symmetry and asymmetry of fair preference are studied and compared. The results show that: in the case of the scenic spot dominating the supply chain, when the information of travel agencies' fairness preference is symmetrical, the scenic spot will adopt the behavior of reducing the wholesale price, and the optimal selling price of travel agency remains unchanged; when the information of the travel agency's fairness preference is asymmetric, the optimal wholesale price of scenic spot remains the same, while the optimal selling price of travel agency increases gradually. In the case of travel agency leading the supply chain, the optimal wholesale price of scenic spot gradually increases, and the optimal selling price of travel agency remains the same, whether the fairness preference information is symmetrical or not. However, the optimal wholesale price of scenic spots in the case of information asymmetry is smaller than that in the case of information symmetry. |
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| Keywords: | leading force fairness preference tourism service supply chain pricing strategy Stackelberg game |
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