Identifying and Verifying Vulnerabilities through PLC Network Protocol and Memory Structure Analysis |
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Authors: | Joo-Chan Lee Hyun-Pyo Choi Jang-Hoon Kim Jun-Won Kim Da-Un Jung Ji-Ho Shin Jung-Taek Seo |
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Affiliation: | 1.Department of Information Security Engineering, Soonchunhyang University, Asan, 31538, Korea. |
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Abstract: | Cyberattacks on the Industrial Control System (ICS) have recently been
increasing, made more intelligent by advancing technologies. As such, cybersecurity for
such systems is attracting attention. As a core element of control devices, the
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) in an ICS carries out on-site control over the ICS. A
cyberattack on the PLC will cause damages on the overall ICS, with Stuxnet and Duqu as
the most representative cases. Thus, cybersecurity for PLCs is considered essential, and
many researchers carry out a variety of analyses on the vulnerabilities of PLCs as part of
preemptive efforts against attacks. In this study, a vulnerability analysis was conducted on
the XGB PLC. Security vulnerabilities were identified by analyzing the network protocols
and memory structure of PLCs and were utilized to launch replay attack, memory
modulation attack, and FTP/Web service account theft for the verification of the results.
Based on the results, the attacks were proven to be able to cause the PLC to malfunction
and disable it, and the identified vulnerabilities were defined. |
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Keywords: | Industrial control system programmable logic controller cybersecurity network protocol vulnerability |
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