风险偏好视角下 PPP 项目控制权初始分配

为有效提高 PPP 项目中政企合作水平和效率，以政企控制权初始分配作为研究节点，基于政企风险偏好和有限理性状态，构建风险投资期望效用模型，得出不同风险偏好组合下的初始控制权分配情景。并从政企风险偏好组合下的 4 种情景，运用算例模拟论证不同风险偏好对控制权初始分配及政府风险投资期望效用的影响。结果表明，政府风险中性时社会资本初始控制权份额与其风险规避程度呈负相关且有最低限度，反之与其风险趋向程度呈正相关且有最高限度。不同风险偏好组合对政府风险投资期望效用有不同影响。因此，政府应充分考虑双方风险偏好，确定最优初始控制权分配份额，以促进PPP 项目高效实施。

Initial Allocation of Control Rights in PPP ProjectsFrom the Perspective of Risk Preference

To effectively improve the degree and efficiency of cooperation between government and private enterprises in PPPprojects, this paper takes the initial distribution of control rights between government and private enterprises as the research node,constructs the expected utility model of venture capital based on the risk preference and bounded rationality state of government andenterprises, and builds the initial distribution scenarios of control rights under different risk preferences. Based on four scenariosunder the risk preference packages of government and enterprises, the influence of different risk preferences on the initial distributionof control rights and the expected utility of government venture capital is simulated and demonstrated by cases. The results show thatwhen the government risk is neutral, the initial control share of social capital is negatively correlated with its risk aversion degree andhas the lowest limit, whereas it is positively correlated with its risk tendency degree and has the highest limit. Different riskpreference combinations have different effects on the expected utility of government venture capital. Therefore, the governmentshould fully consider the risk preferences of both parties and determine the optimal initial share of control rights distribution topromote the efficient implementation of PPP projects.